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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that Lucretius employs five coherent groups of imagery in his De Rerum 
Natura to explain the fundamental laws and processes of his materialist philosophy. These 
groups, embedded in human experience, guide Lucretius’ reader through the difficult, and at 
times unpalatable, doctrines of Epicureanism. Inspired by Lucretius’ weaving metaphors for 
argumentation, and the way in which these groups of imagery intertwine to form the 
expository fabric of the DRN, I have labelled them ‘conceptual threads’. 
 Part 1 applies this framework to the Book 1 prologue, and creates new readings for 
several key passages (not least the hymn to Venus), while enhancing the coherence of the 
prologue as a whole. Lucretius introduces the conceptual threads prominently here, to 
ensure his reader comprehends them before they are expanded throughout the DRN. 
 From this foundation, Part 2 individually maps the development and principal 
applications of each thread, and explores how Lucretius applies each consistently to depict a 
fundamental law or process, and the more specific laws and processes relying on these. The 
broad variety of contexts in which the threads occur emphasises that the fundamental tenets 
of Lucretius’ philosophy are universal. 
 Part 3 considers how the threads intertwine to express more complex theories, and 
uncovers deeper meaning in Lucretius’ most important doctrines – of creation, the soul, 
sensation, cosmology and ethics. To comprehend these, the reader must employ their 
understanding of the individual threads as they have been consistently developed in the epic, 
and often apply new knowledge retrospectively to gain deeper understanding of earlier 
theories. 
 The Epilogue considers how the conceptual threads depict Lucretius’ methodology of 
composition, and how they enhance the consolatory aspects of the DRN, especially in the 
doctrine that ‘death is nothing to us’ in Book 3, and the harrowing plague scene at the end of 
Book 6.  
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Introduction 
 
The status quaestionis 
This thesis considers how persistent, coherent patterns of imagery explain the fundamental 
laws and processes of Lucretius’ science and philosophy. It will show how these patterns, 
taken from human experience, serve to guide the reader through the difficult, and at times 
unpalatable, doctrines of Epicureanism. Frequently they take the form of metaphors 
explaining scientific realities, but often they are employed literally, which in turn strengthens 
their metaphorical application. Inspired by Lucretius’ weaving metaphors for argumentation, 
and the complex web these images form, I have labelled them ‘conceptual threads’. This term 
expresses how they develop and intertwine as the epic progresses. 
 
The present work builds on existing scholarship which has established the importance of 
imagery to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura (DRN) and its interpretation, but the coherence of the 
patterns of imagery across the whole poem has not hitherto been appreciated. In 1949 Stella 
Pope wrote as follows: 
 
‘It is possible that some of the problems in Lucretius will be resolved by 
a consideration of his imagery in its richness and variety, the reality 
which it gives to theoretic processes, and the clarity with which 
abstractions are realized. In this may lie the explanation of the 
passionate invocation to Venus at the outset of the poem attacking 
orthodox religion, and the emotional fervour which pervades Lucretius’ 
exposition of his scientific philosophy. Certainly when one has tried to 
understand his imagery the rigid cleavage which some have seen 
between scientific and poetic parts of the De Rerum Natura no longer 
seems to exist.’1 
 
Pope’s approach to unpacking Lucretius’ imagery is pertinent and convincing, yet, being 
restricted to a ten-page paper, it provides only a cursory analysis of a handful of recurrent 
metaphors.2 A full treatment did not appear until 20 years later. In 1969 the first monograph 
on Lucretian imagery was published: David West’s seminal The Imagery and Poetry of 
                                                          
1
 Pope (1949) 79. The concluding line of Pope’s observation in fact recalls Hohler (1926) 282, who 
describes Lucretius’ similes as ‘a peculiar harmonizing of the poetical and scientific imagination, which 
causes the fortuitous elegance and the vividness of his illustrations of the familiar by the familiar, the 
unseen by the seen, to be felt by the reader as proofs rather than as mere decorative imagery.’ 
2
 Light/dark vs birth/death; movement; water/rivers; feeding; weaving; building; the leges and 
concilium of atomic union. 
7 
 
Lucretius.3 In this book, which is obviously the starting point for anyone else undertaking 
research in this area, West tackles the apparent contradiction of setting forth Epicurean 
doctrine in verse, arguing convincingly that, far from being a mere adornment, Lucretius’ 
poetry is central to his argument. West investigates short passages in depth to explain how 
images, many previously overlooked, strengthen the concurrent arguments. He argues, with 
typical forthright fervour, that a failure to translate Lucretius’ rich images is by turns 
‘destructive’, ‘monstrous’, even ‘murder’.4 Inflammatory language aside, it is difficult to 
disagree that we are doing Lucretius a great disservice by misunderstanding his imagery and, 
in turn, his scientific argument.  
 Since then there have been some briefer studies of Lucretius’ use of particular 
imagery to explain certain scientific theories. Snyder (1983) briefly addresses the weaving 
metaphors used to describe Lucretius’ atoms and his poetic composition. Cabisius (1984) 
considers the socio-political metaphors for atomic union.5 Mayer (1990) discusses military 
imagery principally as a kind of stamp of the heroic epic form on the DRN. Gale (1994), 
although mainly concerned with Lucretius’ use of science to debunk myth, also considers 
various images at length, in particular those of Venus and voluptas. Gale (2000), ch. 7, 
building on Mayer’s work, addresses Lucretius’ military imagery and its reception in Virgil’s 
Georgics. A brief chapter in Clay (1998) focuses not on the types of metaphors employed by 
Lucretius, but rather his techniques and inspirations for them.6 The commentaries provide 
further insight into Lucretian metaphor, in particular P. M. Brown (1984) and (1997), D. 
Fowler (2002) and Gale (2009). 
 The most comprehensive approach to recurrent imagery in Lucretius so far is Garani 
(2007), who makes significant progress in the understanding of this topic. She spots and 
unpacks several previously overlooked recurrent images, and offers an insightful 
interpretation of Lucretius’ use of arguments by analogy. However, Garani’s principal 
concern is with drawing comparisons with Empedocles, which narrows the field of images 
                                                          
3
 Perhaps most surprisingly, it seems West had not read, or at least was unaware of, Pope’s article. 
Rather, he refers to the earlier article by Davies (1931). 
4
 We might see something of Lucretius’ self-assurance in West’s assertions. These all occur in one page 
of the opening chapter; West (1969) 3. 
5
 See also Fowler (1989); Garani (2007) 47-69, which incorporates sexual and military metaphors 
applied to atoms into a ‘web of human relationships’. 
6
 pp.161-73. Namely ‘confusion’ (applying to the vehicle terms appropriate to the tenor, and vice 
versa), ‘contamination’ (applying human attributes to atoms) and ‘translatio’ (the appropriation of 
metaphors from Greek philosophy). The first two recall West’s ‘transfusion of terms’ (1969, pp.43-8), 
which involves, in an analogy or comparison, the application to a target domain of a word or group of 
words usually only relevant to its source domain. For example, 1.271-97, in which fluunt (280), 
relevant to rivers (the source domain), is applied to winds (the target domain). 
8 
 
considered,7 and also limits analysis of Lucretius’ overall strategy of argumentation through 
imagery, or how certain images are introduced and developed throughout the epic.8  
 
Metaphor theory 
Twentieth-century metaphor studies are relevant to my interpretation of Lucretius’ imagery, 
in particular the theory of the experiential basis of metaphor, advanced by Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980), since Lucretius’ conceptual gestalts are deeply rooted in human experience.9 
This theory explains metaphor as deeply embedded in human experience, enabling us to 
express and understand complex concepts. Creating a metaphor involves ‘mapping’ one or 
more concepts onto another concept, frequently with multiple correspondences over many 
levels. The experiential basis of these metaphors greatly enhances our understanding of 
complex concepts. In some cases, we comprehend a complex concept more easily by 
considering the whole concept, known as a ‘gestalt’, rather than one or more of its parts.10 
Again, in some cases we understand the individual parts of one complex concept by the 
individual parts of another, and also the complex concept by the other as a whole. Lakoff and 
Johnson, since they consider metaphor as experiential, label the mapped concept in a multi-
dimensional correspondence an ‘experiential gestalt’, i.e. a conceptual whole born out of 
human experience.11 Sometimes more than one ‘experiential gestalt’ can be applied either 
separately or simultaneously to the same broad concept, depending on which qualities of the 
concept we wish to emphasise.12 These gestalt metaphors (only a small part of Lakoff and 
                                                          
7
 ‘The focus will be on four major metaphorical fields that seem to dominate Lucretius’ poem and best 
underscore the intertextual relationship between himself and Empedocles’; Garani (2007) 155. 
8
 I have been unable to consult Barnaby Taylor’s as yet unpublished doctoral thesis, Word and Object 
in Lucretius: Epicurean Linguistics in Theory and Practice (2013), Ch. 3 of which is on conceptual 
metaphor in Lucretius. 
9
 They have also expanded their theory fruitfully into other areas, including literary criticism (Lakoff & 
Turner (1989)), philosophy (Lakoff & Johnson (1999)) and politics (Lakoff (1996)).  
10
 Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 69-76. According to the Neural Theory of Language (NLT), the way the brain 
is wired explains why gestalts are easily formed and comprehended; for NLT, see Feldman (2006) and 
a summary in Lakoff (2008). 
11
 They give the example of understanding a particular conversation as being an argument. We can do 
this through the metaphor ‘argument is war’. By understanding individual elements of a conversation 
as being like individual elements of war (e.g. defence, attack, manoeuvring, retreating etc.), and by 
applying the ‘experiential gestalt’ of war to the conversation, we can comprehend that conversation as 
being an argument; Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 79-86. 
12
 For example, we comprehend the concept of love sometimes as ‘a journey’, or ‘war’, or ‘a physical 
object’, or ‘madness’ etc. Each explains one of many aspects of the same concept; Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980) 108. 
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Johnson’s wide-ranging theory), and their explanatory function, form the basis of my reading 
of Lucretius’ use of metaphor in the DRN.13  
 Lakoff and Johnson’s gestalt metaphor theory is relevant to Lucretius, because he 
maps multi-correspondence metaphors onto complex concepts, and constituent parts of 
metaphors onto corresponding parts of the same concepts. Furthermore, as in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s theory, Lucretius frequently employs multiple, apparently conflicting metaphors 
concurrently to explain different elements of complex concepts. By considering Lakoff and 
Johnson’s model in the scientific and philosophical context of the DRN, we find that 
Lucretius’ employment of metaphor is a necessary element of his scientific exposition, 
enhancing understanding of otherwise arcane concepts.14 By considering the explanatory 
purpose of Lucretius’ metaphors, we can extract special relevance from his choice and 
employment of them, and their efficacy.  
 Lucretius’ metaphors fulfil the three ‘functions of metaphor in actual literary usage’ 
outlined by Silk (2003). This theory focuses not on the basis of metaphor in linguistics, but on 
its application in literature, which is relevant to this thesis. The three ‘functions’ are: to make 
clearer, like a diagram; to make immediate to the senses; and to exploit associations and 
disassociations between two things or concepts.15 The first of these is the primary 
methodology behind Lucretius’ use of metaphor: to help his reader understand his science.16 
It is evident both in stand-alone metaphors, similes or analogies (both brief and extended), 
and in his persistent gestalt metaphors. The second encapsulates Lucretius’ intention to 
shine light on the dark discoveries of the Greeks, to make visible the atomic processes 
                                                          
13
 Other aspects of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, such as ‘orientational’ and ‘ontological’ metaphors, 
which primarily relate to how the very basis of linguistic expression is formed from our interaction 
with the world (for example how prepositions are used – one can be ‘in’ a race, a relationship or a bad 
mood, because these are all conceived as containers) are less relevant to this thesis. Conceptual 
metaphor theory has only recently been applied to classical language and literature, and this thesis 
contributes to the expansion of research in this area. Pender (2000) and Garani (2007) – concerned 
with the explanatory role of metaphor in Plato, and Lucretius and Empedocles respectively – relate 
their studies to Lakoff and Johnson (Garani more extensively so). Latin linguistic studies of conceptual 
metaphor include Sjöblad (2009) (on Lakoffian metaphor in Cicero’s De Senectute); Fedriani (2011) and 
(2014) (on the experiential basis for linguistic expressions). Such research contributes more broadly to 
the discussion of the extent to which conceptual metaphor theory applies cross-culturally; for which 
see especially Kövecses (2005). 
14
 Martin & Harré (1982) 89: ‘We need to use metaphor to say what we mean – since in the course 
both of literary composition and scientific theorizing we can conceive of more than we can currently 
say.’ 
15
 Silk (2003) 126-8. 
16
 Silk (2003) 127-8 notes that this function of metaphor is common in science and philosophy, offering 
Lucretius’ analogy between human speech and animal communication (5.1056-90) as an example. 
10 
 
underlying all things (1.136-45).17 The third in particular links apparently disparate concepts 
together by the shared processes underlying them (which are themselves often expressed 
with metaphors). This explanatory approach will be considered shortly.  
 Lucretius employs each of these functions for different explanatory purposes 
throughout the DRN. He exploits the power of metaphors, particularly those rooted in 
commonly understood concepts from human understanding and experience, to explain 
complex scientific processes – predominantly at an atomic level. This thesis will investigate 
specifically how Lucretius employs five complex metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson’s 
‘experiential gestalts’) consistently to explain the central tenets of the cornerstone of his 
philosophy – his materialist scientific doctrine18 – namely: atomic attraction and the swerve; 
the atomic birth-death cycle; atomic compound structure; void and atomic movement; and 
finiteness and infinity. For each of these concepts, Lucretius establishes an ‘experiential 
gestalt’ (incorporating multiple constituent metaphorical correspondences), that persists and 
expands throughout the epic. These gestalts are, respective to the above scientific tenets, 
PLEASURE, LIFE-CYCLE, WEAVING, LIQUIDS, and BOUNDARIES.19  
 By explaining such key doctrines, these metaphors occupy a special position in 
Lucretius’ exposition. They are not the only persistent metaphors in the DRN, but others 
either lack explanatory force (the first of Silk’s ‘functions’) or do not consistently explain just 
one central tenet of Lucretius’ philosophy. For example, social metaphors can depict atomic 
union as an ‘assembly’ of bodies, but do not adequately explain the reasons for their union, 
or the resulting birth and growth of composite bodies.20 The metaphor has scarcely more 
functional value than any image expressing ‘coming together’ (and indeed when Lucretius 
depicts ‘coming together’ social intercourse does not always come to mind). Similarly, 
                                                          
17
 For Lucretius explaining the unseen by the seen, see Schrijvers (1977); Snyder (1983); Hardie (1986) 
219-23; Schiesaro (1990); Garani (2007) 182; Lehoux (2013). 
18
 Consistency denied of Lucretius’ metaphors by Anderson (1960) and Amory (1969). 
19
 These can be seen as root metaphors (Pepper (1942)), which are fundamental to Lucretius’ scientific 
and philosophical worldview, and without which the worldview itself would be incoherent or, at best, 
lack sufficient epistemological support. Schrijvers (1977) applies Pepper’s approach to Lucretius, 
particularly in relation to biological root-metaphors, the Earth-mother analogy and his various 
analogical representations of the soul. See also Schiesaro (1990) 72-87. 
20
 For example, Cabisius (1984) 112 and Garani (2007) 66-7 read a social metaphor in a depiction of the 
spontaneous creation of earthworms in the soil: quia corpora materiai / antiquis ex ordinibus permota 
nova re / conciliantur ita ut debent animalia gigni (2.899-901). It is something of a stretch to take ordo 
in its sense of ‘social classes’ here, and similarly to consider nova res as signifying ‘revolution’ 
(Cabisius’ translation). Although these words can carry this meaning, the purpose of a social metaphor 
in explaining re-creation from atoms is unclear. It would not especially clarify Lucretius’ argument for 
the reader, and indeed giving atoms the power of (political) revolution would contradict Lucretius’ 
enthusiastic denial that atoms are sentient (1.919-20; 2.973-900). When advancing interpretations of 
metaphors in Lucretius’ scientific explanations, it is important to consider whether they support his 
science and aid the reader’s understanding of it. 
11 
 
military metaphors, although consistently depicting the ‘violent conflict’ of atomic collisions, 
provide a visual image, rather than an explanation of the underlying forces at work.21 Both 
metaphors prove problematic beyond a superficial level. For example, social structure entails 
superiority and inferiority of classes, but the same cannot be said of atomic varieties; and 
aspects of war, such as military ranks or conquering an enemy have no relevance to atoms. 
They are occasionally pertinent motifs, rather than persistent explanatory gestalts. 
 Hitherto no single scholarly examination of Lucretian metaphor has considered in 
depth its role in explaining the principal laws and processes of Lucretius’ science. My analysis 
will explore the five metaphors specifically on their scientific merits. By examining five key 
metaphors for five key scientific concepts, I shall highlight the strict method in Lucretius’ 
metaphor. Special consideration will be given to why each metaphor was chosen to depict 
each concept, and how Lucretius introduces them to his reader, purposefully and clearly 
mapping them out, especially in the prologue.22  
 
Lucretius’ gestalts 
Lucretius’ gestalts consist of recurrent terminology imbued with metaphorical meaning. The 
definitions of these terms are frequently derived not from the words’ generally accepted or 
common usages (κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν – Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 67; κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φοράν 
– Ep. Hdt. 70),23 but from root meanings – which risks obscuring the clarity of his argument. 
Therefore, following Epicurus’ assertion that it is necessary to grasp the meanings of words 
(or the ideas attached to them, τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις – Ep. Hdt. 37),24 and 
specifically the ‘first concept’ (τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα – Ep. Hdt. 38)25 associated with them, to 
ensure full clarity of meaning,26 Lucretius establishes his own ‘first meaning’ for his terms by 
                                                          
21
 This may explain why the treatment of Lucretius’ military imagery by Mayer (1990) and Gale (2000) 
232-69 focuses in particular on its roots in the epic genre. Gale also notes its application in Lucretius’ 
moral philosophy, highlighting the paradox that ‘it is necessary to become aware of and to accept the 
random and violent nature of the physical world in order to escape the randomness and violence of 
(unenlightened) human life.’ (ibid. 240).  
22
 In Epicurean empiricism, the mind receives images only if it focuses on them (= prolepsis). Schrijvers 
(1970) argues that Lucretius’ explanatory approach adheres to this concept, as he urges his reader to 
focus on and see his proofs, and supports this with subsequent visual exempla. The early 
establishment of the threads focuses the reader’s mind on them, and their later recurrence activates 
the reader’s understanding of them. 
23
 The exact meaning of these phrases is obscured by the broad range of meanings of ὁμιλία (‘usage’, 
‘practice’, also ‘society’) and φορά (‘something brought forth’, ‘a tendency’).  
24
 Asmis (1984) 20: ‘what is subordinate to the utterances’. 
25
 Asmis’ translation (1984, p.20); Bailey (1926) suggests ‘first mental image’. 
26
 The argument that inaccurate language is an obstacle to understanding is echoed by John Locke 
(1632-1704) and John Wilkins (1641-72). Wilkins even created a new written language called ‘real 
character’, based on his conviction that ‘in a Philosophical language, every word ought in strictness to 
have but one proper sense and acception, to prevent equivocalness.’ Wilkins (1668) 318. 
12 
 
introducing them in contexts activating and confirming their intended meaning (usually 
involving collocations with other terms from the same conceptual field).27 This will be evident 
in the introduction of, among other words, natura (1.21, 25), primordia (1.55) and materies 
(1.58) – considered in Part 1. By introducing his terms in this way, Lucretius concentrates the 
reader’s mind on the metaphor, preparing them to recall their metaphorical meanings 
throughout the poem,28 to gain deeper understanding of his science. To support this, several 
techniques can be employed to ascertain intended metaphorical meanings in Lucretius’ 
terminology, principally extratextual comparisons, etymology or internal usages. These 
techniques have contributed to the translations of Lucretius within this thesis, which are all 
my own.29 
 So far the focus has been on metaphor, but Lucretius’ five gestalts are also frequently 
employed literally in his scientific explanations – for example LIFE-CYCLE depicting the birth of 
animals, and LIQUIDS portraying flowing water. Therefore, they are more broadly ‘thematic’ or 
‘conceptual’ gestalts, rather than solely metaphorical. This is an important aspect, since often 
literal applications of these ‘conceptual gestalts’ inform metaphorical applications and vice 
versa, in a reciprocal relationship. The reader’s understanding of key theories is enhanced by 
a two-fold, complementary metaphorical and literal approach. The five gestalts considered in 
this thesis vary in the extent to which they are employed metaphorically or literally, as Parts 
2 and 3 in particular will make clear. 
 Since these complex metaphors run throughout the epic and intertwine to form an 
intricate web of scientific explanation, I have named them ‘threads’. This label embodies the 
concept of a gestalt, because each ‘thread’ corresponds to a whole scientific concept, while 
its individual parts, or ‘strands’, correspond to elements of that scientific concept. It is also 
extracted from Lucretius’ own portrayal of his poetic composition (1.50-55), which will be 
considered in detail in Part 1. In the lines immediately following this passage, Lucretius 
introduces his atomic vocabulary, expressed partly by a weaving metaphor (beginning with 
primordia – 1.55), thus setting strands of metaphorical explanation on his loom of 
discourse.30 From this early expression of intent the reader is primed to notice explanatory 
                                                          
27
 Lucretius’ approach differs from Empedocles’, who apologises for his use of metaphor: †ἣ θέμις† 
καλέουσι, νόμῳ δ’ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός (B9.5); see Garani (2007) 153-4. 
28
 This fulfils the role of a prolepsis – a preparation for receiving a sensation, crucial to the Epicurean 
theory of sensory perception. Schrijvers (1970) 140-7 argues that Lucretius present his images in this 
way. 
29
 Translations of other authors are also my own, unless otherwise stated. 
30
 Weaving is a common metaphor in poetic composition, and rhetoric (e.g. the filum orationis, Cic. De 
or. 3.26.103; Amic. 7.25). Scholars aptly use weaving metaphors to describe Lucretius’ intricate 
composition: his persistent metaphor of a journey towards philosophical enlightenment ‘est le fil qui 
13 
 
threads running throughout the poem. Furthermore, Lucretius’ depiction of atoms and his 
methodology in the same (weaving) terms is appropriate, since materialism is the heart of 
Lucretius’ worldview, and thus poetic composition.31  
 The threads support Epicurean methods of scientific enquiry and explanation. To 
explain an occurrence accurately, reasoning (ratio) must be applied to the sensory evidence 
we receive. Sensory evidence itself is unimpeachable, but can be interpreted falsely by 
incorrect ratio (4.462-521).32 Among the tools for correct ratio are the conceptual threads, 
since they are used to express the fundamental theories of Lucretius’ science. A closely 
related tool is analogy,33 which elucidates unexplained phenomena by comparison with 
occurrences that have been explained.34 The threads work in the same way, but obviate the 
need for an explicit analogy. Instead connections are made by terminology from the threads, 
which concisely highlights the processes shared between occurrences. By this method, the 
processes underlying things are ‘universalised’ – i.e. shown to have universal power.35 A 
closely related method of enquiry is the use of multiple possible explanations for a given 
phenomenon,36 provided each explanation works within the boundaries of established laws – 
or within the applications of the threads. 
 By these techniques processes at all levels from the micro- to the macroscopic are 
compared both within their own level and with others across levels. Within this universalising 
structure, Lucretius also employs specific analogies by which a microscopic process is 
represented by a macroscopic process, which the same microscopic process causes internally 
– creating a kind of ‘internalised analogy’. Each of these techniques is appropriate to 
Lucretius’ scientific worldview: as Hardie remarks, for Lucretius ‘the structure of things is 
homogenous at all levels’.37 This homogeneity is embodied in no small part by Lucretius’ 
                                                                                                                                                                       
les relie l’une à l’autre’ – Schrijvers (1970) 19; ‘punning, poetry, and philosophy form interwoven 
threads in the fabric of Lucretius’ epic’ – Snyder (1980) 144.  
31
 Schiesaro (1994) 87 argues that, since all is body and void to Lucretius, he can make no analogy that 
does not entail atomic causation at its heart.  
32
 Asmis (1984) 141-66. 
33
 See Hardie (1986) 221-3. 
34
 Philodemus argues that inference by similarity is as strong a scientific method as denying the 
opposite of a proposition (de Signis cols. 11.32-12.31 de Lacy (pp.48-50)). Lucretius employs the 
former method throughout the DRN, but, contrary to Philodemus’ recommendation (col. 18.17-20 de 
Lacy (p.64)), also compares things that are not obviously closely connected. See also Asmis (1984) 197-
211; Schiesaro (1990); Setaioli (2005). 
35
 Described by Leen (1984) 108 as Lucretius’ ability ‘to see sameness in very different things’. This 
ability is well represented by his conceptual threads, both in the metaphors they draw, and in their 
contribution to universalisation through shared metaphor and analogy. 
36
 Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 78-80, Ep. Pyth. 85-7; Asmis (1984) 321-30; Hankinson (2013). 
37
 Hardie (1986) 220.  
14 
 
conceptual threads. My investigation will shed new light on Lucretius’ careful development 
of explanations throughout the DRN. 
 
The reader 
The success of Lucretius’ didactic approach relies firmly on the reader. Lucretius sets his 
reader on a journey, on which they should be able to develop from uninitiated novices to 
skilled Epicurean scientific enquirers.38 They must pay attention and apply ratio to the 
evidence Lucretius provides, and, informed by what they have learnt, seek further proofs for 
themselves. Lucretius directs them along the correct route, not just by signposted digressions 
on methodologies of scientific enquiry, argumentation, and comprehension, but by the 
threads themselves. The reader’s understanding of the threads and how they develop 
(because they represent the fundamental laws and processes of Lucretius’ science) enables 
them to become adept at interpreting sensory evidence correctly – especially because the 
threads provide sensory evidence for the reader in the form of pictorial exempla and 
imagery, which serve as representations of imperceptible scientific processes.39 Thus the 
reader becomes able not just to understand, but also to make the analogies that are central 
to Epicurean empiricism. 
 Lucretius is likely to have had several types of reader in mind, including those broadly 
interested in philosophy, those hostile to Epicureanism (Cicero falls into both groups),40 
staunch Epicureans and potentially complete novices. He balances friendly teaching, for his 
devotees of Epicurean study,41 with ‘didactic coercion’,42 for his novices who must be cajoled 
into applying themselves to their learning. This is exemplified in 1.398-417: on the one hand 
(398-409) the reader must use Lucretius’ proofs to pursue further ones for themselves, like 
hounds pursuing prey by tracking ‘certain traces’ (406) left behind;43 on the other (410-17), 
Lucretius will provide so many proofs that he fears death may strike before they run out. The 
novice reader may be represented by Memmius (to whom 1.410-17 are addressed), or find 
                                                          
38
 Lucretius frequently applies the ‘understanding is a journey’ metaphor in the DRN (e.g. 1.72-4, 659, 
1114-7; 2.740). 
39
 Lehoux (2013) notes that trained perception marks the balance between the Epicurean insistence on 
relying on sensory evidence, and acknowledgement of frequent misinterpretation of evidence (this 
being caused only by the untrained mind).  
40
 We know from a famous letter to his brother that he read and admired Lucreti poemata (Q Fr. 
2.10.3), despite criticising Epicurean doctrine elsewhere. 
41
 Certainly he does not assume ignorance from the start of the epic; Keen (1985). 
42
 Mitsis (1993). 
43
 Giving the reader ‘a certain degree of autonomy’; Schiesaro (2007) 66. 
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comfort in Memmius’ apparent confusion at Epicurean doctrine.44 In fact the novice, upon re-
reading the epic, may become an initiate (or at least come close) – and consideration will be 
given to the effect the conceptual threads have on the returning reader.45 This thesis will 
focus on the willing participant – the ‘keen reader’, happy to apply themselves to learning 
and to be guided by hand to enlightenment, since this reader would benefit most from the 
full range of applications of the conceptual threads (although the reader who only notices 
some aspects will still benefit to an extent). Less importance will be placed on Memmius,46 
because even if the DRN is principally intended to guide him towards Epicurean 
enlightenment, he represents only one type of reader.47  
 
Thesis outline 
The order of exposition of this thesis draws attention to the introduction and subsequent 
expansion of the threads. It follows Lucretius by addressing each thread’s basic applications – 
usually at an atomic level – before considering their depiction of more complex, or 
macroscopic, concepts. The resulting approach is broadly linear across the three parts as a 
whole, but thematic as the threads and their applications are considered in turn. Part 1 
considers the Book 1 prologue, in which the threads are introduced. This passage, 
incorporating the notoriously problematic address to Venus,48 also serves as a test case for 
the conceptual threads theory. The reading proposed here brings coherence to the prologue 
as a whole, advances solutions to the many difficulties in the Venus passage, and reveals that 
Lucretius constructs his atomic vocabulary (introduced in 1.50-61) from the LIFE-CYCLE and 
WEAVING threads. Part 2 pursues the five conceptual threads individually through the first 
arguments and beyond, outlining their principal facets and consistent application. Then Part 
3 considers how the threads are interwoven to explain more complex concepts.49 Here we 
shall see the importance of the threads in depicting the principal elements of Epicurean 
doctrine, including: the perpetual cycle of creation and destruction; sensation; the mortality 
                                                          
44
 The reader, faced with Memmius’ apparent ignorance, may more readily accept Lucretius’ coercive 
approach; Mitsis (1993) 125-6. 
45
 See Solomon (2004) on this concept. 
46
 For various views on which Memmius is addressed, see Mussehl (1912); Boyancé (1950); Townend 
(1978); Smith (1992) xlvi-xlix. 
47
 Indeed Volk (2002) 74 considers Memmius not to be a reader at all, but ‘an intra-textual character’, 
as part of a ‘teacher-student constellation typical of didactic poetry’, separate from the extra-textual 
interaction between Lucretius and his readership (p.82). 
48
 Problematic no less in its textual difficulties than in its content. Here, and throughout this thesis, 
Smith’s 1992 revised version of Rouse’s Loeb text (originally published 1924) is followed, with minor 
amendments noted in situ. 
49
 Pender (2000) 118-48 considers Plato’s employment of multiple metaphors for explaining key 
concepts. 
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of the body and soul; and the limits of pleasure. The Epilogue will consider the threads’ role 
in fulfilling the principal moral aim of the epic – to free the reader from fear – in particular in 
relation to emotion, religio and the devastating plague scene at the end of Book 6. 
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Part 1 
 
Setting the Threads on the Loom: Metaphor in Lucretius’ Prologue 
 
Addressing how Lucretius introduces key concepts and metaphors in the DRN causes 
difficulties, since the prologue (1.1-148) is the most disputed and complex passage in the 
epic.50 It seems clear that – as a prologue should – it introduces the whole poem, since its 
themes recur (albeit to varying extents) across the six books.51 Lucretius introduces the 
following key themes: creation; peace; the gods’ detachment from human affairs; atoms; 
religio; Epicurus; the fear of death; celestial bodies; the soul and mind; the task of 
composition; and the dispelling of fear by Naturae species ratioque. Broad content aside, 
several issues remain – especially with the Venus passage, including: the invocation of a 
goddess in an Epicurean poem; the sharp shift between this and the subsequent assertion 
that the Gods live detached from human affairs; the relevance and meaning of the Venus-
Mars scene; the apparent metamorphosis of Venus into Nature from 1.56 onwards; and the 
relevance of the Venus passage to the rest of the prologue. 
 Various solutions to these issues have been suggested, including: the division of the 
prologue into static and kinetic pleasure, represented by Venus52; correspondences drawn 
with Empedocles’ Love and Strife;53 Asmis’ comparing Lucretius’ Venus and the Stoic Zeus;54 
highlighting the importance of natura (translating Greek φύσις);55 and Lucretius’ apparent 
remodelling of Venus to Epicurean ideas of the goddess from 1.45 onwards.56 Each approach 
has its merits, but difficulties remain. Several of these can be explained by a close reading of 
metaphor, and its bedfellow metonymy – a reading that also bears fruit in the analysis of the 
rest of the prologue. Furthermore, just as the prologue introduces the key themes of the 
                                                          
50
 I will primarily address apparent contradictions in content, rather than any textual difficulties, which 
have at any rate been extensively debated. For summaries of the main difficulties and potential 
solutions, see Regenbogen (1932); Friedländer (1939); Bignone (1945) 136-44; Bailey (1947) 585-88 
and ad 44-9.  
51
 As asserted by Bailey (1947) 587; Leonard & Smith (1942); Brown (1984) 41. Lienhard (1969) 349 
goes as far as to say: ‘it is clearly a comprehensive introduction to the whole poem’. In contrast, Cox 
(1971) 1 asserts that 1.1-49 is a prologue to the whole epic, and 1.50-148 to Book 1 alone.  
52
 Bignone (1945) 437-44, adapted by Elder (1954). Bailey (1947) 1749-50 argues Bignone’s 
interpretation solves the problem of lines 44-9. 
53
 Furley (1970); Gale (1994) 50-75; Sedley (1998a) 1-34; Garani (2007) 34-43. 
54
 Asmis (1982). 
55
 Clay (1983) 82-95. 
56
 Solomon (2004). 
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DRN, so it introduces the principal metaphors of the work.57 By highlighting these 
metaphorical correspondences, the prologue, far from being a standalone passage clothed in 
enigma, will be inextricably tied to the first arguments and far beyond. 
  
Lucretius’ Venus and the conceptual thread of PLEASURE 
The opening lines are a good place to start: 
 
Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas,  
alma Venus, caeli subter labentia signa 
quae mare navigerum, quae terras frugiferentis 
concelebras, per te quoniam genus omne animantum 
concipitur visitque exortum lumina solis […]  5 
       (1.1-5) 
Mother of the offspring of Aeneas, pleasure of man and the gods, 
nurturing Venus, you who beneath the gliding heavenly constellations 
fill the ship-bearing sea and the fruitful earth, since by you every kind 
of living thing is conceived and, having sprung to life, looks on the light 
of the sun […] 
 
The rich imagery of birth makes the primary focus of this passage clear, but Venus in these 
lines is immediately complex, playing three roles: to the Romans (in conventional religion), a 
mother; to men and gods, pleasure;58 to all living things, sex. The first suggests this will be a 
standard prayer to a goddess, while the second contrastingly hints at the Epicurean 
remodelling of Venus in the poem itself. The second two, meanwhile, depict different 
qualities possessed by Venus. She represents a life-giving and life-sustaining force (suggested 
by alma) that causes the conception of all living things (4-5), but she is also voluptas 
(‘pleasure’), expressed by apposition. Thus we can read Venus as synonymous with, or 
metonymy for, voluptas59, essentially creating an abstract compound ‘Venus-voluptas’.60 
When Venus fills the land and sea (concelebras, in this context strikingly suggesting 
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 Gale (1997) 64 similarly considers the prominent introduction of ‘systems of imagery’, namely the 
Nature-Venus personification, atomic seeds, Epicurus the warrior, and light and darkness. 
58
 The phrase hominum divomque voluptas recalls Homer (πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε – Il. 1.544) and 
Ennius (patrem divum hominumque – Ann. fr.448; divumque hominumque pater – Ann. fr.449, both 
War.); Brown (1984) ad loc. If the echo is intentional, Lucretius’ purposely replaces pater with voluptas 
rather than mater – thus distancing Venus further from the role of birth, traditional in Roman religion. 
59
 Bignone (1945); Boyancé (1962). 
60
 Bignone (1945) 437-44 argues pleasure in this passage represents the Epicurean division of ‘kinetic’ 
(here = ‘sexual’) and ‘static’ pleasure (1.1-23, 1.24-49 respectively). Elder (1954), however, notes that 
there is static pleasure in the light image of 1.8-9 and kinetic pleasure in the Venus-Mars tableau 
(1.29-40); Asmis (1982) 467-8 is similarly sceptical. At any rate, it is disputed whether Epicureans did 
mark this division; see discussion in Glidden (1980) 189-90; Gosling & Taylor (1982) 365-96; Nikolsky 
(2001). 
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insemination),61 pleasure fills them too. As we shall see later, this compound concept allows 
Lucretius to associate with pleasure certain roles not normally associated with it, which 
Venus performs in the prologue. 
 Some roles, however, are directly associated with pleasure: 
 
         […] tibi suavis daedala tellus 
summittit flores, tibi rident aequora ponti 
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum. 
       (1.7-9) 
[…] for you the skilful earth puts forth sweet flowers, for you the 
expanses of the sea laugh, and the sky, soothed, shines with outpoured 
light.62 
 
The delightful, abundant image captures the pleasure brought by Venus’ arrival,63 and now 
Venus represents not just voluptas (1.1), but also the cause of voluptas. The universalising 
triplet64 earth-sea-sky emphasises the scope of Venus’ pleasurable power, and this is picked 
up shortly after: 
 
[…] aeriae primum volucres te, diva, tuumque 
significant initum perculsae corda tua vi. 
inde ferae, pecudes persultant pabula laeta 
et rapidos tranant amnis: ita capta lepore  15 
te sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis. 
       (1.12-6) 
[…] first the birds of the air signal you, goddess, and your initiation, 
struck to the heart by your power. Then the wild beasts, and the 
livestock dance over flourishing pastures and swim across strong-
flowing rivers: so eagerly each, seized by your charm, follows you to 
where you proceed to lead them. 
 
Another pleasant image represents Venus’ threefold power (birds, wild beasts, domesticated 
animals),65 and extends it from inanimate to animate beings, from the macro to the micro 
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 Suggested to me by David West. 
62
 For the liquids metaphor here, see p.93. 
63
 I am unconvinced by the allegory, advanced by Hahn (1941) and upheld by Gale (1994) 217-9, of 
Venus with spring. Rather, spring is the archetypal time when Venus’ power is most evident, being 
synonymous with pleasure, beauty and procreation. Thus Venus arrives alongside spring in 5.737-8 (it 
Ver et Venus, et Veneris praenuntius ante / pennatus [= Cupid] graditur). 
64
 Three parts listed, standing together for a whole; compare the universalising doublet ‘heaven and 
Earth’ (i.e. ‘the world’). 
65
 It seems most likely a distinction is meant between ferae and pecudes, whether in a slightly loose 
asyndeton bimembre (with a comma in between the two, as printed by Smith (1992)), or with 
Bentley’s emendation ferae et pecudes, supported by Kollmann (1974). Either way, we can read a 
tripartite list echoing others in the prologue. Furthermore, farm animals are a typical Lucretian image 
(e.g. lambs – 1.257-61; sheep – 2.317-22; calves, goats and sheep – 2.349-70).  
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level. Lucretius also gives Venus the power of lepos (‘charm’), denoting the pleasure she 
brings. This charm instils desire in the animals by striking (perculsae) – emphasising Venus’ 
power (vi) and suggesting a propelling force causing the animals’ movement. This power has 
both persuasive (hinted at by inducere)66 and sexual (cupide) connotations, and by it Venus 
leads the animals to procreate, as voluptas leads men in 2.172.67 The animals desire to pursue 
Venus and pleasure – strengthening the reading of Venus as metonymy for voluptas.  
 Lucretius then expands upon Venus’ power of sexual persuasion: 
 
denique, per maria ac montis fluviosque rapacis 
frondiferasque domos avium camposque virentis, 
omnibus incutiens blandum per pectora amorem, 
efficis ut cupide generatim saecla propagent.  20 
       (1.17-20) 
And lastly, over the seas and mountains and rapacious rivers, and the 
leaf-bearing homes of birds, and verdant fields, striking seductive love 
into all through the breast, you make them eagerly beget generations 
according to kind. 
 
Venus causes sexual desire in all animate beings, across the domains of sea, land and sky 
(another universalising triplet). Again she is persuasive (blandum) and again she causes 
animals to follow her eagerly (cupide, repeated from 1.16) by striking them (incutiens). Venus 
has caused flowers to be born, and led animals and caused them to mate. Instigating birth is 
her most important power, since birth is the central theme of the epic. 
 This is confirmed in the next lines: 
 
quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas,   
nec sine te quicquam dias in luminis oras 
exoritur neque fit laetum neque amabile quicquam, 
te sociam studeo scribendis versibus esse 
quos ego De Rerum Natura pangere conor […]   25 
       (1.21-25) 
But since you alone steer the birth of things, and without you nothing 
is born into the daylit borders of light nor does anything happy or 
loveable come to be, I strive after you to be my partner in writing 
verses, which I endeavour to arrange On the Birth of Things […] 
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 Venus by her persuasive power ‘leads’ animals to a certain action (OLD, induco 10). 
67
 See pp.154-5 for an analysis of this passage. 
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This passage summarises the preceding 20 lines,68 confirming that Venus both causes birth 
and brings pleasure (expressed by laetum and amabile). She can also help Lucretius to create 
a pleasurable poem, if she answers his appeal.69 Noting the prominence of birth here is crucial 
to our understanding of the DRN. The preceding imagery, including efficis ut cupide generatim 
saecla propagent (1.20), confirms that rerum natura in 1.21 denotes the birth (and all it 
entails) of things, exhibiting the root sense of natura from nascor, ‘to be born’ (after Greek 
φύσις from φύω).70 Therefore, when this phrase is repeated as the subject of Lucretius’ work 
(1.25), ‘On the Birth of Things’ is the sense that springs to mind.71 The logic is watertight: 
‘since you govern the birth of things, help me to compose a poem about the birth of things’. 
The reader is armed to read ‘birth’ in natura whenever it recurs in the epic – although the 
translator will generally be forced by context to translate it as ‘Nature’ or ‘nature’.72 The 
principal theme of the epic will be generation, which Venus steers. She is therefore an 
appropriate guide for Lucretius’ poetic venture.  
 Importantly these lines confirm that Venus is not a synonym for the Natura of 1.57. 
As outlined in 1.4-5 (per te […] concipitur – ‘conceived by you’) and 1.20 (efficis ut […] 
propagent – ‘make them beget’) Venus represents sexual attraction and intercourse, not birth 
itself.73 Rather she steers natura rerum (1.21) – the birth of things – by instilling them with 
sexual desire, a role she maintains in Lucretius’ discourse on love at the end of Book 4. With 
this reading Venus cannot be supplanted by, or remodelled as, Nature (= birth) later in the 
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 The connection is drawn especially by nec sine te quicquam dias in luminis oras / exoritur, which 
recalls per te quoniam genus omne animantum / concipitur visitque exortum lumina solis (1.4-5), and 
by the explanatory conjunction quoniam; see Schrijvers (1970) 188. 
69
 Schrijvers (1970) 32-3 highlights the charming passage of poetry in which this petition for charm 
from Venus sits – an example of what Jules Marouzeau termed ‘la leçon par example.’  
70
 Although the term may broadly refer to the universe here (Pellicer (1966) 228), Lucretius brings its 
birth meaning to the fore, as Clay (1983) 85 argues: ‘In the matrix of the first twenty lines of Lucretius’ 
invocation, rerum natura can have no other meaning’; see also Sedley (1998a) 25-6; Volk (2002) 85; 
Gale (2004) 53. The late Latin grammarians Lactantius and Servius note the connection between 
nascor and natura; see Maltby (1991) s. v. natura; for the connection between φύσις and natura, see 
Pellicer (1966). 
71
 Bailey (1947) ad 1.21 and p.583 notes the birth meaning of natura in 1.21, but not in 1.25, and 
therefore comments: ‘Natura in the title has a very wide sense and means something like “all about 
things”, including their material, structure, growth and behaviour.’ 
72
 ‘The crucial term natura emerges in Lucretius’ poem, not as it was most commonly used in Latin 
(κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φοράν), but restored to its original meaning (τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα) of birth and 
genesis.’ (Clay (1983) 85). It is unlikely the Roman reader would miss this meaning, as many modern 
readers have, particularly since all other derivatives of nascor carry some birth connotations (natus – 
son; nata – daughter; naturalis – natural (opp. to adoptive); nativus – having birth/origin; natio – birth, 
race; nativitas – birth; natalis – natal) – see Keen (1979) n.7. 
73
 Alternatively, Catto (1988) 98 and 99 labels Lucretius’ Venus as ‘metonymy for the creative process 
of natura’ (but also argues, confusingly, that Venus is later subordinated by Nature). Brown (1987) 91-
9 draws a strong link to the Venus of Book 4, albeit focusing solely on her role in sexual pleasure and 
love, rather than the other types of pleasure evident in the prologue. 
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epic.74 Venus may be the genetrix of the Romans in traditional myth, but for Lucretius she 
represents attraction (and the related concepts of pleasure and desire), leading to 
reproduction and birth.75 
 Next, Lucretius appeals to Venus to employ her persuasive power of lepos to bring 
peace. Here the Roman image of Venus the goddess takes precedence over Venus as 
metonym for voluptas, but evident shared characteristics play simultaneously on both 
images. Venus’ sexual charm captivates Mars (1.32-7), wounding him with love (vulnere 
amoris – 34) so that he is ‘utterly defeated’ (devictus – 34). By this specific choice of image, 
the scene introduces the key topic of sexual desire and its debilitating effects76. However, 
alongside sexual charm, Venus must also persuade Mars by eloquence: 
 
hunc tu, diva, tuo recubantem corpore sancto 
circumfusa super, suavis ex ore loquellas 
funde petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem;  40  
       (1.38-40) 
You, goddess, poured around him, in his recumbent state, from above 
with your sacred body, pour sweet sayings from your mouth, pursuing 
pleasing peace for the Romans, renowned one; […] 
 
Venus’ words to Mars are ‘sweet’, but also ‘persuasive’ (suavis and suadeo derive from the 
same root),77 and they produce pleasure (placidam) in a god far removed from Epicurean 
pleasure. Thus Venus’ eloquence is not far different from her powers of sexual desire and 
attraction. Venus, by her combined skills of persuasion and bringing pleasure is the ideal 
addressee of Lucretius’ epic (indeed he has already asked for help in composing persuasive 
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 Clay (1983) 82-95; Maltby (2005) 102-3. 
75
 Clay (1983) 82-95 overlooks the correspondence between Venus and pleasure and focuses solely on 
birth, inadvertently narrowing the scope of Lucretius’ vision and deflating much of the prologue’s vivid 
imagery.  
76
 Brown (1987) 97 notes that the scene ‘adumbrate[s] the depiction of the human lover’ in Book 4, in 
which man is overcome by voluptas as Mars is by Venus here – and both suffer ‘wounds’ as a result 
(volnera – 4.1070). By this connection the divom voluptas of this scene implicitly suggests hominum 
voluptas – otherwise hominum in the opening line would not be properly addressed until 4.1058-287. 
It is difficult to reconcile the sexual nature of the Venus-Mars scene with Elder’s complaint (1954, 
p.104) that Venus as creator ‘has nothing to do with the pleasure of the gods’. 
77
 IE root *suād-. see E-M, s. v. suavis: etymologically from the same root as Greek Ƒαδύς (= ion.-att. 
ἡδύς), ‘la racine est la meme que celle de suādeō’. Maltby (1991) does not record a popular etymology 
between these words, so Lucretius was probably unaware they are etymologically connected. 
However, their aural similarity invites him to make a comparison – especially when suavis and suadet 
start successive lines in 1.141-2; see Schrijvers (1970) 36-7. Lucretius frequently exploits similar aural 
similarities for explanatory purposes; see Snyder (1980).  
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and charming words: da dictis, diva, leporem – 1.28).78 Whenever something is created, 
whether life or a work of literature, Venus is never far away. 
 Venus instigates peace as she instigates birth. She rules over peace just as she does 
over birth: alone (sola – 1.31, cf. 1.21) and through lepos, and she affects Mars as she affects 
Nature – with suavis and placidam recalling suavis and placatum in 1.7 and 9. There is good 
reason for Lucretius to ask Venus to beg for peace. During wartime there are few noctes 
serenas (1.142), in which Lucretius composes his epic (see also 1.41-2). When Lucretius 
addresses Calliope in 6.92-5, he also focuses on requies (‘rest’) and voluptas (94), and asks her 
to be his leader (te duce – 95) – a role played by Venus (leading the animals) in 1.15-20. 
Additionally, pacem suggests Epicurean ἀταραξία, the ideal mental state of calmness, peace 
and freedom from fear,79 the pinnacle of Epicurean voluptas. Venus, as a goddess, lives this 
sort of life (summa cum pace – 1.45; privata dolore omni, privata periclis – 1.47) – and 
therefore Lucretius is appealing to Venus’ sympathy by her experience.80 
 Why a goddess who lives semota ab nostris rebus (1.46) would petition for peace on 
man’s behalf is unclear, and the text offers no simple answers. Perhaps Lucretius’ prologue 
intentionally portrays two contrasting Venuses: Venus the metonym for voluptas, embodying 
the cause of desire, and pleasure in the strictest Epicurean sense;81 and Venus the Roman 
divinity, matching the reader’s expectations of the ‘mother of the Romans’ (appropriate to 
the prayer format).82 Perhaps Lucretius intended to make a clearer comparison or contrast 
than the one in the text as we have it, for example adding a logical progression before 1.44-9 
(following their likely transposition from 2.646-51),83 to accommodate the lines more 
                                                          
78
 lepos is important to Lucretius’ poetic vision, as evident in his ‘mission statement’ (1.921-50). The 
thematically linked phrases musaeo contingens cuncta lepore (934), contingunt mellis dulci flavoque 
liquore (938) and musaeo dulci contingere melle (947) all denote lepos in his poetry. Note also the 
correspondence between Venus’ suavis […] loquellas and Lucretius’ creation of suaviloquenti / carmine 
Pierio (1.945-6). See pp.222-4 for more on Lucretius’ pleasing poetry. 
79
 The ultimate aim of securing knowledge of the unknown: Epicurus Ep. Pyth. 85, 96. 
80
 Bailey (1947) 1750, after Bignone, emphasises this reading, so that the lines ‘fall into their place as 
Lucr.’s explanation of his allegory and the justification of an appeal for peace to a goddess whose life 
[…] is one of undisturbed and perpetual peace.’ For this connection, see also Schrijvers (1970) 189-90.  
81
 This is the appropriate, Epicurean way to understand the gods: it is permissible, for example to call 
the sea Neptune, corn Ceres and wine Bacchus – as long as one understands the reality: that this is 
mere metonymy (2.655-60). Boyancé (1947) 99 remarks: ‘Vénus est le plaisir, comme Bacchus est le 
vin, et Cérès est le blé’. 
82
 Gale (1994) 217 comments that ‘we cannot exclude the possibility that the proem deliberately 
presents the reader with two contradictory images of divinity’. I argue, however, that the Epicurean 
image of divinity is preferred in the end (1.44 onwards). 
83
 Brown (1984) 43-4 deletes the lines from the prologue, arguing that they make more sense in the 
context of 2.646-51, and in the Venus prologue they make ‘L. associate his Mars and Venus with the 
orthodox Epicurean gods, whilst simultaneously emphasising the fundamental inconsistencies’. Bailey 
(1947) ad loc., however, remarks that repeated lines sometimes make more sense in one place than 
the other (e.g. 4.170-3 = 6.251-4), suggesting they were written in one context and not fully adjusted 
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smoothly into their new context.84 This would have contributed a stricter logical progression 
than the partial logical order created by the persistent theme of peace in 1.29-49.85 
Alternatively, Lucretius may simply have struggled to juggle Epicurean pleasure with the 
complex metonymy of Venus as voluptas, while maintaining the pretence of a standard hymn 
format.86 Although inconsistencies in Lucretius’ portrayal of Venus remain, the interpretation 
advanced here has extracted a greater coherence than before. 
 The metonymy suggested in the opening line has extended throughout the address to 
Venus. Each of her deeds either represents pleasure, or entails instilling pleasure in things – 
ranging from the world to plants, animals, gods, humans and poetry. She is voluptas and 
lepos, but also the cause of voluptas and lepos. In addition, Venus displays powers not 
immediately associated with voluptas, in particular persuasion, and the actions of striking and 
leading – and so voluptas may be considered synecdoche for Venus.87 Nevertheless, voluptas 
assumes these additional roles by association, a connection made partly by the apposition 
voluptas / […] Venus in lines 1-2, and partly because persuasion, striking and leading are 
portrayed with terms associated with pleasure, and in sexual contexts. When terms 
associated with these deeds occur later in the DRN, the reader should recall Venus and 
voluptas; and when voluptas or other pleasure terms (cupido, lepos, etc.) occur, Venus should 
be recalled. Thus, the goddess’ presence is felt throughout the epic, despite being mentioned 
by name only four further times (1.228; 2.173, 437; 3.776) outside the discourse on love 
(4.1037-287). This complex web of correspondences forms the conceptual thread of PLEASURE, 
which encapsulates pleasure, desire, attraction, and charm, as well as persuasion, striking and 
leading.   
  This reading allows the Venus prologue to be deciphered more comprehensively than 
before. Lucretius addresses an apparently un-Epicurean goddess through a standard prayer 
                                                                                                                                                                       
when copied to another. The theme of peace in 1.29-43 justifies the copying of the lines to 1.44-9; lack 
of revision explains the condensed and, at first glance contradictory, logic.  
84
 A stronger contradictory or explanatory conjunction than enim (1.44) might be expected. A more 
explicit logical connection may have been intended after 1.43, which enim would then comfortably 
follow. Schrijvers (1970) 177-80 suggests that in Lucretius enim and nam often pick up from an 
individual word or phrase (I say ‘x’, enim ‘y’…) in a preceding line or passage, rather than from an 
entire proof. 
85
 Friedländer (1939) 371: ‘The whole hymn is so laid out that peace becomes more and more its ruling 
idea’. 
86
 A common tension in allegory or extended metaphor is that the allegory can overpower the thing it 
is representing, and vice versa; Whitman (1987) 1-13. 
87
 Referring to the whole by a part, e.g.: ‘that’s a nice set of wheels (= car)’. Cf. Whitman (1987) 14-20, 
who notes that Athena in Homer can only ever be a partial allegory for wisdom, as she possesses 
several qualities as a goddess that are incompatible with it. 
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format,88 not simply to honour her in an appropriately Epicurean manner,89 but to introduce 
pleasure as the universal instigator of creation. The content, structure, and linguistic and 
rhetorical techniques are typical of prayers. Lucretius enumerates Venus’ powers (1.1-20), 
including her sphere of influence (1.2-15),90 before appealing for help in composition (1.21-
8)91 and peace in which to compose (1.29-49); he addresses Venus by name and lists her 
characteristics in apposition (hominum divomque voluptas, / alma Venus – 1.1-2), before 
outlining her powers in a relative clause (quae mare […] – 1.3),92 and repeating te four times 
(1.4-6);93 and to persuade Venus, he employs flattery (‘you alone rule birth, so help me to 
compose on birth’),94 and appeals to experience (‘you live in peace, so grant us peace also’).95 
However, with 1.44-9 and the remainder of the epic in mind, this seems misleading, for 
Lucretius’ Venus is not the standard Roman goddess, but the embodiment of Epicurean 
voluptas, the bringer of pleasure, and the instigator of birth.96 If we accept Lucretius’ hymn as 
an intentional red herring, playing with his reader’s expectations, the apparent contradiction 
between 1.1-43 and 44-9 is lessened. With this reading, Lucretius’ ‘prayer’ becomes a 
subversive appeal to an Epicurean principle, designed to introduce the important conceptual 
thread of PLEASURE. 
 Lucretius builds upon literary tradition to subvert the standard prayer formats of 
ancient literature, creating a striking contrast between his scientific theory and popular 
theology. Asmis suggests that Lucretius is specifically contradicting Stoic depictions of Zeus,97 
although her reading is principally supported by extratextual evidence. More convincing are 
                                                          
88
 The prologue of a didactic work commonly includes a hymn to an appropriate deity, Gale (1994) 209 
notes, citing Hesiod’s Works and Days, Aratus’ Phaenomena and Virgil’s Georgics. 
89
 See n.81 above. Kleve (1966) interprets the Venus prologue from this perspective, with reference to 
Philodemus, De Musica 4.4. 
90
 See e.g. Homeric hymn to Apollo, 3.14-21. 
91
 See Hom. Od. 1.1, 10. 
92
 Homeric hymn 8 to Ares is an emphatic example: ‘Ares, exceeding in strength, chariot-rider, golden- 
helmed, doughty in heart, shield-bearer, Saviour of cities, harnessed in bronze, strong of arm, 
unwearying, mighty with the spear, O defence of Olympus, father of warlike Victory, ally of Themis, 
stern governor of the rebellious, leader of righteous men, sceptred King of manliness, who whirl your 
fiery sphere among the planets in their sevenfold courses through the aether wherein your blazing 
steeds ever bear you above the third firmament of heaven […]’ (Evelyn-White’s (1914) Loeb 
translation). In Latin see e.g. Hor. Carm. 1.10.1-3: Mercuri, facunde nepos Atlantis, / qui feros cultus 
hominum recentum / voce formasti catus […]. 
93
 See e.g. Hor. Carm. 1.35, where te emphatically starts four of the ode’s opening six stanzas. 
94
 See e.g. Homeric hymn 22 to Poseidon: ‘A two-fold office the gods allotted you, O Shaker of the 
Earth, to be a tamer of horses and a saviour of ships! Hail, Poseidon, Holder of the Earth, dark-haired 
lord! O blessed one, be kindly in heart and help those who voyage in ships!’ (Evelyn-White). 
95
 A technique from suasoriae, appropriate to this prayer format. 
96
 Aeneadum genetrix (1.1) may support the deception, as Lucretius inverts the standard praise of a 
god’s ancestry or progeny. The procreative impulse of pleasure (= Venus), because it causes birth, has 
no ancestry.  
97
 In Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus; Asmis (1982). 
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perceived similarities between Lucretius’ Venus and Empedocles’ Love (itself an embodiment 
of creation). However, the association drawn between the Mars tableau and Empedocles’ 
battle between Love (creative) and Strife (destructive) may be too specific.98 Mars, although a 
destructive god, is not emphatically portrayed as such (aside from belli fera moenera Mavors 
/ armipotens regit – 1.32-3), compared with the abundant depiction of Venus. The related 
suggestion that Natura, which possesses creative and destructive qualities (1.55-7), is 
represented by Mars and Venus together is not conclusively supported by the text.99 If Venus 
represents a quality of Natura, it is problematic for Venus also to be her gubernator (1.21).100 
Again, although Venus governs both Mars and Natura, the two cannot be associated simply 
with each other. The deeper reading of a love-strife allegory here is largely reliant not on the 
prologue itself, but on other passages in the DRN.101 If the apparent reference to Empedocles 
is intentional, it displays more differences than similarities.102 A nod to the previous greatest 
poet-philosopher within an opening hymn structure situates Lucretius firmly in the didactic 
tradition, but the prologue’s content is overwhelmingly Epicurean. The passage can be read 
most convincingly as an exploration of Epicurean voluptas, cast through the prism of a hymn 
to Venus, rather than a complex allegory for the cycle of love and strife, or birth and death – 
the proper roles of Natura.  
 Although Lucretius’ Venus displays qualities of the standard Roman goddess, we need 
not assume Lucretius remodels her in Epicurean terms later.103 Rather his Venus seems quite 
consistent. In the prologue, she embodies pleasure, desire, sexual desire and a striking or 
persuasive force in sexual contexts, as she does later in the epic: Veneris fructu – regular, not 
sexual, pleasure (4.1073); Veneris dulcedinis – desire (4.1059); sexual attraction (4.1052, 
1084, 1101 etc.); res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent – persuasion to sexual attraction 
(2.173); Veneris […] ictus – striking by blows (4.1052). These aspects are also appropriate to 
her representation of sexual intercourse in 2.437, 3.776, 4.1113 etc. She is pleasure and 
                                                          
98
 Sedley (1998a) 17: ‘It has long been recognised that here we have a striking allusion to the joint-
protagonists of Empedocles’ physical poem, Love and Strife – whom Empedocles himself sometimes 
calls Aphrodite and Ares.’ See also Gale (1994) 50-75; Garani (2007) 34-43. 
99
 Gale (1994) 72 convincingly describes Venus and Mars as ‘wound in each other’s embrace’, asserting 
that ‘this may be a way of suggesting that Empedocles’ creative and destructive forces are in fact 
eternally and indissolubly linked’. However, this relies on translator’s legerdemain, since Lucretius’ 
circumfusa (‘poured around’) suggests a less tangible and permanent joining of bodies than Gale’s (a 
weaving metaphor). 
100
 Gale (1994) and Garani (2007) overlook this contradiction, because they assume the displacement 
of Venus by Natura, which I have argued against earlier in this Part.   
101
 Especially in Gale (1994) 222-3. 
102
 Partly conceded by Furley (1970), e.g. in relation to the four elements, which, he argues, Lucretius 
considers ‘only as cosmic masses’ (p.59). 
103
 Solomon (2004). 
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desire in Lucretius’ introduction to his discourse on love: namque voluptatem praesagit muta 
cupido. / haec Venus est nobis […] (4.1057-8). The Venus-voluptas metonymy of the prologue 
extends throughout the epic beyond conventional ideas of pleasure to poetic composition, 
delightful imagery, free will and even, as we shall see in Part 3 Section A, atomic attraction – 
the central concepts of the PLEASURE thread. 
 
De Rerum Natura: birth in Lucretius’ prologue 
We earlier introduced Natura as representing, through its root sense from nascor, birth – a 
metaphorical correspondence felt in the very title of the epic – and as governed by Venus 
(1.21-5). This relationship was in fact suggested in the opening lines: 
 
Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas,  
alma Venus, caeli subter labentia signa 
quae mare navigerum, quae terras frugiferentis 
concelebras, per te quoniam genus omne animantum 
concipitur visitque exortum lumina solis   5 
       (1.1-5) 
 
Venus, as ‘the one who gave birth to Aeneas’ descendants’ (genetrix the agent noun from 
gigno, cf. genitabilis – 1.11),104 is a nurturing (alma) mother. She initiates the ‘birth’ 
(emphasised by the root-meaning of (frugi)fero – ‘to bear’) of plants by ‘inseminating’ 
(concelebras) the ground.  She also causes conception (concipitur)105 and birth (exortum here 
means ‘having been born’) in animals. This vivid description of the birth of living things 
becomes a metaphor later: 
 
quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas,   
nec sine te quicquam dias in luminis oras 
exoritur neque fit laetum neque amabile quicquam, 
te sociam studio scribendis versibus esse 
quos ego De Rerum Natura pangere conor     25  
       (1.21-25) 
 
                                                          
104
 A further etymological correspondence can be read in genus. Although it does not strictly mean 
‘birth’ here, it derives from gigno – as noted by various ancient grammarians; Maltby (1991), s. v.  
genus. 
105
 OLD, concipio 3, which lists this passage (also e.g. Ov. Fast. 4.771). The verb can also denote 
parentage (3b, ‘to be the mother of’) and the germination of plants (3c). 
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Birth, governed by Venus, is extended to [sc. ‘all’] ‘things’ (rerum; quicquam) for the first 
time,106 implying that Venus can affect things as she can animals (1.19-20) – striking them and 
causing them to ‘procreate’. This is the first metaphorical correspondence of the LIFE-CYCLE 
thread in the epic.  
 In 1.21-5 natura denotes ‘birth’, instigated by Venus. In 1.56-7 it becomes a 
personified force, Natura,107 metonymy for the birth of all things: 
 
        […] et rerum primordia pandam,  55 
unde omnis Natura creet res auctet alatque 
quove eadem rursum Natura perempta resolvat, 
       (1.55-7) 
[…] and I shall unfold the first-threads of things, from which Nature 
gives birth to, makes grow and nurtures everything, and into which the 
same Nature unties things again when they are destroyed, […] 
 
Natura – the personified force of birth – not only gives birth to everything,108 but makes it 
grow and nourishes it too.109 In striking contrast, when the birth force of Natura dies, things 
are destroyed (or, by a weaving metaphor, ‘untied’).110 Thus Natura takes on the role of 
death, and encapsulates Lucretius’ birth-death cycle – a dual role emphasised by eadem.111 
Everything that Natura causes to be born, she also causes to die. This distinguishes Lucretius 
                                                          
106
 Also notable is the metaphorical correspondence between birth and ‘looking on the light of the 
sun’, supported by exorior, the usual term for the sun rising. This metaphor is well-established in 
poetry, occurring in Ennius (luminis oras, Ann. 2, fr.136 War.). 
107
 Clay (1983) 94 asserts that Natura displaces Venus ‘precisely at the point where this cycle [of 
Nature] moves from genesis to dissolution’ in 1.57 – a view reiterated in id. (1998) 128. My reading of 
Venus and Nature’s different roles denies that Venus can be displaced by Natura. 
108
 creo is a central term of Lucretius’ LIFE-CYCLE thread. Although it can carry a neutral sense (broadly 
‘to make’ – OLD, creo 2b, 4, 5), its foremost sense is ‘to give birth’ or ‘procreate’ (OLD, creo 1: Cic. 
Tusc. 3.59; Prop. 4.177; Livy 1.3.7, etc.). This sense is evident in this first usage (1.55) and also in the 
first arguments – inviting the reader to consider its birth meaning throughout the DRN. The inceptive 
form cresco, ‘to grow’ is conceptually, as well as etymologically, related see E-M, s. v. creo. 
109
 This need not recall alma Venus in 1.2. The term alma in Latin applies to various mother goddesses, 
including Venus (Plaut. Rud. 694; Verg. Aen. 1.618, 10.332), but particularly Ceres (Lucil. fr. 5.214 War.; 
Verg. G. 1.7; Hor. Carm. 4.5.18), and Cybele (Verg. Aen. 10.220) and Maia (Hor. Carm. 1.2.42), who 
share the name Magna Mater. Lucretius distinguishes the nourishment each provides: Mother Earth 
physically gave birth to all plant and animal life (5.783-854), Natura represents birth itself, and Venus 
offers nourishment in terms of pleasure. In 6.750, Lucretius describes Athena as alma in the more 
general sense ‘kind’ or ‘bountiful’.  
110
 See n.141. 
111
 I follow the reading of Brown (1984) ad loc., taking eadem with Natura, rather than referring to ‘the 
same things’ after res in line 56 (as assumed by Bailey (1947) and Leonard & Smith (1942), both ad 
loc.). Cf. 1.630 for eadem used of Natura in this way. Schrijvers (1977) reads a biological metaphor at 
the heart of this cycle. It may at first be surprising that one term, Natura, embodies birth and death, 
but this recalls a theory of Heraclitus ([Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. = fr.202 KRS): ‘And as the same thing there 
exists in us living and dead […] for these things having changed round are those, and those having 
changed round are these’ (translation KRS). By contrast, Empedocles’ Love and Strife are separate 
entities. 
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from his epic predecessors Ennius and Homer in 1.112-26, a passage which otherwise serves 
to highlight similarities:112 whereas they depict the immortal soul migrating to the 
underworld, Lucretius believes that Natura’s powers of birth and death are universal. It is 
crucial that the reader understands that the soul is mortal (1.112-4), as a pillar of Lucretius’ 
philosophy. For Lucretius the very nature of birth entails death, and this is borne out in his 
LIFE-CYCLE thread.  
 
Seeds and threads: Lucretius’ atomic vocabulary 
At the heart of this birth-death cycle are Lucretius’ atoms, introduced alongside Natura in 
1.54-61. In this passage Lucretius carefully introduces a group of atomic terminology steeped 
in metaphor. It is therefore perhaps the most crucial passage for understanding Lucretius’ 
method of explaining science through metaphor. 
 In his ‘mission statement’ (1.136-45) Lucretius states that his task is difficult because 
‘one must produce new words on account of the utter poverty of the language and the 
novelty of the subject matter’ to ‘shed light upon the dark discoveries of the Greeks’ (1.136-
9).113 Indeed Lucretius must invent several new terms throughout his discourse, but not 
atomic terminology. In extant Latin before Lucretius are found a transliterated version of 
ἄτομος (first in Lucilius fr. 820 War. – […] eidola atque atomos vincere Epicuri volam […]), and 
corpusculum, which Cicero ascribes to the Roman Epicurean Amafinius.114 
 However, Lucretius pointedly avoids using either term with any frequency.115 
corpusculum occurs just five times in the DRN, with Lucretius preferring to emphasise a 
connection between ‘body’ (the quality that enables things to touch and be touched) and the 
atomic ‘bodies’ of which all things consist (see especially 1.483-598). Meanwhile, atomus 
does not occur once, even though ἄτομος occurs in the atomists, and 25 times in Epicurus’ 
extant writings. Smallness and indivisibility are clearly qualities of Lucretius’ atoms (the latter 
is handled at length in 1.483-643), but, in his quest for originality (1.926-34),116 he avoided 
                                                          
112
 Ennius is described as clara (1.119), just as Lucretius shines clara lumina on things (1.144); Homer is 
said to ‘have begun to unfold the nature of things’ (coepisse et rerum naturam expandere – 1.126), 
recalling both the title of Lucretius’ work, and his method of ‘unfolding’ his philosophy (pandam – 55; 
praepandere – 1.144). 
113
 For the poverty of Latin, cf. 1.832; 3.260. For concepts new to Latin, Lucretius employs new words 
such as clinamen (2.292 etc.), and existing words given new meaning, such as extremum cacumen 
(1.599, 749 etc.) and simulacrum (4.34, 257 etc.). 
114
 Cic. Acad. 1.6: quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustulleris, de corpusculorum 
(ita enim appellat atomos) concursione fortuita loqui? 
115
 See Sedley (1999) 230. 
116
 Although Lucretius tends to avoid transliteration (homoeomeria (1.830, 834) and harmonia (3.100, 
118, 131; 4.1215) are exceptions, partly because they resist succinct rendering into Latin), he is not 
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these terms and created a new atomic vocabulary. He wanted his terminology to emphasise 
certain other qualities of atoms, and to achieve this he turned to metaphors, rooted in 
human experience.117 
 Lucretius’ approach can be understood by considering how he transforms Epicurus’ 
atomic vocabulary into Latin – avoiding some terms, translating others directly, and amending 
others in translation.118 An investigation of Lucretius’ terminological summary from the 
prologue will highlight that he perceives atomic forms in metaphorical terms:  
 
      […] et rerum primordia pandam,  55 
unde omnis Natura creet res auctet alatque 
quove eadem rursum Natura perempta resolvat, 
quae nos materiem et genitalia corpora rebus 
reddunda in ratione vocare et semina rerum 
appellare suëmus et haec eadem usurpare  60 
corpora prima, quod ex illis sunt omnia primis. 
       (1.55-61) 
[…] and I shall unfold the first-threads of things, from which Nature 
gives birth, makes grow and nurtures everything, and into which the 
same Nature unties things again when they are destroyed – these, 
when we are explaining the reasons for things, we have become 
accustomed to call the ‘mother-substance and procreative bodies of 
things’, and to name ‘the seeds of things’, and to call habitually these 
same things ‘first bodies’, because all things consist of these first 
things. 
 
It is surprising that two of Lucretius’ most frequently used atomic terms are missing from this 
crucial passage – elementa (= Epicurus’ στοιχεῖα) and unmodified corpora (= Epicurus’ 
σώματα), which both carry a general sense of ‘distinct, composite parts’. Instead, Lucretius 
chooses terms with a strong metaphorical sense, predominantly pertaining to birth – a 
metaphor present in Epicurus’ σπέρματα (‘seeds’),119 translated here by semina. Both σπέρμα 
and semen are established terms in relation to animal and plant conception and growth.120 
                                                                                                                                                                       
adverse to translation. This is evident in his atomic vocabulary, and terms such as finis (= περάς) and 
natura (=φύσις). For atoms, Lucretius seems to have preferred his own translations to others’.  
117
 Martin & Harré (1982) 96-7 remark that neologisms in general supply novel meaning, but only 
metaphors can do this while being instantly meaningful to language users without need of technical 
understanding and experience. For Lucretius’ replacement of technical terms with sets of metaphors, 
see Sedley (1999) 
118
 Previous detailed examinations include Reiley (1909) 35-62, and Keen (1979); see also Bailey (1947) 
for notes at each first occurrence of atomic vocabulary. 
119
 In Ep. Hdt. 38, and also in Anaxagoras – although see KRS 193, pp.367-8, and note there, on the 
difficulty of interpreting his term. Kranz provides a useful index on σπέρμα in the Presocratics in DK, 
vol. 2.  
120
 Before Lucretius, Cato uses semen in the botanical sense (e.g. Agr. 5.3, 48.3 etc.), while Plaut. 
Amph. 1139 and Catull. 67.26 use it of semen, and Varro Rust. 2.2.4 and Cic. Prov. Cons. fr. 2.43 of 
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 Another possible translation is materies (literally, ‘matter’ or ‘timber’), from the 
Greek term ὕλη, which also occurs in Epicurus. This connection is unclear, however, since ὕλη 
may not mean ‘atoms’ in its two occurrences in Epicurus’ extant writings (Ep. Pyth. 93 and 
112, where it could equally mean generic ‘fuel’).121 Furthermore, Lucretius extracts a meaning 
– captured in the above translation ‘mother-substance’ – not carried by Epicurus’ term. 
Lucretius’ first argument brings out this sense: 
 
quippe ubi non essent genitalia corpora cuique, 
qui posset mater rebus consistere certa? 
at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur, 
inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit  170 
materies ubi inest cuiusque et corpora prima; 
       (1.167-71) 
Indeed since each thing would not have procreative bodies, how could 
a fixed mother for things exist? But now because each is born from 
fixed seeds, thence each is born and comes out into the borders of 
light, and in which the mother-substance and the first bodies of each 
are inside; […] 
 
Birth imagery pervades the passage, with genitalia corpora (cf. 1.58) and creo (cf. 1.56, 58) 
repeated from the terminological summary, and the birth image of 170 recalling dias in 
luminis oras / exoritur (1.22-3) from the Venus prologue. mater further strengthens the birth 
imagery, and proves the intended etymology between mater and materies.122 The polyptoton 
certa […] certis (168-9) connects mater and semina, which in 1.58-9 was introduced as a 
synonym for materies. In turn, mater and materies are linked, marking their shared maternal 
meaning. The birth meaning of materies is confirmed in 1.191: 
 
      […] omnia quando 
paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo, 
crescentesque genus servant; ut noscere possis 190 
quidque sua de materie grandescere alique. 
       (1.188-91) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
parentage. The term complements the long-established sexual metaphor of sowing, depicted in Greek 
by σπείρω, the verbal form of σπέρμα (Latin semen); e.g. Soph. Aj. 1293. Lucretius employs this 
metaphor in muliebria conserat arva (4.1107); see Adams (1982) 154. 
121
 See Reiley (1909) 48-9. The word is more common in Aristotle, who may have been first to use it in 
a philosophical context, as one of the four causes of his οὐσία.  
122
 E-M, s. v. materies: ‘proprement ‘substance dont est faite la mater, c’est-à-dire le tronc de l’arbre 
considéré en tant que producteur de rejetons. Dérive de mater, comme pauperies de pauper.’ See also 
Maltby (1991) s. v. materies. There is general consensus that mater intentionally introduces materies: 
Merrill (1907) ad 1.171 notes, ‘materies seems to look back to mater, 168, as if the two were 
etymologically related’; and Bailey (1947) ad 1.168, ‘mater is intended to suggest materies 171’. 
Nevertheless, neither translates materies with a birth meaning. See also Leonard & Smith (1942) ad 
168; Brown (1984) ad 171. 
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[…] since everything grows a little at a time, as is fitting, from fixed 
seed, and in growing preserves its kind; so that you may recognise that 
each grows and is nourished by its own mother-substance. 
 
Again materies is synonymous with semina, and it assumes the roles of grandescere alique, 
recalling Natura in 1.56 (auctet alatque). The careful attachment of a birth meaning to 
materies in the Book 1 prologue indicates that Lucretius intends the same meaning 
throughout the epic. Lucretius has transferred the metaphor of materies (and ὕλη) from 
trees, fuel or construction, towards birth. The usual translations – ‘matter’ (Rouse,123 Leonard, 
Melville), ‘material’ (Bailey), ‘matèria’ (Giussani), ‘raw material’ (Latham) or similar – seem 
inadequate. The bolder translation ‘mother-substance’ conveys Lucretius’ metaphor, and 
situates materies firmly within his birth-themed atomic vocabulary.124 
 The reading of a birth metaphor in materies is justified further by genitalia corpora 
(1.58), which carries a clear birth meaning – captured by Merrill’s ‘creative elements’.125 The 
occurrence of this compound term here is surprising, since it occurs just three more times in 
the atomic sense (1.167; 2.62-3, 548).126 It seems anomalous in this terminological summary, 
and hardly for Lucretius an ‘accustomed’ (suëmus – 1.60) term. It seems the reason that 
genitalia corpora is introduced here is its birth sense, which corpora on its own lacks. 
Similarly, prima corpora (1.61) – suggesting ‘beginning bodies’ or ‘initial bodies’ – is 
conceptually related to birth. In fact, the reader might appropriately think of the generative 
qualities of corpora whenever this term occurs in an atomic sense in the DRN.  
 Lucretius’ prima corpora and prima (1.61) translate Epicurus’ ἀρχή, which denotes 
both atoms – often qualifying ἄτομοι (e.g. Ep. Hdt. 41) – and beginnings in general (e.g. Ep. 
Hdt. 44). In the context of Lucretius’ terminological summary, prima corpora and prima 
support the overall sense of creation. These two terms have perhaps been included by 
Lucretius in this list of terminology because they are more appropriate than elementa and 
corpora for extending the birth metaphor. 
                                                          
123
 For bibliographical details, see under Smith (1992). 
124
 Snyder (1980) 39, noting the wordplay of mater-materies, states, ‘matter and its atomic structure 
function as the mother of things’. Schrijvers (1977) 80, by outlining a specifically biological 
metaphorical group (or perhaps by overlooking the metaphor implicit in the term), does not correlate 
materies with semina or genitalia corpora. 
125
 Merrill (1907) ad 1.58. Keen (1979) 65-6 suggests that genitalia corpora translates σωμάτων φύσεις 
(Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 41). However, Epicurus’ φύσις more directly corresponds with Lucretius’ Natura, in 
the sense ‘inborn nature’ or even ‘birth’ – a comparison that Keen makes; see also Pellicer (1966). 
Lucretius translates σωμάτων φύσις directly with corporea natura (‘bodily nature’), e.g. in 1.302-3 and 
2.20-1. 
126
 The term occurs in 4.1044 and 6.1207, denoting human ‘genital parts’. We also find genitalia 
semina (5.851), which means ‘procreative seed’ in a sexual context. 
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 After the prologue the creative properties of Lucretius’ atoms are emphasised 
throughout the first arguments and beyond. Lucretius builds upon the vocabulary introduced 
in the prologue to map concepts of sexual union and birth onto his atoms. This is a principal 
role of the LIFE-CYCLE thread, which expands to create a panoptic atomic theory applicable to 
inanimate and animate objects on a microscopic and macroscopic level. Birth lies at the heart 
of human experience, and by applying a birth metaphor to atomic creation in the prologue, 
Lucretius introduces his atomic theory in a more easily comprehensible way, setting up more 
complex correspondences between atomic union and dissolution (Books 1 and 2), and the 
nature of sensation, the soul, love and death (Books 3 to 6). 
 However, not all of Lucretius’ atomic vocabulary fits within this one metaphor.127 The 
atomic terms discussed so far are synonyms for one which has no equivalent in Epicurus: 
primordia (1.55). This is the first atomic term introduced in the epic, and is Lucretius’ second-
favourite term behind corpora (and its various compounds), occurring 72 times in all (53 in 
the atomic-themed opening two books), so its accurate translation is critical. The birth 
meaning of the other atomic terms introduced in this summary suggests primordia might be 
another birth term. Indeed its prefix prim- expresses origins (cf. corpora prima and primis in 
1.61) and its suffix -ordia is linked to the verb ordior, usually translated ‘to begin’. Previous 
usages of primordia suggest the same, denoting a ‘beginning’ (dubito […] quod primordium 
capissam ad stirpem exquirendum – Pac. fr. 52.3 War.) or family ‘origins’ (in primordio pueruli 
– Var. Log. 9.1 in Non. p.308M; see also Cic. Leg. 2.7, written at a similar time to the DRN).128 
Finally, it is argued that Lucretius employs principia,129 which, like corpora prima and prima, is 
conceptually related to beginnings and birth, to cover the unmetrical genitive, dative and 
ablative plural forms of primordia, in a ‘complementary distribution’.130 Although it is not 
necessarily the case that primordia and principia, since they are used interchangeably to 
denote Lucretius’ atoms, must carry the same metaphorical meaning, nevertheless 
translating primordia as ‘first beginnings’ completes a tidy, thematically consistent group of 
atomic vocabulary introduced in this summary, and maintains the persistent birth imagery of 
the Venus prologue. 
 
 
                                                          
127
 contra Sedley (1999) 230. 
128
 See also Cic. Part. or. 7.21, which denotes elements (i.e. building blocks) of an argument.  
129
 A term Lucretius may have omitted from his glossary to avoid over-repetition of words with prim- 
as a root, or because it is a virtual synonym of (corpora) prima. 
130
 Reiley (1909) 51-3; Merrill (1907) ad 1.55 s. v. primordia; Bailey (1947) ad 1.55 s. v. rerum 
primordia.  
34 
 
 This reading does not, however, fully account for Lucretius’ ingenuity in metaphor, 
and interest in the semantic range of words. As seen with Natura and materies, Lucretius 
employs root-meanings to add metaphorical colour to his philosophy. The term primordia fits 
within a semantic grouping in Lucretius alongside exordium, ‘the warp set up on a loom’131 
(like primordium etymologically connected with ordior, which, as well as meaning ‘to begin’, 
also specifically means ‘to lay the warp of a web’),132 and ordo, which broadly denotes 
ordered rows or lines (and therefore can conceptually apply to threads in weaving).133 While 
ordo is not etymologically related to ordior (or primordium and exordium),134 it is difficult to 
agree with Ernout and Meillet that ‘les Latins ne sentaient pas une parenté entre ordo et 
ordior’,135 owing to their aural proximity, to which Lucretius often draws attention 
(particularly between ordo and primordia), therefore assimilating their meaning and creating 
a (false) etymology.136 Taking this semantic group, and especially the close relationship 
between primordia and exordia, primordia might be translated as the ‘first threads laid on the 
loom’.137 The meaning seems initially too abstract, and the translators render it ‘first-
beginnings’ (Rouse, Bailey), ‘atoms’ (Latham), ‘prime particles’ or ‘basic particles’ (Stallings), 
or ‘primal elements’ or ‘primal matter’ (Melville). 1.50-7, however, confirm Lucretius’ 
intention: 
 
quod superest, vacuas auris animumque sagacem 50 
semotum a curis adhibe veram ad rationem,  
ne mea dona tibi studio disposta fideli, 
intellecta prium quam sint, contempta relinquas. 
                                                          
131
 OLD, exordium 1, used literally (e.g. Quint. Inst. 5.10.71, of a toga) or metaphorically (e.g. Inc. trag. 
87 War., of a prologue, alongside detexo). Compare also exordior, used in a weaving metaphor in 
Plaut. Pseud. 399 (with detexo and tela), Bacch. 350 (with tela); Cic. De or. 2.145 (with pertexo), 2.158 
(with detexo and retexo). On the derivatives of texo, see n.255. 
132
 OLD, ordior 1, e.g. Plin. HN 11.80 (of a spider). For the etymological connection, see de Vaan (2008) 
s. v. ordior. Lucretius employs primordia and exordia as synonyms in the DRN, for which see pp.69-70.  
133
 E.g. OLD, ordo 1b, ‘a row of seats in the theatre’; ordo 2, ‘a line of soldiers standing abreast (usu. in 
battle), a rank; ordo 5, ‘civil or social standing, rank, position’. 
134
 E-M, s. v. ordo: ‘Le dérivé de ordo qui signifie <<mettre en ordre>>, c’est ordino’; de Vaan (2008) s. 
v. ordo: ‘The original denominative to ordo was ornare < *ord-n-are < *orde/on-a-’ – although he does 
(s. v. ordior) posit a possible connection between exordior specifically and ordo from a shared *ord- 
root. 
135
 E-M, s. v. ordo. 
136
 See pp.71-2 for a detailed consideration. Also, Nagy (2002) 80-1 notes the weaving sense of ordior 
evident in Cic. Leg. 1.3.9, alongside contexo and absolvo. 
137
 Snyder (1983) 40-1 calls them ‘first warp-threads’, and notes that the weaving sense is more clearly 
captured by the tmesis ordia prima at 4.28. Reiley (1909) 52 (also p.62) previously noted the 
importance of this separation, but, despite noting the weaving meaning of exordia, suggested a birth, 
rather than weaving, meaning for primordia. Similarly Garani (2007) 175-6, in analysing 4.114-5, 
recognises the weaving meaning of exordia ‘atoms’, but not of primordia, which she translates as ‘first-
beginnings’. 
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nam tibi de summa caeli ratione deumque 
disserere incipiam, et rerum primordia pandam, 55 
unde omnis Natura creet res auctet alatque 
quove eadem rursum Natura perempta resolvat,   
       (1.50-7) 
What is more, apply your open ears and keen judgement, far removed 
from worries, to true reasoning, lest my gifts, laid out before you with 
loyal devotion, be disregarded before they have been understood. For I 
shall begin to separate the threads of the highest logical array of the 
heavens and the gods, and I shall unfold the first-threads of things, 
whence Nature gives birth, makes grow and nurtures everything, and 
into which the same Nature unties things again when they are 
destroyed, […] 
 
Lucretius’ method of explanation involves ‘laying out’, ‘separating out’ and ‘unfolding’ 
threads of scientific evidence. disposta is a complex word suggesting both ‘separating’ (the 
dis- prefix) and ‘laying out’ (pono) – an image expanded by disserere (‘to disentwine’, ‘to 
unfasten’)138 and pandam (‘to spread or stretch out cloth’).139 The importance of this method 
is emphasised by studio […] fideli: the task is painstaking but crucial to explaining his complex 
theories. A metaphor is created, depicting pieces of evidence for atomic theory as threads 
entwined in complex array, which Lucretius must separate for his reader to comprehend.140 
This marks the first instance of Lucretius’ WEAVING thread.  
 Lucretius extends the weaving metaphor to the atoms themselves. They are 
described as ‘first-threads’ that are used to create all things and are prone to being ‘untied’ – 
the most common application of the weaving metaphor in the DRN.141 The weaving metaphor 
of resolvat in 1.57 is less surprising than it may seem, since it translates Epicurus’ διαλύω 
                                                          
138
 Formed again of the dis- prefix and OLD, sero
2
 ‘to link together, entwine, interlace’, from the Greek 
εἴρω ‘to fasten together in rows, string’ (e.g. of a necklace) – LSJ. Although dissero more generally 
means ‘to explain’, its weaving sense is brought out by the other weaving terms in this passage. 
139
 OLD, pando 2a. Cf. expandere in 1.126, describing Homer ‘unfolding’ the nature of things; and 
praepandere lumina ‘to unfold the lights (of explanation)’ in 1.144. Snyder (1983) 37-43, while noticing 
the intrinsic meaning of primordia, overlooks the surrounding weaving imagery in this passage. The 
link between Lucretius’ weaving of discourse and atomic threads does, however, support her 
argument that his ‘woven’ poem mirrors the ‘woven universe’. 
140
 The comparison between separating threads and separating words for the purpose of teaching 
occurs in Pl. Cra. 388b11-c1: ‘So a name is a kind of teaching instrument, and one that separates things 
that are, just as the shuttle separates the web.’  
141
 Expressed most frequently by the essentially interchangeable cognates solvo, resolvo, dissolvo and 
exsolvo. In Latin these express various connotations of untying, unweaving and unpicking both threads 
and threadlike things, for examples: OLD, solvo 1-6 and 11 (e.g. Ov. Met. 4.6 of hair ties; Curt. 3.1.18 of 
knots; Cic. Att. 11.9.2 and 15.4.4 of a tied-up bundle of letters); OLD, resolvo 1-2 (Verg. Aen. 3.370 of a 
headband; Ov. Ars am. 3.328 of hair); OLD, dissolvo 1, ‘undo’ (Tib. 1.7.1-2 of the warp-threads 
(stamina) knitted (neo) by the fates) and 3 ‘unbind, set free’ (Tib. 1.10.62 with coma); OLD, exsolvo 1, 
‘undo’ (Plaut. Rud. 367 with restis) and 2, ‘release (from bonds)’ (Plaut. Bacch. 957). 
36 
 
(literally ‘loosen’, ‘untie’), with which it is etymologically linked142 – a term that may stem 
from Empedocles or Leucippus (Aristotle uses διαλύω and its derivative διάλυσις in a 
summary of their theories – Gen. corr. A8, 325a2 = KRS 545). As Parts 2 and 3 will explore, 
Lucretius expands Epicurus’ weaving image far beyond διαλύω and the occasional περιπλοκή 
(‘interlacing’) and πλεκτικός (‘entwined’) (e.g. Ep. Hdt. 43),143 to create an expansive, 
coherent portrayal of atomic compound structure and dissolution. Lucretius’ primordia 
cannot simply be grouped with corpora prima as ‘Lucretius’ more neutral equivalents for the 
ἀρχαί of Greek physics’.144 Rather, the term expresses a crucial metaphor absent from 
Lucretius’ other common atomic terms, including its supposed partner principia. This crucial 
passage alerts the reader to the WEAVING thread, which they should recall when primordia and 
resolvo recur, and also their cognates (exordia; solvo, dissolvo, exsolvo), and more generally 
other weaving terms in an atomic context. The keen reader will follow Lucretius and picture 
interwoven ‘first-threads’ forming the nature of things, and also the woven nature of 
Lucretius’ exposition (introduced by pandam, disserere and disposta above), as he unties and 
unfolds the facts of atomic union by untying things themselves into their first-threads. His 
poem will mirror the make-up of the world, and in itself reinforce his atomic theory.145  
 Having outlined the birth and weaving metaphors in Lucretius’ atomic vocabulary, 
two questions arise: why did Lucretius choose these metaphors in particular for his atoms, 
and why did he choose two metaphors instead of one? First, both metaphors are ideal for 
depicting the principal aspects of Lucretius’ atoms. Birth (why and how things come to be) is 
the fundamental explanandum in natural philosophy. It is also fundamental to life and central 
to our experience, and thus readily comprehensible. Most importantly, several aspects of 
birth can be mapped directly onto atoms: birth begins with seeds (= Lucretius’ semina), which 
create things and make them grow; things are born according to species and, once born, 
                                                          
142
 E-M, s. v. solvo, which also points out the connection between absolvo and ἀπολύω; also de Vaan 
(2008) s. v. solvo. 
143
 Considered by Snyder (1983) 41. Aristotle employs a cognate in describing Democritus’ theory of 
atomic collisions, which are said ‘to be entangled’ (περιπλέκεσθαι – on Democritus ap. Simpl. in Cael. 
295.9 = KRS 578); cf. also in Cael. 295.11 = KRS 583; and in Cael. 242.21 = KRS 584. 
144
 Clay (1998) 129. Similarly, Keen (1979) 63-4, following Reiley (1909) 51, asserts that primordia has 
been taken from ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις (Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 41), 
owing to similarities between this section of Epicurus’ letter and DRN 1.483-6. Despite a strong 
connection between ἀρχή and the prim- stem of primordia, this overlooks the important first 
occurrence of primordia in 1.55 and its weaving context. Moreover, prima (used both substantively 
and adjectivally, as in prima corpora) suffices as a direct translation of ἀρχή. It is unnecessary to 
assume primordia was inspired specifically by this passage of Epicurus. 
145
 See pp.224-6.  
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maintain their essential characteristics throughout their lives;146 and everything born is 
destined to die. These concepts are expressed in Lucretius’ atomic theory, which is central to 
his birth-death cycle, explored in Part 2 Section A. The weaving metaphor is also well chosen, 
since weaving as a craft was universally known by Lucretius’ readership.147 Furthermore, 
aspects of weaving and woven cloth are extensively applicable to conjoined atoms: threads 
are the smallest parts of woven items, and if they are split any further, weaving becomes 
impossible; woven threads cohere until an external force (i.e. tearing or unravelling) is 
applied; a cloth is destroyed when its threads are untied; untied threads can be rewoven in 
different configurations to make new items; the characteristics of a cloth depend on the 
type(s) of threads used in its production, and the order and density in which these are 
interwoven. These aspects, which form the WEAVING thread, perfectly capture atomic 
compound structure and dissolution in the DRN, as Part 2 Section B will consider. 
 The question of why Lucretius chose two metaphors for his atoms can now be 
addressed. The birth metaphor is ideal for depicting atomic creation; the weaving metaphor 
for depicting compound structure. However, neither metaphor depicts both aspects. Each 
covers the conceptual shortcomings of the other, and both together explain Lucretius’ atoms. 
Lucretius may hint at this division in a reference to his indivisible bodies, ‘which we teach to 
be the seeds and first-threads of things’ (semina quae rerum primordiaque esse docemus – 
1.501). However, this phrase draws attention to a possible contradiction. The birth metaphor 
pictorialises atoms as essentially round seeds148, while by the weaving metaphor atoms are 
threads which are woven into compounds. But how can an atom be both a ball and a thread? 
 This apparent contradiction might be compared with the modern wave-particle 
duality model of light. Two contrasting and apparently incompatible theories depicting light 
as waves or particles were combined in the early twentieth century, and both models are 
now used to explain the properties and functions of light. Each model explains different 
functions, and both cannot be used together: when detected by interaction light acts like 
                                                          
146
 Lucretius frequently addresses the fixed nature of procreation (e.g. 1.159-73, 584-98) via the 
intertwined BOUNDARIES and LIFE-CYCLE threads – a correspondence considered in Part 3 Section A. 
147
 ‘The assumption of readers’ familiarity with the operations of weaving led to frequent allusions [by 
Greek and Roman authors], to which we should be alert’ – Snyder (1983) 39. 
148
 In 3.186-207, soul atoms are compared to round, smooth water atoms, and then by analogy to 
poppy seeds. Other types of atoms are more like wheat-ears – essentially rounded, but elongated and 
spiked. Similarly, oil atoms strain slowly through a sieve despite (we assume) being round, because 
they have hooked protrusions (2.392-7). By mapping Lucretius’ ‘atoms are seeds’ metaphor onto this 
explanation, the oil atoms are reminiscent of burdock seed, for example, which cling together and 
onto animals’ fur. 
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particles; when in motion it acts like waves.149 Each model is a metaphor, whereby light is 
conceptualised in terms of two macroscopic concepts (waves and balls).150 The wave 
metaphor highlights the wave-like properties of light and suppresses its particle-like 
properties; the particle metaphor vice versa.151 Similarly, Lucretius’ seeds metaphor 
highlights his atoms’ seed-like properties and suppresses their thread-like properties, while 
his threads metaphor does the opposite.152 The metaphors are probably not intended to be 
conceptualised simultaneously (although sometimes they are juxtaposed), but neither fully 
explains atoms without the other.153 Parts 2 and 3 will consider in more detail how the two 
metaphors complement one another, and occasionally combine to explain more complex 
concepts. 
 In fact, Lucretius’ atomic term primordia bridges the gap between the two 
metaphors. The translation ‘first-threads’ captures its weaving meaning, but the prefix prim- 
also suggests a creative aspect (as, for example, corpora prima). Expanding the metaphor, 
the first threads (i.e. warp threads) mark the beginning of weaving, the creation of a cloth or 
garment.154 This plays a broader role in Lucretius’ atomic theory, since not only are the warp 
threads the starting-point (technically the ‘starting border’) of weaving, but they also dictate 
what sort of weave will result (in other words the cloth’s growth and resulting form), 
depending on their configuration.155 In an atomic sense, the configuration of primordia 
dictates the form and qualities of the things they create,156 which further explains the ‘fixed 
birth and growth’ of things, depicted by the intertwined LIFE-CYCLE and BOUNDARIES threads.157 
The nature of a thing, animate or inanimate, is fixed as soon as its creation (or weaving) is 
                                                          
149
 The two theories are now applied to all types of radiation, and also to matter itself. Eisburg & 
Resnick (1985) 62-3 in their explanation paraphrase Niels Bohr as follows: ‘The wave and particle 
models are complementary; if a measurement proves the wave character of radiation or matter, then 
it is impossible to prove the particle character in the same measurement, and conversely. […] 
Furthermore, our understanding of radiation, or of matter, is incomplete unless we take into account 
measurements which reveal the wave aspects and also those that reveal the particle aspects.’. In fact 
the two models (interacting particles and moving waves) have recently been observed simultaneously 
through microscopic imaging; Piazza et al. (2015). 
150
 See Bump (1985) 445 and 446. 
151
 Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 164-6. 
152
 Pender (2000) notes the same approach to metaphor in Plato. 
153
 The mind is in fact capable, via the process of ‘blending’ (a central theory of cognitive linguistics), of 
accommodating opposites in a single thought. For the concept of blending, see especially Fauconnier 
& Turner (2003). They remark (p.29) that ‘often the point of the blend is not to obscure 
incompatibilities but, in a fashion, to have at once something and its opposite’. 
154
 Weaving as a process is inextricably associated with beginnings; Nagy (2002) 79. 
155
 Indeed we can tell which weaves were used in ancient weaving from surviving examples of starting 
borders; Hoffmann (1964) 151-83; see also Wild (1970) 55-6. 
156
 Explored in Part 2 Section B. 
157
 See Part 3 Section A. 
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initiated. The single term primordia marks the convergence of the LIFE-CYCLE, BOUNDARIES and 
WEAVING threads to depict the fixed nature of things.  
 Lucretius uses his first ‘mission statement’ (1.50-61) to introduce the conceptual LIFE-
CYCLE and WEAVING threads in his theory of atomic union. These threads persist throughout 
the epic, and are combined (or rather, interwoven) with others to explain the central 
theories of Lucretius’ science. The importance of understanding these metaphors is 
underlined in this passage. He gains the reader’s attention:  
 
quod superest, vacuas auris animumque sagacem 50 
semotum a curis adhibe veram ad rationem, 
ne mea dona tibi studio disposta fideli, 
intellecta prius quam sint, contempta relinquas. 
       (1.50-53)158 
 
Then he lays out, in his atomic vocabulary, his principal threads – LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING. ratio 
here might even represent Lucretius’ ‘rationale’ or ‘methodology’ – specifically of metaphor, 
which the subsequent lines (1.54-7) exemplify. The reader, by applying ‘open ears and keen 
judgement’ to the birth and weaving metaphors, will gain increased understanding of 
Lucretius’ atomic theory. The same applies to the metaphors of his other threads.159 This 
opening ‘mission statement’ is much more than ‘a very compendious syllabus of the 
poem’.160 Rather, it alerts the reader to Lucretius’ methodology, directing them towards 
getting the most out of the DRN. Metaphor is as essential to Lucretius’ philosophy as the 
science it explains. Noticing its importance underlines the consistent, introductory nature of 
the prologue. The correspondence highlighted by Lucretius between ‘woven’ atoms and his 
‘woven’ exposition invites us to consider the prologue – the starting point for the growth of 
his poem – as a ‘starting border’.161 Just as warp threads on a loom (or atomic first-threads in 
a compound) dictate, by their type and configuration, the form of the item they produce, so 
the prologue’s content and structure – including the conceptual threads laid down in it – 
dictate the content of the epic. 
 
Epicurus: breaker of boundaries 
                                                          
158
 Translated pp.34-5. 
159
 Elsewhere, concentration on proofs themselves is required for the reader to sense and understand 
the process they depict: Schrijvers (1970) 145-6. 
160
 Bailey (1947) 604. 
161
 For the relevance of the starting border to poetic composition, see Fanfani & Harlizius-Klück 
(forthcoming 2016). 
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The passage following the ‘mission statement’ introduces the BOUNDARIES thread. Here 
Lucretius depicts the oppressive force of religio looming menacingly over mankind (1.62-5). It 
has previously been conquered by Epicurus (depicted as a general – 1.66-79),162 but has risen 
again owing to man’s return to ignorance. In the DRN Lucretius will set about vanquishing 
religio again, and following this passage Lucretius uses an emotive portrayal of Iphianassa’s 
sacrifice to persuade the reader to be his ally. Next, a more direct appeal urges the reader to 
avoid becoming a future victim of religio (tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore, vatum / 
terriloquis victus dictis, desciscere quaeres – 1.102-3). The first victor Epicurus reappears in 
the prologues to Books 3, 5 and 6, casting a long shadow over Lucretius’ work, and reminding 
the reader of the inspiration behind his didactic task. Thus the Book 1 prologue introduces 
another of the epic’s key themes. 
 The passage also introduces key metaphors, principally a persistent military 
metaphor (pervicit – 1.72; processit – 1.73;163 extra / […] moenia (1.72-3); refert nobis victor 
(1.75);164 subiecta / […] obterritur (1.78-9);165 victoria – 79), as General Epicurus conquers 
religio.166 As considered in the Introduction, military imagery, although not constituting a 
conceptual ‘thread’, frequently occurs in the DRN in a broad range of exempla, analogies and 
metaphors. An additional metaphor, from the BOUNDARIES thread, is couched in the military 
imagery as follows:167 
 
unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri,  75 
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique 
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens. 
       (1.75-8) 
[…] whence, as victor, he brings back the spoils to us: what can be born, 
what cannot; in short by what reasoning each thing might have a fixed 
limit of power, and a deep-set boundary post. 
 
Epicurus brings back the spoils of war: knowledge of the boundaries governing what can and 
cannot be born, and the limited power innate in each thing. This knowledge will help us 
combat religio, as Lucretius asserts later: nam si certam finem esse viderent / aerumnarum 
                                                          
162
 The Graius homo (66) is surely Epicurus (as Bailey (1947) and Brown (1984), both ad loc., argue), as 
the first (primum – 66) to use atomism to attack religio, and not one of the Presocratics (suggested by 
Edelstein (1940)). 
163
 OLD, procedo 1b: ‘(of military forces)’, quoting instances in Livy, Caesar and Sallust. 
164
 OLD, refero 1b: ‘(mil.) to bring back (the spoils of war from the enemy)’. 
165
 Cf. e.g. Verg. Aen. 6.853: parcere subiectis. 
166
 Davies (1931) 33-5; West (1969) 57-60. Godwin (1991) ad 6.32 notes the resumption of the military 
metaphor in quibus e portis occurri cuique deceret; see Bailey (1947) ad 6.32. 
167
 Davies and West overlook the boundaries metaphor here. De Lacy (1969) notes instead the concept 
of ‘limit’, one part of my BOUNDARIES gestalt; see Part 2 Section D. 
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homines, aliqua ratione valerent / religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum (1.107-9). In our 
passage finita potestas and alte terminus haerens embody the metaphor, together suggesting 
the boundaries of an empire, thus extending the military metaphor above.168 The phrase alte 
terminus haerens recurs at important points, describing the constancy of species as proof for 
unchangeable atoms (1.595-6), and representing an antidote to fear of the gods (5.89-90; 
6.65-6).  
 The preceding lines of our passage explain how Epicurus secured this knowledge: 
 
         […] sed eo magis acrem 
inritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta  70 
Naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret. 
ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra  
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi 
atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,  
       (1.69-74) 
[…] but [religio] provoked the shrewd vigour of his mind so much more 
that he desired to be the first to break open the tightly-fastened bolts 
of Nature’s gates. Therefore, the vigorous force of his mind won a 
convincing victory, and he advanced far beyond the flaming walls of 
the world and traversed the immeasurable universe with his mind and 
judgement […] 
 
By breaking Nature’s confining gates, Epicurus broke both the existing boundaries of human 
knowledge and the assumed boundary of the world, the flammantia moenia mundi (cf. 
2.1144; 5.454).169 The image is of city walls breached by General Epicurus, casting open the 
limitless universe (discussed in detail in 1.958-1051). 1.62-79 introduce the BOUNDARIES 
thread, which, responding to and expanding upon Epicurus’ πέρας (‘boundary’) and ἄπειρος 
(‘limitless’),170 depicts the various limits integral to his philosophy including the limitless 
universe and the limits restricting the birth of things. The latter concept represents the 
                                                          
168
 A terminus can refer to a boundary marker of a property (OLD 1) or the limit of a country or empire 
(2; e.g. Hor. Carm. 3.3.53), a sense activated here. The finita potestas would have been a prominent 
image in the contemporary public consciousness, owing to Pompey’s expansion of the Roman Empire, 
and subsequent triumph, after victory in the Mithridatic wars (61B.C.). Wiseman (1992) argues that 
from the same conflict elephants would also have been an appropriate contemporary image – thus 
explaining the inclusion of the ivory palisade image of 2.532-40.  
169
 The same concept appears in Epicurus’ letter to Pythocles, which describes our (or any) world as 
ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ (Ep. Pyth. 88). The 
OLD classifies the flammantia moenia mundi as the bounds of the world in (specifically) Epicurean 
philosophy. However, it is also attributed to Anaximander ([Plut.] Strom. 2; fr.121 KRS). Elsewhere in 
Latin (aside from Ov. Met. 2.401), Manilius employs the image in 1.486, 3.48, and especially 1.149-51, 
which depicts in Stoic terms how the four elements formed the world, suggesting that the image was 
not specifically Epicurean even in Lucretius’ time.  
170
 e.g. Ep. Hdt. 41-2, 45; Ep. Pyth. 89; Segal (1990) 113-4. 
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intertwining of the LIFE-CYCLE and BOUNDARIES threads, a crucial interaction recurrent 
throughout the DRN, which Part 3 will explore in detail. 
 
Methodology and metaphor in the second ‘mission statement’  
The remainder of the prologue further outlines Lucretius’ methodology, and part of his 
motivation for composing. The closing lines encapsulate and expand upon the Epicurean 
belief that visual evidence is the cornerstone of philosophical and scientific discovery.171 The 
passage also expands certain aspects of the PLEASURE and LIFE-CYCLE threads, particularly from 
the Venus prologue: 
 
nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta 
difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse, 
multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum 
propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem; 
sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas  140 
suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem 
suadet, et inducit noctes vigilare serenas 
quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum 
clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti, 
res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis. 
       (1.136-45) 
And I am not mistaken in mind that it is difficult to shed light upon the 
dark discoveries of the Greeks in Latin verse, most especially since it is 
necessary to produce new words on account of the utter poverty of the 
language and the novelty of the subject matter; but nevertheless your 
excellence and the hoped-for pleasure of sweet friendship persuades 
me to carry through whatever labour you wish, and leads me to spend 
clear nights awake, seeking by which words and by which poetry at last 
I might unfurl clear lights before your mind, by which you might see 
deeply, far into things concealed from view.  
 
The motivation behind Lucretius’ poetic undertaking is the pleasure of friendship (for 
Epicurus, the greatest requirement for living a complete life – RS 27)172 he hopes to gain from 
Memmius. This voluptas, which Venus represented in the prologue, persuades (suadet) and 
leads (inducit) Lucretius to compose his poem – just as Venus was seen to persuade Mars 
(suavis – 39) and lead animals to procreate (inducere – 16). The result, as in the image of the 
animals, is creation – this time of poetry. Furthermore, combining this passage with Lucretius’ 
appeal to Venus to be his socia in composing poetry (1.21-8), Lucretius’ intention is to attain 
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 Cf. Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 38, analysed pertinently by Asmis (1984) 83-103. 
172
 See Long (1986) 303-10 on Epicurean friendship. 
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pleasurable friendship by creating a pleasurable poem with Venus’ help. Again Venus is seen 
to be an appropriate addressee of the DRN. 
 Lucretius also explains his methodology further in this passage. Earlier he drew 
attention to the process of untying the facts of things by untying things into their atomic first-
threads. Here he explains another approach for depicting atoms: shining light on them to 
make them visible. He describes illuminating the ‘dark’ discoveries of his Greek 
predecessors,173 and laying forth lights by which his reader can see hidden things (i.e. atoms 
and their processes). This is crucial to Lucretius’ philosophy, since although sensory evidence 
is the unimpeachable standard of proof for Epicureans, atoms cannot be sensed.174 The lights 
in these images represent Lucretius’ explanations, and more specifically his visual exempla, 
analogies and metaphors, which form the spine of his clear poetry (lucida / carmina in 1.933-
4, which recalls clara lumina here). By mapping these onto atoms and their processes, 
Lucretius enables his reader to ‘see deeply, far into things’.175 Similar light metaphors recur 
throughout the DRN to depict this explanatory method. 
 This imagery extends to Lucretius’ preferred time of composition: noctes serenas, 
which suggest Lucretius’ ability to see into dark (or obscure) things.176 Lucretius’ calm nights 
of work contrast the wakeful nights of terror experienced by those ignorant of Epicureanism 
(1.132-5).177 Epicurean philosophy is a light exposing the dark fear of man, as summarised in 
the famous lines that follow: 
 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 
discutiant, sed Naturae species ratioque. 
       (1.146-8) 
Therefore, it is necessary not for the rays of the sun or the shining 
beams of daylight to shake off this terror and darkness of the mind, 
but rather Nature’s outward form and reasoning. 
   
                                                          
173
 Lucretius presumably has in mind both Epicurus and the Atomists. This is not false modesty, but 
genuine indebtedness to his predecessors. obscura is also closely related to caeca, used of atoms in 
1.277, 295, 328 etc. Brown (1984) ad loc. remarks: ‘The darkness is appropriate both to the difficulty 
of the subject and to the imperceptibility of nature’s processes at the atomic level’.  
174
 Townend (1965) 100-1; Schrijvers (1977); Lehoux (2013). 
175
 The con- prefix (OLD, con- 5) suggests intensity of action, thus convisere means ‘to see thoroughly’, 
or here ‘to see deeply’. As West (1969) 81 has it: ‘the Epicurean vision is not of the superficies but of 
the inner atomic constitution of everything in the Universe.’ 
176
 Nightingale (2007) terms this ‘night-vision’. 
177
 This passage is recalled in 2.55-61, where Lucretius describes men fearing in the light what children 
fear in the darkness, especially by the verbatim repetition of 1.146-8 in 2.59-61. In turn, 2.55-61 is 
repeated in 3.87-93 and 6.35-41, emphasising the importance to Lucretius’ philosophy of conquering 
darkness and fear. 
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Most editions of Lucretius print these lines as an introduction to the first argument. However, 
they most appropriately form the end of the prologue.178 Lucretius’ argument flows well: ‘I 
shall illuminate hidden things so you might see them clearly. This visual evidence and the 
knowledge of it – and not actual light – will dispel the darkness of fear’. Lucretius 
distinguishes carefully between actual light (radii solis and lucida tela diei) and the 
metaphorical light (clara lumina) he shines on hidden things. Daylight partially dispels fear by 
enabling us to see, but only the light of philosophy, informed by our ratio in interpreting 
Nature, can dispel fear completely. This is facilitated by Lucretius’ visual exempla and 
metaphors.179 
 Instead of sunlight, Lucretius’ remedy for fear is Naturae species ratioque. The 
translators take ratio and species with Naturae: ‘the outward appearance and inner workings 
of nature’ (Bailey, Latham), ‘the aspect and law of nature’ (Rouse), or ‘the face of nature and 
her laws’ (Melville). Yet this would be an unsatisfactory remedy, since the laws and evidence 
of Nature cannot overcome mental darkness and terror alone. Only a keen mind (cf. 1.50-1) 
can interpret them correctly. Therefore, as P. M. Brown observes, Naturae species ratioque 
carries a dual meaning: both Naturae species et Naturae ratio (‘The outward appearance and 
“rationale” of Nature’) and Naturae species, ratioque (‘The evidence transmitted by Nature, 
and our reasoning in interpreting it’).180 This interpretation clarifies the preceding lines. The 
light Lucretius sheds on the dark truths of the world is his portrayal of Naturae species 
ratioque, but, as in 1.51-3, the onus is partially on his reader, who must employ ratio to 
interpret Lucretius’ illumination correctly. 
 
                                                          
178
 Lucretius’ explanation of his methodology persists in these lines, while principium cuius hinc nobis 
exordia sumet (1.149) aptly introduces Lucretius’ first arguments. Also, igitur most frequently marks a 
conclusion, either in the middle or at the end of a paragraph (19 times combined, of 23 occurrences in 
Book 1). 
179
 West (1969) 80-2 and Snyder (1983) 43 read a weaving metaphor in radii (which also means 
‘shuttles’) and tela (‘loom’), supported by their appearance in a description of the loom (5.1351-3), the 
proximity of exordia in 1.149, and the weaving metaphor applied to sunlight in 5.267 and 389. The 
Latin resists this interpretation, since discutiant would jar with singular tela (as opposed to tela the 
plural of telum), even if forming a joint subject with plural radii. The purpose of a weaving metaphor is 
also questionable, and West does not provide an explanation. The phrase lucida tela occurs in the 
sense ‘flashing spears’ in 4.845 – an entirely appropriate image for sunlight in 1.146-8, and also 
supporting the sense of ‘striking out’ fear. 
180
 Lucretius’ phrase is thus distinguished from φυσιολογία, which Sedley (1999) 229 argues Lucretius 
is translating, since this only means ‘logos about physis’ and not the logos possessed by physis. My 
translation, ‘Nature’s outward form and reasoning’, captures the ambiguity. Natura and ratio are key, 
but separate, elements of Lucretius’ empirical approach, as emphasised in 1.497-8 (sed quia vera 
tamen ratio Naturaque rerum / cogit […]); see Brown (1984) ad loc. and Garani (2007) 18. This echoes 
Friedrich Max Müller’s assertion (1882, Lecture VII), following Epicurus, that reason helped language 
to develop: ‘General notions are not formed at random, but according to law, that law being our 
reason within corresponding to the reason without – to the reason, if I may so call it, of nature’.  
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The prologue to the DRN is intricately composed and carefully calculated to introduce the 
epic’s key themes, scientific theories and metaphors.181 Most importantly, four key 
conceptual threads have been introduced – PLEASURE, LIFE-CYCLE, WEAVING, and BOUNDARIES – 
and another, LIQUIDS, has been briefly hinted at. This Part, like Lucretius’ prologue, has 
introduced the conceptual threads of the DRN, enabling more detailed analysis and 
understanding of the remainder of the epic in the rest of the thesis. Parts 2 and 3 will show 
the threads to be universal, depicting the scientific laws and processes governing everything 
from the most microscopic to the most macroscopic level. They embody the homogeneity of 
Lucretius’ materialist science,182 and show the two most common translations of the title – 
‘On the Nature of Things’ and ‘On the Nature of the Universe’ – to amount to the same thing.  
 
  
                                                          
181
 Including the military metaphor, frequently employed in visual exempla in the DRN, and the light 
metaphor, which depicts Lucretius’ processes of enquiry and methodology of argumentation. 
182
 Analogy has the same effect, as Hardie (1986) 220 argues. 
46 
 
Part 2 
 
Tracking the Individual Threads 
 
Lucretius’ five conceptual threads – LIFE-CYCLE, WEAVING, LIQUIDS, BOUNDARIES and PLEASURE – 
have been introduced to varying degrees in the Book 1 prologue. This Part will individually 
map their development throughout the rest of the epic and show that each thread is 
consistently applied within rigidly-defined parameters. In this way, each thread creates a 
framework within which new and more complex correspondences can be created. This 
didactic approach is appropriate to Epicureanism, which holds that first principles must be 
established before being applied to more complex concepts (Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 35-7). The 
development of the threads presupposes the reader’s understanding of them, since they 
become more allusive as the epic progresses, often tying together disparate theories with 
just one or two choice terms. Furthermore, as the threads progress they expand and modify 
theories established earlier in the epic. Evidently the more attentive reader will benefit most 
from this methodology of exposition – although even those who spot and understand only 
certain instances will grasp some aspects of Lucretian universalisation. The reader who has 
noticed and understood the threads as they are introduced will gain further meaning when 
they are applied in new contexts, and even apply later occurrences retrospectively to extract 
new meaning from earlier theories.  
 To optimise this process of comprehension, Lucretius introduces further aspects of 
the threads in the first arguments and beyond, broadening them to uncover several 
fundamental theories of his science. Thus the gestalt nature (a whole consisting of 
thematically consistent parts) of each thread becomes apparent, and the reader becomes 
conversant with each thread’s vocabulary. Thematically-related terms – both metaphorical 
and literal – within each thread are often introduced in dense collocations (as we saw with 
Lucretius’ atomic vocabulary), signposting clearly how they will be applied later in the DRN. 
Alongside terms with a meaning clearly related to a given thread, Lucretius introduces terms 
that carry only a broadly similar metaphorical or conceptual meaning, but whose primary or 
even secondary meaning supports the thread in that context. A term introduced in this way 
may reasonably be considered as part of the thread it is introduced alongside, and to support 
that thread whenever the term occurs later in the DRN (as we saw in the prologue with verbs 
of leading and striking being incorporated into the PLEASURE thread). This interpretation may 
risk West’s ‘pansemantic fallacy’, that every word can carry all or any of its meanings in a 
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given context.183 However, when a word is introduced in a crucial context with an 
unexpected or secondary meaning activated by juxtaposition with established terms of a 
given thread, it is probable that Lucretius intends his reader to recall this meaning when it 
occurs later in a similar context. The employment of the threads in the early stages of the 
DRN sets the tone for their development.  
 This Part will consider each thread in turn, starting with the more prominent (in the 
order LIFE-CYCLE, WEAVING, LIQUIDS, BOUNDARIES, PLEASURE), and establish the breadth of their 
correspondences. The presentation of each thread in this Part is dictated by the nature and 
employment of each thread in the DRN. In general, the threads’ gestalt nature is suited to 
thematic analysis, taking each main part in turn. However, since the development of the 
threads is important, a broadly linear approach will be applied to each principal part – 
although at times this is affected slightly by Lucretius’ occasionally non-linear approach 
(partially caused by his preference for ‘anticipation of thought’).184 The exception will be the 
LIFE-CYCLE thread, which will be mapped in essentially linear order, because its most 
interesting aspect is its broad development from microscopic to macroscopic applications as 
the DRN progresses. The primary focus will be on the threads’ role of explaining scientific and 
philosophical theories, with only brief comment on how the threads depict Lucretius’ 
methodology of exposition and argumentation, which the Epilogue will consider more fully. 
 Since Part 3 addresses instances where the threads intertwine, Part 2 will only 
outline the essence of each thread, the fundamental theories they represent, and how 
Lucretius guides his reader to understand them. This follows Lucretius’ approach of 
establishing the threads first before considering complex concepts later. In this Part, several 
apparently confusing or contradictory passages will be clarified, and Lucretius’ 
methodological technique of universalisation, and his logical exposition, will be highlighted. 
The threads will be shown to a large extent to form and dictate the structure of the DRN, to 
support and direct the development of arguments, and, by explaining the central theories of 
Lucretius’ philosophy, to guide the reader on the path to vera ratio.   
                                                          
183
 West (1995) 161, in which he denies that the sexual sense of sinus in Hor. Carm. 1.33.16 is activated 
in the context. Lucretius, who understood the importance of employing words to avoid 
misunderstanding (see Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 37-8; Asmis (1984) 19-34), would not condone 
pansemanticism. 
184
 This, labelled by Büchner (1936) as ‘die verfrühte Andeutung’, is taken to be an application of 
Epicurus’ προλήψις (the concentration of the mind on sense impressions); see Schrijvers (1970). Bailey 
(1947) 165-8 attributes Lucretius’ non-linear approach to his poetic mind. Classen (1968) esp. 80-7, 
rather more harshly accuses Lucretius of begging the question by these anticipations. Asmis (1983) 36-
66 offers a kinder assessment, for example (p.37): ‘Lucretius is in control of the logical sequence, but 
[…] has chosen to present his doctrines in an order which is not strictly logically correct’. 
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Section A 
 
The LIFE-CYCLE Thread 
 
The abundant imagery in the Venus prologue announced the importance of the LIFE-CYCLE 
thread in his epic. We have seen how Venus-voluptas governs Natura in the birth of things, 
and that Natura is the force which causes everything to be created and destroyed through 
atomic combination and dissolution. Knowledge of how birth and death occur can dispel fear, 
and this was Epicurus’ gift to man. Lucretius passes on this knowledge to his reader by 
expanding the LIFE-CYCLE thread in Book 1 and beyond. This Section will outline the principal 
applications of this thread when used on its own, mapping its linear development to track 
the cycle of ‘life’ from an atomic to a macroscopic level – as per Lucretius’ scientific 
worldview. 
  
Nothing is born from nothing (1.159-214) 
The DRN began with an extended image of birth, and birth is prominent in the first 
arguments. In the lines directly following the prologue, Lucretius translates Epicurus’ 
principal law: 
 
πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. 
       (Ep. Hdt. 38) 
 
principium cuius hinc nobis exordia sumet, 
nullam rem e nilo gigni divinitus umquam.  150 
       (1.149-50) 
Hence, the first subject which begins our web of discourse is that 
nothing is ever born by divine agency from nothing. 
 
Lucretius begins his argument by capturing the birth sense of Epicurus’ γίνεται in gigni, and 
thus picks up the LIFE-CYCLE thread from 1.56 (omnis Natura creet res auctet alatque). He also 
embellishes Epicurus’ law with the addition of divinitus, which constitutes a logical 
progression from the passages on Iphianassa (1.80-101), and the fear of death and the gods 
(1.102-35, 146-8) in the prologue.185 The next lines (1.151-8) ease the transition, and reiterate 
                                                          
185
 Solomon (2004) 268-70 considers the flow from these arguments. Bailey (1947) 625 attributes 
divinitus to Lucretius’ ‘vehement anti-theological bias’, although he does also concede that Epicurus in 
RS 11 describes the refutation of religio as the reason for studying nature – and thus Clay (1983) 113 
considers Lucretius’ addition to represent ‘a perfect awareness of the antitheological implications’ of 
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the reasons behind this scientific discourse, i.e. to rid the reader of fear caused by religio. 
Lucretius expands upon 1.150 by stating that he will undertake to prove that ‘nothing can be 
born’ from nothing (nil posse creari / de nilo – 155-6), and to discover ‘from where each thing 
can be born (unde queat res quaeque creari – 157) and how everything occurs ‘without the 
workings of the gods’ (opera sine divom – 158). The gods then disappear from the first 
argument. However, perhaps Lucretius intends his reader, when they encounter a birth term 
here, to recall these lines and know that the gods are unconnected with creation. This process 
of comprehension is enabled by the LIFE-CYCLE thread.  
 At this point the concept of ‘birth’ is used primarily metaphorically, referring to all 
things (i.e. animate and inanimate). In the subsequent lines the emphasis seems to shift to 
the literal birth of animals: 
 
nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu’ rebus 
omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.  160 
e mari primum homines, e terra posset oriri 
squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere caelo; 
armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum, 
incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent;  
nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent,  165 
sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent. 
quippe ubi non essent genitalia corpora cuique, 
qui posset mater rebus consistere certa? 
at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur, 
inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit  170 
materies ubi inest cuiusque et corpora prima; 
atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni, 
quod certis in rebus inest secreta facultas. 
       (1.159-73) 
For if they came to be from nothing, every kind of thing could be born 
from all things, nothing would require a seed.186 First men could arise 
from the sea, the scaly tribes from the earth, and birds could hatch 
from the sky; cattle and other herds, every kind of wild animal, would, 
with unfixed birth, occupy cultivated land and desert; nor would the 
same fruits be accustomed to remain on the same trees, but they 
would switch around: everything could bear everything. Indeed, since 
each thing would not have generative bodies, how could a fixed 
mother for things exist? But now because each is born from fixed 
seeds, the place in which the mother-substance and first bodies of 
each are inside, from these each is born and comes out into the 
borders of light; and by this evidence everything cannot be born from 
everything, because there is a hidden supply in fixed things. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
this principal theory. It seems to me that maintaining a logical flow is a more important contributing 
factor in this addition. 
186
 This is Lucretius’ translation of Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 38, πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ’ ἂν σπερμάτων γε 
οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον. 
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The range and variety of birth words in this passage is striking. Alongside creo and gigno we 
see fio, nascor, orior, fero and enascor;187 a variety of birth nouns – genus (from gigno), partus 
and mater; and the recurrence of three atomic terms of birth meaning – semina, genitalia 
corpora and materies. The transitions in this analogy, which proves creation from atoms by 
displaying the creation of living things from fixed mothers and seeds, are extraordinarily deft. 
The argument moves seamlessly from ‘things’ (rebus – 159, answering rem in 150 and res in 
157) to animate beings (starting with homines in 161). The shift is eased by ex omnibu’ rebus / 
omne genus nasci posset (159-60), in which genus denotes any ‘kind’ of res, before later 
referring specifically to living things (162, 163).188  
 However, semine in 160 recalls its atomic meaning from 1.59, and, while seminibus in 
169 refers specifically to biological seed, we cannot, since it occurs alongside genitalia 
corpora (167) and materies (171), avoid thinking of the programmatic list of atomic 
vocabulary in 1.55-61.189 The same connection is drawn by mater (referring to the literal 
mother of each animal)190 and materies (the atomic ‘mother-substance’ from which all things 
are created).191 The transitions and overlapping meanings allow Lucretius, as Sedley observes, 
to allude to atoms before he has proved their existence.192 They also blur the lines between 
animal birth and the ‘birth’ of inanimate things, appealing to the reader’s understanding of 
animal birth to prove that everything is ‘born’ from ‘fixed seed, according to ‘species’. The 
passage is an especially compact example of a conceptual thread being applied both 
metaphorically and literally to strengthen an argument. 
 The final transition between 169-71 and 172-3 – that just as animals are born from 
fixed materies, so too are all things – reveals that the birth terms pervading the preceding 
lines are intended to refer simultaneously to literal animal birth (explicitly) and to 
                                                          
187
 We might also include erumpo here. Although this technically means ‘burst forth’, when applied 
here to the way in which birds are born, hatching should immediately spring to mind; see Brown 
(1984) ad loc. 
188
 Bailey (1947) ad 1.159 misses this transition, labelling omnibu’ […] omne genus ‘an overstatement’ 
of Epicurus’ πᾶν ἐκ παντός. 
189
 Sedley (1998) 194. 
190
 Solomon (2004) 270 interprets this as an early introduction to the Mater Terra passage (1.250-64) – 
perhaps following Bailey (1947) ad 1.168 (‘mater in Lucretius is normally “the earth”, which is “the 
mother of all things”’). This takes our passage out of context. In the previous lines Lucretius states that 
if everything came from everything, men and animals could be born from anything, fruits from any 
tree – i.e. none from their ‘fixed’ mother. Here mater here means ‘mother’ in its strictest sense. 
191
 See discussion pp.31-2. 
192
 Sedley (1998) 193. 
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metaphorical inanimate ‘birth’ (implicitly).193 Therefore, when these terms later explain 
creation from atoms, a birth metaphor is surely intended. Far from poetic variatio to avoid 
repetition of gigno, creo etc., the broad range of birth terms in our passage creates a closely-
related terminological group, whose birth meaning also applies in an atomic context. 
Lucretius has extracted the metaphorical potential from Epicurus’ γίγνομαι (used to describe 
creation from atoms) and greatly expanded it. In the opening sections of the letter to 
Herodotus (concerned with atoms and εἴδωλα), the repetition of γίγνομαι and its derivatives 
(γίνεται, ἐγἰνετο – 38; γίνονται – 42; γένοιτο – 45; γίνεσθαι – 46a (twice) and 48; γένεσις – 48; 
γεννητικοὶ – 48) tempers any intended metaphor by a lack of variety – in stark contrast with 
Lucretius. Just as in his atomic vocabulary, Lucretius has extracted a birth metaphor latent in 
Epicurus and expanded it with a broad array of terms. Through the LIFE-CYCLE thread, 
Lucretius has associated atoms with the seeds that create living things, heightening his 
reader’s understanding of this cornerstone doctrine by a tight visual analogy. 
 The LIFE-CYCLE thread persists throughout this first argument, extending the analogy 
between living things being born from seeds and all things being born from atoms. The next 
41 lines, in addition to several of the twelve birth words of the previous passage,194 introduce 
an additional fourteen terms of birth and growth.195 Of these, many have an obvious birth 
meaning: exorior (180, 187);196 fetus (‘produce’ – 193, 209);197 natura (= here ‘inborn nature’ 
– 194); Natura (199); propago (195).198 Many others have an obvious meaning of growth or 
nourishment, both closely associated with birth: augeo (184); cresco (185, 189, 190); 
grandesco (191); alo (191; cf. 1.56). Others have an implicit birth meaning activated by the 
context: concilium (= here ‘union’ – 183) and coeo (lit. ‘coming together’, here in a sexual 
sense – 185) – both depicting the coming together of atoms; paro (= here ‘bring into being’ – 
                                                          
193
 This is a more satisfactory reading than that of Bailey (1947) 628, who states that Lucretius’ atomic 
terms are used in this passage ‘with the wider meaning of “seeds” or “germs” or “primary particles”’ in 
the manner of Anaxagoras, Empedocles or Thales. Lucretius’ argument is more extensive and less 
generic than Bailey’s rather superficial reading allows. 
194
 i.e. fio (180, 186, 205, 214), semen (176, 185, 189), orior (204, 212), genitalis (182), creo (177, 206), 
materies (191, 203), gigno (204). 
195
 I agree with Bailey’s assertion (1947, p.627) that ‘growth in Lucretius’ view was not different from 
birth; it is the addition to the thing of further appropriate seeds, like in kind to those which produced 
its birth.’ 
196
 Cf. 1.5, 23. 
197
 OLD, fetus
2
 can either denote the bearing of young (1a-c) or fruits (2), or the offspring (3a-b) or fruit 
(4a-b) itself. 
198
 As Brown (1984) ad loc. notes, this can denote plant propagation (OLD, propago
1
 1) – recalling the 
horticultural metaphor of semen – or, metaphorically as here, animal procreation (2a-b). 
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199);199 effero and profero (both here = ‘bring forth’ in a birth sense – 179, 207);200 and 
fecundus (= ‘fertile’ – 211).201 In particular, coeo and concilium in the phrases seminis ad 
coitum and genitali concilio can carry no meaning other than atoms conjoining in ‘sexual 
union’.202 Furthermore, their occurrence alongside so many birth terms in this prominent 
passage encourages us to read a birth meaning when they occur later – especially in a similar 
birth context. In the prologue Lucretius depicted the birth of animals, and later ‘birth’ from 
atoms;203 here an analogy draws the connection more tightly. By tracking the LIFE-CYCLE thread 
between these passages, a clearer thematic progression between the prologue and first 
arguments has been discerned. 
 
Nothing is destroyed into nothing (1.215-64) 
Lucretius’ second argument translates the second half of Epicurus’ first law and completes 
Nature’s dual roles of creation and destruction expressed in 1.56-7: 
 
καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει 
τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο. 
       (Ep. Hdt. 38) 
 
huc accedit uti quidque in sua corpora rursum  215 
dissoluat Natura neque ad nilum interemat res. 
nam si quid mortale e cunctis partibus esset, 
ex oculis res quaeque repente erepta periret; 
       (1.215-8) 
Add to this that Nature unties each thing into its own bodies again and 
does not destroy things to nothing. For if something were mortal in all 
its parts, each thing would perish and be snatched away from our sight 
in an instant; […] 
                                                          
199
 OLD, paro 2, under which this instance is listed (cf. also materies ut suppeditet rebus reparandis – 
1.547). The verb is cognate with pario, whose first meaning in the OLD is ‘to give birth to, bear’, cf. 
Plaut. Amph. 480, Truc.18; Ter. An. 464.  
200
 OLD, effero 6, ‘yield (crops)’; profero 3 (first in Naev. fr. com. 18-19 War.). 
201
 OLD, fecundus 1a-d. salio (187) and submitto (193) also conceptually support the birth image. 
202
 As argued by Sedley (1998) 196. Adams (1982) 178-9 attributes the first sexual application of coeo 
to Lucr. 4.1055 (of sexual intercourse). However, the instance in 1.185 carries metaphorical sexual 
connotations (brought out by semen). Its derived noun coitus can mean ‘sexual intercourse or union’ 
(OLD, coitus 3; TLL, coitus 2 – commixtio sexualis, concubitus; e.g. Ov. Met. 7.709 and Sen. Phaedr. 
160), a sense which is transferred onto coetus (OLD, coitus: ‘n.b. see COETUS, which is not 
distinguishable in some cases; TLL, coetus II – actio venere, amore coeundi, coitus; e.g. Sil. 1.638 and 
Stat. Theb. 4.214). concilium meanwhile is said carry a sexual meaning only in later Latin, as in TLL s. v. 
concilium, I.3 de concubitu: Arn. 2.16, per corporalibus conciliis procreant). However, TLL, loc. cit. also 
suggests a euphemistic usage in Plaut. Mil. 1013, socium tuorum conciliorum, referring to the activity 
of lenocinium. With this, the sexual context and the similar metaphor applied to coeo in mind, we 
might conclude that concilium also carries a metaphorical sexual meaning here. 
203
 Sedley (1998) 195 observes, ‘the language of biological procreation is being exploited to the 
utmost’. 
53 
 
 
These lines interrupt the analogy of living creatures in the previous argument, turning back to 
‘things’ (res) in general, which are able to ‘die’. In expressing this, Lucretius directly translates 
Epicurus’ ἐφθείρετο and ἀπωλώλει (= interemat and periret),204 but again extends the 
metaphor, with mortalis (associated with living things)205 applied to res in general. The range 
is expanded in the subsequent lines with exitium (224), peremo (226), immortalis (236), 
conficio (239) and letum (241).206 Concurrent birth terms complete the cycle of birth and 
death – specifically semen (here in the atomic sense, though retaining vestiges of ‘biological 
seed’ – 221), materies (226, 245, 249), genus (227), generatim (227, 229),207 in lumina vitae 
(227; cf. 1.5, 22), ingenui (230),208 pascit (231),209 natura (= ‘inborn nature’ – 236), alit atque 
auget (229; cf. Nature’s role in 1.56). These lines refer to both the restoration of living things 
after death (227-8) and the constant regeneration of inanimate things (the sea and rivers – 
230-1; the stars – 231).  
 The correspondence is then clearly tied together:  
 
omnia enim debet, mortali corpore quae sunt, 
infinita aetas consumpse anteacta diesque. 
quod si in eo spatio atque anteacta aetate fuere 
e quibus haec rerum consistit summa refecta,  235 
immortali sunt natura praedita certe.   
haud igitur possunt ad nilum quaeque reverti. 
       (1.232-7) 
For infinite time and days past must have consumed everything that is 
of mortal body. But if in that time-span and in time past there have 
been things from which this sum of things, having been remade, 
consists, they are certainly endowed with immortal nature. Therefore, 
nothing can return to nothing. 
 
Eternal, immortal substance must be required for all things, being mortal, to be created and 
re-created. The reader should fully understand that inanimate atomic compounds and 
composite bodies undergo the same birth-death cycle as living things. This perpetual cycle of 
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 And also the weaving term διελύετο (= dissoluat – see n.141). For the weaving and death 
correspondence here, see p.148. 
205
 OLD, mortalis
1
 1 (e.g. Cic. Sest. 143, of human body; Luc. 21, of man); the term is especially 
evocative of man, owing to the noun mortalis, used to distinguish man from gods (OLD, mortalis
2
 1). 
206
 All, apart from immortalis, used of the gods (as distinct from humans) (OLD, immortalis 1b, 3), 
frequently associated with living things, or specifically humans: OLD, exitium 2 (also 1, of political and 
personal ruin); perimo (= peremo) 1b; conficio 16 (also 11, of living out a time period); letum 1a-b, 2. 
207
 See Part 3 Section A for genus and generatim. 
208
 Denotes a restriction of birth: OLD, ingenuus 1, ‘indigenous’; 2a-b, ‘freeborn’. 
209
 Here metaphorically of the ether ‘nourishing’ the stars. OLD, pasco 1, ‘to feed, pasture’; 2-3, ‘to 
provide food for’; 4, ‘to nurture’. 
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things being created from and destroyed into atoms is supported by Lucretius’ theory of flux, 
expressed by the intertwined LIFE-CYCLE and LIQUIDS threads (for which, see Part 3 Section A) – 
vividly depicted in an extended image of creation initiated by rain from Pater Aether (1.250-
64).210 For now, it will suffice to note the concluding lines: 
  
haud igitur penitus pereunt quaecumque videntur, 
quando alid ex alio reficit Natura, nec ullam 
rem gigni patitur nisi morte adiuta aliena. 
       (1.262-4) 
Therefore anything that seems to does not completely die, since 
Nature restores one thing from another, nor does she allow anything to 
be born unless benefitted by another’s death. 
 
The cycle of birth and death is embodied in the alternating triplet pereunt-gigni-morte, and 
the repetition of pereunt from the analogy’s opening line (250). The dual roles of Natura are 
reemphasised, particularly in the balanced final line. As a whole, the complementary first 
arguments (1.150-264) introduce, through the LIFE-CYCLE thread, the essence of Lucretius’ 
theory of creation and dissolution. 
 
Atomic ‘mothers’ and mortal compounds (1.483-624) 
The lengthy explanation of the nature of atoms marks the first solely metaphorical application 
of the LIFE-CYCLE thread, and the full detachment of semina from sustained images of the birth 
of living things (semina quae rerum primordiaque esse docemus, / unde omnis rerum nunc 
constet summa creata – 501-2). Here the thread distinguishes between eternal, indestructible 
atoms, and the things they create, which are born and die: 
 
praeterea quoniam genitis in rebus inanest, 
materiem circum solidam constare necessest, 
       (1.511-2) 
Besides, since there is void in things that are born, solid mother-
substance must exist around it, […] 
 
praeterea nisi materies aeterna fuisset,  540 
antehac ad nilum penitus res quaeque redissent, 
                                                          
210
 The image recurs in 2.991-1022, in which Mother Earth ‘gives birth’ (parit – 994) to crops and 
subsequently (parit – 995) all animals that feed on them, which in turn grow and ‘propagate’ 
(propagant – 997) – a cycle that proves the Earth is rightly called Mother (998). The cycle also shows 
that death is impermanent, since the constituent materies returns to the Earth or the Ether to be 
reassembled again in sexual union (coetum – 1003; coniungit – 1004). For the sexual sense of coniungo, 
see Adams (1982) 179-80, which offers Lucr. 5.853 (feminaque ut maribus coniungi possit) and Hor. 
Carm. 1.33.8 (ingentur caprae lupis) as examples; for coetus see n.202. 
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de niloque renata forent quaecumque videmus. 
at quoniam supra docui nil posse creari 
de nilo neque quod genitum est ad nil revocari, 
esse inmortali primordia corpore debent,  545 
dissolui quo quaeque supremo tempore possint, 
materies ut suppeditet rebus reparandis. 
       (1.540-7) 
Besides, unless the mother-substance had been eternal, all things 
would beforehand have returned utterly to nothing, and whatever we 
see would have been reborn from nothing. But since I have taught 
above that nothing can be born from nothing, nor what has been born 
be recalled to nothing, the first-threads must be of immortal body into 
which each thing might be untied at the last moment, so mother-
substance is available for the restoration of things. 
Lucretius distinguishes his atoms, which are eternal and immortal, from the things they 
create, which are born and, having been destroyed, reborn. The contrast is pointedly made 
with materies – the ‘mother-substance’ that ‘gives birth’ to other things (cf. also 1.516-9). 
These passages are representative of 1.512-633, in which materies occurs nine times211 (of 61 
occurrences in Books 1 and 2) at a rate of one every 13.6 lines. The only two passages with a 
greater concentration (1.171-249, 986-1051)212 both centre specifically on creation and 
destruction, suggesting that materies is specifically intended to evoke birth and re-birth (cf. 
1.171) as a central part of the LIFE-CYCLE thread.  
 
The debunking of other philosophers (1.635-920) 
Lucretius employs aspects of his LIFE-CYCLE thread effectively to portray and disprove the 
theories of the Presocratics Heraclitus (1.635-704), Empedocles (1.705-829) and Anaxagoras 
(1.830-920).213 First, Lucretius summarises Heraclitus’ central theory in the language of his 
own atomic theory, as all things being ‘born’ (creatae – 645) from fire. Extending the 
metaphor, he offers a counter-argument, that if the (sexual?)214 ‘union’ (coetu – 666; cf. 
1.185) of fire made everything, fire ‘would die to nothing’ (occidet ad nilum – 668)  in the 
process. This would be impossible, because everything ‘would be born from nothing’ (e nilo 
[…] creantur – 669; cf. de niloque renata vigescat – 674) – an impossibility in Lucretius’ 
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 512, 516, 518, 540, 547, 552, 565, 591, 633. 
212
 Seven in each, at one every 11.3 lines, and one every 9.4 lines respectively. 
213
 Explaining others’ theories in a way that facilitates easy dismissal is a feature of ancient criticism of 
other philosophers; see Tatum (1984). 
214
 See n.202. 
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worldview (1.215-64). For Lucretius, the carefully defined constraints of his LIFE-CYCLE thread 
are incompatible with Heraclitus’ theory, and therefore disprove it.215 
 Lucretius dismisses Empedocles’ four elements in the same way, referring to them as 
‘born’ (nativa – 754) and ‘made of mortal body’ (mortali cum corpore funditus – 755). He then 
recycles almost verbatim the proof against Heraclitus from 674 to refute Empedocles’ theory 
of unlimited division: 
 
debeat ad nilum iam rerum summa reverti 
de niloque renata vigescere copia rerum 
       (1.756-7) 
the sum of things should by now have returned to nothing, and the 
abundance of things is reborn and grows strong from nothing. 
 
Again the LIFE-CYCLE thread, drawing on 1.215-64, disproves an opposing theory in Lucretius’ 
own terms. Later Lucretius argues that Empedocles’ four elements cannot be the building 
blocks of things, if the elements themselves ‘are born from one another’ (alternis gignuntur – 
767). gigno pointedly undermines Empedocles’ theory, since birth entails mortality and so the 
four elements, having died, would be unable to create new things (cf. 1.511-19 and 540-
50)216. If, on the other hand, they do not change when they join in (sexual) union (coire – 770; 
concilio – 772, cf. 1.183), nothing different could ‘be born’ (creata – 773) from them. This 
reductio ad absurdum (with a suppressed counter-argument, ‘but things are born…’) 
simultaneously undermines Empedocles’ theory and strengthens Lucretius’ LIFE-CYCLE thread. 
 Lucretius employs a slightly different technique to discredit Anaxagoras’ 
homoeomeria, expressing a reductio ad absurdum with condescending diminutives (pauxillis 
atque minutis – 835 and 836; terris parvis – 840), odd-sounding plurals (ignibus, umoribus – 
841), unusual imagery (auri micis, ‘grains of gold’ – 839)217 and a particularly sceptical putat 
(839). When juxtaposed with creari (837), coeuntibu’ (838) and concrescere (840), words from 
the LIFE-CYCLE thread that express solid truths in Lucretius’ science, Anaxagoras’ theory 
becomes more ridiculous. Later Lucretius employs his atomic term semina to argue that fire 
breaking out in a forest is not caused by fire within the wood (as Anaxagoras supposed), but 
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 Cf. 1.1153-6, where Lucretius refutes other portrayals of the Earth’s creation with mortalia (1153), 
crearunt (1155) genuit (1156) and alit (1156). 
216
 For this technique, see also gigni and creari in relation to water and earth (784) and fire (799). Fire 
is described neutrally as being born in e.g. 2.386-7 (ignis / noster hic e lignis ortus taedaque creatus), 
591. 
217
 More often used of grains of salt, as in Catull. 86.3 (metaphorically) and Hor. Carm. 3.23.12. 
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by semina […] ardoris (902), which congregate when the branches rub together.218 The 
reader, spotting this central term of the LIFE-CYCLE thread, recalls Lucretius’ atoms and the 
truth of how one substance can be created from another. 
 
Atomic motion and the swerve (2.62-332) 
The LIFE-CYCLE thread has argued that things are created when atoms combine in (sexual) 
union. This passage expands upon the process – the movement and swerve of atoms219 – 
behind the birth of things. The LIFE-CYCLE thread here builds upon the foundations of Book 1 
immediately after the Book 2 prologue, by introducing the issue at hand as, ‘by what motion 
the generative bodies of mother-substance give birth to various things and untie them again 
once born’ (quo motu genitalia materiai / corpora res varias gignant genitasque resolvant – 
62-3). Lucretius guides the reader from arguments towards the end of Book 1 that the atoms 
made the universe ‘by trying out every kind of motion and (sexual) union’ (omne genus motus 
et coetus experiundo – 1.1026). Although the focus of Book 2 will be atomic motion and the 
forces behind it (2.64-5), Lucretius ensures the resultant birth of things is not forgotten in the 
subsequent arguments, denying that resting atoms can ‘give birth to motions’ (progignere 
motus – 2.81), and that atomic weight alone ‘gives birth to blows that can bestow generative 
motion’ (plagas / gignere quae possint genitalis reddere motus – 2.227-8). A swerve is 
needed too, or else: 
 
nec foret offensus natus nec plaga creata 
principiis: ita nil umquam Natura creasset. 
       (2.223-4) 
there would have been no collision born nor blow created by the first-
beginnings: thus Nature would never have created anything. 
 
The etymological figure natus-Natura (which translation can scarcely capture) and the 
polyptoton creata-creasset situate birth prominently in this passage.  
 As atomic motion initiates birth, so perpetual motion enables a perpetual cycle of 
creation, preserving the constancy of the universe. This theory (2.294-302) recalls Epicurus’ 
Letter to Herodotus 39,220 which is devoid of birth vocabulary. Lucretius, however, describes a 
constant sum of ‘mother-substance’ (materiai – 294), which ‘nothing increases or dies from’ 
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 A similar explanation is given in 4.324-31 for why bright light causes pain in our eyes: a multitude of 
semina […] ignis (4.330) present in light enter our eyes and ‘give birth to’ (gignunt – 331) pain. 
219
 Expressed by the LIQUIDS and PLEASURE threads – see pp.99, 159-66. 
220
 Bailey (1947) 291. 
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(neque adaugescit quicquam neque deperit inde – 296). As a result, current atomic motions 
are the same as they have always been, and will remain the same forever (2.297-9):221 
 
et quae consuerint gigni gignentur eadem  300 
condicione et erunt et crescent vique valebunt, 
quantum cuique datum est per foedera Naturai. 
       (2.300-302) 
[…] and things which are accustomed to be born will be born by the 
same agreement and they will exist and grow and be robust in 
strength, as much as is granted to them by the laws of Nature. 
 
This argument is strengthened by the metaphorical correspondences between materies in 
294 and the other terms from the LIFE-CYCLE thread. Again, the very name materies supports 
and even justifies the subsequent assertions about birth and death: of course nothing can add 
to materies, as it is the (only) mother of all things. Furthermore, its eternal nature – 
established in Book 1 – backs up the image of unchanging, eternal birth in our passage – an 
intentional petitio principii or Lucretian ‘anticipation’ strengthening his argument.222  
 
More on the birth-death cycle (2.569-80) 
Among his consideration of atomic variety, Lucretius extends his crucial argument (1.215-64, 
especially 250-64) that birth and death alternate in an eternal cycle to depict the balanced, 
infinite sum of matter: 
 
nec superare queunt motus itaque exitiales 
perpetuo neque in aeternum sepelire salutem,  570 
nec porro rerum genitales auctificique 
motus perpetuo possunt servare creata. […]  572 
nunc hic nunc illic superant vitalia rerum  575 
et superantur item. miscetur funere vagor 
quem pueri tollunt visentes luminis oras; 
nec nox ulla diem neque noctem aurora secutast 
quae non audierit mixtos vagatibus aegris 
ploratus mortis comites et funeris atri.   580 
       (2.569-80) 
And so death-bringing motions cannot conquer continuously nor bury 
safety for eternity, nor besides can generative and growth-causing 
motions continuously preserve things born. […] now here now there 
the life-giving parts of things conquer and are conquered in turn. With 
funeral rites are mingled the cries which children raise upon seeing the 
borders of light; and no night has followed day nor dawn night which 
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 Motion is crucial for atomic creation. See the repeated asyndetic lists depicting how atoms cause 
variety in things (1.633-4, 685; 2.726-7, 896, 1021; 5.438-9). 
222
 See n.184. 
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will not have mixed with their sick cries the wailing that accompanies 
death and the black funeral. 
 
A dual metaphor is evident here, as Lucretius subtly equates the fixed nature of the day-night 
cycle and the birth-death cycle of humans with the cycle of atomic combination and 
dissolution.223 The two analogous examples combine in visentes luminis oras, both an 
established metaphor for birth (cf. 1.22, 170, 179) and a literal depiction of witnessing dawn. 
Lucretius employs our human experience of birth and death to tighten the established 
connection between birth in living things and atomic union. Again the LIFE-CYCLE thread is 
applied literally and metaphorically to universalise and prove a theory. Lucretius portrays the 
cycle consistently to bring into sharp focus that things born will inevitably die. By moving 
from animal birth in 1.250-64 to human birth and death here, Lucretius makes the analogy 
more personal and vivid to his reader, and introduces his theory that death is inevitable long 
before addressing it in Book 3. 
 
The cycle of birth and death also applies to the Earth (2.1105-74) 
The birth-death cycle of terrestrial life, introduced in 1.250-64 and 2.991-1022,224 is extended 
to the Earth itself in an extended analogy. Lucretius describes, by means of the LIFE-CYCLE 
thread, the world’s birth (mundi tempus genitale – 1105; diemque / primigenum maris et 
terrae solisque coortum – 1106),225 and growth (mare et terrae possent augescere – 1109). 
The birth and growth of animals according to kind (befitting our understanding of birth) is 
now applied to the world (terreno corpore terra / crescit – 1114). This growth is not 
unlimited, however, as Natura ‘reins in’ the growth of all things (Natura suis refrenat viribus 
auctum – 1121) – suggesting that growth is pre-limited at birth (i.e. Natura).226 This is 
supported by an analogy with human growth and decline (1118-49) and a depiction of the 
Earth’s infertility in comparison to when she bore all animals (1150-74).227 Lucretius 
concludes at the end of the book that in time ‘everything gradually decays and goes to the 
reef of destruction (ad scopulum)’ (1170). The LIFE-CYCLE thread builds on images of birth and 
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 Later, Lucretius offers his tentative theory that new suns and moons are born daily by a timely 
confluence of atoms (5.656-79; 731-50). For now, Lucretius has illegitimately compared human birth 
and death with the coming and going (not strictly ‘birth’ and ‘death’) of day and night – a minor 
Lucretian ‘anticipation’.  
224
 See n.210. 
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 There is a play-on-words here, as orior is the usual verb for depicting sunrises. 
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 See Part 3 Section A for the limits of birth. 
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 See pp.199-200 on these passages. 
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death from human experience to construct a universal birth-death cycle, based on atomic 
cohesion and dissolution, active at the most microscopic and macroscopic levels. 
 
The Book 3 prologue (3.1-93) 
Here Lucretius returns to Epicurus’ role in bringing knowledge to mankind. Rather than being 
the victorious general of 1.62-79, he is now a father (tu pater es – 3.9) bearing knowledge for 
his followers (9-10).228 As in the Book 1 prologue, he brings knowledge of birth (coepit 
vociferari / naturam rerum – 3.14-5) itself ‘born’ from his mind (mente coortam – 3.15).229 
Lucretius places birth prominently in this transition between the first two books, on atoms, 
and the next two, on the soul and perception. He expresses an intended logical progression, 
that having proved things ‘are born’ (creari – 3.34) from atoms, now he must depict the 
nature of the soul (3.35-6) – i.e. that it is also born. The importance of the LIFE-CYCLE thread in 
relation to the soul is confirmed.  
 
The subtle introduction of the soul’s mortality (3.186-230)230 
Lucretius explains that the soul is exceedingly quick and moveable (owing to its round, minute 
atoms), to lay a foundation for later proofs of the soul’s mortality (3.417-829). The analogy 
Lucretius casts to prove the soul’s speed hints again at its birth (and therefore mortality). Soul 
is bodily, since it can touch and be touched (3.161-76; cf. 1.430-48), and we infer from this 
that the soul consists of atoms (for all is atoms or void, and only atoms are bodily). This is 
proved in 3.187, which states that anything as mobile as the soul must consist of exceedingly 
round and minute ‘seeds’ – the atomic term semina, which also implies that the soul must be 
born. Lucretius strengthens this implication by comparing the soul to water, which is ‘born’ 
(creata – 190) from round particles, and honey, which consists of a tightly-clinging 
congregation of ‘mother-substance’ (materiai – 193). Lucretius then compares the soul to 
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 For the Roman and divine implications of pater see Bailey (1947) ad 3.9. 
229
 I see no problem with coortam (agreeing with naturam rerum) in the manuscripts, since it depicts 
the facts of the nature of things springing from Epicurus’ mind. Emendation to coorta (agreeing with 
ratio) is unwarranted; see Bailey (1947) ad loc. 
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 Bailey (1947) ad 208-27 rightly states that this passage refers more specifically to the anima (soul) 
than the animus (mind). However, lightness and mobility refer happily to both, and the two are 
conjoined in one nature (3.136-7, 416). Lucretius indeed tells his reader to think of both when he 
refers to either (tu fac utrumque uno sub iungas nomine eorum […] quatenus est unum inter se 
coniunctaque res est. – 3.421-4), and he alternates freely between animus and anima in 3.558-79. 
Their joint nature is emphasised by the repeated elided phrases anima atque animus, animum atque 
animam etc. (1.131; 3.161, 329, 416, 499, 565, 705, 796; 4.121; 5.140). With these observations in 
mind, it is difficult to read with Annas (1992) 175-6 and Konstan (2008) a distinction between ‘the 
rational soul’ (animus) and ‘the irrational soul’ (anima) in Lucretius. Therefore, I refer generically to 
‘the soul’ in relation to either anima, animus or anima atque animus.  
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poppy seeds (196-7), picking up from seminibus in 187 to bring the analogy full-circle. 
Although the primary comparison here is of shape, the established semantic range of semina 
implies that the soul is born from atoms, and therefore mortal. 
 That the soul’s atoms are minute, and therefore light, is supported by an observation 
that there is no change in bodyweight when the soul departs at death (216-7). An analogy 
follows with wine and ointment, which do not change in weight when they lose odour, 
because this also consists of minuta semina. Again this term, this time by analogy, implies 
that the soul is born from atoms. This is confirmed in the following lines, which reassert that 
the soul, because its departure does not reduce the body’s weight, must ‘be born from 
exceedingly tiny seeds’ (perquam pauxillis esse creatam / seminibus – 229-30). The crucial 
term creatam marks the first explicit statement that the soul is born, and therefore mortal, 
because for Lucretius birth implies mortality. This almost surreptitious introduction of the 
soul’s birth (and implied mortality) is strengthened across the next few passages (sic calor 
atque aer et venti caeca potestas / mixta creant unam naturam [sc. animae] – 269-70; 
corporibus quia de partis paucisque creatast – 278; ab origine prima - 331). By noticing these 
birth terms and recalling their established connotations, the keen reader will be 
preconditioned to accept the soul’s mortality when it is discussed later.231 
  
Proofs of the soul’s mortality (3.417-829) 
Interestingly, the soul’s birth and mortality is for now only depicted metaphorically as ‘birth’ 
from seeds. Later this depiction of the soul is expressed literally by the same terminology. So 
far Lucretius has advanced a preliminary fundamental proof, based on essential doctrine that 
bodily, immortal atoms create bodily, mortal things. He continues in 3.323-36 to depict the 
combined nature (and therefore shared mortality) of soul and body at the atomic level. These 
foundations strengthen the thirty proofs that the soul is born and dies with the body (3.417-
829), which in themselves consist principally of inferences from examples of ageing (445-58), 
disease (459-75, 487-525., 819-29), the effects of alcohol (476-86), shocks (592-606), heredity 
(741-53), etc. The LIFE-CYCLE thread persists from the introductory proofs into the subsequent 
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 Lucretius builds on these assertions that the soul is born with the body in 4.823-76, in which he 
dismisses a teleological account of human sensation (as in Aristotle, especially Gen. an.), that our 
sensory organs were born in order to sense things. In turn, we infer that Lucretius also denies the soul 
was born for the purpose of sensation. Instead, soul and sensory organs alike had an intrinsic potential 
for sensation, which was only fully ‘born’ when there were things to sense (‘nothing is born (natumst) 
in the body so we can use it, but the thing born (natumst) is what begets (procreat) the use’ – 834-5), 
and so our sensory organs existed long before words, sights and sounds (836-42). 
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arguments, in which the keen reader should recall that the soul is an atomic compound and, 
therefore, mortal. 
 The mortality of the soul is Lucretius’ longest maintained proof, and is used to set up 
(in the very next line, 830) the crucial doctrine nil igitur mors est ad nos. The LIFE-CYCLE thread 
in this section is literal rather than metaphorical, but the terminology describing the soul’s 
birth and death is the same as that of atomic creation and destruction: the soul dies (pereo – 
437, 710, 798; intereo 701, 756, 759; funus - 712), grows (cresco – 683), and is born (origo – 
686; creo – 708; natalis – 711; orior – 788; innasco – 792; gigno - 797). The reader has been 
conditioned to understand atomic union and dissolution metaphorically in these terms, and 
so these proofs should recall the atomic reality underlying them. This connection is 
strengthened in 806-18, which argues that anything immortal must either be solid (like 
atoms), be unable to be touched (like void), or have no space around it (like the universe). 
The penultimate proof of this section reminds the reader that all composite bodies are 
mortal, and consist of atoms. The reader should recall this reality in the closing section of the 
book, which argues that death is nothing to us and so should not be feared – to be considered 
in the Epilogue.  
 
Effluences ‘born’ from things (Book 4) 
The characteristics of the effluences that cause sensation, the focus of Book 4, are primarily 
expressed by the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads,232 but their emission is occasionally depicted 
with birth terms. Effluences are ‘born’ from the objects that emit them (geno233 – 143, 159; 
origo – 160; gigno – 604; exorior – 605), sometimes from within (intrinsicus ortae – 92; exire 
coortae – 94). Some images, like those of mythical creatures, are ‘born’ (gignuntur – 131; 
creantur – 744) or ‘grow together’ (concrescere – 134) when films conjoin in mid-air. Their 
various qualities are ‘born’ from the qualities of their constituent atoms, such as roughness 
and smoothness (of the voice: coorta (530), creatur (543); of flavour: coorta (625)), or size – 
affecting the ability of smell to pass through walls (creatum – 698). Sensory effluences, like all 
composite bodies, are born by atomic combination, and therefore are bodily and mortal. 
 
Seeds and conception (4.1030-1287) 
The most important instance of the LIFE-CYCLE thread in Book 4 occurs at the very end, in 
Lucretius’ account of human reproduction. Conception and the transmission of hereditary 
characteristics are both caused by semen (‘seed’), the technical term in ancient science (= 
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Greek σπέρμα)234 for male and female gametes.235 Lucretius introduces semen in his 
description, preceding his discussion of sexual desire, of a wet dream (1030-6). Ejaculation 
occurs when a source of desire causing a build-up of semen is followed by the desire to expel 
it towards the source (1045-8). During sexual intercourse, this male semen mixes with female 
semen236. In the light of the atomic term semina this has implications for the reading of the 
various aspects of conception covered in this section.  
 Seed dictates several aspects of conception and inheritance. First, gender (4.1227-32) 
is caused by seed ratios (always a proportion of both male and female seed): a majority of 
male seed creates a boy; of female seed, a girl. Second, family resemblance (1209-16) is 
dictated by whether the mother’s or father’s force is dominant during intercourse, with 
children like their mothers born from their mother’s seed,237 and those like their fathers from 
their father’s seed.238 Third, barrenness (1233-47) is caused by seed that is either too thin 
(because it cannot cohere) or too thick (because it is clogged and the male seed cannot get 
through to mix with it).239 Fourth, failure to conceive (1248-59) is caused by the 
incompatibility of male and female seed: it is best for the thin to mix with the thick, and vice 
versa. 
 There is little new in Lucretius’ explanations, but by implication they are enhanced by 
his atomic theory. Essentially, successful conception and the transmission of characteristics 
depend on the type and ratio of semina combining. That Lucretius has atoms analogously in 
mind here is confirmed by a passage on inheritance through the generations (4.1218-22). In 
instances where children look like their grandparents or great-grandparents, this is because 
‘parents often hide in their bodies many first-threads (primordia) mixed in many ways, which 
fathers pass on to fathers grown from their stock’ (4.220-22). Thus the function possessed by 
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 Pl. Ti. 86C; Arist. Gen. an. passim. 
235
 In 4.1030-57 the term semen refers solely to male seminal fluid, but later (1209ff.) also applies to 
female reproductive ‘seed’, e.g. commiscendo semine (1209). 
236
 For this theory, from Democritus and Empedocles (according to Arist. Gen. an. 1.18, 722b7-723a8) 
and supported by Hippocrates, Generation, see Democritus 138a and 138b Taylor (1999); Blayney 
(1986) 230-3; Taylor (1999) 198-9. Against this theory, Aristotle argued that the female supplies 
material in the form of καταμήνια (menstrual blood) rather than semen (Arist. Gen. an. 1.19-20, 
726a28-728b32). For a detailed account of Lucretius’ portrayal and its forerunners, see Brown (1987) 
320-23. 
237
 The word similis here does not clearly reveal whether Lucretius has in mind shared physical 
characteristics or personality traits. 
238
 Again this stems from Democritus, according to Aristotle (Gen. an. 4.3, 769a17-22). A dual process 
seems to take place here: the mother’s force prevailing allows for a child to be born like the mother, 
with characteristics passed on by the mother’s seed. This is to account for sons that are like their 
mothers and daughters like their fathers, but it is not made clear how, for example, if the mother’s 
force is dominant, this does not necessarily create a daughter. Brown (1987) 322-3 notes Lucretius’ 
failure here. 
239
 See especially Hippocrates, Barrenness.   
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sexual semina of creating offspring with similar characteristics to their parents is in fact 
reliant on the atomic semina of which they consist. Across these correspondences, Lucretius 
has performed an innovative and effective sleight of hand. He has established an extensive 
metaphor of birth from atoms, which is rooted in our everyday understanding of birth, but 
here the correspondence is reversed, helping the reader to map their comprehension of 
atomic ‘birth’ onto humans, in order to understand the reasons behind gender and inherited 
characteristics. Both are caused by different types of semina and their various different ratios. 
The literal is explained by the metaphorical and, like in the description of the soul’s birth and 
mortality, the LIFE-CYCLE thread has come full circle again. 
 
On the creation of the world (Book 5) 
The principal application of the LIFE-CYCLE thread in Book 5 is to emphasise the world was 
born and is therefore mortal. This is stated in the prologue: ‘I must explain the reason that 
the world consists of mortal body and had birth’ (mihi mortali consistere corpore mundum / 
nativomque simul ratio reddunda sit esse – 65-6). This will be explored in depth in Part 3 
Section E, in particular in comparison with the mortality of the human body and soul. For 
now, it will suffice to introduce briefly Lucretius’ expansion of the LIFE-CYCLE thread to depict 
how the world was born. Again, following the literal birth entailed in conception in Book 4, 
metaphorical birth returns. 
 One of Lucretius’ principal aims in discussing the world’s origin is to prove that gods 
were not involved in its creation (recalling the first argument, nullam rem e nilo gigni divinitus 
umquam – 1.150).240 Lucretius asks from where ‘an exemplum of things being born’ 
(exemplum […] gignundis rebus – 181) would have entered the gods’ minds, to give them an 
insight into the power of the atoms and what they could achieve ‘by swapping their order 
around’ (permutato ordine – 185), ‘unless Nature herself provided a model for birth’ (si non 
ipsa dedit specimen Natura creandi – 186). The argument is somewhat circular, avoiding the 
possibility that the gods created the concept of birth, and therefore Natura. For Lucretius, 
however, such inventions only occur by analogy, which must be drawn from Natura (as in the 
inventions of man in 5.1011-457). As argued in Part 1, for Lucretius Natura is birth and all it 
entails, and so only Natura can provide the paradigm of birth from which things can be 
created. By her specimen atoms combine (as Lucretius elucidates following ita in 187) in a 
manner (appropriate for Natura) associated with birth (coire – 190; creare – 191) and 
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 As in Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 76-82. 
65 
 
‘regeneration’ across the sum of things (qualibus haec rerum geritur nunc summa novando – 
194). 
 Having discounted divine provenance, Lucretius later depicts the chance creation of 
the world by the union of atoms, driven by blows to all varieties of motions: 
 
omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare, 425 
quaecumque inter se possent congressa creare, 
       (5.425-26) 
[…] and to unite in all ways and exhaust all combinations, whatever 
they could give birth to by coming together among themselves […] 
 
The image of sexual union suggested by coire is resumed when Lucretius states that atoms 
created the world ‘by trying out all kinds of unions and motions’ (omne genus coetus et 
motus experiundo – 428, repeated almost verbatim from 1.1026).241 As a result atoms 
became the exordia (430 – here = congregations of primordia) that created the realms of the 
world and everything in it. From these first congregations the world’s constituent parts were 
formed by various other processes, such as the compacting of heavy earth (449-52), and the 
squeezing out of water (452), the Ether (457-9) and the particles that would make heavenly 
bodies (453-4, 471-9), clouds (465-6) etc.242 Birth was the first process that initiated the 
evolution of the world to its current state. The Earth and sky cohabit today as when they 
were born from first conception (prima concepta ab origine – 548), and the beginning of their 
lifespan (ex ineunte aevo – 555). The LIFE-CYCLE thread has been expanded to the most 
macroscopic level. 
 
Clouds (6.451-82), disease (6.655-72) 
In Book 6 the LIFE-CYCLE thread occurs intermittently to depict various processes. Lucretius 
uses birth terms to describe cloud-producing bodies uniting (coeo – 452); small clouds 
conjoining to form bigger clouds (concresco – 451; coniungo – 457; cresco – 457); and storm 
clouds (coorior – 458). Birth occurs first at the atomic level, then at the compound level until 
the largest, densest clouds are produced. The cause of volcanic eruptions is similarly 
expressed in birth terms, in an analogy with ‘fever born with burning heat’ (calido febrim 
fervore coortam – 656) in the body, which occurs: 
 
nimirum quia sunt multarum semina rerum, 
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 Lucretius uses coetus here as a synonym for coitus (see n.202), and, following coire in 425 and 
creare in 426, may have a sexual meaning.  
242
 See Part 3 Section B on this process. 
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et satis haec tellus morbi caelumque mali fert, 
unde queat vis immensi procrescere morbi. 
       (6.662-4) 
[…] no doubt because there are seeds of many things, and this Earth 
and the sky carry enough nasty disease, from which can grow together 
the force of immeasurable disease. 
 
Lucretius uses this example in turn to prove there are many seeds that can cause storms, 
earthquakes, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions (665-72). The analogy is drawn tightly by 
corresponding birth terms between the analogy and the conclusion: 
 
  […] et ardescunt caelestia templa, 670 
et tempestates pluviae graviore coortu 
sunt, ubi forte ita se tetulerunt semina aquarum. 
       (6.670-2) 
[…] both the celestial regions burn and there are storms of rain with 
heavier origin, when by chance the seeds of water have raised 
themselves together in this way. 
 
Here coortu picks up from coortam in 656, and semina is repeated from 662, emphasising the 
similarity of the two processes. Storms and disease are both born from the confluence of 
many seeds.  
 Despite these examples, in Book 6, as in Book 4, close congregations of birth terms 
are less frequent. Taking the key birth terms creo, gigno, nascor, orior, cresco and coeo and 
their derivatives,243 these occur only 66 times in Book 6 (1 every 19.5 lines) compared with 
121 in Book 5 (1/12.8 lines) and 218 across the first two books (1/10.5 lines). However, where 
the LIFE-CYCLE thread appears in Book 6, it is frequently in an innovative way. Specifically, 
among these 66 occurrences, there is a marked increase in instances of the compounds 
coorior and concresco, which both suggest birth by combination. Of 19 instances of orior and 
its derivatives, 14 are of coorior;244 of 17 instances of cresco and derivatives, 8 are of 
concresco245 – representing respectively 41% and 42% of occurrences of these two verbs in 
the DRN. There is a clear change in focus in Book 6 towards the birth of things from atomic 
congregations: clouds (159, 250, 451, 465); rain, storms and other precipitation (196, 458, 
                                                          
243
 recreo, procreo, creatrix; progigno, egigno, genitor, genetrix, genitabilis, genitalis, progenus, 
primigenus, terrigenus, generasco; nativus, Natura (capitalised only), innascor, naturalis, enascor; 
exorior, aborior, suborior, oborior, adorior, coorior; procresco, recresco, decresco, concresco (and 
participle concretus); coitus (and the often indistinguishable coetus). 
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 Or 74% – compare Book 1 (6.7%), Book 2 (23%) and Book 4 (31%).  
245
 Or 47% – compare Book 1 (13.3%), Book 3 (11.1%) and Book 5 (25%). n.b. Book 4 has a 50% ratio, 
although for only 6 total instances of cresco and compounds (compared to 17 in Book 6, 15 in Book 1 
etc.). 
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495, 528, 671, 956); wind (579); volcanic fire (641); disease (656, 1091, 1096, 1100); hot 
springs in winter (846); and iron atoms in a magnet (1013). These phenomena are tied 
together in the shared process of birth. This is most emphatic in the close proximity of febrim 
fervore coortam (656) and pluviae graviore coortu (671) in the analogy explored above. 
Furthermore, the LIFE-CYCLE thread again shows that birth occurs at both a microscopic level, 
between individual atoms, and a macroscopic level, to form great composite bodies.  
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Section B 
 
The WEAVING Thread 
 
In the prologue Lucretius introduced the WEAVING thread in relation to his poetic discourse 
(‘untying’ and ‘laying out’ the facts of Natura) and the cohesion and dissolution of his 
primordia (‘first-threads’) (1.50-61). The prominence of weaving in this passage suggests its 
importance in depicting Lucretius’ atomic theory. The thread expands throughout the DRN, 
as weaving terms are employed to depict the role of atomic cohesion and dissolution in a 
wide range of apparently disparate processes, which are tied together by shared ‘woven 
textures’ or their ‘unravelling’.246 The frequency of weaving terms in such contexts 
throughout the epic, and the average Roman reader’s broad experience of weaving,247 urges 
deeper reading of instances of the WEAVING thread, from which several detailed and technical 
multi-correspondence metaphors, drawing on technicalities of weaving and the various 
qualities of woven cloth, become apparent. As a result a conceptual thread emerges of 
unrivalled richness in the DRN.  
 Lucretius has already highlighted his atoms’ threadlike nature in describing atomic 
dissolution: Natura perempta resolvat (‘Nature unties things again when they are destroyed’ 
– 1.57).248 However, in lieu of an opposite and complementary weaving metaphor describing 
creation, the LIFE-CYCLE thread is used (Natura creet auget alatque – 56). Lucretius has not 
simply chosen to introduce only this most common weaving metaphor here, but rather 
Lucretius sees initial atomic combination not in weaving, but in birth terms – presumably 
because birth in the natural world is the perfect paradigm for creation. The metaphors of 
weaving and birth together explain atomic combination and compound structure, while the 
metaphors of weaving and death (as Part 3 Section A will consider) interweave to depict 
atomic dissolution. Although we have seen that the atomic term primordia straddles both the 
birth and weaving metaphors to depict the ‘first-threads’ (or the ‘starting border’) of things, 
neither this term nor any in Lucretius’ weaving vocabulary depicts specific aspects of atomic 
creation. 
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 Snyder (1983) provides a brief overview. 
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 Crowfoot (1936) 36 states that ancient writers expected their readers to recognise ‘any witty or 
fanciful allusion’ to weaving and its tools, however slight; see also Snyder (1983) 39 on this 
observation. 
248
 See pp.35-6 and notes there. 
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 The investigation of the WEAVING thread in this Section will focus on atomic 
compound structure and the various qualities created by interwoven first-threads (which will 
be expanded upon further in Part 3). This Section will consider the weaving terms for atomic 
‘thread’ and its arrangement, before introducing examples of how the WEAVING thread 
explains the qualities of woven compounds, and various processes. Lucretius builds a 
foundation of persistent weaving terms, upon which he develops complex metaphors to 
explain more complex concepts.  
 
Atomic ‘first-threads’ and their woven compounds 
The principal atomic term with weaving connotations, occurring 72 times in all, is primordia. 
In Part 1 ‘first-threads’ was advanced as a suitable translation for this term, owing to its 
juxtaposition with other weaving terms in 1.50-61. This approach will prove fruitful in this 
Section for translating other weaving terms depicting atomic congregations and their 
dissolution. Lucretius employs as a synonym for primordia its cognate exordia, which in 
weaving denotes the warp set up on the loom.249 The connection between these terms is 
highlighted by the replacement of primordia with exordia five times in the sense ‘atoms’:250 
in a discussion of atomic shapes (exordia rerum / qualia sint – 2.333-4); to recap proofs of 
atomic shape and movement (quoniam docui cunctarum exordia rerum / qualia sint – 3.31-2, 
repeated in 4.45-6);251 to depict the spacing of soul atoms in the body (tanta / intervalla 
tenere exordia prima animai – 3.379-80); and to explain how small atoms are (exordia rerum 
/ cunctarum quam sint subtilia percipe paucis – 4.114-5).252 The collocations exordia rerum 
(recalling the frequent primordia rerum) and exordia prima (a clear resonance with 
primordia, and especially ordia prima in 4.28), occurring eight times in all (2.333, 1062; 3.31; 
4.45, 114; 5.430 with rerum; and 3.380, 5.677 with prima), strengthen the correspondence 
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 See p.34 and note there.  
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 Out of eleven usages of exordium. Of the other six, four occur in an atomic context but may refer 
more specifically to ‘(atomic) beginnings’ (5.331, 471), or both this and ‘congregations of atoms’ 
(2.1062, repeated almost verbatim in 5.430); while another refers to ‘beginnings of causes’ (5.677), 
although with a subsidiary meaning of ‘atomic beginnings’ brought out by ab origine prima (‘from the 
first origin (of the world)’) in the same location in the next line. The other example is used of 
argumentation (1.149), itself frequently expressed by a weaving metaphor in Latin (for which see 
p.224 and notes there). In fact, in seven of the ten instances pertaining to ‘beginnings’ or ‘atoms’ 
elementa is elided with the preceding word, suggesting Lucretius considered it a permissible variant 
for primordia when required by metre. 
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 The passage 4.45-53 is bracketed in most editions, since these lines pick up directly from Book 2, 
and were presumably written at a time when Book 4 was intended to follow 2 directly. For a brief 
summary of the editing of this passage, see Bailey (1947) 1181-2, 1184. 
252
 The weaving sense of exordia is brought out further by subtilis, for which see n.276. 
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further.253 These instances highlight the connection between exordia and primordia and 
strengthen our reading of a weaving metaphor in primordia, and the broader image of atoms 
as threads that form woven compounds. 
 The metaphor of the woven structure of things is the primary application of the 
WEAVING thread in the DRN. It is introduced emphatically in the argument that nothing can be 
reduced to nothing, as a proof for the existence of indestructible matter (1.215-49). The 
physical structure of things is described as nexus (‘bindings’ – 1.220, 240, 244),254 textura 
(‘(woven) texture’ – 1.247) and contextum (‘interweaving’ – 1.243),255 which is held together 
‘less or more entangled’ (minus aut magis indupedita – 240).256 The metaphor in this passage 
is supported further by descriptions of the destruction of these composite bodies in terms of 
‘untying’. This prominent passage alerts the reader to keep ‘woven compounds’, and the 
vocabulary depicting them, firmly in mind throughout the DRN. 
 This metaphor is supported by a striking analogy employed to prove that atoms can 
be colourless and still make coloured things (2.826-33). The smaller the parts into which 
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 It is notable also that among these instances, six show elision between exordia and the preceding 
word, in which cases primordia would not fit metrically. Again exordia prima and exordia rerum appear 
to be synonyms for primordia rerum where this would not fit. This would recall Homer’s employment 
of formulae; see Finkelberg (2011) s. v. Formula and refs. there. 
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 This is part of a group of cognate weaving terms used by Lucretius (with necto, conecto, adnecto 
and conexus): OLD, necto 1-4, of both threads (Sen. Her. O. 1098, with stamina; Stat. Silv. 1.4.123, with 
fila) and threadlike things (Varro Rust. 1.23.6, with linum; Hor. Carm. 1.38.2 of a flower garland); 
conecto, ‘to join, fasten, or link together’, cf. Verg. Aen. 8.437 (of snakes); Prop. 2.5.23 (of hair); 
adnecto 1 (Plin. HN 11.81 of a spider’s web); nexus
3
 1 denoting the action of weaving (Sen. Q Nat. 
2.2.3), 2 of something that fastens (Stat. Silv. 4.4.93 of hair) and 4, ‘an intertwined or entangled 
formation’ (Lucretius’ preferred usage – e.g. 1.220, 240; cf. Tib. 2.3.16 of a basket, with detexo and 
rarus – for which see n.275). The weaving sense is made clear within the WEAVING thread applied to the 
structure of composite bodies, weakening any sense of a legal ‘bond’, advanced by Davies (1931) 36-7. 
255
 The two of these belong within a large group of connected words used by Lucretius, alongside the 
verbs of weaving texo, contexo, pertexo (used only figuratively, of weaving discourse – 1.418; 6.42) 
and subtexo; retexo (‘to unweave’); and textus (‘woven fabric’). See OLD, texo 1 and 2 (Ter. Haut. 285 
with tela; Tib 2.3.54 with vestis; Cic. Nat. D. and Catull. 68.49 of spiders; Ov Met. 10.123 of plaited 
flowers); OLD, contexo 1 (Cic. Nat. D. 2.158 of wool); OLD, contextus
3
 1, ‘the action of weaving’ (Cic. 
Fin. 5.83); OLD, retexo 1 (Cic. Luc. 95 and Ov. Am. 3.9.30, denoting Penelope’s night-time activity); 
subtexo usually occurs in a metaphorical sense, often of cloud (or darkness) ‘woven’ to hide the sun 
(Ov. Met. 14.368; Verg. Aen. 3.582), although see Juv. 7.192 and Stat. Silv. 1.2.99; OLD, textura, ‘the 
art or process of weaving’ (Prop. 4.5.23; Plaut. Stich. 348 of spiders) – but Lucretius employs the term 
in the sense ‘woven texture’, normally denoted by textum in Latin (Ov. Ep. 9.163, Met. 8.640; Stat. 
Theb. 5.354); OLD, textus
3
 ‘a woven fabric’ (Apul. Flor. 9, Apol. 61, used figuratively). The terms are all 
etymologically linked with tela, subtemen, subtilis (see n.276), textilis and textile – all of which carry 
weaving connotations – see E-M s. v. texo, who equate Lucretius’ textura with Greek περιπλοκἠ, used 
by Epicurus. 
256
 OLD, impedio 1 ‘to restrict the movement of (by hobbling, binding, entangling, etc.), e.g. Plaut. Mil. 
1388 (with plagae); Cic. Tusc. 5.82 (with vincula – see n.311); Ov. Pont. 14.30 and Apul. Met. 5.22 (of 
hair). Lucretius also uses its antonym, expedio, ‘to free from fastenings […] untie’ or ‘to disentangle, 
untwine’ (OLD, 1a-b; e.g. Ov. Met. 6.57, in the weaving process; Apul. Met. 1.16.10-11, with restis; Cic. 
Att. 5.21.3, of figurative knots).  
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something is ‘pulled apart’ (distrahitur – 827), the more its colour fades away (and so the 
primordia are colourless); just as ‘when [purple wool] is pulled apart thread by thread’ (filatim 
cum distractum est – 831) its colour is lost. The wool corresponds to any coloured item, its 
individual threads to the coloured item’s atomic ‘first-threads’. One of Lucretius’ explanatory 
methods is to use terms from his principal metaphors in an analogy (in the literal sense), to 
support their metaphorical sense elsewhere.257 This is the case with distraho, which we shall 
find later describing the process of pulling something apart into its first-threads. More 
generally, as we shall see later in this Section, analogies with woven items are frequently 
employed to represent the ‘woven’ textures of things and the qualities associated with them. 
 A third term that supports the weaving metaphor in Lucretius’ atomic vocabulary is 
ordo, which is joined to primordia and exordia by its aural similarity258 – a connection drawn 
especially by fifteen instances of juxtaposition between ordo and primordia. In itself ordo 
carries a general sense of ordered rows or lines,259 which lends itself to depicting woven 
items, and this is brought out by such juxtapositions and in particular several passages 
discussing the importance of the ordo (‘order’, ‘formation’, ‘array’) of primordia for creating 
variety in things, and the creation of new things by rearranging this ordo. Two examples will 
suffice as preliminary proof. First, Lucretius concludes an explanation of how atoms, which 
cannot feel, can create things capable of sensation (supported by an example of food being 
ingested by animals and changed into their sensible, bodily substance), with an appeal to the 
reader: ‘Do you see, then, how much it matters in what sort of order the first-threads are 
placed […] ?’ (iamne vides igitur magni primordia rerum / referre in quali sint ordine quaeque 
locata – 2.883-4).260 The aural jingle primordia-ordo closely associates the two terms, while 
emphasising in weaving terms the importance of atomic order.  
 A second example strengthens this reading. Lucretius denies that the Gods invented 
atoms and the world: 
 
quove modost umquam vis cognita principiorum, 
quidque inter sese permutato ordine possent,  185 
si non ipsa dedit specimen Natura creandi? 
namque ita multa modis multis primordia rerum […]  
       […] consuerunt concita ferri  189 
omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare,[…] 190 
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 Garani (2007) 210-19 reads this approach with what she terms Lucretius’ ‘squeezing out the 
sponge’ metaphor. 
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 See p.34. 
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 See n.133. 
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 Compare 1.1021-2 (neque consilio primordia rerum / ordine se quo quaeque sagaci mente 
locarunt). 
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ut non sit mirum si in talis disposituras   192 
deciderunt quoque et in talis venere meatus, 
qualibus haec rerum geritur nunc summa novando. 
       (5.184-94) 
Or in what way was the power of the first-things ever learned, and 
what they could do in themselves by swapping their order around, if 
Nature herself did not provide a model for birth? For thus many first-
threads of things in many ways […] have been accustomed to be 
carried and to unite in all kinds of ways […] so that it would be no 
wonder if they fell into such laid-out arrangements, and also to come 
into such movements, by which this sum of things now carries out 
regeneration. 
 
This passage addresses the potentially teleological implications of ordered atomic array, first 
denying divine design, and then stressing the chance (deciderunt) behind their 
combination.261 The figure ordo-primordia suggests the arrangement of woven threads, and 
their rearrangement to cause variety in things. Lucretius offers a synonym for ordo – 
dispositura, whose cognate dispono carried weaving connotations in 1.52.262 dispositura 
suggests things separated and laid down, perhaps in careful arrangement – suggesting the 
setting of warp threads on the loom, and thus applying a weaving metaphor to Epicurus’ 
more neutral θέσις (‘arrangement’, ‘placement’ – Ep. Hdt. 46a). With this reading, atomic 
compound structure is expressed by a consistent weaving metaphor, spearheaded not just by 
primordia and exordia, but also by ordo and dispositura.  
 
The order of atoms in different things 
With these observations in mind, a new reading arises for a crucial phrase, which appears five 
times in various modified forms in the DRN, highlighting the atomic causes of creation and 
variety in things. The first occurrence concludes the theory of smallest parts, arguing that 
without limited division matter would not exist for further creation, and would lack: 
 
           […] varios conexus pondera plagas 
concursus motus, per quae res quaeque geruntur. 
       (1.633-4) 
[…] the various interweavings, weights, blows, collisions, motions by 
which everything is carried out. 
 
Such processes (and also intervalla vias, ‘spaces, paths’ – 2.726; 5.438) cause every action 
(quaeque geruntur) and reaction at an atomic level, in turn dictating macroscopic 
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 Cf. 1.1021-8, which denies atomic intelligence in their own design: deveniunt in talis disposituras 
(1027); and also 5.416-31. 
262
 See discussion on p.35. 
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occurrences, and maintaining the fixed separation of certain entities. They include weaving, 
expressed here by conexus.263 
 This phrase occurs twice more, with an important alteration. In 1.665-89 Lucretius 
states that all cannot be fire, as Heraclitus believes, because either everything would have the 
characteristics of fire, or fire would have to change (and therefore perish) to create new 
things. Instead: 
 
 […] sunt quaedam corpora quorum 
concursus motus ordo positura figurae    685 
efficiunt ignis, mutatoque ordine mutant 
naturam […] 
       (1.684-7) 
[…] there are certain bodies whose collisions, motions, array, 
placements, shapes make up fire, and by changed array they change its 
nature […] 
 
Here Lucretius refers to the motions and placements of atoms, and in doing so replaces 
conexus with ordo, to shift the focus from atomic interweaving in general to the order of the 
first-threads,264 the importance of which has just been emphasised by the repetition mutato 
ordine (677, 686) and mutari ordine (681). The weaving sense is supported by positura (a near 
synonym for dispositura, mentioned above), which later appears in a clearer weaving context, 
describing the effect of a blow striking the body: 
 
dissoluuntur enim positurae principiorum 
et penitus motus vitales inpediuntur 
       (2.947-8) 
For the placements of first-things are untied and the vital motions are 
deeply entangled, […] 
 
Two processes are depicted here: the ‘untied pattern’ of the atoms, and the resulting 
‘entanglement’ of the motus vitales. The weaving terms dissolvo and impedio activate in 
positura a sense of carefully laid-out threads. Like conexus and ordo, the ‘laying out’ of first-
threads is a principal cause of creation (1.1027; 5.192) and of the fixed nature of things 
(2.896; 3.787, 795; 5.131, 139, 695). 
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 See n.254. Snyder’s suggestion (1983, p.41) that pondera might refer to loom-weights in 2.88 and 
218 is made unlikely by this passage, since, whereas different weights of atoms cause different 
qualities in things, different loom-weights do not effect a cloth’s weave. Benferhat (2014) 600 notes 
this is the first attestation of the 4
th
 declension noun conexus, and may be Lucretius’ coinage, 
translating Greek συμπλοκή; see E-M, s. v. necto: ‘conecto: attacher ensemble, συμπλέκω’. 
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 Furthermore, by replacing conexus with ordo here, the weaving sense of the latter is brought out. 
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 We find 1.685 repeated in 2.1021, as a conclusion to Lucretius’ famous analogy 
comparing variety in words caused by rearranged letters, with variety in things caused by 
rearranged atoms.265 In words, Lucretius says, the letters’ ‘placements distinguish between 
things’ (positura discrepitant res – 1018), and so in things: 
 
concursus motus ordo positura figurae 
cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent. 
       (2.1021-2) 
[…] when the collisions, motions, array, placements, shapes are now 
changed, things must also be changed. 
 
These lines tie the analogy tightly, picking up from positura in 1009 (of letters) and ordine in 
1014 (of atoms). The placements of atoms and letters in Lucretius’ analogy recall the 
placement of threads in a woven cloth, and the different results created by rearranging these 
threads. The possible combinations enabled by atomic ‘interweaving’ are a principal cause of 
variety in things. Weaving is seen to play two roles here: ‘first-threads’ interweave to create 
things, and rearrange to create new things and cause variety. 
 As in his proofs against Heraclitus’ theory of fire, Lucretius emphasises the 
importance of atomic arrangement to refute Empedocles’ doctrine of the four elements. 
Lucretius takes the example of fire changing to air, arguing that this is not caused by a power 
struggle of elements, but by the addition, subtraction and rearrangement of atoms: demptis 
paucis paucisque tributis, / ordine mutato et motu, facere aeris auras (1.800-1). Changes of 
substance, like poetry differing in sound by transposed words and verses, can be caused 
solely by permutato ordine (1.827). This recalls Lucretius’ argument, discussed above, that 
food being changed into animals’ bodies (2.883-5) is caused by changed ordo of primordia. 
Juxtaposed with this example is one of wood ‘turning into’ (versat – 882) fire, which is 
pertinent, as it repeats his previous explanation (dismissing Anaxagoras’ homoeomeria 
theory) of a forest fire caused by a confluence of semina ignis in tree branches: 
 
iamne vides igitur, paulo quod diximus ante, 
permagni referre eadem primordia saepe 
cum quibus et quali positura contineantur   
et quos inter se dent motus accipiantque,  910 
       (1.907-10) 
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 An analogy so important that it spawned a new mode of reading the DRN: Friedländer’s 
‘atomology’ (1941), by which shared letters and syllables in Lucretius’ words highlight the similarities 
between things. See also Snyder (1980), Dionigi (1988) and Schiesaro (1994), who argues not only that 
the letters should be considered to consist of atoms too, but also (p.85) the epic’s rhetorical devices 
‘are actually devised to reflect a set of underlying atomic phenomena’.  
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Therefore do you now see, as I have said just before, how important it 
is with which and in what positions the same first-threads are held and 
which motions they give and receive among themselves […] ? 
 
The similarity between the passages is clear, both in content and the repetition of permagni 
referre from magni […] referre in 2.883-4 (the phrase occurs five times in the first two books, 
all in relation to atomic position and motion).266 Here positura replaces ordo in 2.884, again 
highlighting their synonymous nature, and situating them together in Lucretius’ weaving 
metaphor. Lucretius pointedly emphasises the importance of atomic ordo and positura in 
creating different things. As in weaving, the arrangement of individual atomic ‘threads’ is 
required to create new and different ‘woven’ things, and two different items consisting of the 
same or similar atomic ‘threads’ differ only by varied arrangements of these threads. In 
weaving the pattern is set by the starting border; in creation by the position of atomic ‘first-
threads’. 
 The qualities of different things are caused not just by the ordo and positura of their 
first-threads, but also by the way they interweave. Returning to 1.215-49, the woven 
structures (nexus – 240) of different things are held together ‘less or more entangled’ (minus 
aut magis indupedita – 240) and so require different forces to ‘untie’ (dissolvere – 243) their 
‘different bindings’ (nexus dissimiles – 244-5). This depiction of the relationship between a 
thing’s woven texture and the most appropriate means of destroying it forms an important 
foundation for the explanation of many processes in the DRN. The reader who notes this 
weaving metaphor, and the terms that express it, will increase their understanding of 
Lucretius’ science later in the DRN. 
 Different woven structures account for the various sensations we receive from 
different things, in particular in our interaction with sensory effluences. We usually267 
perceive things as they actually are because they emit vision films ‘in the same array’ (ordine 
eodem – 4.68) as their surface atoms. If the woven pattern of a film’s atoms differed from the 
source object, we would perceive it incorrectly. Similarly, rearranging atoms, although 
colourless themselves, changes the colour of things, again because ‘it matters greatly’ (magni 
refert – 2.760) which seeds make up things, and ‘which placements’ (quali positura – 761) 
they are arranged in. Thus something black becomes white when the ‘array of its first-things 
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 1.817, 908; 2.760, 883, 894. 
267
 Sometimes vision films become distorted in some way, causing optical illusions (cf. especially 4.353-
63; also 4.379-468). 
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is changed’ (ordo / principiis mutatus – 769-70).268 We perceive colour correctly when the 
atoms in a given film reach our eyes in the correct ordo. 
 The reception of pain is also explained in weaving terms. Bitter things, for example, 
hurt our senses because their constituent atoms are furnished with tiny hooks, by which they 
are ‘held woven together among themselves’ (inter se nexa teneri – 2.405).269 As well as 
creating a closely cohering structure, these hooks also ‘tear open’ (rescindere – 406)270 our 
senses, causing an unpleasant sensation. On the contrary, the atoms of things such as smoke 
and fire, which ‘prick’ (pungere – 2.460) our senses, cannot be hooked, as these substances 
are diffuse and not perplexis indupedita (‘entangled by entwined elements’ – 459).271 Instead, 
they consist of ‘not entwined but sharp elements’ (non e perplexis sed acutis esse elementis – 
463). How we perceive things is dictated by their woven structures. Furthermore, our sensory 
interactions with things depend on the atomic textura of our sensory organs (4.657), and so 
certain things are more aptus (‘suitable’, or perhaps ‘bindable’272 – 4.677) to certain species 
than others – embodying the potential for interweaving between sensory effluences and the 
organ receiving them. 
 Woven structure – and specifically how closely atoms are interwoven (cf. minus aut 
magis indupedita in 1.240 above) – accounts for the varied firmness and density in things, 
since atoms cannot vary in solidity (1.483-634, esp. 565-76). In Book 2, Lucretius explains that 
substances such as stone and iron are dense because their atoms, being ‘more tightly packed 
in union’ (100) and ‘entangled by their own intertwined shapes’ (indupedita suis perplexis 
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 This reading clarifies the meaning of 1.589-90, which depicts the constancy of species as strict ‘to 
such an extent that all the different birds display markings of their kinds in patterns on their bodies’ 
(usque adeo variae volucres ut in ordine cunctae / ostendant maculas generalis corpore inesse). 
Rouse’s ‘in succession’ will not do for ordine here. Lucretius is interested in the ‘pattern’ of a bird’s 
plumage caused by atomic ordo, just as changed ordo of threads creates a new type of cloth, to prove 
that animals of a given kind share inmutabili materiae corpus (591) – i.e. consist of the same atoms in 
the same ordo.   
269
 In the immediately preceding passage (2.391-7) the same description is applied to explain why olive 
oil moves slowly through a sieve; see pp.171-2. 
270
 This verb often applies to woven items (e.g. Tib. 1.10.16 with vestis), as do its cognates scindo (Pl. 
Trin. 837, with vela; Livy 3.58.8 and Verg. A. 12.609, with vestis), discindo (Ter. Ad. 120, with vestis) 
and perscindo (Tib. 1.10.63, with vestis). The weaving sense is activated when depicting the texture of 
things (consistently depicted as ‘woven’) being torn, and is a more convincing reading from an 
explanatory perspective than of (personified) ‘divorce’, as Brown (1984) ad 220. Here our ‘woven’ 
sense organs appropriately receive ‘woven’ effluences; see also on metal images (pp.86-7). 
271
 The adjective perplexus is related to the verb plecto, ‘to plait, twine’ (often of flowers in a garland – 
Lucr. 5.1399; Catull. 64.283) and its derivatives, e.g. implecto, used by Virgil of the Eumenides’ snake-
hair (G. 4.482). The verbs are common in Lucretius and form a connected group of weaving terms 
alongside the etymologically related plico and its derivatives (see n.533). The words are all related to 
Greek πλέκω, ‘to plait, weave’ employed by Epicurus as περιπλοκή and πλεκτικός; E-M s. v. plecto.  
272
 OLD, aptus 1, ‘tied, fastened, bound’; cf. Enn. Ann. 341 (with vincla); Bas. poet. 2.4 (of hair); and 
esp. the weaving metaphor in Cic. Orat. 235.13 (facilius est apta dissolvere quam dissipata conectere). 
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ipsa figuris – 102),273 only collide and separate at short intervals. This is supported by magis 
condenso conciliatu (100), ‘in more greatly condensed union’, which in the context must 
denote tightly packed threads.274  In contrast, smoke is diffuse because it is ‘not entangled by 
interwoven elements’ (non […] perplexis indupedita [sc. elementis] – 2.459), while air consists 
of spread-out atoms and is therefore ‘loose-knit’ (rarum – 107).275 These explanations reflect 
our experience of cloth: a tightly-woven fabric is more resilient than one loosely-woven from 
the same thread.  
 These depictions of woven atomic array play an important role in Lucretius’ theory of 
the soul. The soul, being bodily (3.161-2), consists of atoms, and these, to account for the 
soul’s fast movement (3.182-5, 203-7), must be particularly minute (3.179-80), round (3.186-
7), and ‘exceedingly fine’ (persubtilem (3.179), a weaving term).276 The soul’s ‘woven’ 
substance is confirmed as Lucretius continues his description: 
 
haec quoque res etiam naturam dedicat eius, 
quam tenui constet textura quamque loco se 
contineat parvo, si possit conglomerari, […]  210 
       (3.208-10) 
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 A description recalled in Lucretius’ explanation of magnetism in Book 6: ‘Nor does anything cling 
together more entangled (magis […] indupedita) among its own elements, nor is anything woven 
together more tightly (arte conexa)’ than iron (1009-11). Similarly, in Book 5 Lucretius describes earth 
atoms as perplexa (450, 452) in order to explain why the earth is heavier and denser than the sea and 
sky.  
274
 condenso is, along with denso and the related denseo, the technical term for ‘beating up the weft’. 
Varro, Ling. 5.23.113 defines densus cloth as that which ‘is beaten up by dentibus pectinis (‘the teeth 
of the comb’); for the verb denseo in this sense, see e.g. Ov. Fast. 3.819-20: illa etiam stantis radio 
percurrere telas / erudit et rarum pectine denset opus. Elsewhere densus refers to hair (Lucil. 9.682; 
Ov. Ars am. 3.165), reminiscent of thread; and is used figuratively with texo in Sil. 6.540. The sense of 
condenso, ‘to pack closely together’ (OLD, condenso 1) is nevertheless appropriate to the weaving 
context. concilio can denote the thickening of cloth, as Varro, Ling. 6.43 notes: a cogitatione concilium, 
quod ut vestimentum apud fullonem (= ‘cloth-fuller’) cum cogitur, conciliari dictum, but its sense ‘bring 
together’ (OLD, concilio 1) is equally appropriate to weaving in the context. 
275
 The adjective rarus can depict anything porous, but also ‘loosely woven’ items such as cloth (Plin. 
HN 34.172) and nets (Verg. Aen. 4.131). This sense is activated in relation to compound structure, 
which is depicted consistently in weaving terms. When rarus is first used (1.347) – of the porous 
nature of rock – the reader, recalling the woven texture of things introduced at length in 1.215-49, will 
think of its weaving sense. Lucretius also occasionally uses the derivatives rarefio and rarefacio, ‘to 
make thin’ (only attested in Lucretius) and raresco, ‘to become less dense’ (OLD, raresco 1, e.g. Ov. 
Met. 15.246: resoluta […] tellus in liquidas rarescit aquas). 
276
 An intensive form of subtilis (which Lucretius uses, along with the adverb subtiliter), from tela, 
which the OLD defines as either ‘cloth in the process of being woven on a loom’ (1, e.g. Plaut. Pseud. 
400; Cic. Luc. 95; Virg. Aen. 4.264), ‘the upright threads in a loom’ (3, e.g. Verg. G. 1.285; Tib. 1.6.79; 
Ov. Fast. 3.8.19); or, as in Lucr. 5.1351, ‘a loom’ (4, e.g. Ter. An. 75; Cato, Agr. 10.5). subtilis occurs in a 
weaving sense in Catull. 64.63 (with mitra); Fro. Aur. 2.p.224 (233N) (subtile et tenue subtemen); E-M. 
s. v. subtilis: ‘sans doute terme de tisserand […] cf. subtemen, qui désigne les fils les plus fins de la 
trame’; de Vaan, s. v. texo draws an etymological link between texo and subtilis from a shared root 
*tek-s-. 
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This proof besides also makes its nature clear, how fine a texture it 
consists of and in how small a space it might hold itself together, if it 
could be wound into a ball, […] 
 
The image of the woven soul is clear, with the weaving sense of tenuis (‘fine’)277 brought out 
by textura,278 and conglomerari suggesting thread being wound into a ball.279 The soul’s 
finely-woven texture is confirmed shortly after as Lucretius describes its composite nature 
(3.231-45), which must consist of breath, heat and air, since we sense that these leave the 
moribund. This breath is ‘fine’ (tenvis – 232), while the heat, ‘since its nature is loose-knit’ 
(rara quod eius enim constat natura – 235), must have many ‘first-threads of air’ (aeris […] 
primordia – 236) within. To this is added a fourth substance ‘entirely without name’ (242), 
than which nothing is ‘finer’ (tenvius – 243). The soul’s loosely-woven texture is created by its 
rarus and tenuis constituent parts. The reader, from experience, can understand the soul’s 
woven texture as highly mobile, fragile, and able to be penetrated by or interwoven with 
another substance. The wide-reaching implications of Lucretius’ description of the soul in 
weaving terms will be considered in Part 3 Section D. 
 
How composite bodies combine 
Just as composite bodies are formed from primordia woven together in various ways, so can 
composite bodies be interwoven with one another. This does not occur without restriction, as 
Lucretius confirms (2.700-29): ‘it must not be thought, however, that all things can be woven 
together (conecti) in all ways’ (2.700-1)280, because if this were the case, portenta such as 
Chimeras would exist, or we would see ‘many limbs of land animals woven together (conecti) 
with sea creatures’ (2.704). We know from the first arguments of Book 1 that this cannot 
happen, since animals are born from fixed mothers and seeds, and Lucretius repeats these 
proofs here (2.707-9). The reason why not all composites can combine is explained by an 
analogy at the atomic level, contrasting individual food atoms interwoven with our bodies 
(expressed by conexa – 712), with other atoms that are excreted because they cannot ‘be 
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 tenuis (often tenvis in Lucretius for metrical reasons) denotes anything fine or drawn-out, but often 
specifically ‘fine’ thread (Plaut. Men. 516 with subtemen; Verg. Aen. 4.264 denoting fine gold thread 
inlaid in a cloak) or ‘finely-woven’ fabric (Verg. Aen. 8.33; Tib. 2.3.52; Ov. Ars am. 3.445); cf. also Catull. 
68.49 of a spider’s web (tenuem texens aranea telam). The weaving sense is activated by context. If an 
item that is known to be woven is described as tenuis, the senses outlined here are activated. 
278
 See n.255. 
279
 A reading taken as read by Snyder (1983) 42. The verb is used of hair in Pac. fr. 13-14 War. cf. 
glomero (Ov. Met. 6.19, of wool) and glomus, which Lucretius uses of wool (1.360; cf. Hor. Epist. 
1.13.14). Although glomus, glomero and conglomero can refer to any mass in a ball (and E-M, s. v. 
glomus assert that glomus and globus, ‘ball’ do not differ in meaning), an appropriate image of wound-
up threads is created when applied to physical substances in Lucretius. 
280
 See n.254. 
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interwoven’ (conecti – 716) with our bodies. Whether composite bodies can combine with 
one another is dictated by intervalla vias conexus pondera plagas / concursus motus (726-7) – 
the same forces behind atomic cohesion. Successful interweaving between composites occurs 
when the atomic threads of one interact with the void spaces of another, as Lucretius 
explores in relation to the magnet in Book 6, considering among other things soldered metals 
and cemented stones (to be discussed in Part 3 Section F). 
 The relationship between the body and soul differs from these composites. The soul’s 
woven nature (discussed above, and later in Part 3 Section D), is ‘interwoven’ particularly 
thoroughly with the body.281 This is first expressed in 3.217, where the soul is described as 
‘interwoven through the blood vessels, organs and flesh’ (nexam per venas viscera nervos). 
This extensive combination is caused by ‘first things interwoven from first birth’ (inplexis […] 
principiis ab origine prima – 331), giving body and soul a ‘shared life’ (332). This is explained in 
more detail later, as Lucretius asserts that the soul’s full interpenetration of the body would 
be impossible unless they were born together: 
 
nam neque tanto opere adnecti potuisse putandumst 
corporibus nostris extrinsecus insinuatas –  
quod fieri totum contra manifesta docet res;  690 
namque ita conexa est per venas viscera nervos 
ossaque, […]       
nec, tam contextae cum sint, exire videntur  695 
incolumes posse et salvas exsolvere sese 
omnibus e nervis atque ossibus articulisque. 
       (3.688-97) 
For you must not think that they can be woven together with our 
bodies to such an extent, having made their way in from without – 
clearly what occurs wholly proves the opposite; for the spirit is so 
interwoven through the blood vessels, organs, flesh and bones, […] and 
they are not, since they are so interwoven, seen to be able to exist 
without harm and untie themselves safely from all the flesh, bones and 
joints. 
 
Body and soul, because they are woven together ab initio, are so interwoven (692, repeated 
almost verbatim from 3.217) that they cannot survive untying282 – unlike other composite 
bodies, which remain intact when untied from one another. Conceptually this distinguishes a 
cloth woven ab initio from two types of thread, which cannot be separated without harming 
the whole, and two cloths stitched or woven together by their loose threads, which can be 
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 Plato regularly applies a weaving metaphor to the soul and body in the Phaedo; see Pender (2000) 
165, with refs., and Part 3 Section D. 
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 Answering Plato in the Phaedo and Timaeus (see Part 3, Section D). 
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unpicked without harming either piece. Body and soul do not exist as woven wholes before 
being combined, but rather are interwoven as first-threads – a description supported further 
by subtiliter […] conexae (‘finely woven together’) in 3.739-40. 
 The body threads form the majority of the structure, with the soul threads 
interwoven at intervals. This is confirmed in 3.370-95, where Lucretius denies Democritus’ 
theory that the first-threads (primordia – 372, pointedly employed here) of body and soul are 
‘laid out’ (adposita – 373) one-by-one in alternating pattern to ‘weave together’ (nectere – 
373) the limbs. Instead, the soul’s elementa are both smaller (374) and fewer (376) than 
those of the body, and are ‘set out loose-knit throughout the limbs’ (rara per artus / dissita 
sunt’ – 376-7). The concept of weaving ab initio is embodied by adposita and dissita, which 
recall dispono (see p.35) in meaning and, respectively, their shared stem and prefix. The 
single woven structure of soul and body is not like a cloth spun from equal quantities of two 
types of thread, but more like a cloth woven principally from one type of thick thread, 
forming the majority of the warp and weft, with a different, thinner thread inlayed at 
intervals.   
 This reading, which shows the range and explanatory power of the WEAVING thread, 
may explain the problematic subsequent proof, which explains that we cannot feel certain 
things like gnats’ feet and cobwebs when they fall on the intervals between the soul’s 
primordia (3.377-95) – although even such small things must be considerably larger than even 
a few intervening body atoms.283 We might, however, following our interpretation of 3.370-7, 
imagine a fine thread (representing the soul) interwoven with a cloth (representing the body) 
at intervals, so that on one side only parts of the fine thread are seen between the thicker 
threads, but underneath it runs unseen over a greater space. If body and soul atoms 
intertwine in this way, wider gaps occur on the skin’s surface, on which the gnat treads. The 
soul’s first-threads cannot feel such objects because they run under the skin’s surface, 
covered by first-threads of skin. Our intricate interpretation may seem to stretch the image 
here, but the WEAVING thread employed in Lucretius’ description of the body and soul 
supports it.   
 
Untying things into atoms 
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 4.116-22 argues a fortiori that, because we cannot see a third part of the smallest creatures, their 
internal organs must be exceedingly small, and their constituent atoms more so in turn. By this 
reasoning, a gnat’s foot could not fall between two soul atoms. In 3.377-95 Giussani (1923) ad loc. 
suggests Lucretius believed there were no soul atoms on the skin’s surface. Bailey (1947) ad loc. 
doubts Lucretius considered this problematic or noticed any difference between his examples.  
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The woven textures of things formed from cohering first-threads can be untied, with various 
effects. This is the most common application of Lucretius’ WEAVING thread, with the greatest 
range of vocabulary and most innovative imagery of all five threads. This is principally 
because dissolution is a cornerstone of Lucretius’ birth-death cycle, including the mortality of 
body and soul. Part 3 will consider how the LIFE-CYCLE, WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads intertwine 
to depict these theories. For now general examples of atomic dissolution and its role in 
certain processes will be considered. 
 Lucretius introduces the dissolution of compounds into atoms in the summary of 
atomic vocabulary in the prologue, depicting in weaving terms ‘the first-threads’ (primordia – 
1.55) into which Natura ‘unties’ (resolvat – 1.57) everything. The WEAVING thread then recurs 
in the second of Lucretius’ first arguments: 
 
huc accedit uti quidque in sua corpora rursum  215 
dissoluat Natura neque ad nilum interemat res. 
       (1.215-6) 
Add to this that Nature unties each thing into its own bodies again, and 
does not destroy things to nothing. 
 
Weaving terms persist throughout this argument, describing both the woven texture of things 
(see p.70 above) and their unweaving. If something could be destroyed to nothing, Lucretius 
argues, no force would be required to cause its ‘tearing apart’ (discidium - 220)284, or to ‘untie 
its bonds’ (nexus exsolvere – 220). But in fact nothing can be destroyed unless an appropriate 
force penetrates and ‘unties’ (dissoluat – 223) it. Lucretius later concludes that a touch would 
destroy things unless their constituent bodies, whose ‘interweaving (contextum) requires a 
certain force to untie (dissolvere) it’ (243), were everlasting. He then recaps his opening 
assertion: 
 
haud igitur redit ad nilum res ulla, sed omnes 
discidio redeunt in corpora materiai 
       (1.248-9) 
Therefore, nothing returns to nothing, but everything returns to the 
bodies of mother-substance by tearing up.  
 
Here discidium speaks back to dissoluo (216), emphasising the former’s unweaving meaning. 
By introducing the metaphor ‘dissolution is unweaving’ prominently here and in the prologue, 
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 discidium is etymologically related to scindo (see n.270) and can carry the same weaving meanings 
by association (especially when juxtaposed with other weaving terms, as here). 
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Lucretius intends his reader to envisage compound dissolution as ‘unweaving’ throughout the 
DRN.  
 Since it is established in the first arguments that everything is unwoven into 
constituent bodies, the reader can infer that the bodies themselves cannot be untied. 
Lucretius seeks to confirm this in 1.483-643, the crucial passage explaining atomic 
indivisibility and the complex doctrine of smallest parts. The contrast is made early in the 
passage: 
 
materies igitur, solido quae corpore constat, 
esse aeterna potest, cum cetera dissoluantur. 
       (1.518-9) 
Therefore the mother-substance, which consists of solid body, can be 
eternal, while all else is untied. 
 
A weaving metaphor distinguishes atoms, which cannot be untied, from compounds (= 
cetera), which can. This is made explicit shortly after: 
 
haec neque dissolui plagis extrinsecus icta 
possunt nec porro penitus penetrata retexi […] 
       (1.528-9) 
These [bodies] can neither be untied, struck from without by blows, 
nor moreover be penetrated and unravelled from within […] 
 
The primordia mark the final point of unravelling: they must be indivisible, and all things must 
ultimately be untied into them (545-6).  
 Lucretius extends the metaphorical correspondence to argue that if atoms could be 
untied, nothing would remain now to create things, ‘for we see that any given thing can be 
untied (dissolvi) more quickly than it can be remade again’ (556-7). Moreover, there would be 
no time for the creation of things if infinite time, ‘disturbing and untying’ (disturbans 
dissoluensque – 559), had already destroyed them to nothing, because the first-threads 
would be untied more quickly than they could tie together. This brings to mind, from 
experience of weaving, someone unravelling a cloth at one end faster than it can be woven at 
the other. The weaving metaphor is perfect for enhancing the reader’s understanding of the 
first-threads’ indestructibility. 
 Towards the end of this passage, Lucretius employs the WEAVING thread to elucidate 
the difficult smallest parts theory.285 From our experience of weaving, the smallest thread, 
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 For a summary of Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ differing portrayals of this concept, and their relation to 
Democritus and Leucippus, see Bailey (1947) 700-4. 
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although consisting of smaller parts, cannot be untied further without reweaving becoming 
impossible. Similarly, an atom consists of ‘other similar parts in order, in tightly packed 
formation’ (similes ex ordine partes / agmine condenso – 605-6, with ordo embodying an 
ordered pattern of threads, or, here, their strands)286, which cling together and cannot be 
‘torn apart’ (revelli – 608).287 If Natura could force atoms ‘to be untied’ (resolvi – 628) into 
their smallest parts, nothing could be made afresh, because things not ‘enlarged by parts’ 
(631) cannot possess the varios conexus pondera plagas / concursus motus (633-4) of 
genitalis materies, which enable things to come to pass. Lucretius uses the WEAVING thread to 
reiterate that the primordia are the ‘first-threads’ of all things, marking both the limit to 
which things can be torn, and the point from which things can be rewoven.  
 Having employed the WEAVING thread to explain the nature of atoms, Lucretius can 
extend his arguments to a macroscopic level. Just as both atoms and compounds form woven 
composites (discussed above), so unweaving occurs at the smallest and largest level. At the 
end of Book 1, Lucretius turns from small composite bodies to the world and the universe, to 
argue that matter and void are infinite. If matter were finite, he says, ‘the abundance of 
mother-substance’ (1017-8) would be ‘untied’ (soluta – 1018) and carried across the void, 
rendering creation impossible. Lucretius then casts an analogy, that just as animals deprived 
of food waste away, so things are ‘untied’ (dissolvi - 1040) when further materies ceases to be 
supplied. Just as sufficient thread is required for weaving or repairing cloth to take place, so 
sufficient first-threads are required for ongoing life and creation. 
 The second principal point of Lucretius’ argument here is that the universe has no 
middle (1.1052-1113; esp. 1.1070-1).288 Some believe (1052-1067) the earth stands at the 
middle of the universe, and matter compressing it from all directions prevents its topmost 
and lowest parts from being ‘untied’ (resolvi – 1055). But there can be no middle, since the 
                                                          
286
 A complementary metaphor is evident here, with ordo and agmen suggesting their meaning of 
military battle lines (OLD, ordo 2. ‘a line of soldiers standing abreast (usu. In battle), a rank’; agmen 7. 
‘a line of troops’); Brown (1984) ad loc. 
287
 See 1.612-3: ‘Nature forbids anything to be torn away’ (neque avelli quicquam […] concedit Natura) 
from the first-threads. Derivatives of vello (of which Lucretius uses avello, convello, divello, evello and 
revello) frequently depict the tearing or pulling apart of threads or threadlike things: vello – of hair 
(Scip. min. orat. 10; Hor. Epist. 2.1.46) and wool (Varro Ling. 5.54); avello – of hair (Sen. Oed. 592); 
divello – of knots (Verg. Aen. 2.220); evelli – of hair (Plaut. Truc. 288; Sen. Ep. 47.7). Also, vello is 
etymologically connected to vellus, ‘wool’ (E-M s. v. vello) and has a derivative, vellico, ‘to pluck 
(hairs)’. Although vello and its derivatives also often apply to plucking, pulling or tearing things that are 
not threadlike, for Lucretius they provide an appropriate image for depicting effects on ‘interwoven’ 
atomic structures. 
288
 Although 1070 is incomplete (nam medium nil esse potest… / infinita) owing to mutilation in 
manuscript O, the general sense is clear, whether we take Munro’s (quando omnia constant) or 
Lachmann’s (ubi summa profundist) supplements (Bailey prints Munro’s in a critical note, but does not 
dispute Lachmann’s, or others’, conjectures). Bailey (1947) ad 1.1068-75. 
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universe is infinite and all moves perpetually. Others argue that only the world remains static 
in the middle, while air and heat travel away (and fuel the stars and the sun). However, by 
this argument, the flammantia moenia mundi would suddenly be ‘untied’ (soluta – 1103) into 
the void, and the ruins of things and the sky, ‘untying’ (solventes – 1108) bodies into the void, 
would leave nothing but ‘empty space and invisible first-threads’ (desertum […] spatium et 
primordia caeca – 1110). In short, suggesting that either matter is finite, or substances can 
tend away into the void, allows for the untying of the world and, in turn, the universe.  
 Finally, Lucretius adds another cause of unravelling to the ‘blows’ and ‘force’ of 
1.215ff.: atomic motion. The importance of motion to birth is evident in the phrase varios 
conexus pondera plagas / concursus motus (1.633-4), and the first arguments of Book 2 (62-
332), in which motion also causes death, expressed by the weaving term resolvant (63). The 
dual effects of motion and unweaving are reemphasised in the analogy for atomic movement 
of dust motes dancing in the sunbeams (2.112-24). A warfare metaphor is prominent in this 
image (et velut aeterno certamine proelia pugnas / edere turmatim certantia nec dare 
pausam – 118-9), but the result of this battle is described in weaving terms: the motes are 
‘driven by repeated unions and tearings apart’ (conciliis et discidiis exercita crebris – 120). 
Just as the right blow or force can untie or tear cloth, so can movement, by pushing together 
and pulling apart. These two metaphors represent two causes of atomic dissolution. 
 The description of the dissolution of things into their constituent bodies as 
‘unweaving’ into their ‘first-threads’ is the most important aspect of Lucretius’ WEAVING 
thread, because it forms the basis of several explanations of physical processes. Among these 
processes is the death of things, explained by the intertwined WEAVING and LIFE-CYCLE threads. 
This has important implications for Lucretius’ central ethical doctrine that death is nothing to 
us, which is supported by consistent and extensive applications of the ‘death is unweaving’ 
metaphor at an atomic level and in relation to inanimate things. The end of this Section will 
introduce the WEAVING thread’s role in depicting several physical processes, while Part 3 will 
address those, including death, that are portrayed by the WEAVING thread intertwining with 
one or more other threads. 
 
Sensory effluences 
Another principal role of the WEAVING thread is to depict sensation.289 We hear, smell and see 
things, Lucretius argues, because thin effluences are emitted from things and strike our 
senses. Of these, vision is caused by ‘films’ emitted from the surface of things, and Lucretius 
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 Briefly noted by Snyder (1983) 42. 
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describes there with several terms emphasising either the similarity between the films and 
their source objects – as with simulacra (‘likenesses’), effigiae (‘images’, ‘icons’), imago 
(‘image’) and figurae (‘shapes’), all representing a replica such as a sculpture or cast290 – or 
their nature as thin coverings – membranae (‘skins’). These terms do not suggest the films are 
woven; however, Lucretius frequently uses weaving terminology to describe their structure as 
consisting of first-threads woven into an exceedingly fine texture. In doing so, again Lucretius 
broadly expands a metaphor from Epicurus, who describes the films as ‘far surpassing visible 
things in their fineness’ (λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινομένων – Ep. Hdt. 46a).291 
 The weaving metaphor is only latent in Lucretius’ introduction to the films (4.26-44), 
in the adjective tenuis (42).292 However, in the immediately subsequent passages (if we are to 
delete 4.45-53),293 Lucretius draws two analogies with weaving particularly in mind. The first 
(4.54-64) describes visible substances cast from things in two ways: either ‘poured out 
loosened’ (diffusa solute – 55)294 or ‘more interwoven and crowded together’ (contexta 
magis condensaque – 57).295 Of the former kind are wood smoke and heat from flame,296 
which are visible but loosely formed (solute here must specifically mean ‘loosened’, since 
‘untied’ emissions would be invisible); of the latter kind are animal skins, which are tightly 
formed enough to be visible and tangible. Lucretius describes these skins in greater depth, 
with further weaving metaphors: 
 
et partim contexta magis condensaque, ut olim 
cum teretis ponunt tunicas aestate cicadae, 
et vituli cum membranas de corpore summo 
nascentes mittunt, et item cum lubrica serpens  60 
exuit in spinis vestem […] 
       (4.57-61) 
[…] and others more interwoven and crowded together, as on occasion 
when cicadas take off their snug tunics in the summer, and when 
calves send out skins from the surface of their bodies as they are being 
born, and again when the slippery snake takes off its clothing among 
the thorns […] 
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 Recalling Epicurus’ τύποι and εἴδωλα (Ep. Hdt. 46
a
); see Sedley (1999) 231-4. 
291
 λεπτός commonly refers to ‘fine’ garments in Homer, cf. LSJ, λεπτός 3. 
292
 See n.277. 
293
 See n.251. 
294
 See Part 3 Section C for the combination of liquids and weaving metaphor in depicting sensation. 
295
 Snyder (1983) 41-2 notes the weaving metaphor of condensa (see n.274) brought out by contexta 
(see n.255). 
296
 i.e. intense heat, visible as haze; less intense heat could not be included among rebus apertis. 
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The images of cicadas and snakes are audacious, especially the use of pono and exuo to 
describe removing clothes,297 and of teres, often used of fabrics tightly ‘rounded into a 
bulge’.298 Translations should preserve such vivid images, rather than dilute them with ‘drop’ 
(Rouse, Melville), ‘throw off’ (Rouse), ‘shed’ (Latham), ‘shrugs her castings off’ (Stallings), 
‘slough off their skins’ (Melville). Lucretius explains contexta magis (57) with explicit clothing 
imagery, depicting woven, snug-fitting coverings, which largely maintain the shape of the 
wearer when removed.  
 Just one of Lucretius’ technical terms for films occurs here (membranae, depicting the 
calf’s caul), and in the one exemplum devoid of weaving imagery. The caul, being thin, wet 
and fragile, cannot maintain the calf’s shape once shed, and is not receptive to weaving 
imagery. However, it joins the snakeskin and cicada shells in a trio of skins of varying solidity, 
to express two important aspects: variety of thickness, and (at least for two of them) woven 
structure. If deliberate, this is a rather forced attempt at implying the woven nature of 
membranae by association. Regardless, the passage clearly introduces the woven nature of 
films, through a carefully drawn analogy and individual terms (alongside solute and contexta 
we also find tenuis – 63). This is supported in the next lines, where Lucretius concludes that 
the emission of such visible skins from things should remove doubt that ‘fine’ (tenvia – 66) 
vision films, which are cast from the very edge of things and are ‘less entangled’ (minus 
indupediri – 70) with their source body, can preserve their ‘array’ (ordo – 66) more easily. In 
this passage Lucretius emphatically depicts the woven nature of his films by metaphor and 
analogy. This is maintained in the subsequent analogy, depicting colour cast from a theatre 
awning – a passage addressed in Part 3 Section C, in relation to intertwined weaving and 
liquids metaphors.  
 The WEAVING thread also depicts mental images, which are similar to vision films, but 
finer and more fragile. Their fineness explains why we can imagine composite monsters that 
have never been seen, such as centaurs. The film of a man and a horse cohere instantly in the 
air, ‘on account of their fine-woven nature and thin textures’ (propter subtilem naturam et 
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 OLD, pono 6b, ‘to take off (clothes)’, cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.113 (w. vestis), 5.60 (w. tunica); Ov. Ars am. 
2.616 and Met. 4.345 (w. velamen). OLD, exuo 1, ‘to take or put off (a garment)’, cf. Plaut. Men. 199 (si 
non saltas, exue igitur [sc. pallam]); Ov. Fast. 2.171 (w. tunica); Suet. Ner. 32.3 (w. vestis). 
298
 OLD, teres 1c. Examples under this entry may be better translated as ‘tightly rounded’. In Hor. 
Carm. 1.1.28 (rupit teretes Marsus aper plagas), teres describes a net tight enough to catch a boar; in 
Catull. 64.65 (tereti strophio lactentis vincta papillas) teres describes a band wound tightly around the 
breasts; and in Ov. Fast. 319-20, when Omphale swaps clothes with Hercules (dat tenuis tunicas […] 
dat teretem zonam), teres introduces a clear contrast (extended when Hercules puts them on – 321-4) 
with Hercules’ usual clothing: the dress is ‘tightly rounded’ and therefore too small for Hercules’ belly 
(321). Thus in the present passage, teres specifically depicts a cast-off cicada skin maintaining the 
cicada’s body shape, contrasting the limp snakeskin and the wet, disintegrating calf’s caul. 
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tenvia texta – 742-3; cf. tenvia – 726), just like spiders’ webs (themselves woven – cf. 3.383) 
or gold leaf. The metaphor suggests mental films have sufficient gaps between their threads 
to allow interweaving, which supports Lucretius’ explanation of why and how the mind 
perceives mental images. These images must be of ‘much finer texture’ (magis tenvia textu – 
728; cf. mage tenvia – 756) than vision images, so they can enter through ‘the loose-knit 
parts of the body’ (corporis rara - 730) and rouse the ‘fine nature of the mind’ (tenvem animi 
naturam – 731; cf. tenvis enim mens est - 748). We can picture things in our minds because 
mental images and the mind are both tenuis.299 Indeed, of 43 appearances of this adjective in 
the DRN, fifteen refer to films300 (four to mental films specifically),301 while a further six refer 
to the mind or spirit.302 The weaving metaphor universalises Lucretius’ theory of effluences 
both sensory and mental. As Book 4 progresses, Lucretius explains further qualities of these 
effluences by building upon their established woven nature. In doing so, the WEAVING and 
LIQUIDS threads intertwine, as Part 3 Section C will consider. 
 
Other processes 
In addition to the theory of vision, Lucretius utilises the WEAVING thread to explain further 
complex processes – in particular in Book 6 to explain various natural phenomena that 
confuse and often terrify men.303 These phenomena are often difficult to explain by physical 
or empirical evidence, and so Lucretius uses analogy and the threads – in particular the 
WEAVING thread – to infer their underlying causes, as a result simplifying and to an extent 
demystifying them. 
 In 5.247-323 Lucretius provides the visibly fluctuating growth and diminution of the 
Earth as evidence for the world’s mortality. The cycle at the moment maintains equilibrium, 
but eventually, when diminution sufficiently outweighs growth, the world will die. In this 
cycle, the WEAVING thread explains how ocean levels remain relatively constant, despite the 
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 Lucretius uses the same argument (5.146-55) to prove that the gods do not touch our world. Their 
nature, he says, is tenvis […] longeque remota / sensibus ab nostris (148-9) and so our minds can 
scarcely see them. The tenuis nature of the gods might seem ideal for our tenuis minds to see them. 
However, a distinction seems to be drawn by longeque remota sensibus – suggesting that a 
combination of distance and fineness hinders our perception of the gods. Perhaps their images have 
been broken up or distorted before they reach our minds. 
300
 4.42, 63, 66, 85, 95, 104, 110, 158 twice, 726, 728, 756, 802, 807, 1096 (specifically love images). 
301
 4.726, 728, 756, 802 (and possibly 1096 – referring ambiguously to erotic images). 
302
 Aside from the two here, 3.209, 232, 243, 425. 
303
 Explanations of such phenomena were a philosophical commonplace, seen in. Arist. Mete. 1.9 
(rain), 11 (snow), 12 (hail); 2.4-6 (winds), 7-8 (earthquakes), 9 (thunder and lightning); 3.1 (hurricanes, 
typhoons, thunderbolts), 4-5 (rainbows). For the influence of Theophrastus (via Aetius) on Lucretius, 
see Sedley (1998a) 157-60, which includes a useful table comparing the order of phenomena 
addressed in the three authors. The threads’ consolatory aspects will be addressed in the Epilogue. 
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evident abundance of new water in seas, rivers and springs, partly by evaporation and partly 
by water permeating into the earth (5.261-72). Evaporation occurs ‘because strong winds by 
sweeping, and the heavenly sun by unweaving with its rays, diminish the waters’ (quod validi 
verrentes aequora venti / deminuunt radiisque retexens aetherius sol – 266-7) – with the 
subsidiary meaning of radii (‘shuttles’ in weaving) activated by the context.304 As West argues, 
the easiest way to unweave a cloth and keep the thread is to pass the shuttle back through 
the open warp threads.305 Here, we assume, like Penelope’s cloth, total unweaving is 
prevented by a constant cycle of weaving and unravelling.306 Lucretius returns to this image to 
describe the ongoing war of the four elements (5.380-415). Whenever one element becomes 
dominant, another grows to subdue it, and so when water has grown powerful, the wind 
sweeps it and the sun unweaves it with its rays (388-9, repeated from 266-7, bar the opening 
two words). A principal way in which one of the four elements is kept in check is atomic 
unweaving, which balances against rain to maintain consistent water levels in the world. 
 The WEAVING thread also explains how lightning evaporates wine in a pot (6.225-38). 
The lightning’s minute constituent bodies allow it to pass through solid walls, stone and 
metals (which it also melts – 6.352-6), and to affect earthenware pots in an unexpected way: 
 
curat item vasis integris vina repente 
diffugiant, quia nimirum facile omnia circum 
conlaxat rareque facit lateramina vasi 
adveniens calor eius, et insinuatus in ipsum 
mobiliter soluens differt primordia vini.  235 
       (6.231-5) 
[Lightning] also sees to it that wine suddenly escapes from intact 
vessels, no doubt because its approaching heat easily loosens all the 
earthenware around the vase and makes it loose-knit, and, having 
penetrated the vessel itself with ease of movement, unties the first-
threads of wine and carries them abroad. 
 
The process is expressed by two weaving images: the lightning expands the gaps between the 
pot’s first-threads,307 enabling itself to pass through; and it unties the wine’s first-threads, 
causing them to depart between the pot’s first-threads.  
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 This sense of radii occurs in the description of the loom at 5.1353. West (1969) 80-2 argues these 
two instances support his reading of a weaving metaphor in radii solis and lucida tela diei in 1.147. The 
weaving meaning is more obviously activated here (see n.179). 
305
 West (1969) 82. 
306
 See Gale (2009) ad loc. 
307
 conlaxo is rare, but its cognates laxo (OLD 3 and 4) and relaxo (OLD 3b) frequently carry an ‘untying’ 
sense; cf. Lucil. 4.632 (of knots); Sen. Tro. 1179 (of sails); Verg. Aen. 3.267 (of rope). Cicero uses relaxo 
figuratively alongside other weaving terms (Div. 2.100 with solvo; De or. 3.176 with vincio), creating a 
similar effect to Lucretius here. 
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 The keen reader, upon encountering evaporation by unweaving in 5.267 and 389, 
should recall the metaphor of compounds being ‘unwoven’, persistent in the opening four 
books. The particularly alert reader may even recall a pertinent example at the beginning of 
the argument (1.483-632) that primordia rerum are solid and indestructible. Lucretius admits 
it is difficult to imagine anything solid, because even hard substances have weaknesses. For 
example, heat melts metals such as gold: ‘the rigidity of gold is weakened and untied by heat’ 
(labefactus rigor auri solvitur aestu – 492).308 The sense of solvo here is unattested in Latin 
before Lucretius,309 but its Greek cognate λύω can mean both ‘loosen’ and ‘melt’ (Aristotle 
employs it in the latter sense).310 Lucretius exploits the dual meaning latent in solvo and gives 
it special relevance within his ‘woven’ atomic theory, situating melting among the dissolution 
or ‘unweaving’ of composite bodies (introduced in 1.215-49). This intrinsic process is 
universalised beyond destruction to changes of state.  
 Three passages in Book 6 comprehensively dispel any doubt that solvo depicts 
melting metaphorically as ‘unweaving’ here. First, in describing (6.348-56) lightning’s various 
effects on different things, Lucretius states that it ‘unties and instantaneously boils bronze 
and gold’ (dissoluit […] aes aurumque repente / confervefacit – 352-3), before extending the 
metaphor, stating that metals, owing to their weak elementa, ‘untie all their knots and 
loosen their bonds’ (dissoluont nodos omnis et vincla relaxant – 356)311 when struck by 
lightning. Metals are included among substances in which lightning can pierce through ‘the 
points where the woven textures are held together’ (qua texta tenentur – 351) – i.e. where 
the first-threads intertwine. These points mark the point of ‘untying’ or dissolution in things. 
Whereas earlier the melting of metals by lightning was described literally as liquidum facit 
(6.230), here Lucretius clarifies that this entails the unweaving of the constituent atomic 
‘knots and bonds’ in metal.  
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 Note the possible pun of rigor, which can also mean ‘frozen’ (OLD, rigor 2.), contrasting aestu at the 
end of the line. 
309
 OLD, soluo 13a, ‘to turn to liquid, dissolve’; 13b, ‘to melt by heat’; Ov. Ars. am 2.47 (of melting 
wax); Hor. Carm. 1.4.1 (winter thawing). 
310
 In Mete. 4.6-7 Aristotle alternates between λύεσθαι and τῆξις to refer to the dissolution or melting 
of solids; see Webster (1923) ad 382b35. 
311
 The primary sense of nodus is ‘knot’ (OLD, nodus 1), sometimes used in a transferred sense (e.g. Cic. 
Att. 5.21.3 of difficulties – see OLD, nodus 5a). vinc(u)lum denotes any kind of bond, including ropes or 
chains (OLD, vinculum 1-4) – e.g. Enn. Ann. 518 War. (of tethers); Man. 5.660, Hor. Epod. 17.72 and Ov. 
Met. 11.75 (of snares or nooses). Its cognate verb vincio usually means to ‘tie’, ‘fatsten’ or bind (OLD, 
vincio 1, 2 and 4) – e.g. Ter. Eun. 314 and Verg. Aen. 1.337 (with items of attire). The sense of vinculum 
and vincio denoting ties or tying is appropriate to Lucretius’ WEAVING thread, and the sense is often 
brought out by context. Notably vincio and nodus occur together in Ov. Met. 8.248 (binding together 
with a knot), and nodus and vinculum in Cic. Tim. 13.8 (of joining parts of the world). 
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 The melting of metal and ice are tied together by a shared ‘unweaving’ metaphor, 
confirmed among Lucretius’ consideration of the magnet (6.906-1089). Lucretius explains that 
different bodies are not suited to all things and do not effect them in the same way. For 
example, the sun bakes the earth dry, but it ‘unties’ (dissolvit – 963) ice, melts (tabescere 
cogit – 964) snow with its radii, liquefies (liquefit – 965; liquidum facit – 966) wax and bronze, 
and ‘unties’ (resolvit – 966) gold. The passages considered here contain a broad variety of 
weaving terms depicting melting, with seven different verbs of untying or unweaving (retexo, 
solvo, exsolvo, dissolvo, raresco, relaxo, conlaxo), the weaving implement radii (‘shuttles’), 
and two nouns suggesting interwoven texture (nodi, vincla). A further metaphor from 
weaving might be read in a depiction of heat contracting skin and flesh – trahit et conducit 
(967), which recalls the contraction of the soul’s woven substance in Book 3 (expressed by, 
e.g. conducere – 3.534; distracta – 3.492; and distractam – 3.590, 799).312 The unweaving 
metaphor is so extensively applied to melting that the reader would struggle to envisage 
melting without thinking of unweaving – even when depicted with more literal terms such as 
liquefacio or liquefit.  
 The WEAVING thread also depicts the dispersal of clouds, which is given as a cause of 
several other meteorological processes. The sky in general and clouds specifically are often 
portrayed with a weaving metaphor in ancient literature, presumably owing to the 
resemblance between clouds and clumps of wool.313 Although cloud dispersal is somewhat 
different from melting or evaporation, the underlying atomic process is the same. This is 
especially evident in Lucretius’ description (6.160-422) of the mysterious phenomenon of 
thunder and lightning, for which numerous explanations are advanced, in order to prove it is 
neither mysterious nor caused by the gods (6.379-422; cf. 6.50-79).  
 Empirical evidence suggests lightning only originates from cloudy skies,314 and 
therefore clouds, and their woven nature, are central to Lucretius’ explanations. Lucretius 
offers an aural comparison (6.108-15) between a thunderclap and a theatre awning flapping 
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 Considered in Part 3 Section D. The weaving metaphor of distraho has been established in the 
analogy with thread being pulled apart in 2.826-33 (see pp.70-1). E-M, s. v. traho note ‘traho lanam: 
d’où <<filer>>’. 
313
 Cf. 6.504 (vellera lanae). The comparison is made in Theophr., Sign. 13.87, while Virgil’s nigro 
glomeri pulvere nubem (A. 12.254, specifically a cloud of dust) recalls wool wound into a ball. For the 
sky in general, cf. Sen. Q Nat 2.1.1 (scrutatur […] solidumne sit caelum […] an ex subtili tenuique 
nexum).  
314
 For the opposite occurrence, cf. Hor. Carm. 1.34, in which the poet sees a bolt from the blue and, 
seriously or not (Mayer (2012) 207-9 cites exponents of each point of view), recants his Epicurean 
beliefs. 
91 
 
or clothes drying on a washing line. The awning is ‘torn apart’ (perscissa – 111)315 in the wind, 
mimicking the sound of tearing paper (112) or of thunder. By these analogies with woven 
items, Lucretius hints at the clouds’ ‘woven’ nature. This is supported by a description (6.476-
82) of how clouds are formed, in which Lucretius strikingly concludes: 
 
urget enim quoque signiferi super aetheris aestus 
et quasi densendo subtexit caerula nimbis. 
       (6.481-2) 
For the heat of the star-bearing ether above also presses them and, by 
condensing them, as it were, weaves under the blue with clouds. 
 
Clouds are formed by weaving techniques, expressed by the vivid subtexo316 and the term 
denso, here suggests ‘beating up the weft’317 to create a cloth of uniform density. Later 
Lucretius describes thunder caused when wind ‘tears through’ (perscindat – 138) cloud, 
recalling perscindo in the earlier analogy with awning and clothes. The awning analogy directs 
the reader to recall the awning in 4.75-89, in which the weaving metaphor is also particularly 
prevalent (see Part 3 Section C). The connection is aided by the comparison with mist and 
smoke in 6.102-7, which were described in weaving terms in 4.56 and 4.90-7. Again, the 
woven nature of things is shown to be universal. Finally, as the awning analogy and its 
surrounding passages in Book 4 alert the reader to the depiction of effluences as ‘loosely-
woven’ throughout the book, so here Lucretius highlights a weaving metaphor, which will 
persist throughout his explanations of weather phenomena.  
 Lucretius proceeds to explain lightning in various ways, which unsurprisingly match 
his explanations of thunder. Three different causes are expressed by a metaphor of ‘tearing’. 
Lightning occurs, Lucretius says (6.173-84), when wind trapped in a cloud rushes around and 
grows hot enough to ‘tear apart’ (perscidit – 180) the cloud and emit semina ignis as a 
lightning flash. It also occurs (6.269-94) when whirling wind forges a thunderbolt in a cloud 
and suddenly forces the bolt to ‘tear apart’ (perscindit – 283) the cloud, which also (discidio – 
293) causes rain to fall. Finally, wind from without tears apart (perscidit – 297) cloud and 
causes lightning to fall. The repeated perscindo and its cognate discidium tie together the 
processes of thunder and lightning, again recalling the cloth analogies of 108-15. By noticing 
this correspondence and recalling these everyday images, the reader’s understanding of 
splitting clouds is enhanced. 
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 Similar meteorological usages occur in Livy 21.58.7 (of wind) and Sen. Q Nat. 2.20.2 (of lightning). 
See n.270 for perscindo and its cognates. 
316
 See n.255. 
317
 See n.274. 
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 Two further devastating meteorological phenomena are explained in the same way. 
One of the causes of water-spouts Lucretius advances (6.423-42) is wind trying to burst 
through a cloud, first forcing it down before finally ‘tearing it apart’ (discidit – 436) and 
causing the water to boil. Lucretius suggests that whirlwinds (6.443-50) might occur when a 
wind vortex gathers seeds of cloud around itself, descends to the ground and ‘unties’ 
(dissoluitque – 446), vomiting out violent winds. The rending of clouds is not caused by the 
gods, but by the unweaving of constituent atomic congregations – a process firmly 
established in the preceding books.  
 By the end of Book 6, Lucretius’ reader should be thoroughly conversant with the 
metaphor of atomic unweaving, which has been applied persistently across Lucretius’ 
principal doctrines to universalise the process of dissolution across a wide range of disparate 
examples. The conceptual thread, supported by carefully-drawn analogies with woven things 
(such as clothes and theatre awnings) brings intangible or invisible phenomena closer to the 
reader, in particular by the persistent use of specific weaving terms (such as solvo, textus, 
necto), and by correlations between certain physical processes and known weaving 
techniques and qualities of woven cloth. As a result, the reader’s understanding of the 
universe is enhanced from the microscopic to the macroscopic level. 
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Section C 
 
The LIQUIDS Thread 
 
Of the five conceptual threads, the LIQUIDS thread is introduced least extensively in the 
prologue, despite underpinning several crucial theories.318 Just two liquids metaphors occur 
here, both pertaining to Venus’ deeds. The first forms part of the pleasing description of 
Venus’ effect on the world: 
 
  […] tibi rident aequora ponti 
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum. 
       (1.8-9) 
[…] for you the expanses of the sea laugh, and the sky, soothed, shines 
with outpoured light.319 
 
The image of pouring light is common in literature, and Lucretius’ reader might picture it 
‘pouring’ from a small point of origin (the sun) and filling the sky like liquid in a vessel.320 The 
‘pouring light’ metaphor in Latin is first attested in Ennius (Ann. 560 War.) and later occurs in 
Virgil (Aen. 2.683; 3.152) – an example of the many characteristics they share with 
Lucretius.321  
 The second instance occurs in Lucretius’ request that Venus petition Mars for peace 
on Rome’s behalf: 
                                                          
318
 The importance of liquids imagery in Lucretius is noted by Pope (1949) 74-5; von Raumer (1893) 26-
8; Serres (2000); Garani (2007) 195-219. 
319
 The primary sense of diffundo is ‘to spread (a liquid) widely over a surface (Varro, Rust. 3.5.2, with 
aqua; Vitr. 8.2.2 of rain; Cic. Nat. D. 2.26 of thawing snow). Lucretius employs multiple other cognates 
of fundo
1
, ‘to pour’ (OLD 1, 3, 4), all with various liquids applications: circumfundo, to pour round’ (OLD 
1, 2, 5); confundo, ‘to pour into’ (OLD 1), ‘to pour together’ (2; e.g. Cic. Clu. 173 of poison); effundo, ‘to 
pour out off, or away’ (OLD 1), also ‘to cause to pour’ (2), and applied to bodily substances (3) and 
rivers (4); infundo, ‘to pour in’ (OLD 1; used by Lucretius of water poured into a cup – 1.496), ‘to fill or 
moisten’ (2), ‘to cause to pour’ (3), and applied to rivers (4); perfundo, usually ‘to wet, drench, flood, 
etc.’ (OLD 2; used by Lucretius of incense – 2.416), and used of rivers (3); profundo, ‘to empty liquids 
out of a container, pour out’ (OLD 1), also used of bodily fluids (2); suffundo, ‘to pour on or in’ (OLD 1), 
‘to cause to well up’ (2, usually of bodily fluids), ‘to fill with a  liquid that wells up from below’ (3). 
320
 Empedocles and Ennius, perhaps the two strongest influences on Lucretius’ style, both employ the 
image: Empedocles fr.21 (Simpl. in Phys. 159, 13 = KRS 355) – ἄμβροτα δ’ ὅσσ’ εἴδει τε καὶ ἀργέτι 
δεύεται αὐγῇ (‘the immortal things, as many as are drenched in heat and bright sunlight’); Enn. Ann. 
560 War. – ‘and they pour (fundunt) light from uplifted nostrils’. Cf. also Verg. Aen. 1.683, 3.152; Mart. 
8.65.4; Sen. Oed. 155; OLD, fundo 5b (light, shadow), 5c (sounds). 
321
 For this chain of influence across the genre of epic, both didactic and heroic, stretching back in fact 
to Hesiod and Homer, see especially Gale (1994) 99-129. For heroic epic in Lucretius, see Murley 
(1947), Hardie (1986) and Mayer (1990); for didactic epic in Lucretius, see Gale (2000), Volk (2002), 
Gale (2013); Lucretius hints at his own debt to Ennius in 1.117-9. 
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hunc tu, diva, tuo recubantem corpore sancto 
circumfusa super, suavis ex ore loquellas 
funde petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem; 40 
       (1.38-40) 
You, goddess, poured around him, in his recumbent state, from above 
with your sacred body, pour sweet sayings from your mouth, pursuing 
pleasing peace for the Romans, renowned one; 
 
This similarly delightful image (supported by suavis and placidam) embodies the effect of 
Venus on Mars, or peace on war. The striking image of Venus being ‘poured around’ Mars 
from above again suggests the filling of space – this time around Mars.   
 Pouring is associated with pleasure in each example (the latter focusing on 
persuasion through pleasure), a connection resumed in Book 4 in the context of sexual 
pleasure. Lucretius describes various dreams (1024-36), culminating in those involving 
liquids: a thirsty man drinking from a river; children dreaming of urinating, and consequently 
wetting the bed; and a youth’s wet dream. The liquids imagery spills over into the next 
section (1037-57), where Lucretius explains the cause of men’s sexual arousal and ejaculation 
(compared with blood ejected from a wound – another liquid example). Sexual desire occurs 
when ‘a drop of Venus’ sweetness drips into the heart’ (Veneris dulcedinis in cor / stillavit 
gutta – 1059-60),322 following which Lucretius advises that the ‘collected liquid’ (1065) – now 
referring to semen – should be cast out anywhere. This desire is later compared (4.1088-
1104) with thirst, although it cannot be quenched as easily, since desire only enters the body 
as images – just as real thirst cannot be quenched by water sought in sleep (recalling 4.1024-
5). The metaphors and literal exempla of liquids here introduce Lucretius’ discussion (4.1233-
62) of the importance of corresponding thicknesses of sexual fluids for successful conception. 
Venus, as the embodiment of desire, can fill animate beings like a liquid, which flows into us 
at the initial impulse of desire and out again during sexual intercourse. 
 Despite these connections the LIQUIDS thread is not introduced extensively or 
especially consistently in the prologue. This is perhaps because its primary applications in the 
DRN are to prove the existence of void and to depict movement within it.323 Lucretius has 
chosen in his prologue to introduce only certain principal facets of his philosophy, and 
others, like void (and therefore the LIQUIDS thread), are omitted. Nevertheless, the thread’s 
                                                          
322
 OLD, stillo 1, ‘to fall in drops’; 2, ‘to drop’; 3, ‘to cause to drip’. From stilla, ‘drop of liquid’; see De 
Vaan (2008) s. v. stilla. 
323
 The assertion of Serres (2000) 82 that ‘Lucretian physics is modelled on a mechanics of flows’ is 
rather over-generalised, inflating the prominence of the liquids metaphor in the DRN, and overlooking 
the processes described by other metaphors. 
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appearances in the prologue presage its later application to pleasure and desire, and most 
importantly to movement, which relies on Lucretius’ theory of void. The ‘outpoured light’ of 
1.9 reflects light’s ability to move swiftly and almost unimpeded, to which Lucretius returns 
most extensively in 2.142-64. The liquids image in 1.38-40 depicts Venus’ movement in 
contrast to Mars, suggesting an ability to inspire change by movement – a cornerstone of 
Lucretius’ atomic theory.  
 
Void 
A series of proofs in 1.329-417 assert the existence of void in things (namque est in rebus 
inane – 330). Three main deductions support this, all answering the counter-factual ‘if there 
were no void’: firstly (335-45) because things could not move, since matter has the ‘duty […] 
to impede and to block’ (officium […] / officere atque obstare (336-7) – the ‘iconic’ elision 
creating a chain of words uninterrupted by void, the etymological figure officium […] officere 
expressing that matter by nature impedes);324 secondly (346-57) because apparently solid 
things could not be penetrated; and thirdly (358-69) because similarly-sized things would 
contain the same quantity of body and therefore weigh the same. The first pertains to void 
between things, the other two to void in things.  
 Among initial proofs for these deductions, Lucretius employs two liquids analogies. 
The first depicts various substances moving within other things: 
 
in saxis ac speluncis permanat aquarum 
liquidus umor et uberibus flent omnia guttis; 
dissipat in corpus sese cibus omne animantum; 350 
crescunt arbusta et fetus in tempore fundunt, 
quod cibus in totas usque ab radicibus imis 
per truncos ac per ramos diffunditur omnis; 
inter saepta meant voces et clausa domorum 
transvolitant; rigidum permanat frigus ad ossa. 355 
       (1.348-55) 
In rocks and caves the liquid moisture of water seeps through and 
everywhere weeps with abundant drops; food disperses itself 
throughout the whole body of animate things; trees grow and in season 
pour forth fresh fruit, because food is poured out throughout them 
from the deepest roots through the trunks and all branches; voices pass 
between walls and fly constantly across the closed parts of houses; stiff 
cold seeps through to the bones. 
 
                                                          
324
 Friedländer (1941) 19 suggests that Lucretius creates a compound officium corporis here because 
corpus and officere are not linked by similar letters. 
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Such things could not occur without void (356-7). The importance of liquids to this argument 
is made immediately clear by the pleonasm aquarum liquidus umor, and the striking 
personification of flent.325 The liquid terminology flows over into the subsequent examples, 
especially in the audacious etymological figure fundunt […] diffundunt, describing how trees 
‘pour’ (i.e. produce) fruit, and nutrients ‘pour out’ (i.e. disperse) inside trees. Nourishment 
and birth are both enabled by void within the trees – and this is expressed by the liquids 
metaphor. Similarly, void in our bodies allows cold to ‘seep through’ even to the bones. A 
liquids metaphor might also be drawn from dissipat (‘disperses’326 – picked up by diffunditur 
in 353) – which would tighten the correspondence between food in animate beings and 
(liquid) food in trees. Even meant, by juxtaposition with verbs of ‘flowing’, might suggest 
liquid movement in this context.327 Finally three different liquids movements are expressed 
here – ‘oozing’, ‘dispersing’ and ‘pouring’, which recur to describe different movements 
throughout the DRN.328 
 In the second analogy (1.370-83), Lucretius addresses a false opinion of how a fish 
moves through water. ‘They say’ (aiunt – 372, referring apparently to Plato, Aristotle and the 
Stoics)329 that the advancing fish opens ways in the water, leaving a gap behind into which 
water flows (372-4), so void is not required for movement. Lucretius contradicts this: 
 
nam quo squamigeri poterunt procedere tandem, 
ni spatium dederint latices? concedere porro 
quo poterunt undae, cum pisces ire nequibunt? 380 
       (1.378-80) 
                                                          
325
 OLD, fleo 1, ‘to weep, cry, lament’. 
326
 E-M state the origin of dissipo is unclear, owing to its unconfirmed medial vowel (-u- or -i-). If it is -
u- we might compare OSL sŭpǫ, ‘pour’, ‘strew’, which de Vaan (2008) s. v. supo, suggests is ‘the closest 
semantic match’. Regardless, E-M’s translation ‘jeter de côté et d’autre’ suggests sprinkling or 
scattering appropriate to liquids. Perhaps given the context here, Lucretius intends dissipat to share 
this correspondence. Cicero employs it similarly alongside pouring terms in De or. 2.142 (ius civile, 
quod nunc diffusum et dissipatum esset) and Orat. 220 (dissipata et inculta et fluens […] oratio). 
327
 meo primarily means simply ‘to go’ or ‘to pass’, although the noun meatus can, as E-M, s. v. meo 
states, mean ‘lit d’un fleuve’ or ‘bras de mer’. Also, in later Latin meo refers to rivers in e.g. Plin. Ep. 
8.20.9. 
328
 Lucretius employs mano, ‘to flow’ but also ‘to exude’ (OLD 1) and ‘to leak in or away’ (2) and ‘to be 
wet with’ (3), and its derivatives emano, permano, remano and manabile (only in Lucretius), each of 
which have liquids meanings: emano, ‘to pour forth, flow’ (OLD 1), also figuratively ‘to leak’ (3; e.g. Cic. 
Att. 10.12.3, of private correspondence); permano means ‘to seep, percolate’ (Cato, Agr. 40.4, of 
water seeping into bark; Cic. Clu. 173, of poison in the veins); remano, ‘to flow back’ (OLD 1). These 
terms generally denote steadier, more gradual liquid movement than fluo and fundo. 
329
 Bailey (1947) 658-9 asserts that, contrary to the pseudo-Aristotelian de Melisso Xenophane et 
Gorgia, the theory occurs first not in Anaxagoras or Empedocles, but in Plato (Tim. 79b). Bailey 
summarises the theory in Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, among others. 
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For where after all might the scaly fish advance to, unless the water has 
yielded space? Furthermore, to where might the waters withdraw, 
seeing as the fish will be unable to go forward?  
 
Lucretius then concludes (381-3): either nothing moves or void must exist to allow 
movement. Here all movement is represented by a single example of a fish moving through 
water, and Lucretius argues that all things contain void because water evidently does. The 
tendency of liquids to fill void space provides the archetype for movement, and thus pouring 
is a metaphor for movement through the void. This metaphor consistently depicts movement 
in the DRN. The reader, helped by Lucretius’ careful choice of liquids imagery and exempla to 
depict void and movement, should recognise and understand this correspondence fully from 
these early proofs. Having primed the reader to envisage movement through the void in 
liquid terms, Lucretius can now extend the correspondence to other facets of void and 
beyond.  
 
Void in things 
When introducing the cornerstone doctrine that atoms are solid and indestructible (1.483-
634), Lucretius concedes this seems unlikely, since even stone, iron and metal are evidently 
penetrable (489-93). The final example states: 
 
permanat calor argentum penetraleque frigus, 
quando utrumque manu retinentes pocula rite  495 
sensimus, infuso lympharum rore superne. 
       (1.494-6) 
[…] heat and penetrating cold seep through silver, since we have felt 
both duly when we cling to a wine cup while the dew of water is 
poured in from above. 
 
The goblet walls must contain void, through which the warmth or cold of water passes 
gradually (expressed by permanat as in 1.348 above).330 The explanation is resumed in an 
argument (1.520-39) that the universe consists solely of body and void, marked off alternately 
from one another (524-7). Bodies are distinct from void, and so cannot be destroyed by 
disintegration or external blows or piercing (528-30). Again, without void nothing could be 
broken or split in two, 
                                                          
330
 Heat and cold are bodily substances. Heat is explained as consisting of ‘seeds of fire’ (semina ignis) 
or ‘seeds of heat’ (semina vaporis or ardoris). Lucretius never states explicitly that cold exists in atomic 
form, but does describe cold substances as containing ‘toothed’ (dentata – 432) bodies that cause cold 
sensations. However, we can also infer that something is cold when it lacks heat seeds; indeed 
changes in temperature in the springs of Ammon and Dodona (6.848-89) are ascribed to different 
proportions of fire atoms. See further Montserrat & Navarro (2000). 
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nec capere umorem neque item manabile frigus  
nec penetralem ignem, quibus omnia conficiuntur. 535 
       (1.534-5) 
[…] nor take in moisture, nor again seeping cold, nor penetrating fire, 
by which everything is destroyed. 
 
Void gaps between bodies allow liquids and ‘seeping’ (literally ‘seepable’) cold to enter. 
Lucretius has reversed the descriptions of hot and cold – the heat now penetrating, the cold 
pouring – emphasising their shared qualities. In these passages juxtaposed metaphorical and 
literal examples of pouring support the existence of void in things. 
 Lucretius employs various visual exempla to support this theory in his exploration of 
the possible structures different atoms can form (2.333-729). Examples of liquids passing 
through certain things are chosen to depict and explain the ways in which things interact. 
Firstly, Lucretius addresses the fact that lightning ‘flows’ (fluat – 383) with more penetration 
than torch fire. He then considers horn, through which light passes but rain ‘is spat back’ 
(respuitur – 388), because light consists of smaller bodies than water. Finally wine and oil 
passing through a sieve are considered. ‘We see wine flow through as quickly as you like’ 
(quamvis subito […] vina videmus / perfluere – 391-2), while oil ‘lingers’ (392), because its 
elementa cannot ‘ooze through’ (permanare - 397) each hole singly.331 The persistent image 
(first metaphorical and then literal) in these examples is flowing liquids – a connection 
emphasised by the echo of fluat (383) in perfluere (391). When addressing movement 
through the void spaces in things, liquids exempla and metaphors are Lucretius’ default 
explanatory devices.  
 
Movement through the void 
Pouring, the paradigm for movement through the void in things, also explains how things 
traverse spaces between things, or through the air, which contains extensive void space. This 
is introduced in the intricate analogy between wind and rivers (1.271-97), employed to prove 
the existence of invisible constituent bodies. The analogy is tightly made, with a striking 
fluidity of imagery applied to the two forces. The wind’s effects, vividly described (271-6), are 
attributed to venti […] corpora caeca (277, repeated in the conclusion at 295), which must be 
tangible since wind is destructive. The comparable effects of water are then introduced by 
the following bridge: 
                                                          
331
 The analogy has shifted slightly, progressing deftly from invisible to visible void spaces. See pp.171-
2 for more on this image. 
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nec ratione fluunt alia stragemque propagant  280 
et cum mollis aquae fertur natura repente 
flumine abundanti, quam largis imbribus auget 
montibus ex altis magnus decursus aquai, 
       (1.280-3) 
Nor do they [i.e. the bodies of wind] flow and deal destruction any 
differently from when the soft nature of water is carried suddenly by an 
abundant river, when a great deluge of water from the high mountains 
swells with abundant downpour, […] 
 
The image is richly painted by multiple words expressing abundance, and a pleonastic build-
up of liquids vocabulary332 – exhibiting the importance of liquids imagery for portraying 
movement. The unexpected application of fluunt to the bodies of wind in 280 is only 
explained by mollis aquae in the following line, as Lucretius introduces the comparison with 
rivers.333 This comparison is supported by multiple words shared between the descriptions of 
wind (270-9, 290-5) and rivers (280-9) and their effects: ruit (272 and 289) and ruunt (292); 
montis (274) and montibus (283); silvifragis (275) and fragmina […] silvarum (284); venti vis 
(271), aquai / vim (285-6) and viribus amnis (287). The audacious wordplay of venti […] 
flamina (290) compared with a validum […] flumen (291) strengthens the comparison further. 
Importantly, the movement of the bodies of wind is described extensively in liquids terms, 
including the verb fluo which persistently depicts the movement of bodies throughout the 
DRN. The analogy between wind and rivers not only proves that invisible bodies exist, but also 
introduces Lucretius’ doctrine of ‘liquid’ movement in advance.334 
 Atomic movement is described in these terms in Book 2. Lucretius states (184-224) 
that, because things tend downwards, a swerve must occur to enable atomic combination – 
otherwise, matter would ‘fall through the deep void like drops of rain’ (imbris uti guttae, 
caderent per inane profundum – 222) without combining.335 The preceding lines make it clear 
that the reader should understand movement in terms of pouring liquids. Lucretius addresses 
a conjecture that the upward motion of fire disproves the downward tendency of things (187-
93), by arguing that it is propelled upwards by force (203-5). Two liquids analogies, of blood 
spurting from the body (194-5) and timber being forced up when pressed into water (196-
200), support this. Although primarily explaining upward motion, each reasserts the 
metaphor ‘movement is pouring through the void’ – the blood filling the void in the 
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 West (1970) 273-4 enumerates these and further correspondences. 
333
 An example of West’s ‘transfusion of terms’ (1969) 43-8; see n.6 of this thesis. 
334
 By our reading, this passage may be another Lucretian ‘anticipation’, for which see n.184. 
335
 The tendency of matter to ‘pour’ downwards is also expressed in a denial that the universe is finite 
(1.984-98); see pp.169-70 for discussion. 
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surrounding air, the water striving to fill the void vacated by the wood. The tendency of water 
to fill void space is so strong that the further the wood is submerged, the more violently the 
water forces it up when released (197-200). Fire is similarly forced upwards, being ‘squeezed 
out’ (expressae – 204) through the air, reminiscent of water squeezed from a bladder.336 In 
contrast, the sun ‘scatters’ (dissipat – 210) its heat downwards over a large area and ‘sows 
the fields with light’ (lumine conserit arva – 211). The primary image is of scattering seed 
(sero is etymologically linked with semen),337 but, since this is conceptually similar to the 
sprinkling of water, it supports the liquids imagery of the preceding examples.338 
 
Speed 
To portray movement through the void Lucretius has drawn on several aspects of liquid 
movement: seeping through porous things; filling void space as efficiently and quickly as 
possible; and tending downwards, unless forced otherwise. Another crucial concept explained 
by the LIQUIDS thread is speed, which was implicitly portrayed in the analogies of spurting 
blood and the log leaping from water, discussed above. This correspondence supports the 
explanation of several processes central to Lucretius’ science.  
 Early in Book 2, Lucretius depicts the unsurpassed speed of atoms (142-64). This 
cannot be proved directly by the senses, so Lucretius provides an analogy with light, and 
specifically sunlight cast at dawn: 
 
primum aurora novo cum spargit lumine terras, 
et variae volucres nemora avia pervolitantes  145 
aera per tenerum liquidis loca vocibus opplent, 
quam subito soleat sol ortus tempore tali 
convestire sua perfundens omnia luce, 
omnibus in promptu manifestumque esse videmus. 
       (2.144-9) 
First, when dawn sprinkles the lands with new light, and the various 
birds flying about the pathless woods through the soft air fill the place 
with liquid voices, how suddenly the risen sun at such a time is 
accustomed to clothe everything, pouring forth with its light, we see to 
be manifest in front of all. 
 
The strength of the example is formed from a complex network of metaphorical 
correspondences. Light is described as a liquid, spreading out through the air and onto the 
                                                          
336
 The squeezing metaphor will be considered in Part 3 Section B, expanding upon the ‘squeezing out 
the sponge’ metaphor outlined by Garani (2007) 210-19. 
337
 Lucretius may have known this link, since Varro Ling. 5.37 connects seges and semen. Later, the 
grammarian Festus connects seges with sero; see Maltby (1991) s. v. seges. 
338
 See n.326 for discussion of dissipo. 
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land, with spargit339 and perfundens depicting the wide area covered (aided by the different 
but complementary metaphor convestire, suggesting total covering with a cloth). Coupled 
with this image, a chorus of birds fill the surrounding air with their liquid voices.340 This is a 
particularly surreptitious analogy, neither explicitly separate nor ostensibly linked with the 
comparison between the speed of atoms and light. Nevertheless, the reader awake to 
Lucretius’ methodology of metaphor would note the comparison of light with sound, and of 
both with liquids. Each entirely fills the available space almost instantly, like a poured liquid.  
 The speed of the soul is also depicted by the LIQUIDS thread (3.177-207). This enables 
Lucretius to explain the soul’s movement as passive, contrasting Plato’s metaphors of self-
propulsion (Phdr. 245c-246a).341 The metaphor is subtly introduced, with the soul described 
as consisting of rutundis / […] seminibus (186-7), recalling liquid atoms (levibus atque rutundis 
– 2.451-2). An analogy clarifies the link: 
 
namque movetur aqua et tantillo momine flutat, 
quippe volubilibus parvisque creata figuris.  190 
       (3.189-90) 
For water is moved and flows about by such a small impetus, clearly 
because it is born from rollable and small shapes. 
 
Again a liquid provides the visible archetype of swift, unimpeded movement. The analogy 
with the soul is tightened by volubilibus parvisque […] figuris, which responds to rutundis / 
perquam seminibus […] perquamque minutis in 186-7. Since the soul’s bodies are rounder and 
smaller than those of water, it must ‘flow’ with even less driving power (tantillo momine, 
responding to momine […] parvo in 188). Lucretius then contrasts water with honey, a thicker, 
‘more lingering’ (cunctatior – 192, recalling cunctatur olivom – 2.392) liquid, and compares it 
with poppy seeds, which provide a visual example of round, minute bodies. A pile of poppy 
seeds ‘flows down’ (diffluat – 197) when blown only lightly, and the reader can complete the 
argument a fortiori to infer how swiftly the considerably more minute bodies of animus move 
                                                          
339
 OLD, spargo 1, ‘to scatter in drops’ (e.g. Vitr. 8.4.1, of water). The verb often refers to non-liquid 
things being scattered, but frequently, as here, in Lucretius the liquids sense is activated by context. 
The same is true of its derivatives, of which Lucretius uses: conspargo, ‘to sprinkle a liquid’ (OLD 1) (of 
spattering blood in 3.661); dispergo, more generally ‘to scatter’, but used figuratively with defluo in 
Apul. Met. 11.3; exspargo (only Lucr. 5.371); and praespargo (only Lucr. 5.739). See also de Vaan 
(2008), s. v. spargo on respergere, ‘to sprinkle with liquid’. 
340
 See West (1969) 91-2 on the liquid imagery in this passage. oppleo denotes filling up in general, 
with any given substance. At times, as here, a liquids sense is activated, e.g. Ter. Haut. 306 (of tears). 
The same is true of expleo, ‘to fill up’ (often with solid things, but also, e.g., of satisfying thirst in Cic. 
Sen. 8.26 and Lucr. 4.876) and plenus, ‘full’ (e.g. Stat. Silv. 5.5.15, of udders; Hor. Ars P. figuratively 
with mano), which Lucretius also uses. 
341
 Pender (2000) 151. 
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in comparison. The analogy is especially tight because poppy seeds have been compared to 
bodies of water in 2.451-5, and recall the atomic ‘seeds’ of soul in 187. Lucretius completes 
the analogy by concluding that the smaller and lighter constituent bodies are, the more 
mobile they, and the composite bodies they form, are (199-200). Anything consisting of 
bodies similar to those in free-flowing liquids must ‘flow’ in the same way,342 and the soul, 
being ‘outstandingly mobile’ (204), must be formed from bodies ‘exceedingly small and light 
and round’ (perquam […] parvis et levibus atque rutundis – 204-5) – and therefore flow faster 
than liquids.  
  
Light 
Pouring light is a common metaphor in the DRN, introduced in 1.9 with diffuso lumine, and 
extended in 2.144-9, discussed above. Elsewhere, in the famous dust motes analogy the sun’s 
rays ‘pour light’ (lumina […] fundunt – 2.114-5) through a window, and, in a passage imitating 
Homer Od. 6.42-6, the home of the gods ‘laughs with light poured all around’343 (large diffuso 
lumine ridet – 3.22). Unsurprisingly, darkness, being ‘air deprived of light’ (4.368-9), moves in 
the same way. When the sky suddenly becomes dark with cloud, Lucretius says, ‘you might 
reckon that all the darkness had left Acheron and filled the great caverns of the sky’ 
(tenebras omnis Acherunta rearis / liquisse et magnas caeli complesse cavernas – 4.170-1).344  
 The liquid qualities of light and darkness explain the complex phenomenon of 
shadows. Lucretius advances as a possible cause of eclipses (5.751-70) the intervention of a 
dark body in the path of light, explained as a barrier preventing the flow of liquid: the object 
‘might interrupt the rays and poured-forth light’ (radios interrumpat lumenque profusum – 
767). This is comparable with the way in which our bodies cast shadows by interrupting the 
rays of light so they ‘die’ (dispereunt – 376; cf. perire in the eclipse explanation, 5.760). Our 
shadows, being only air deprived of light, cannot follow us intentionally, but rather our bodies 
deprive ‘fixed places’ (locis […] certis – 370, ‘fixed’ by the location of the intervening object) of 
sunlight in order (370-1).  In turn, ‘the part we have left is filled up again’ (repletur item quod 
liquimus eius – 372) because ‘new rays of light always pour out’ (semper […] nova se radiorum 
lumina fundunt – 375). Our bodies prevent the pouring light from filling the ground 
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 Leen (1984) 114-5 notes that the proof of the soul’s speed here ‘depends on the weight of a 
previous proof, in the form of a simile, to illustrate and bolster a subsequent argument of some 
difficulty’. However, she overlooks the ramifications of this depiction on the easy flowing of the soul at 
death, discussed below in Part 3 Section D. 
343
 Images of this kind will be discussed in the Epilogue. 
344
 Compare also the description of the cow’s character: it never experiences anger ‘pouring over the 
shadow of blind darkness’ (suffundens caecae caliginis umbram – 3.304). 
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instantaneously, as it does when its path is cleared. Lucretius extends the metaphor further in 
conclusion: 
 
propterea facile et spoliatur lumine terra 
et repletur item nigrasque sibi abluit umbras. 
       (4.377-8) 
For this reason the sun is easily both deprived of light and filled up 
again, and it washes away the black shadows from itself. 
 
Not only is the space ‘filled up’ by liquid light, but the light itself ‘washes away’ the 
shadows345 – a slightly misleading metaphor, since shadow, being air without light, cannot be 
‘washed away’ (but appropriate to the description of light as a liquid). 
 The LIQUIDS thread depicts sunlight more vividly by the metaphor ‘the sun is a 
fountain of light’. Lucretius offers proofs (5.281-305) that the sun emits light constantly, 
because whenever the cast-out rays perish, more arise in ceaseless support: 
 
largus item liquidi fons luminis, aetherius sol, 
inrigat adsidue caelum candore recenti 
suppeditatque novo confestim lumine lumen. 
       (5.281-3) 
Again the bountiful fountain of liquid light, the heavenly sun, 
constantly floods the earth with new brightness, and immediately 
brings new light as relief for light. 
 
The mapping of a fountain onto the sun depicts three particular facets: the expansive area 
covered by the poured-out sunlight (expressed by inrigat);346 the relatively small size of the 
source; and the continual stream of light (emphasised emphatically by adsidue and confestim, 
and the juxtaposed polyptoton lumine lumen). The third aspect, although lacking liquid 
terminology, appropriately supports the fountain metaphor. 
 In the DRN fire and light are often synonymous and interchangeable, with terms such 
as ignis and flamma used of sunlight and lumen of fire. Therefore, the LIQUIDS thread depicts 
fire in similar terms to light. In 6.879-99 Lucretius explains how a spring at Dodona can light 
tow held above it. Invisible seeds of fire ‘burst out’ (erumpere – 895)347 of the water and ‘gush 
                                                          
345
 OLD, abluo 1, ‘to wash off, out, or away’; also 2, ‘to wash clean, cleanse’. Lucretius uses its cognate 
eluo literally of washing out purple dye in 6.1077. 
346
 A clear liquids metaphor; see OLD, irrigo 1, ‘to flood, drench’; 1b, ‘to irrigate’; 2, ‘to cause (liquids) 
to flow’; see Gale (2009) ad 276. 
347
 The verb does not in itself carry liquids connotations, meaning ‘to burst or spring out’ (OLD, erumpo 
1), but can take on a subsidiary sense in context, e.g., as here, of liquids (2b, of fluids; 2c of rivers), or, 
as in 1.162, of birth (see n.187 above). 
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forth’ (scatere – 896)348, just as freshwater gushes out (scatit – 891)349 of the sea at the spring 
of Aradus – terms used in the extensive light-liquids correspondence of 5.594-603 (discussed 
in Part 3, Section B). This phenomenon is compared (6.900-5) with a candle being rekindled at 
a distance ‘before the nearby fire floods it’ (prius […] quam comminus imbuat ignis – 903-
4).350 The liquids image employed here is more appropriate to the phenomenon of the spring, 
and so the comparison works both ways, with the spring mapped onto the candle and vice 
versa to create a shared explanation supported by the ‘liquid light’ strand of the LIQUIDS 
thread.351  
 The LIQUIDS thread is also commonly applied to lightning, which Lucretius, aligned 
with conventional ancient scientific thought,352 believed to be a form of fire.353 Lightning is 
described as ‘the golden colour of liquid fire’ (liquidi color aureus ignis – 6.205), formed of 
seeds which clouds ‘pour forth’ (profundant – 6.210). These seeds, however, are ‘without any 
water’ (6.207), creating an apparent oxymoron, designed by Lucretius to emphasise the 
source image of ‘pouring’ (and its association with movement) rather than suggesting fire is 
actually a liquid. Later, Lucretius explains (6.348-56) that lightning passes through things 
because it is a liquid (liquidis – 349) able to penetrate the void in things – combining the 
metaphors ‘fire is a liquid’ and ‘motion through void space is pouring’.354 The various 
movements and subsequent effects of fire are described consistently by the LIQUIDS thread. 
 
Sensation 
Lucretius’ theory of sensation involves effluences being emitted from things, and moving 
towards and entering our sensory organs. This process is depicted by the LIQUIDS thread as a 
‘flow’ from the source object, a description that probably stems from Empedocles, whose 
theory that things give off ‘certain effluences’ (ἀπορροάς τινας, from ἀπορρέω, ‘to flow 
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 OLD, scateo 1, ‘(of liquids) to be emitted with violence, gush forth’; also 1b ‘to gush (with a liquid)’. 
Lucretius also uses the verb literally in 5.952 of springs; West (1969) 44; Godwin (1991) ad 895-6. 
349
 n.b. the verb can either be 2
nd
 or mixed conjugation. 
350
 A word with clear liquids meaning: OLD, imbuo 1, ‘to drench, steep, wet’ (see also 1c, 3); West 
(1969) 45; Godwin (1991) ad loc. 
351
 See West (1969) 44-5 for the ‘transfusion of terms’ in this passage, first from the argument to the 
analogy, and then to the second analogy. 
352
 Cf. Epicurus Ep. Pyth. 101-3; and Arist. Mete. 369a10-369b11; 369b11-370a21, which ascribes to 
Anaxagoras and Empedocles a theory that fire (able to create lightning) is permanently present in the 
clouds. 
353
 West (1969) 7-9 argues that fulgur always means ‘lightning’ in Lucretius, despite dictionaries listing 
four of his usages (and only these four in classical Latin) as ‘brightness’. These four usages all describe 
a form of fire: torches (5.295-6), sunlight (2.164) and lightning (1.725; 6.182). Lucretius’ strategies of 
imagery aside (of which West uses these passages as examples), the Roman reader would 
comprehend phrases such as ‘lightnings of fire’, because lightning and fire were considered to be the 
same substance. 
354
 See p.89 for the weaving metaphor in this passage. 
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from’) is summarised by Plato (Meno 76c).355 Epicurus utilises ἀπορροή (Ep. Hdt. 46a) and its 
cognate ῥεῦσις (Ep. Hdt. 48) for the same purpose. Lucretius nods to these terms in a single 
reference to a fluctus odorum (‘stream of smells’ – 4.675) emanating from things, but 
elsewhere uses liquids terminology solely to describe the process behind the emission and 
movement of effluences, rather than their physical nature, which, as we saw in the Section B 
of this Part, is woven. As with his appropriation and expansion of latent metaphor in Epicurus’ 
atomic terminology, Lucretius greatly expands the LIQUIDS thread in his theory of sensory 
effluences (including perhaps the creation of three neologisms).356 This is first evident in Book 
4 in the analogy (4.74-85) depicting colours flowing from an undulating awning (expressed 
primarily by fluto, fluito and perfundo), and the accompanying examples of smell, smoke and 
heat ‘poured out’ (diffusa – 55; diffusae – 91) from things (both considered further in Part 3 
Section C). 
 In 4.143-67, Lucretius describes the swift formation of vision films, which ‘are born 
easily and swiftly and flow perpetually from things’ (facili et celeri ratione genantur / 
perpetuoque fluant ab rebus – 143-4).357 Visual evidence that image films ‘flow perpetually’ 
(perpetuo fluere – 157) from things is provided by a mirror reflecting images instantly when 
held up. Following this repetition of perpetuo fluo, when perpetuo appears alone in 162 to 
depict places ‘full’ (plena – 162) of uninterrupted sunlight, the keen reader would envisage 
flowing movement, and consider sunlight as a perpetually flowing liquid filling all available 
space (recalling especially the pouring light in 2.144-9, discussed above). It is typically 
Lucretian to alternate between stating metaphors openly and implying them, urging the 
reader to apply their own ratio to enhance their understanding. A similar technique is 
employed in a proof (4.199-208) for the images’ speed. Lucretius depicts swift effluences 
emitted from deep within an object, like sunlight and heat, which, in a familiar metaphor, we 
see ‘pour forth’ (diffundere - 202) and ‘flood’ (rigare – 203) the sky. Arguing a fortiori, 
Lucretius concludes that surely effluences emitted from the edge move even further in less 
time. This conclusion is devoid of liquids terminology, but the keen reader would map the 
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 If Plato is using Empedocles’ own term. In fact, it seems to have become standardised, as ἀπορρόη 
occurs in Theophr. Sens. (KRS 589) and ἀπορρέω in Alex. de sensu 56.12 (= KRS 590), both depicting 
Democritus’ and Leucippus’ theories of sensation. The source of Lucretius’ inspiration here is therefore 
uncertain. 
356
 fluenter (4.225; 6.931), fluto (4.77, also in 3.188) and fluvidus (2.464, 466) are unattested in Latin 
before Lucretius; Benferhat (2014) 601. 
357
 See also the explanation (4.332-6) of why people with jaundice see things with a yellow tinge. The 
flow of vision films is met by a flow (fluunt – 334) of yellow seeds from the eyes, dyeing (we infer) the 
films yellow. 
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liquids metaphor of diffundere and rigare onto these effluences, imagining them as ‘pouring 
forth’ more swiftly and freely.358 
 By the familiar Lucretian technique of universalisation through metaphor, other ‘long 
distance’359 sensation is caused by effluences ‘poured’ from things (4.218-29). These include 
odours, which ‘flow perpetually’ (perpetuoque fluunt – 218) from things, just like cold from 
rivers, heat from the sun and spray from waves (and vision films, as considered above); 
voices, which flit (volitare – 221) through the air; and salt and bitter tastes emitted by the sea 
and wormwood tincture respectively. The majority of these examples involve liquids, while 
the sun’s heat is given as an example of something that ‘flows’ (already a well-established 
description in the epic). The ascending tricolon in which the sensations are listed ends with 
examples of actual liquids – sea-spray and particles of wormwood tincture. The spray is 
emphatically described as a ‘devourer of sea walls’ (exesor moerorum – 220), to draw 
attention to its constant flow – supported also by cum mare versamur propter, ‘whenever we 
are by the sea’ or even ‘for the whole time’ (cum + indicative denotes either a habitual or 
simultaneous action). Only the voices in 221 are not described in liquid terms, but the 
surrounding context suggests the reader should imagine them ‘flowing’ too.360  
 The metaphor persists in the conclusion: 
 
usque adeo omnibus ab rebus res quaeque fluenter 225 
fertur et in cunctas dimittitur undique partis,   
nec mora nec requies interdatur ulla fluendi, 
perpetuo quoniam sentimus, et omnia semper 
cernere odorari licet et sentire sonare. 
       (4.225-9) 
So much so is it that each thing is carried fluidly from all things and sent 
to all parts in all directions, and no delay or rest from flowing gets in 
the way, since we constantly sense it, and we can always see them all, 
smell them and hear their sound. 
 
Lucretius pleonastically states the universal and perpetual flow of emissions from things 
(omnibus; in cunctas […] undique partis; nec mora nec requies; perpetuo; omnia). The passage 
as a whole is bookended by images of ‘perpetual flowing’ (perpetuo – 218, 228; fluunt – 218; 
fluenter – 225; fluendi – 227). Although only the first perpetuo modifies fluo, the keen reader 
                                                          
358
 Similarly, in 2.256-68 Lucretius explains why, although we perceive things by their films, we cannot 
perceive the films singularly, just as we feel wind and cold without sensing each ‘little part’ (particulam 
– 261). Lucretius states that cold ‘flows’ (fluit – 260) towards us – applying a term used of films to 
make the comparison clearer to the reader. 
359
 Omitting touch and taste, which are caused by direct interaction with the items perceived. 
360
 In fact volito has appeared alongside liquid terms in the awning analogy (4.88) and among proofs 
for void in things (alongside permano – 1.355). Note also travolat employed near tranant in 4.601-2. 
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would envisage flowing in the second instance too (228), as in 4.157 and 162 (explored 
above). The reader will be certain that sensory effluences flow continually from things to 
arouse each of our ‘long-distance’ senses (listed in 229).  
 The LIQUIDS thread depicts sounds and smells later in Book 4. Recalling the ‘liquid 
voices’ of birds in 2.146, woodland music is described in the same way (tibia […] fundit digitis 
pulsata canentum – 585; fistula […] ne cessat fundere musam – 589), introducing a number of 
examples of liquid sounds. Lucretius states that voices ‘swim through’ (tranant – 601)361 walls, 
amending the image from a flowing liquid to movement through a liquid (recalling the 
swimming fish in 1.370-83). He then considers the various ways they are dispersed or 
distorted (4.603-14). When a voice is cast forth, it spreads in all directions: 
 
             […] quasi ignis  605 
saepe solet scintilla suos se spargere in ignis. 
ergo replentur loca vocibus abdita retro, 
omnia quae circum fervunt sonituque cientur. 
       (4.605-8) 
[…] just as a spark of fire is often accustomed to sprinkle itself into its 
own fires. Therefore, concealed places are filled with voices again, all of 
which boil around and are stirred with sound. 
 
As in 2.144-9, referring to light, we find spargo and a derivative of pleo depicting the totality 
of space covered and filled by a substance. The primary image is of fire, but nonetheless 
compliments the liquid metaphor in the preceding exemplum, especially since fire is often 
‘liquid’ in the DRN. The use of fervunt here depicts the heat of the fire, but also perhaps 
suggests the bubbling murmur of (liquid) sounds arising, mingling and abating.362 The dual 
image would certainly be appropriate, since heat makes things boil. 
 Lucretius’ brief consideration of smell is introduced pointedly with a dense 
collocation of liquids terms: 
 
   […] primum res multas esse necessest  
unde fluens volvat varius se fluctus odorum,  675 
et fluere et mitti volgo spargique putandumst;  
       (4.674-6) 
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 Also used of images in 4.177 (tranantibus auras). 
362
 OLD, ferveo (combined entry with fervo) 1b, ‘to boil’ (e.g. Sen. Q Nat. 3.24.1 of water) and 3 ‘(of 
seas, rivers, etc.) to be turbulent, seethe’ (e.g. Verg. G. 1.327) – a sense perhaps activated in these 
lines by spargo and repleo. The sound of either boiling water or hissing sparks (noted by Leonard & 
Smith (1942) ad loc.) is onomatopoeically enhanced by a remarkable six consecutive words beginning 
with ‘s’, among ten in total in just ten words (the ‘most prolonged’ alliteration in the DRN, according to 
Bailey (1947) ad loc.). 
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First, there must be many things from which, flowing, a varied wave of 
smells undulates, and it must be thought to flow and be sent out and 
sprinkled en masse; […] 
 
This introduction, with fluo repeated alongside its derived noun fluctus, and the technical 
usage of volvo depicting rolling waves,363 emphatically portrays smells as flowing, 
universalising the LIQUIDS thread’s role in depicting sensory effluences. Following this, the 
remainder of the passage requires no further liquids imagery: the reader should envisage 
smells flowing and undulating, and apply this image to the remaining proofs. Nevertheless, 
fluo does return in 4.695 to explain that smells dissipate quickly because they are emitted 
from the depths (penitus fluere […] videntur – 695-6), recalling 4.90-4 in which smells, smoke 
and heat ‘pour forth’ (abundant – 91).  
 The LIQUIDS thread depicts all long-distance sensation as caused by effluences flowing 
from things, proving how they fill all available space (be it a room, a forest or our sensory 
organs). By this depiction the LIQUIDS thread ties sensory effluences closely together with 
light, which is emitted and perceived in the same way. The liquid movement of these 
effluences forms the basis for more complex explanations, such as of optical illusions, aided 
by the WEAVING thread. Such correspondences will be considered in Part 3 Section C.  
 
  
                                                          
363
 OLD, volvo 6. 
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Section D 
 
The BOUNDARIES Thread 
 
The importance of boundaries in Epicurean philosophy has been noted especially by de Lacy 
(1969), who considers the general concept of ‘limit’, which (p.104) ‘clearly represents to 
[Lucretius] the unifying principle of Epicurean teaching’. He examines limits in the central 
Epicurean theories of: atomic size and variety; the swerve; death; change; what can and 
cannot be born; and moral concepts of pleasure and fear. Within these limits there is scope 
for variety, but not infinite variety – a distinction Lucretius must balance carefully. The nature 
of limits is governed by foedera Naturae – the laws or ‘pacts’ restricting things, including (as 
suggested by Natura) their birth.364 Droz-Vincent (1996) also considers the central role of 
foedera in Lucretius’ science, additionally emphasising the important analogy between 
foedera Naturae and the foedera established by early man.365 A broad range of scholarship 
has considered ‘laws’ in the DRN.366 Within the framework of conceptual threads, Lucretius’ 
foedera and pacta can be viewed as an important strand of the BOUNDARIES thread, 
embodying the metaphor ‘laws are boundaries restricting things’ – governing quid possit oriri, 
/ quid nequeat (1.75-6). To these analyses can be added Garani’s ‘filling or emptying the 
atomic container’ metaphor, in which body can be ‘filled’.367 This process is enabled by void, 
through which, as discussed in Section C, bodies move freely like pouring liquids. One 
substance can fill another, thanks to the void space bounded off by atoms – a convergence of 
the LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES threads, to be examined in Part 3 Section B. 
 The strength of the BOUNDARIES thread, which encapsulates the visible and tangible 
limits (and by extension the microscopic limits) in things, and the laws limiting the power of 
things, originates from the ‘Epicurus the general’ passage of the Book 1 prologue. Here 
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 A convergence of the LIFE-CYCLE and BOUNDARIES threads, considered in Part 3 Section A. Bailey (1947) 
ad 1.586 offers a pertinent summary: ‘Lucr. is not thinking of an observed uniformity in nature, but 
rather the limits which nature imposes on the growth, life, powers, etc. of things’. Cabisius (1984) 
compares these limits with the uniform structure of society, to support her reading of a recurring 
social metaphor applied by Lucretius to his atoms. On natural laws and the laws of nature, see also 
Lehoux (2006); Asmis (2008); Johnson (2013). 
365
 Again terms are employed both literally (the pacts between men) and metaphorically (the ‘pacts’ of 
Nature) to universalise a theory. The term pactum is used similarly in the DRN; Garani (2007) 59. 
366
 Cabisius (1984) 112-3; Asmis (2008) on how foedera Naturae define the ethical nature of Lucretius’ 
physics; Schiesaro (1990) 141 on the Roman colour in Lucretius’ depiction of these foedera, and (2007) 
on ‘law’ in general in Lucretius’ science; Garani (2007) 50-61. 
367
 Garani (2007) 187-95. Specifically she considers words suggesting fullness (in particular verbs 
formed from plenus, such as repleo and compleo) in Lucretius’ material science and his theory of 
pleasure.  
110 
 
Epicurus destroys the physical boundary of the moenia mundi so the ‘limit of power’ and 
‘deep-set boundary mark’ of all things can be understood. Lucretius develops the BOUNDARIES 
thread from here, and it casts a wide reach over the DRN. By tracking the thread, the 
arguments of de Lacy, Droz-Vincent and Garani will be united, and expanded in order to 
explain previously overlooked aspects. The thread’s most extensive application is its 
combination with other threads to explain complex concepts, in particular the restrictions on 
the birth and lifespans of things and the Epicurean ‘axiom of change’ (that change constitutes 
the ‘death’ of what was before), which will be considered in Part 3. For now, the essence of 
the BOUNDARIES thread, and instances where it is employed alone, will be outlined. 
 
The boundaries metaphor 
The conceptual metaphor of boundaries has a broad range of potential applications, several 
of which Lucretius exploits. As with Lucretius’ other threads, the BOUNDARIES thread can be 
employed literally or metaphorically, and tie together apparently disparate theories, by 
explaining the literal with the metaphorical and vice versa. However, this thread differs from 
the others in a crucial aspect, since it embodies a fundamental aspect of human cognition and 
interaction with our surroundings.368 In short, we understand literal descriptions of 
boundaries by mapping our own cognitive experience of boundaries onto them. Lakoff and 
Johnson consider boundaries within their cognitive metaphor theory, in a group labelled 
‘ontological metaphors’.369 These metaphors differ from their category ‘orientational 
metaphors’ (e.g. ‘good is up’, ‘bad is down’) because, rather than helping to explain things in 
terms of direction or position, they enable us to ‘pick out parts of our experience and treat 
them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind’,370 for example viewing events or 
activities as containers (e.g. one can be in or out of a race). We can not only label these, but 
also ‘categorize them, group them, and quantify them – and, by these means, reason about 
them’.371 This process of reasoning and analysis depends fundamentally on ‘ontological 
metaphors’ – formed partly from our understanding of boundaries372 – and echoes Lucretius’ 
own considerations of the interrelationship between knowledge, boundaries and the 
knowledge of boundaries. 
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 Partially owing to the boundaries of the human body. Segal (1990) 95 argues that the breaking of 
boundaries in Lucretius ‘reflects some of our most basic fears about the violation of bodily 
boundaries’; see further ibid. pp.94-170. 
369
 Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 25-34. 
370
 ibid. 25. 
371
 ibid. 25. 
372
 ibid. 29-30. 
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 Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of how ‘ontological metaphors’ aid reasoning is echoed 
by individual applications of Lucretius’ BOUNDARIES thread, including: the maximum and 
minimum boundaries of matter and the universe (quantifying); boundaries of variety 
(categorising, grouping, quantifying); boundaries between entities (‘discrete entities’, 
categorising); boundaries within entities (‘discrete entities’); boundaries of knowledge 
(reasoning); boundaries of possibility (reasoning). Therefore, although the BOUNDARIES thread 
consists of constituent strands (two entities separated, the boundary separating them, the 
varying permanence of separation, the act of separating, etc.) applied to certain theories, and 
therefore constitutes a gestalt like Lucretius’ other threads,373 it is employed more frequently 
in its gestalt form than others. The concept of boundaries is applied as a gestalt to a wide 
range of theories, especially via the words finis and certus. Thus multiple theories are unified 
under a central concept, running throughout Lucretius’ scientific and philosophical theories. 
Truly, by understanding the nature of boundaries, we will be a long way towards achieving 
full Epicurean enlightenment. 
 
Boundaries in the prologues 
Lucretius introduces the BOUNDARIES thread in the Book 1 prologue, in his depiction of 
‘Epicurus the general’ triumphantly breaking the boundaries of the universe and knowledge. 
Here, Lucretius outlines his perspective on the philosopher’s ultimate aim: revealing the 
truth about the nature of things by displaying and breaking the boundaries of knowledge 
through the knowledge of boundaries. He portrays this in three ways: metaphorically 
breaking the boundaries of the universe (the flammantia moenia mundi) by gaining 
knowledge (1.70-4); confirming by this knowledge that boundaries exist, and what they 
govern – the finita potestas and alte terminus haerens of things (1.75-7); and, as outlined 
following the Iphianassa scene, the ultimate goal of discovering the limit to desire and fear 
(summarised as finem esse […] aerumnarum, ‘there is a limit of troubles’ – 1.107-8).374  
 These steps to vera ratio recur in the prologues to Books 3, 5 and 6, which also 
include eulogies to Epicurus. The Book 3 prologue praises Epicurus’ skill in discovering truths, 
and describes the effects of his ratio: 
 
diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi 
discedunt, totum video per inane geri res. 
       (3.16-7) 
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 See pp.8-9.  
374
 See de Lacy (1969) 106-7 on limits in Epicurean ethics and physics. 
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[…] the terrors of the mind flee, the walls of the world fall away, I see 
things done throughout the whole void. 
 
Here terror flees as the moenia mundi crumble.375 In the Book 5 prologue the causative link 
between knowledge of boundaries and the flight of terror is made more explicit. Lucretius 
warns that even those who accept that the gods did not create the world may nevertheless 
revert to superstition, if a celestial phenomenon occurs that they cannot explain. This is 
because knowledge of the gods alone cannot banish superstitious fear, if we are also 
 
           […] ignari quid queat esse, 
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique 
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens. 90 
       (5.88-90)376 
[…] ignorant of what can be, what cannot, in short by which reasoning 
each thing might have a fixed limit of power and a deep-set boundary 
mark. 
 
As the Book 1 prologue explained (1.145-9), only Naturae species ratioque can dispel fear – 
and part of this ratio is the knowledge of boundaries. 1.146-9 are repeated in 6.39-41 to 
conclude the eulogy to Epicurus, which describes how Epicurus realised that man’s mind (vas, 
‘the pot’ – 17) was causing grief. As a remedy, he ‘established a limit of desire and fear’ 
(finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris – 25), constituting the ‘highest good’ (bonum 
summum – 26) man should strive for – i.e. the absence of pain (Epicurus Ep. Men. 131-3). This 
limit can only be reached ‘by a narrow path’ (tramite parvo – 27) – i.e. Epicurean philosophy. 
In this prologue, fear, rather than fleeing, is shown, along with desire, to be limited. Even the 
path towards the bonum summum is limited both in width and direction. Comprehending, 
understanding and, in the case of pleasure, adhering to fixed boundaries established by 
Nature will enable Lucretius’ reader to attain vera ratio and freedom of fear, brought by 
Epicurean philosophy.377 
 
On the correct understanding of boundaries 
In the first arguments of Book 1, among the extensive intertwining of the BOUNDARIES and LIFE-
CYCLE threads (to be examined in Part 3 Section A), Lucretius reiterates the central motivation 
                                                          
375
 Elsewhere Lucretius refers to people superstitious about the heavens, who believe anyone shaking 
the moenia mundi with ratio should be punished like the giants in the war with the Olympian gods 
(5.114-21). 
376
 Repeating almost verbatim 1.75-7. 
377
 See de Lacy (1969) 104-6; Conte (1994) 24-5; Nightingale (2007) 75-9. Epicurus (Ep. Men. 133) 
states that the best man understands the limit to good things (τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας), and that this is 
easy to attain. 
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of his philosophy – to rid man of fear. He states his first argument that nothing is ever born 
from nothing by divine agency (150) – a dual limit on birth. This misconception of divine 
causation ‘confines all mortals’ (mortalis continet omnis – 151) because they cannot reason 
(= nulla ratione – 153) about apparently miraculous celestial phenomena, and subsequently 
reckon (rentur – 154) them to be caused by the gods. In short, an inability to use reason 
(emphasised by the etymological figure of ratio with reor)378 to set a boundary on creation 
directly causes fear. Fear itself is expressed as a boundary confining mortals (contineo – 
elsewhere used of one substance ‘holding’ another)379 that must be broken. By doing this, as 
suggested by the image in Book 2 of observing life from ‘high serene temples’  built by 
correct philosophy (7-13), we will be bounded off from the majority of mankind, who live life 
in fear and torment.380 The image of confinement by fear is supported by the WEAVING thread, 
which depicts the constricting powers of fear, religio and pleasure (considered in Part 3 
Section G and the Epilogue). The prominent continuation of the BOUNDARIES in the first 
arguments extends one of the prologue’s principal themes – the banishment of fear through 
ratio. 
 This mental process is portrayed again in Book 5, in relation to previous generations 
of men. Just as the reader’s understanding of Nature is enhanced by reasoned understanding 
of boundaries (guided by the BOUNDARIES thread), people unversed in science and philosophy 
can observe and reason about boundaries. In the lengthy exposition of mankind’s 
development (5.925-1457), Lucretius explains that early man correctly observed heavenly 
bodies and seasons operating ‘in fixed order’ (ordine certo – 1183), but misinterpreted the 
cause of these boundaries, attributing them to the gods, whom they located in the sky, the 
home of incomprehensible phenomena (1186-93). The keen reader would recall the Book 1 
prologue, which revealed that this ignorance persisted into Epicurus’ time and beyond. 
Failure to reason correctly about the boundaries of things leads to religio, and doubt about 
the future finis (1213) of the world, owing to the belief that the gods might preserve it 
eternally.  
 In contrast (5.1436-9), early man, guided by the certa ratione and ordine certo (1439) 
of the seasons,381 did learn when to farm animals and grow crops.382 Thus, correct knowledge 
of boundaries can be beneficial. This reading eases an apparently jarring transition from the 
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 Felt most strongly in the perfect participle ratus; Maltby (1991) s. v. ratus. 
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 E.g. 1.1086 (the earth holding waters); 5.319 (the air holding the earth); 6.877 (water holding cold). 
Cf. also 3.210 (the soul compacted and ‘held’ in a small space). 
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 Nussbaum (1989) 325-7. 
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 The chiasmus in this line is an ‘iconic’ echo of the cyclical nature of the seasons. 
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 This process of analogical reasoning is not explicitly stated, but can be inferred from 5.1361-78, in 
which cultivation is learnt from natural plant growth. 
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preceding passage, in which Lucretius describes how envy of others’ possessions caused 
havoc, including murder (1420-2) and war (1424). Whereas 5.1436-9 suggests correct and 
beneficial understanding of boundaries, envy is caused by man’s ignorance of ‘the limit of 
possession’ (finis / habendi – 1432-3) and ‘to what point true pleasure can ever grow’ 
(omnino quoad crescat vera voluptas – 1433). The keen reader should again heed the warning 
to understand the fixed boundaries of things, and to apply this understanding to reasoning, 
invention and the emotions in order to banish fear.  
  
Atomic limits 
Section A explored Lucretius’ first arguments that everything is created from, consists of, and 
dies into constituent ‘fixed seeds’ (semina certa) and ‘fixed mother-substance’ (materies 
certa). The first arguments prove the ‘fixed’ nature of these by the observable existence of 
fixed mothers (matres) and seeds (semina) for living things.383 Lucretius only explains fully 
how this relates to primordia, and what exactly is ‘fixed’ about them, in 1.483-634, in which 
he establishes the limits of division (briefly introduced in 1.215-49), variety and quantity of 
matter, and the limits of void. As with the other conceptual threads, Lucretius establishes 
boundaries at the atomic level before extending them to other key processes and theories 
underlying his philosophy. Therefore, it is necessary to consider Lucretius’ atomic boundaries 
before considering more complex applications of the BOUNDARIES thread. In turn, limited 
division, the separation of body and void, limited atomic variety and the limited swerve will 
be addressed, providing a comprehensive overview of Lucretius’ atomic boundaries. 
 Starting with limited division, although indivisibility is not central to Lucretius’ atomic 
vocabulary (as noted in Part 1), he states intermittently that primordia cannot be destroyed, 
for example nec frangi nec findi in bina secando (533-5), and solida ac sine inani corpora 
prima / sunt (538-9). These assertions are supported by modus tollens deductions, with 
premises broadly expressing ‘if division were not limited…’ (si nullam finem Natura parasset / 
frangendis rebus – 551-2; si nullast frangendis reddita finis / corporibus – 577-8). These 
introduce Lucretius’ theory of smallest parts (599-634), which explains how bodies with 
volume can be indivisible. First Lucretius depicts the boundary of perception at the edge of 
visible things – the extremum […] cacumen (‘extreme point’ – 599), which he then maps (in 
somewhat condensed fashion) onto the first-bodies (601-14). These consist entirely of 
‘extreme points’, which are sine partibus (601), cohere in ‘solid singleness’ (solida […] 
simplicitate – 1.609), and are unbreakable (613-4). Lucretius then employs the logic of Zeno 
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 Part 3 Section A will consider this correspondence in greater depth. 
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and Democritus to argue that without parvissima (‘smallest things’ – 615) bodies would 
consist of ‘unlimited parts’ (partibus infinitis – 616), able to be halved and halved again 
infinitely, because ‘nothing would fix a limit’ (nec res praefiniet ulla – 619) to halving. 
Without this limit matter would have infinite parts, and therefore equal the universe in 
infinite extent – an obvious impossibility. On these grounds Lucretius dismisses Empedocles’ 
and Anaxagoras’ theories of matter, which include no finem […] secandis / corporibus (‘limit 
of cutting bodies’ – 1.746-7; cf. 844). For Lucretius, all things, however strong or long-lasting, 
are divisible up to the boundary of atoms, and so atoms represent the ultimate finita potestas 
of things.  
 The physical boundary between body and void is also established in these proofs 
(1.503-39). The two form ‘a dissimilar twofold nature’ (duplex natura […]/ dissimilis – 503-4), 
and each must ‘exist for itself, in itself and uncontaminated’ (esse […] sibi per se puramque – 
506). Void contains no body, and vice versa; therefore ‘there are first bodies solid and 
without void’ (510). In turn, because there is void ‘in born things’ (genitis in rebus – 511) – i.e. 
composites – solid materies must surround it (512), because nothing can ‘hide void in its 
body and hold it within’ (corpore inane suo celare atque intus habere – 514) unless 
‘whatever holds is solid’ (quod cohibet, solidum constare – 515). In this proof, solid body is a 
boundary – or rather, container – for void; indeed, its only possible container, emphasised by 
the etymological figure habere […] cohibet. It is difficult to comprehend body ‘holding’ void, 
because void is not substantial. However, the contrasting qualities of body and void – the 
former the preventer, the latter the enabler, of movement – allow one bodily substance to 
fill another.384 
 Following the image of 1.513-5, Lucretius shifts focus slightly from body as a 
container for void, to the boundary dividing the two substances. Without void all would be 
solid, and without corpora certa (‘fixed [i.e. unchangeable and unbreakable] bodies’ – 521) all 
would be empty void: 
 
alternis igitur nimirum corpus inani 
distinctum, quoniam nec plenum naviter extat  525 
nec porro vacuum. sunt ergo corpora certa 
quae spatium pleno possint distinguere inane. 
       (1.524-7) 
Therefore, without doubt body is marked off alternately from void, 
since existence is neither completely full nor empty. There are 
therefore fixed bodies which can mark off empty space from full. 
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 The ‘filling or emptying the atomic container’ metaphor of Garani (2007) 187-195, for which see 
Part 3 Section B. 
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Lucretius applies our cognitive understanding of boundaries marking off entities to the 
division between body and void,385 emphasised by the polyptoton distinctum […] distinguere. 
The metaphor progresses from body and void bounding each other alternately, to bodies 
representing the boundary between empty space and full (an easier image to envisage). This 
is the basis for the metaphor ‘body is a container for void’.  
 Later in Book 1, among proofs that the universe is infinite (951-1117), Lucretius 
counters the conjecture that substances such as breezes and fire tend upwards, arguing that 
if they did, the world would be swiftly dispersed.386 This would (expressed by the WEAVING 
thread) partly be caused by things being ‘untied into the great void’ (magnum per inane 
soluta – 1103), but also because, we assume (following 1.418-44, and its conclusion ‘but 
nothing can do and be acted upon except body, nor provide space except void and space’), 
void alone cannot hold them in. Body forms a tangible boundary holding other body or 
confining void; and the edge of body bounds body off from void. In other words, body is the 
only physical boundary, and the very boundary point – the extremum cacumen – is also part 
of body, while void is simply what exists beyond the extremum cacumen. This is not 
particularly problematic for the reader’s understanding, since everyday theoretical 
boundaries (such as one that enables a mountain to be designated, although where it starts 
cannot be distinguished) are comprehensible to humans.387  
 The next boundary Lucretius places on atoms is limited variety (2.333-729).388 He 
seeks to display what kinds (qualia – 334) of atoms exist, ‘how far they stand apart in shape’ 
(quam longe distantia formis – 334), and ‘how varied they are in their many kinds of shapes’ 
(multigenis quam sint variata figuris – 335). They must differ to an extent, Lucretius says, 
because atoms have ‘no limit and no total number’ (neque finis […] neque summa – 339). 
Indeed, Lucretius continues (342-76), even individuals within the same species, which look 
superficially alike, in fact differ in minor ways. For this reason, atoms cannot have been 
created ‘by hand’ (manu – 378) based on the ‘fixed form’ (certam formam – 379) of one 
atomic prototype, but must consist of dissimili […] figura (380). This dissimilarity also 
                                                          
385
 De Lacy (1969) does not discuss this central theory of Epicurean physics, perhaps because the word 
‘limit’ (his primary focus) is semantically difficult in this context. 
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 A lacuna after 1.1093 obscures the exact content of this passage. However, the analogy of the 
world dispersing volucri ritu flammarum (1102) at least suggests the continuation of the argument 
against fire tending upwards in 1083-93. Bailey’s supplement afferret surgens ignis calor intus 
adaugens (1947, ad loc.) is a reasonable approximation for the words preceding 1102. 
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 Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 25 and 29-30. 
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 Noted briefly by de Lacy (1969) 106. 
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accounts for the different interactions between substances (381-97), the different sensations 
aroused by different things (398-443), and the different qualities things possess (444-77). 
 Lucretius then modifies the proof, asserting that primordia ‘differ in a finite array of 
shapes’ (finita variare figurarum ratione – 480), otherwise ‘some seeds will have to consist of 
unlimited size of body’ (semina quaedam / esse infinito debebunt corporis auctu – 481-2). 
Experience shows that even the largest seeds are still small, and the bizarre image of infinitely 
large seeds dismisses the premise without requiring an expressed conclusion (which follows 
only at 499). The smallest parts theory supports this, since their transposition would allow 
only a limited number of possible combinations (485-90), and adding extra parts would, 
impossibly, create larger and larger atoms (491-99).  
 Two further proofs support this argument. The first asserts that unlimited atomic 
variety would allow the best and worst things to be surpassed; however: 
 
quae quoniam non sunt, sed rebus reddita certa 
finis utrimque tenet summam, fateare necessest 
materiem quoque finitis differre figuris. 
       (2.512-4) 
Since these things are not so, but rather a fixed limit, allotted to things, 
holds the whole on both sides, it is necessary to confess that mother-
substance also differs in a finite number of forms. 
 
A conceptual bounded area creates a restricted range of things from good to bad, external to 
which nothing exists – expressed by summa (the range), teneo and reddita certa finis.389 The 
polyptoton finis […] finitis maps this restricted range onto the atoms, proving their limited 
variety of shapes.  
 The second proof addresses the conjecture that this range might consist of infinite 
parts: 
 
denique ab ignibus ad gelidas iter usque pruinas 515 
finitumst retroque pari ratione remensumst; 
omnis enim calor ac frigus mediique tepores 
interutrasque iacent explentes ordine summam. 
ergo finita distant ratione creata,    
ancipiti quoniam mucroni utrimque notantur,  520 
       (2.515-20) 
Lastly, the journey from fires to icy frosts is limited and is measured 
back again equally; for all heat and cold and intermediate temperatures 
lie between the extremes filling up the sum in ordered array. 
                                                          
389
 This restricted range is echoed later in the limits set on pleasure (e.g. 5.1432-3; 6.26; cf. also 
4.1084-120 on the insatiability of sexual impulse), which cannot be surpassed. 
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Therefore, things born differ to a limited degree, since they are 
distinguished at both ends by two opposite points, […] 
 
The limited range of possible temperatures is depicted as a line drawn between two extreme 
points,390 supported by a metaphor from building or surveying, with iter, finitum and 
remensum suggesting the construction of a road (a fixed path from ‘a’ to ‘b’). The bounded 
length and width of this ‘road’ limits (finita) the degree of difference between each end.391 
Importantly here the same term (finis) applies both to the necessary limits of size and range, 
and to the resulting limit of variety. This is appropriate, since limited atomic variety is a direct 
result of limited atomic size and shape. Boundaries of size and range are deep-rooted 
cognitive concepts, which we experience in the boundary of our bodies and environmental 
boundaries, and enact in boundary legislation. By associating limited atomic variety with 
cognitive concepts of limited size and range, Lucretius embodies more clearly in the reader’s 
mind the nature of the fixed laws underpinning this variety.  
 The same proof applies to sensory effluences, because their qualities are dictated by 
the limited variety of their atomic constituents – explaining further the limited range of 
agreeable and disagreeable sensations in 2.500-14. In Book 4, Lucretius asserts that emissions 
from things are fixed in the shapes they hold (formarum vestigia certa – 87), which is partly 
dictated by the things that emit them – suggested in Lucretius’ description of smells as being 
emitted ‘from fixed things’ (certis ab rebus – 4.218; 6.924). The boundaries restricting 
sensory effluences are crucial to Lucretius’ theory of sensation, since if they were not fixed, 
sensation would (contrary to Epicurean empiricism) be unreliable.  
 The atomic boundaries considered so far are imposed by physical laws, among the 
foedera Naturae governing all things.392 These also play a complex and specifically-defined 
role in the movement of atoms,393 and specifically the swerve – one of the causes of atomic 
creation. Within Lucretius’ law of movement through the void, a potential contradiction 
arises: if all tends down like a pouring liquid (as discussed in Section C above), how do atoms 
combine? The solution is the idiosyncratic theory of the swerve: 
 
corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur 
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 Garani (2007) 190 categorises this passage within her ‘filling or emptying the atomic container’ 
metaphor. The reading is supported by explentes (used in 1.606 of smallest parts ‘filling up’ the atom), 
but it is difficult to imagine a straight line being ‘filled up’ like a container, which brings liquids to mind. 
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 It is debatable whether Lucretius successfully dismisses the potential Zeno’s paradox of infinite 
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 See Droz-Vincent (1996) 197-9. 
393
 De Lacy (1969) 106-7; Berns (1976) 480-2. 
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ponderibus propriis, incerto tempore ferme 
incertisque locis spatio depellere paulum, 
tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis.  220 
       (2.217-20) 
[…] while bodies are carried by their own weight straight down through 
the void, at more or less unfixed times and in unfixed locations, they 
drive off course a little, to such an extent that you might call it changed 
movement. 
 
The swerve enables collisions as the atoms deviate from pouring vertically ‘like raindrops’ 
(imbris uti guttae – 222). The deviations, in contrast to atomic size and shape, are not fully 
restricted, either in time or space – as expressed by ferme, which cannot, as D. Fowler 
suggests, mean ‘completely’ here,394 because if greater movements were possible, birth 
would be too transitory and random, and growth would not be restricted to fixed seasons. 
The meaning ‘almost’ or ‘more or less’395 captures the reality of birth within certain 
parameters, limiting the swerve (alongside nec plus quam minimum in 244) in time and 
extent.396 This is important because the swerve allows free will to occur:  
 
id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum 
nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. 
       (2.292-3)  
[…] the tiny swerve of the first-things, at neither a fixed location nor 
fixed time, brings this [free will] about. 
 
Lucretius does not argue that the swerve is possible at any time or place, but that the time 
and place are not limited.397 The careful portrayal of a partially limited atomic swerve in these 
passages allows birth to be neither pre-ordained nor fully predictable, and, as Part 3 Section A 
will consider, for actions to occur by free will. The boundaries imposed on atoms have been 
shown to be crucial to Lucretius’ theory of creation. 
 
Matter and the unlimited universe 
The BOUNDARIES thread, like the others, is established at an atomic level, before being 
expanded to explain macroscopic realities. As a result, it answers at length quid possit oriri, 
quid nequeat from the Book 1 prologue. A further guiding factor in these limits of creation is 
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 Fowler (2002) ad loc. 
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 OLD, fere, ferme 1, 2. 
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 As noted by de Lacy (1969) 108-7. For a consideration of what kind of movement minimum 
constitutes, see Fowler (2002) 303-5. 
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 As Johnson (2013) 101 remarks: ‘what the atomists [including Lucretius] are committed to is not 
lack of order or violation of law, but rather lack of external constraint or control or domination.’ 
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the infinity of matter and the universe, explored at the end of Book 1, and introduced as 
follows: 
 
omne quod est igitur nulla regione viarum 
finitumst; namque extremum debebat habere. 
extremum porro nullius posse videtur   960 
esse, nisi ultra sit quod finiat; ut videatur 
quo non longius haec sensus natura sequatur. 
nunc extra summam quoniam nil esse fatendum, 
non habet extremum, caret ergo fine modoque. 
nec refert quibus adsistas regionibus eius:  965 
usque adeo, quem quisque locum possedit, in omnis 
tantundem partis infinitum omne relinquit. 
       (1.958-67) 
That which is the universe, therefore, is not bounded in any region of 
its paths; for then it ought to have an extreme point. Besides, no 
extreme point is seen to be able to exist unless there is something 
beyond that bounds it, so something might be seen, past which this 
nature of our senses might follow no further. Now since we must 
confess there is nothing beyond the sum, it has no extreme point, and 
therefore it lacks a limit and an extent. And it does not matter in which 
of its regions you stand, so much so that whatever place you occupy, 
you leave the universe just as infinite in all directions. 
 
Lucretius returns to an argument supporting his smallest parts theory, that visible objects 
have extreme points, beyond which we cannot see (1.599-601). The two passages are linked 
together by the emphatic repetition of extremum in 959, 960 and 964, which recalls 
extremum […] cacumen in 599. Here Lucretius shifts focus from a postulated boundary of 
atomic division to a theoretical boundary of the universe. Just as an extremum allows us to 
distinguish between bodies or between body and space, so an extremum applied to the 
universe requires either body or space. In each proof the extremum limits infinity, whether 
infinite division or infinite extent, but unlike matter the universe ‘has no extreme point, and 
therefore lacks a limit and an extent’. This connection embodies Lucretius’ assertion in 1.619-
22 that unlimited division would result in no distinction between rerum […] summam 
minimamque (619). The concept of boundaries is universal, whether limiting microscopic or 
macroscopic measurements. 
 Lucretius strengthens this with a visual explanation (968-83), that a spear cast at the 
‘furthest extreme margins’ (oras / ultimus extremas – 969-70) of the universe would either 
keep moving (and therefore the universe is unbounded) or strike something (constituting 
matter beyond the universe). Therefore, wherever the putative oras […] extremas (980-1) are 
placed, something must exist beyond, and so ‘the boundary can exist nowhere’ (nusquam 
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possit consistere finis – 982). This military image – whether or not it specifically implies the 
Roman fetial declaring war by casting a spear over an enemy border398 – recalls Epicurus’ 
mental foray in the prologue. Just as Epicurus breached the flammantia moenia mundi to 
reveal the surrounding universe, so here a hypothetical boundary placed on the universe is 
destroyed by reasoning. By this proof, Lucretius, taking his reader with him, roams the 
universe with his mind, just like Epicurus (1.74-7). And like Epicurus, Lucretius returns with 
knowledge of boundaries: specifically that the universe has no boundary. His method of 
discovery is summarised by a play on words, in which Lucretius will pursue whoever still sets 
oras extremas for the universe, ‘so that a boundary could exist nowhere, and the ready 
availability of flight [for the spear] will always prolong [your] flight’ (uti nusquam possit 
consistere finis / effugiumque fugae prolatet copia semper – 982-3). Lucretius defeats his 
hypothetical adversary by situating him within the example.  
 Finally, whereas the universe is boundless, there are readily observable boundaries 
marked off within it: 
 
postremo ante oculos res rem finire videtur: 
aer dissaepit collis atque aera montes; 
terra mare et contra mare terras terminat omnis;  
omne quidem vero nil est quod finiat extra.  1001 
       (1.998-1001) 
Lastly, before our eyes thing is seen to limit thing: air separates hills, 
and mountains air; land bounds the sea and conversely the sea all 
lands; and yet there is nothing that limits the universe from without. 
 
Since boundaries are essential to perception and categorisation,399 it is intrinsically difficult 
for us to envisage a boundless universe. These examples draw attention to this difficulty, 
enhanced by three different ‘limiting’ verbs. Shortly after, Lucretius explains more fully: 
 
ipsa modum porro sibi rerum summa parare 
ne possit, Natura tenet, quae corpus inani 
et quod inane autem est finire corpore cogit,  1010 
ut sic alternis infinita omnia reddat, 
       (1.1008-11) 
Moreover, Nature herself keeps it that the sum of things cannot 
provide a limit to itself, and she forces body to be limited by void, and 
again void by body, so that in this way she makes the universe limitless 
by these alternations, […] 
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Lucretius now returns to the atomic level. Just as distinct objects can be seen to be bounded 
off from others, so the distinct entities of body and void border each other. Indeed neither 
can remain unless bordered by the other, and so each must be infinite. Limitless boundaries 
between body and void combine to make a limitless universe. 
 The boundaries depicted at the end of Book 1 are complex, but the reader must 
reason correctly about them, in order to understand in Book 2 how atoms of limited variety 
can create things in an infinite universe. Lucretius argues: 
 
           […] primordia rerum, 
inter se simili quae sunt perfecta figura, 
infinita cluere. etenim distantia cum sit  525 
formarum finita, necesse est quae similes sint 
esse infinitas aut summam materiai 
finitam constare, id quod non esse probavi, 
versibus ostendens corpuscula materiai 
ex infinito summam rerum usque tenere  530 
undique protelo plagarum continuato. 
       (2.523-31) 
[…] the first-threads of things that are among themselves made of the 
same shape are reckoned to be without limit. Indeed, since there is a 
limited difference of shapes, those which are similar must be 
unlimited, or the sum of mother-substance would stand limited, 
something I have proved not to be so, displaying in verses that the little 
bodies of mother-substance completely maintain the sum of things 
infinitely, with an uninterrupted succession of blows from everywhere. 
 
The BOUNDARIES thread is carefully applied in this passage to argue that, because atomic 
variety is limited, each type of atom must be unlimited to enable perpetual creation in an 
infinite universe. Lucretius reiterates this shortly after, arguing that each thing requires 
infinita […] vis materiai (544) for its creation, since finita […] corpora (547-8) could not 
combine in a boundless universe. If some primordia were finita (560) they would neither 
combine, nor remain combined nor grow, which Lucretius has shown to happen. He 
concludes that ‘there are therefore unlimited first-threads of things in whichever type you 
choose’ (esse igitur genere in quovis primordia rerum / infinita – 567-8), juxtaposing the 
boundary of kind (genus) with the boundless number of atoms in each. Bounded infinity, 
expressed by various correspondences of the BOUNDARIES thread, governs Lucretius’ physics. 
 This is supported at the end of Book 2 by a proof for the Earth’s decline, which is 
attributable to more atoms being given out than taken in (1128-49). Evidence for this is 
provided by the Earth’s declining ability to bear living things (1150-9), including crops, which 
we now have to farm because they no longer grow by themselves (1160-3). Lucretius then 
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depicts a ploughman and a vine-grower bemoaning their lot in comparison with older times, 
when less toil was required in farming, and crops could be grown on smaller plots of land 
(angustis finibus, ‘with narrow borders’ – 1171). This is attributable to a decline in the 
number of creative bodies in the soil. For Lucretius, cultivation involves turning the soil so its 
constituent bodies combine to create plants (1.210-2; 5.210-2), and so creation becomes 
more difficult, the fewer bodies there are. Therefore, it less important how much space there 
is to grow crops than how great a concentration of creative bodies there is in the soil. Thus 
Lucretius’ atomic theory explains the reasons behind the common topos that farming was 
easier in bygone days.400 The argument is subtly drawn; however, the keen reader with a clear 
knowledge of boundaries in Lucretius’ atomic theory (and its depiction of seeds creating 
things) will understand the reasons behind this decline. 
 A combination between the carefully defined nature of variety in atoms, and the 
limitless universe formed from limitless body bounded off from limitless void explains the 
existence of discrete entities in the world. Lucretius argues in 2.688-99 that several things 
share several types of primordia, but in different combinations, so as to create different types 
of thing. The ways in which primordia can combine are limited, or else monsters could be 
formed by parts of living things combining (2.700-17). However, it is not only animals that are 
‘held by these laws’ (teneri / legibus hisce – 718-9), but ‘the same reasoning marks off 
everything with a boundary’ (eadem ratio disterminat omnia – 719). This is because all things 
‘dissimilar in their whole nature’ (tota natura dissimiles – 720) must also consist of ‘a 
different form of first-things’ (dissimili […] figura principiorum – 722) – not necessarily 
entirely different, but with limited common constituent bodies (723-4). Furthermore, ‘given 
that the seeds are different’ (semina cum […] distent – 725), so must all their movements, 
interweavings, blows etc. ‘be different’ (differe – 725). These various atomic qualities 
 
       non animalia solum 
corpora seiungunt, sed terras ac mare totum 
secernunt caelumque a terris omne retentant. 
       (2.727-29) 
[…] keep apart not only animal bodies, but set a barrier between the 
earth and the whole sea, and hold back the totality of the heavens 
from the earth. 
 
That the same laws (leges – a synonym for foedera Naturae) hold all things, and not just 
animals (718-9), is emphasised here by the application of seiungunt and secernunt to animals 
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abundant produce readily available in the past (116-9). 
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and the parts of the world – expressing (by the se- prefix) similar separation or bounding off. 
The shared boundaries have also been expressed by the polyptoton dissimiles […] dissimili 
(720-2), and the repeated dis- prefix in these terms and distent and differre (725). Thus 
boundaries are established for animate and inanimate things, including macroscopic entities 
such as the sea, earth and heavens. Therefore, just as infinite body bounded off alternately 
from void creates the universe, so the world is formed by the earth, sea and heavens 
bounded off from one another. Lucretius expands our comprehension of separate entities, 
rooted in our experience of the boundaries of our bodies, and those separating 
distinguishable things, to the macroscopic level, enhancing his reader’s understanding of the 
boundaries restricting all things.  
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Section E 
 
The PLEASURE Thread 
 
As considered in Part 1, Lucretius introduces the PLEASURE thread in the prologue through the 
complex metonymic correspondence of Venus-voluptas, which symbolises the instigating 
force governing the process of birth (Natura), both literal and, in relation to creation from 
primordia, metaphorical. Venus represents not only voluptas, but more specifically both the 
causes of pleasing things, and the sensation of pleasure itself. These characteristics are 
evident respectively in the pleasing images of abundant creation caused by her arrival (suavis 
[…] flores – 7-8; rident aequora ponti – 8; nitet diffuso lumine caelum – 9); and the pleasure 
felt by animals as they follow her lead (perculsae corda tua vi – 13; cupide – 16, 20; incutiens 
blandum per pectora amorem – 19). In the prologue, the PLEASURE thread encapsulates the 
following concepts: pleasure in general; sexual pleasure specifically; pleasure as a cause of 
creation; pleasure as a means of persuasion towards certain movements and deeds 
(including poetic composition); and the causes of pleasure (including poetic imagery). 
 Typical of Lucretius’ threads, these concepts are established in the prologue, before 
being expanded throughout the epic, intertwining as individual strands of the PLEASURE thread 
to embody more complex scientific or moral concepts. However, as considered in Part 1, 
among these strands are the concepts, not specifically related to pleasure, of striking and 
leading, which are introduced in the prologue by incutio and induco as roles of Venus. When 
these and other related terms recur in the DRN, the reader should recall their introduction in 
the context of Venus and voluptas. By doing so, they will be able to draw further meaning 
from several of Lucretius’ scientific theories, in particular that of atomic creation. 
 Pleasure is of course central to Epicurean ethical theory, which urges the pursuit of 
natural and necessary pleasures (such as simple food or the beauty of nature) above others, 
and the avoidance of unnatural and unnecessary pleasures (such as wealth).401 The DRN 
depicts a range of pleasures along these lines, establishing, as Part 3 Section G will consider, 
a fixed limit to pleasure.402 This Section, however, will focus on how pleasure, as a conceptual 
thread, depicts certain processes and concepts central to Lucretius’ science. In such contexts 
                                                          
401
 Epicurus Ep. Men. 127-32. For Epicurean pleasure, see e.g. Glidden (1980); Gosling & Taylor (1982) 
345-412; Annas (1987); Sedley (1998b) 142-6, who argues that Epicurus’ ‘dyadic’ scheme of pleasure 
versus pain mirrors his body/space duality nicely – marking a crossover between Epicurean physics 
and ethics, which Lucretius’ threads also often fulfil; and Konstan (2008). 
402
 See de Lacy (1969); Droz-Vincent (1996). 
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the PLEASURE thread suppresses the clear distinctions in Epicurus’ theory of pleasure – 
appropriately, since Lucretius defines pleasure less clearly, rigidly and extensively than 
Epicurus.403 As is typical of the gestalt nature of Lucretius’ conceptual threads, the PLEASURE 
thread, in referring to ‘pleasure’, depicts both the totality (comprising causes of pleasure, the 
emotions that lead us to pleasure, and the sensation of pleasure), and parts of this totality.  
 
Persuasive pleasure 
In the Book 1 prologue Venus, as metonymy for voluptas, makes things move, both in general 
and towards procreation.404 Upon her arrival the winds and clouds flee (1.6-7), and animals 
dance over the meadows (1.14-5); and later animals are driven to procreate (1.17-20). The 
latter two are caused by striking (perculsae – 13; incutiens – 19) and leading, as animals are 
persuaded to follow Venus, who leads them in their delight (te sequitur cupide quo quamque 
inducere pergis – 1.16). The pleasure entailed in this persuasion is captured by capta lepore 
(1.15 – causing movement), and blandum […] amorem (1.19 – causing procreation). Leading 
and persuasion by Venus-voluptas persist later in the prologue, the former when Venus is 
designated the steersman (gubernans – 1.21) of birth, and voluptas leads (inducit – 1.142) 
Lucretius to compose his poetry; the latter when Venus is asked to use suavis […] loquellas 
(1.39) to make Mars give up war, and voluptas persuades (suadet – 1.142; also suavis – 
1.141) Lucretius to write. The persistence of leading and persuading, expressed by key 
related terms repeated in close proximity, highlights them as key themes. The keen reader 
should notice these concepts when they recur in similar contexts later in the DRN, and 
understand them in terms of pleasure, as per Venus-voluptas in the prologue.405 
 Movement (both sexual and non-sexual) in a given direction is often instigated by 
persuasion, and frequently by pleasure or the seeking of pleasurable things. Thus, sheep 
moving in an unmoving flock (2.317-322) are persuaded to move by the grass: 
 
lanigerae reptant pecudes quo quamque vocantes 
invitant herbae gemmantes rore recenti, 
       (2.318-9) 
                                                          
403
 Indeed occasionally Lucretius uses terms for sexual or general pleasure interchangeably, e.g.: 
blanda voluptas, used of both sexual (4.1263) and general (5.178) pleasure. Epicurus may have 
distinguished more clearly between pleasure (ἡδονή, passim in Ep. Men. and RS) and sexual pleasure 
(τα ἀφροδίσια, Sent. Vat. 51). 
404
 Boyancé (1947) 99: ‘la voluptas, le principe de l’activité chez tous les êtres animés, le moteur de 
toute la vie.’ 
405
 Indeed, Lucretius reminds the reader of the faculty of voluptas as the leader towards procreation in 
2.171-3: mortalis quae suadet adire / ipsaque deducit dux vitae dia voluptas / et res per Veneris 
blanditur saecla propagent. 
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The woolly flocks creep wherever the calling grass, shining with recent 
dew, invites them, […] 
 
The pleasure of the look, and the prospective pleasure of the taste, of new grass guides the 
sheep’s movements.406 The lambs, meanwhile, are led by the pleasure of play: ‘they play and 
shake their heads in fun’ (ludunt blandeque coruscant – 320)407 – blande suggesting both 
personal enjoyment and the encouragement of others’ enjoyment. Later, Lucretius depicts 
(4.677-86) different animals led by the smell of their favourite foods. Here the foods 
represent an expected pleasure for the animals, and so assume the ‘leading’ role of Venus-
voluptas in the prologue (ducuntur – 679; ducit – 682, 685). The argument here, that certain 
bodies are appropriate to certain things, is resumed in 6.970-8, including examples of goats 
attracted to wild olive (970-1), and pigs to mud (976-8). In each case the animals’ pleasure is 
emphasised (iuvat – 970; iucunda – 977) as the cause of the attraction. These examples are 
employed analogously to explain why iron is attracted to the magnet, which is said ‘to lead’ 
(ducere – 907) the iron towards it. The keen reader, recalling the leading by Venus-voluptas in 
the prologue, and the voluptas of the animals in being led to their favourite things, might in 
turn envisage the iron as led by ‘pleasure’ towards the magnet (like the modern term 
‘magnetic attraction’). If this still seems doubtful, Part 3 Section A will consider how ‘pleasure’ 
is involved in the movement of inanimate atoms. 
  
Pleasure the instigator of creation 
As discussed in Part 1, in the prologue Venus instigates Natura, or rather pleasure instigates 
creation. In the opening invocation Venus, as the one by which ‘every kind of living thing is 
conceived’ (genus omne animantum / concipitur – 1.4-5), specifically represents sexual 
intercourse. Here concipio is used literally, but later it metaphorically depicts the ‘conception’ 
of things in general. Shortly after in the prologue the instigation takes the form of persuasion, 
with Venus as dux striking animals and leading them to procreate – a chain that will later also 
be applied metaphorically to atomic combination, as Part 3 Section A will address. 
 For now, a brief survey of Lucretius’ use of Venus and voluptas to describe sexual 
intercourse and the pleasure derived from it will suffice. Sexual intercourse is described 
                                                          
406
 Contrast the cow distressed at the slaughter of her calf in 2.349-66. For her, food (also dewy grass – 
herbae rore vigentes – 361) cannot ‘delight her mind’ (oblectare animum – 363) or ‘lead her mind 
away’ (derivare […] animum – 365). 
407
 OLD, corusco lists differing senses: ‘brandish’ (1) and ‘flash’ like lightning or fire (3) (e.g. Verg. G. 
4.98, with fulgor). It seems Lucretius is introducing a comparison with the soldiers in the next analogy 
(323-32), which depicts the fulgor (325) of their weapons. The soldiers are engaged in mock-battle 
manoeuvres, the lambs in mock-fighting. 
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metonymically as simply Veneris res (2.437; 4.1215;408 5.848) and Venus (4.1267; 5.1017),409 
and also with a variety of compound phrases: conubia Veneris (3.776), Veneris compages 
(4.1113, 1205), Veneris sudor (4.1128), and Veneris stimulis (4.1215). We also find blanda 
voluptas (4.1268) as a synonym for sexual intercourse, perhaps by synecdoche (since pleasure 
is only a part of this). In addition, Venus and voluptas also occur in phrases relating to sexual 
intercourse, such as sexual attraction (Veneris vis – 4.1172), sexual desire (Venus – 5.897, 
962), and sterility (Venus sterilis – 4.1235); and sexual pleasure (voluptas – 4.1201; communi’ 
voluptas – 4.1208) and orgasm (voluptatis […] vi – 4.1114). This variety embodies the breadth 
of the concept of pleasure in Lucretius’ thread, since it pertains to desire (i.e. the expectation 
or yearning for pleasure), the process by which pleasure is obtained, and the subsequent 
pleasure itself. The fluid meanings of Venus and voluptas, which occasionally take on each 
other’s primary sense (sexual intercourse and sexual desire/pleasure respectively) in this 
context, support this. Venus embodies both concepts when she is described in 4.1057-8 as 
dumb desire heralding pleasure (namque voluptatem praesagit muta cupido. / haec Venus est 
nobis). Here Venus explicitly represents both pleasure and the desire that precedes it – as we 
untangled in the prologue. With this in mind, the PLEASURE thread is shown to be extensive in 
depicting creation through sexual intercourse, embodying desire, sexual intercourse itself, 
and sexual pleasure.  
  
Blows and pleasure 
In the Book 1 prologue Venus strikes animals with desire to seek pleasure through sexual 
intercourse (perculsae corda tua vi – 13; incutiens blandum per pectora amorem – 19). Thus, a 
direct link is drawn between striking and sensation, and resulting actions and movements, 
with Venus, representing desire and subsequent pleasure, the initiating cause. This process is 
also described in Lucretius’ second ‘mission statement’ (1.921-50) as he explains the 
inspiration for his poetry: 
 
          […] sed acri 
percussit thyrso laudis spes magna meum cor, 
et simul incussit suavem mi in pectus amorem 
Musarum, […]      925 
       (1.922-5) 
                                                          
408
 In the phrase harmonia Veneris, describing sexual compatibility. 
409
 Campbell (2003) ad loc. suggests Venus here represents ‘physical love’ as well as other facets of 
Lucretian Venus. It seems to me, however, that ‘Venus sapped their strength’ (5.1017) can only refer 
to sexual intercourse. 
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[…] but great hope of fame has struck my heart with a thyrsus, and at 
the same time it has struck the sweet love of the Muses into my heart, 
[…] 
 
In the prologue Lucretius described the motivation behind his composition as ‘the hoped for 
pleasure of sweet friendship’ (sperata voluptas / suavis amicitiae – 140-1), and here his 
inspiration is again hope (perhaps = ‘expected pleasure’ of, or ‘desire for’, fame) and pleasure 
(expressed by suavis amor). Both of these descriptions recall Venus and her effect on the 
animals in the prologue. It is also notable that, just as Venus causes animal procreation by 
striking (incutiens – 19), so desire for pleasure initiates poetic creation specifically by striking 
(incussit – 924). The actions of Venus in the prologue can therefore be seen as the archetype 
for how creative acts occur in the DRN.  
In fact, general feelings and movements can also be caused by striking. This includes 
the expression of emotions by the mind, which occurs when a thought or idea ‘strikes the 
mind itself’ (animum […] percutit ipsum – 2.886) and ‘moves it and causes it to express 
various feelings’ (movet et varios sensus expromere cogit – 2.887).410 Similarly, striking can 
initiate a response to the emotion of fear: the spirit ‘is struck’ (percussast – 160) by the mind, 
and in turn ‘strikes the body and drives it forward’ (corpus propellit et icit – 160). More 
generally, in 4.877-906 voluntary movement occurs when ‘images of movement’ (simulacra 
meandi – 881) strike (pulsare – 882) our mind, which in turn strikes (ferit – 887) the spirit, 
which then strikes (ferit - 890) the body, causing motion. This causes us to pursue pleasure, as 
we move ‘when we want’ (cum volumus – 878), by our will (voluntas – 883). Again, this recalls 
Venus in the prologue, striking the animals to move by their will towards expected pleasure. 
Here the desire for movement is general, however, and not specifically sexual. 
 A more detailed scheme of the causes of movement towards sexual pleasure occurs 
in 4.1037-57 at the beginning of Lucretius’ exploration of love. First he states that ‘only 
human force rouses (ciet) human seed from a human’ (1040). Having been roused, the 
genitals are ‘roused’ (ciet – 1043) in turn, recalling the chain of movement caused by 
sensation in the mind.411 Lucretius then asserts this connection more strongly. The body 
follows the movement of the mind, desiring to emit the seed towards wherever the mind was 
‘wounded’ (saucia – 1048) with love. This metaphor is extended as Lucretius compares blood 
spurting from a wounded body towards the source of the blow (ictu – 1050). This analogy 
persists with an example of a man ‘who has received a blow from the shafts of Venus’ 
                                                          
410
 Cf. 5.1222-3, in which proud kings are struck by fear, and consequentially fear the gods (regesque 
superbi / corripiunt divum percussi membra timore). 
411
 Brown (1987) 63 terms the process ‘a physiological chain reaction – impersonal and mechanical’. 
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(Veneris qui telis accipit ictus – 1052), whether a boy or woman ‘launches’ (iaculatur – 1053; 
iactans – 1054) them at him. Again the man is struck and moves in the direction of expected 
pleasure: 
 
unde feritur, eo tendit gestitque coire   1055 
et iacere umorem in corpus de corpore ductum; 
namque voluptatem praesagit muta cupido. 
haec Venus est nobis; […] 
       (4.1055-7) 
[…] from where the blow has come he reaches out in that direction, 
and longs to have sex412 and to cast the fluid drawn from his body into 
the other body; for dumb desire heralds pleasure. This is our Venus; 
[…] 
 
The blow of cupido strikes cupido into the man, causing him to seek pleasure from where the 
blow originated – a process described as Venus nobis. Again the Book 1 prologue, in which 
Venus strikes animals and leads them in her direction towards sexual intercourse, is 
recalled.413 The man in our passage is affected exactly as the animals are, and yearns for 
sexual intercourse as they do. This underlines the consistent portrayal of Venus throughout 
the DRN, as a representation of both general and specifically sexual pleasure and their cause, 
and sexual intercourse and the pleasure it promises. Therefore, again it is not necessary to 
assume a ‘redefinition’ of Venus following the prologue.414 This reading is aided by the 
PLEASURE thread and its various applications. 
 Despite this onslaught of blows, man can nevertheless overcome desire for love and 
sexual pleasure,415 and their accompanying pains (curam certumque dolorem – 4.1067). One 
way to do this – other than to avoid attractive simulacra, to think of other things, to emit the 
seed somewhere else (4.1063-6) – is to mix up the original wounds ‘with new blows’ (novis 
[…] plagis – 4.1070), especially by visiting prostitutes (4.1071).416 Blows, in the form of 
pleasure from another source, soothe the pain of overwhelming sexual desire brought about 
by obsessing over a single lover. A further good reason to seek these ‘blows’ from a different 
                                                          
412
 This is the correct meaning of coeo in this context: not simply ‘to come together’, but, as Adams 
(1982) 179 has it, ‘the verbal euphemism par excellence for copulation’ (citing this passage as its first 
usage in this sense). Perhaps this is a synonym for Greek σύνειμι (‘to copulate’, Arist. Hist. an. 5.2.29, 
540a10). 
413
 The image recurs in 5.1075, describing a stallion struck by ‘the blow of winged love’ (pinnigeri […] 
ictus Amoris). 
414
 As Solomon (2004); or the replacement of Venus by Nature, as Catto (1988). 
415
 As Brown (1987) 65 points out, one should not avoid sexual pleasure altogether, but that which is 
sought out of love. 
416
 This interpretation, advanced by Brown (1987) 74, of the euphemistic phrase volgivagaque vagus 
Venere (4.1071) is surely correct. 
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source is revealed at the end of Book 4, as Lucretius explains why men love unattractive girls. 
This is caused by the woman’s efforts towards seemly conduct (factis / morigerisque modis – 
1280-1) and cosmetic appearance (cultu – 1281). The man falls in love by becoming 
accustomed (consuetudo – 1283) to these: 
 
nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 
vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit.  1285 
       (4.1284-5) 
[…] for however lightly he is struck with a repeated blow, he is 
nevertheless conquered in the long run and yields. 
 
The combined effect of ‘light’ blows from something mildly pleasurable, like a seemly 
appearance, is sufficient to engender love and sexual desire.417 Blows are persistently 
portrayed in the DRN as causing pleasure or the pursuit of pleasure, and most specifically to 
lead to sexual intercourse. This has implications for Lucretius’ theory of creation, as Part 3 
Section A will consider.  
 
  
                                                          
417
 The small blows equate to a beating, expressed by tundo, used most frequently of heavy (and 
usually repeated) blows; OLD, tundo – especially the transferred senses of buffeting by wind or waves 
(1c), haranguing someone with repeated noise or words (1d), and beating something to a pulp (2). For 
the possible sexual connotations of tundo, see Adams (1982) 149. 
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Part 3 
 
Intertwining the Threads 
 
Part 2 has tracked Lucretius’ conceptual threads individually, mapping their principal 
applications, and showing how far they expand throughout the DRN from their introduction 
in the prologue. Part 3 will consider how the threads interact, or rather ‘intertwine’, to depict 
and explain more complex concepts. Established correspondences of individual threads are 
modified by, and modify, established correspondences of other threads, building upon the 
reader’s understanding to extract new meaning. Such intertwining occurs throughout the 
DRN as new concepts are introduced, and as such certain brief glimpses of intertwined 
threads have been seen in Part 2. These will be built upon, alongside many others in this Part, 
and the extent to which Lucretius’ central doctrines rely on the intertwining of his conceptual 
threads will become apparent. The full potential of the conceptual threads as explanatory 
devices will be further uncovered, revealing unexpected and even radical readings of certain 
doctrines.  
 The doctrines chosen for analysis in this Part represent those in which threads 
intertwine consistently to portray a crucial aspect of Lucretius’ science or moral philosophy, 
in particular: the birth-death cycle; certain essential processes; sensation; the body and soul; 
the world; the meteorological and terrestrial phenomena of Book 6; and Lucretius’ moral 
philosophy. The full reach of the threads, and their role in universalising Lucretius’ key 
theories, will be exhibited, further highlighting Lucretius’ consistent and coherent 
methodological approach. 
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Section A 
 
Creation and Destruction 
 
The central theory of Lucretius’ philosophy is the cycle of creation and destruction by the 
combination and dissolution of atomic congregations. Interactions between conceptual 
threads depict different aspects of this cycle, and all five threads form a complex web 
explaining the whole cycle. Several established aspects of each conceptual thread are 
employed in this scheme, again underlining their consistent nature. This Section will address 
the interaction between the LIFE-CYCLE thread and each of the other threads in turn, broadly 
in order of appearance. Since several of Lucretius’ theories depend on his theory of creation, 
several aspects considered here will be relevant for interpreting key theories later in this 
Part. 
 
LIFE-CYCLE and BOUNDARIES 
The BOUNDARIES thread occurs most frequently in the DRN when intertwined with the LIFE-
CYCLE thread to explain, broadly, ‘what can be born, and what cannot’ (quid possit oriri, / quid 
nequeat – 1.75-6). The full meaning of this phrase will be clarified throughout the epic, and 
especially in the first two books, which outline the boundaries restricting the life cycle of 
things, from atomic creation to growth and the ultimate boundary of death, which marks 
each thing’s restricted lifespan, and represents a departure from physical boundaries. The 
LIFE-CYCLE and BOUNDARIES threads intertwine most extensively in the first arguments of Book 
1, that nothing comes from nothing, and nothing dies to nothing. Together these explain the 
following limits: nothing is born from nothing; species are restricted in the way they are born, 
their growth and their habitat; fixed things contain fixed materies; and birth occurs at fixed 
times and at fixed speeds. These key theories are expanded later to explain how boundaries 
govern other atomic and macroscopic processes. 
 
The boundaries of birth 
As discussed in Part 2 Section D, the purpose of explaining quid possit oriri, quid nequeat (i.e. 
the boundaries restricting creation) is to rid man of fear – especially that caused by religio. 
Lucretius explains two of these boundaries in his first argument (1.150), that nothing is born 
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from nothing, and nothing is born from divine agency (divinitus).418 Lucretius supports his 
argument by portraying several limits restricting the birth of things, drawn from human 
experience. These, as Part 2 Section A explored, are punctuated by terms from Lucretius’ 
birth-themed atomic vocabulary, and other birth words, some applied metaphorically to 
atoms and others literally to the birth of things. Lucretius’ arguments are predominantly 
packaged in modus tollens (‘denying the consequent’) deductions, with the intertwined LIFE-
CYCLE and BOUNDARIES threads expressing the impossible consequences unlimited birth would 
cause. Two pairs of terms express this in particular: creo and certus, and genus and 
generatim. 
 Lucretius depicts the boundaries restricting birth by frequently repeating creo and its 
cognate cresco (five and three occurrences respectively), and certus (seven). Three different 
but complementary proofs in particular juxtapose these terms to draw striking correlations 
between birth and boundaries. First, the act of creation depends on fixed mothers and fixed 
constituent bodies. Lucretius emphasises this by stating that without genitalia corpora things 
could not have a ‘fixed mother’ (mater […] certa – 168),419 and so they ‘are born from fixed 
seeds’ (seminibus […] certis […] creantur – 169). Second, things could not be born seasonally, 
unless ‘fixed seeds’ (certa […] semina – 176) combine at the proper time, from which each 
thing ‘is born’ (creatur – 177). Third, instantaneous growth of trees, or youths from infants, is 
impossible because things ‘grow gradually, as is appropriate, from fixed seed, and in growing 
preserve their kind’ (paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo, / crescentesque genus 
servant – 189-90). In these proofs, ‘fixed seed’ simultaneously depicts animal and plant seed, 
and the atomic semina that create all things, while atomic materies is the metaphorical ‘fixed 
mother’ of things.420 Both denote a boundary restricting birth, which Lucretius highlights by 
juxtaposing creo and certus in linguistic jingles, deployed, as Snyder notes, ‘as if the meaning 
of one term automatically included the meaning of the other’.421 Thus we might read birth in 
certus and fixity in creo, each term representing a convergence of the LIFE-CYCLE and 
                                                          
418
 This must be what Lucretius means: that an instigating force (represented by the goddess Venus in 
the prologue), which is not divine, creates everything out of something. However the ambiguous 
wording (nullam rem e nilo gigni divinitus umquam) unfortunately allows that divine agency can create 
things from something. 
419
 This phrase recalls the concept of illegitimate birth. Within this framework, suggesting the mother 
might be unknown makes the original proposition seem absurd. 
420
 Snyder (1980) 137-41 argues that several instances of Lucretius’ frequent wordplay of creo and 
certus ‘help to stress the idea that the materies does act as mater certa out of which are born all 
things.’ 
421
 Snyder (1980) 141. On pp.137-41 she enumerates 22 juxtapositions of these terms (alongside other 
cer- and cre- words, including cerno and certo) in an atomic context. Certainly a link was felt between 
cerno and creo (as Varro Ling. 6.81 notes) and also, therefore, cresco; Maltby (1991) s. v. cerno. 
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BOUNDARIES threads, again emphasising that for Lucretius birth intrinsically entails certain 
boundaries. 
 The term genus intrinsically relates to birth as a derivative of gigno. However, it also 
denotes a boundary of category, classifying animals into ‘kinds’ maintained by birth. Lucretius 
frequently draws attention to these concepts to highlight the boundaries governing birth, as 
in the first modus tollens deduction of the first arguments: 
 
nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu’ rebus 
omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.  160 
       (1.159-60) 
For if they came to be from nothing, every kind of thing could be born 
from all things, nothing would require a seed. 
 
Removing limits from birth eliminates genera, and so seed as we understand it would be 
unnecessary for birth. Lucretius disproves the premise throughout the opening arguments by 
demonstrating that birth requires seed, and occurs according to genus.  
 In 189-90, quoted in the consideration of creo and certus above, Lucretius states that 
animals preserve their genus throughout their gradual growth from fixed seed. The 
designation genus inherently denotes birth and growth within fixed parameters – as our 
experience of animal and plant life confirms – strengthening the theory of fixed seed. Again, 
in 192-8, when Lucretius considers ‘fixed rains’ (certis imbribus – 192), which enable plant 
birth, he draws attention not to the nourishment they provide for animals, but the fact that 
animals without food cannot ‘propagate their kind’ (propagare genus – 195).422 Lucretius 
emphasises the boundaries of genus dictating birth, and the boundaries of seasons 
(expressed by ‘fixed rains’) that facilitate birth within these boundaries. The boundaries of 
birth and growth also disprove that anything can die to nothing, since, if time could reduce 
materies to nothing: 
 
unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitae 
redducit Venus, aut redductum daedala tellus 
unde alit atque auget generatim pabula praebens? 
       (1.227-29) 
[…] from where does Venus lead back423 a kind of animal into the light 
of life according to kind, or, having been led back, from where does the 
skilful earth nourish them and make them grow, providing food, 
according to kind? 
                                                          
422
 propago suggests the generation of plants from semina (see n. 198), enhancing the connection 
between plants and animals. 
423
 Venus’ role here will be considered later in this Section. 
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Etymological figure (genus generatim) and the repetition of generatim place special emphasis 
on genus. The same boundaries entailed in birth also restrict growth and nourishment. The 
prominence of genus in the opening arguments firmly establishes the central role of 
boundaries in Lucretius’ theory of birth. 
 A notable example occurs in a proof for the broad variety of atomic shapes and 
arrangements. Although animals in a field eat the same grass and drink from the same river: 
 
dissimili vivont specie retinentque parentum  665 
naturam et mores generatim quaeque imitantur. 
tanta est in quovis genere herbae materiai 
dissimilis ratio, tanta est in flumine quoque. 
       (2.665-8) 
[…] they live in a different outward form and retain the nature of their 
parents and in each case copy customs according to kind. So dissimilar 
is the orderly array424 of mother-substance in whatever variety of 
herbage you choose, so dissimilar in each river. 
 
Two different consequences of fixed inheritance are outlined here. Firstly, animals inherit 
their parents’ nature and customs ‘according to kind’, and the reader is aware that this is 
owing to the passing on of fixed materies to offspring. Secondly, animals of the same kind 
consume the same kind of food, and the materies within this food is processed in such a way 
that the animals remain of the same kind. For this reason, different kinds of animal can eat 
the same food and still remain different. The contrast between these two points is 
strengthened by the position of parentum and materiai in their respective lines, the 
polyptoton dissimili […] dissimilis, and the etymological figure generatim […] genere. The 
latter highlights the incorrect postulation that different kinds of animal might become similar 
by consuming the same kind of plant. Instead the pattern of the materies of the plant is 
altered when the animal consumes it, ensuring that an animal does not become different in 
its kind by eating. Extrapolating from this, the materies of the food eaten by a parent surely 
forms part of the materies passed on to their offspring, which, by eating the same food, 
consume the same materies. Animals are able to maintain their genus because they consume 
food containing varied materies in different arrangements, which contributes to each 
animal’s growth according to kind. 
                                                          
424
 Bailey (1947) ad loc. suggests dissimilis ratio is a paraphrase for the unmetrical differentia, and so 
overlooks a reference to atomic order in addition to type. It seems ratio is intended to refer both to 
‘ratios’ of different atomic types and to their varied arrangements. My translation attempts to capture 
the concept of order suggested by ratio. 
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 Animals also inherit sensory responses to certain things, passed on by fixed first-
bodies according to kind (4.642-86). Therefore, different animals like different foods not just 
because things contain ‘many seeds mixed in many ways’ (644), but because animals do too: 
 
ut sunt dissimiles extrinsecus et generatim 
extima membrorum circumcaesura coercet, 
proinde et seminibus constant variante figura. 
       (4.646-8) 
[…] as they are dissimilar externally and as the outermost contour of 
the limbs holds in [each animal] according to kind, so also they consist 
of seeds of varying shape. 
 
The differences separating animals by kind are expressed by dissimilis, picked up by distent 
(649) and differre (649, 655) with their shared prefix.  Because their constituent seeds differ, 
so do their foramina, and therefore (via the WEAVING thread) a given food’s textura (657) 
‘forces’ (coercet – 657) a certain sensory reaction when it interacts with a given animal’s first-
bodies. The repetition of coerceo symbolises the physical boundaries restricting an animal’s 
shape, and the boundary of an ‘enforced law’ dictating the animal’s sensation. These 
boundaries operate generatim, distinguishing animals by type. The same applies to smells 
(4.673-86), which have dissimilis (678) forms better suited to certain animals. Specifically, an 
animal’s sense of smell, being dictated according to genus, distinguishes edible and poisonous 
food, ‘and in this way generations of beasts are preserved’ (eoque modo servantur saecla 
ferarum – 686). Boundaries governing sensation are set from birth by heredity, which is itself 
maintained by these sensation boundaries. 
 This interpretation extracts further meaning from Lucretius’ first denial of the 
proposition si de nilo fierent – that animals would be born and live in unnatural locations 
(161-4). The term genus occurs twice (162, 163), highlighting that this would constitute a 
violation of boundaries of both birth and kind. This sense persists in the next denial, that 
fruits would be frequently interchanged (mutarentur – 166)425 between plants – that is, be 
born and grow without restrictions of genus. Lucretius summarises these impossibilities in the 
phrase ‘all would be able to bear all’ (ferre omne omnia possent – 166),426 which would be the 
result of incerto partu (164)427 – ‘unfixed birth’, or birth without its usual boundaries. The first 
arguments outline both the pre-established boundary governing birth and the boundaries 
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 i.e. grow naturally without human intervention, by grafting (for which, cf. Varro Rust. 1.40.5-41.3). 
For Lucretius, change entails the death of what was before.  
426
 The elision perhaps embodies the muddling of species types. 
427
 This extends the reference to illegitimate birth (see n.419), with a further absurdity suggested by 
Lucretius’ focus on parents giving birth to uncertain offspring rather than on offspring of uncertain 
parentage. 
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maintained throughout a living thing’s lifetime. By understanding the boundaries entailed in 
birth the reader can understand Lucretius’ theory of birth more fully. 
 Heredity marks a key convergence of Lucretius’ BOUNDARIES and LIFE-CYCLE threads. 
Picking up from the first arguments, later in Book 1 the ‘limit of growth and possession of life 
allotted according to kind’ (generatim reddita finis / crescendi […] vitamque tenendi (584-5) 
and the foedera Naturai (586) restricting things according to genus prove the existence of 
inmutabili’ materiae (591 – recalling mater certa and semina certa in the first arguments). 
Animals are so rigidly restricted in terms of genus, in fact, ‘that various birds all show in 
succession that there are marks of their kind on their bodies’ (variae volucres ut in ordine 
cunctae / ostendant maculas generalis corpore inesse – 589-90). This expresses the visible 
boundaries of genus inherited at birth, and specifically the fixed linear progression of 
inheritance. Here in ordine may carry an implicit weaving sense,428 of a starting border 
initiating a cloth’s fixed ‘creation’ and ‘growth’.  
 If the primordia could be changed (commutari – 593):   
 
incertum quoque iam constet quid possit oriri, 
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique  595 
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens, 
nec totiens possent generatim saecla referre 
naturam mores victum motusque parentum. 
       (1.594-8) 
[…] it would also not be fixed what could be born, what could not, in 
short by which reasoning each thing might have a fixed limit of power 
and a deep-set boundary mark, and generations could not, according 
to kind, so often repeat the nature, customs, way of life and 
movements of their parents. 
 
594-6 (from quid possit) repeat 1.75-7 verbatim, but extend the general boundaries 
introduced there to the fixed limits of heredity. These entail not just inherited appearance, 
such as fixed plumage, but also accustomed lifestyles and actions,429 which later provides 
proof that the soul is born with the body (3.741-53). Intra-species heredity proves the 
existence of fixed first-bodies, and these explain facets of heredity. Both are governed by the 
strict boundaries of foedera Naturae and the alte terminus haerens. 
 
Boundaries of time and season  
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 See discussion on pp.34, 71-6. 
429
 Perhaps a precursor to 3.288-322, which attributes the dispositions and moods of different kinds of 
animal to atomic positions (3.317-8). 
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The third boundary restricting birth, alongside fixed seed and heredity, is time. A further 
denial of the proposition si de nilo fierent appeals to the reader’s experience of seasonal fruits 
and flowers (174-83). Their regular production occurs ‘because fixed seeds of things flow 
together at their own time’ (certa suo quia tempore semina rerum / […] confluxerunt (176-
7)430 – i.e. time restrictions operate according to kind. Lucretius then restates his original 
premise, arguing that si de nilo fierent (180), things would be born  
 
incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni 
quippe ubi nulla forent primordia quae genitali 
concilio possent arceri tempore iniquo. 
       (1.181-3) 
[…] at unfixed intervals and unnatural times of the year, for the very 
reason that there would be no first-threads which could be kept from 
generative union at an adverse time. 
 
The evident fixed regularity of seasonal birth and growth need not be restated. It is so fixed 
that even the primordia are restricted (arceri) to uniting at fixed times – and this will later 
explain various fixed terrestrial and meteorological occurrences. 
 Lucretius then deduces that si de nilo fierent, things would require no time for 
growth, allowing infants to become youths and trees to grow instantaneously. This does not 
happen, 
     
        […] omnia quando 
paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo, 
crescentesque genus servant; ut noscere possis 190 
quidque sua de materie grandescere alique. 
       (1.188-90) 
[…] since everything grows a little at a time, as is fitting, from a fixed 
seed, and in growing preserves its kind; so that you may recognise that 
each grows and is nourished by its own mother-substance. 
 
Lucretius succinctly summarises the boundaries of growth, governed specifically by time and 
certa semina. The echo of suo tempore (176) by sua de materie emphasises that time and 
materies are the two main restrictions on birth, and also expresses the boundaries set 
according to kind (suggested by suus), which also restrict growth (crescentes genus servant).  
 This argument is supported by a reductio ad absurdum, which extends the conjecture 
that everything could be born from everything, to ask why giant men could not be born. This 
would occur without the ‘fixed mother-substance […] on which what can arise is dependent’ 
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 The liquids metaphor confluxerunt will be considered later in this Section. 
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(materies […] certa […] e qua constat quid possit oriri (203-4).431 One effect of certa materies 
is that men cannot ‘by living conquer many generations of life’ (202) and grow to giant size. 
Lifespans are fixed, and dictate the finita potestas of each thing. This argument returns later 
in Book 1 to prove that indivisible bodies exist. Lucretius states that without ‘a limit to the 
breaking of things’ (finem […] frangendis rebus – 552), time past would have destroyed 
corpora materiai (552) to the extent ‘that nothing conceived from these could within a fixed 
time make it to the final boundary of its lifetime’ (ut nil ex illis a certo tempore posset / 
conceptum summum aetatis pervadere finem – 554-5). If ‘mother-substance’ were 
susceptible to being destroyed, birth might be possible, but not full growth. This is supported 
by a weaving metaphor (see p.82), that recreation would not occur as fast as things ‘untying’ 
(dissoluens – 559). Therefore, there must be ‘a fixed boundary allotted to breaking up’ 
(frangendi reddita finis / certa – 561-2), since evidence shows both that things are ‘remade’ 
(refici – 562), and that there are ‘fixed durations’ (finita […] tempora – 563) allotted to things 
‘according to kind’ (generatim – 563), in which they grow to maturity.432 These fixed durations 
are echoed by generatim reddita finis / crescendi rebus (‘the limit of growth allotted to 
things according to kind’ – 584) and the foedera Naturai (586), the ‘laws of Nature’ or 
perhaps ‘of birth’ that govern them. The boundaries restricting lifespans and growth to 
maturity are possible owing to the atomic boundary of division.  
 The fixed times and seasons for things introduced in the first arguments inform 
proofs in Book 5, where Lucretius explains the boundaries governing the regularity of celestial 
phenomena – expressed especially by the phrases tempore certo (‘at a fixed time’) and ordine 
certo (‘in a fixed line (i.e. ‘order’)’). This regularity, the basis for central theories in Platonism 
(the world soul) and Stoicism (the guiding intelligence of the universe), must be explained in 
Epicurean terms.433 An especially emphatic example of Lucretius’ approach is his suggestion 
(5.660-79) that daily sunrises and sunsets might occur when a new sun is born and dies.434 By 
this theory, dawn’s arrival tempore […] certo (656) would require fires or ‘many seeds of heat 
to flow together at a fixed time’ (semina multa / confluere ardoris […] tempore certo (660-1). 
The keen reader will recall seeds ‘flowing together’ (confluxerunt) to create flowers and fruits 
in 1.176-7, and map seasonal horticultural birth and growth onto the sun. Indeed, among 
examples analogous to the confluence certo tempore (5.667) of seeds of heat, other things 
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 Lucretius replicates the deed of Epicurus, who triumphantly brought knowledge of quid possit oriri 
(1.75) to man, and therefore sets his reader on a similar path to freedom from fear. 
432
 Expressed by the metaphor contingere florem, which suggests living things reaching sexual maturity 
– a pre-requisite for reproduction. 
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 For the Platonic view, cf. Pl. Ti., esp. 27c-69a; for the Stoic view, cf. e.g. Cic. Nat. D. 1.15.39 and Sen. 
Ep. 65.2. 
434
 The multiple possible solutions offered correspond to Epicurus, Ep. Pyth. 92. 
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that occur certo […] tempore (5.669) include trees blossoming and dropping their blossom 
(tempore certo – 670; certo […] tempore – 671). He also appeals to our experience of regular 
events in human lifespans: teeth falling out (certo […] tempore – 672-3), and beards growing 
in adolescence. Finally, he considers lightning, snow, rain, cloud and winds, which ‘occur in 
not entirely unfixed parts of the year’ (non nimis incertis fiunt in partibus anni – 676).  
 The weight of examples strengthens Lucretius’ unlikely theory. However, they are in 
fact less rigidly fixed than daily sunrises, and become progressively less fixed as they are 
introduced. Indeed, the examples do not even occur with the same kind of regularity: trees 
blossom yearly at more or less fixed times; the advances of age are broadly fixed, but gradual; 
and certain weather is associated with certain seasons in general. Masking such incongruities, 
the strength of Lucretius’ argument lies in the boundary expressed by the repetition of 
tempore certo and the alternative non incertis in partibus anni.435 This is enhanced in the 
conclusion by a weaving metaphor: 
 
namque ubi sic fuerunt causarum exordia prima 
atque ita res mundi cecidere ab origine prima 
consequiae436 quoque iam redeunt ex ordine certo. 
       (5.677-79) 
For since the first warp of causes has been so and things have occurred 
in this way from the first birth of the world, the consequences also 
recur from the fixed thread. 
 
Lucretius explains that regular fixed occurrences, such as those addressed just previously, 
have existed from the world’s birth. The weaving metaphor of fixed threads (ordo) 
proceeding from the first warp (exordia prima), or ‘starting border’, of the universe, supports 
this argument. Anything woven is inseparably connected to the position of the threads, in 
particular in the starting border.437 The interwoven WEAVING, BOUNDARIES and LIFE-CYCLE threads 
make the daily creation of a new sun seem less improbable. 
 Further regular celestial occurrences are explained by these proofs. Two explanations 
for the progressive lengthening and shortening of days (5.680-704) entail boundaries of time 
and also place. In one Lucretius posits thicker air ‘in fixed regions’ (certis in partibus – 696) 
delaying the sun on its circuitous journey. In the other he modifies the explanation that a new 
sun is born daily when ‘fires flow together’ (confluere ignes – 702) at a fixed time, by 
suggesting this happens at different speeds (tardius et citius – 702), making the sun rise 
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 Gale (2009) ad 670-4 suggests the regularity is emphasised by the chiasmus of 670-1. 
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 This reading, from OQ, suggests (perhaps rightly) the notion of fixed cause and effect. Smith (1992) 
prints Lachmann’s conjecture consequë. 
437
 See pp.38-9, 75. 
142 
 
seasonally ‘in a fixed region’ (certa de […] parte – 703). If the reader has accepted that daily 
sunrises might occur by fixed confluences of fires, this new proof is not problematic. Next, 
among explanations for lunar phases, Lucretius suggests moons are born daily in fixed 
succession (731-50). Although, since firm proof is impossible (727-31), this radical suggestion 
is one of many equally possible theories,438 in fact previously stated examples of regular 
occurrences support it. Lucretius asks why ‘a new moon couldn’t always be born, with fixed 
shapes in a fixed row of forms’ (nequeat semper nova luna creari / ordine formarum certo 
certisque figuris – 731-2), in a daily cycle of one moon dying (aborisci – 733) and another 
being born (creata – 733). The language used here recalls the preceding proofs, and Lucretius 
challenges his reader to disprove the present theory, ‘given that you see many things born in 
so fixed a row’ (ordine cum videas tam certo multa creari – 736). By mapping the weaving 
image of 5.677-9, which outlined the ordine certo of fixed occurrences from the universe’s 
first birth, onto the cycle of moons, Lucretius suggests their constant rebirth is an eternal, 
established phenomenon.   
 The reader, with a clear knowledge of boundaries informed by previous proofs, can 
easily understand and accept a fixed sequence of new moons. The BOUNDARIES thread ties 
together several celestial phenomena in shared processes, strengthening suggestions that 
solar and lunar eclipses occur when their light is doused tempore […] certo (759) or certa […] 
parte (769). Again Lucretius concludes that ‘it is less wondrous’ (748) if new moons are born 
and die certo tempore (748, 749), because so many things occur certo tempore (750). The 
BOUNDARIES and LIFE-CYCLE (and WEAVING) threads intertwine in this section to demystify and 
rationalise celestial phenomena. 
 
Boundaries of motion 
The various atomic causes of birth and variety in things, outlined in asyndetic lists (1.633-4, 
685; 2.726-7, 896, 1021; 5.438-9) – broadly atomic interaction and motion – constitute the 
boundaries restricting what can be created from which atoms. In 2.700-29 Lucretius recalls 
the first arguments to explain that one of the reasons distinct entities exist is because parts 
of things cannot combine. Instead they are born from ‘from fixed seeds and a fixed mother’ 
(seminibus certis certa genetrice – 708), and preserve their genus (709) as they grow. 
Because seeds ‘differ’ (distent and differre – 725) in shape and in their ‘spaces, paths, 
interweavings, weights, blows, collisions and motions’, they must create a variety of 
different, distinct entities – and not just animals (700-17, 727), but also the realms of the 
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 On multiple proofs, cf. 5.526-32, 6.703-11; Asmis (1984) 321-30; Hankinson (2013). 
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world (728-9). The nature of atoms, their movements and interactions restrict what can be 
born, and boundaries set at birth account for distinct entities. 
 The limits of atomic motion were introduced in Part 2 Section D in relation to the 
atomic swerve (2.216-93), which is limited in extent and partially in timing. In the subsequent 
passage (2.294-307) Lucretius combines his theories of atomic motion, unlimited matter and 
the unlimited universe to explain another boundary of birth. Because the universe is 
boundless, and atoms are eternal and unlimited, the overall density of matter remains 
constant (294-6). Similarly, atomic motions have always been the same and always will be 
(297-9), so that 
 
[…] quae consuerint gigni gignentur eadem  300 
condicione et erunt et crescent vique valebunt, 
quantum cuique datum est per foedera Naturai. 
       (2.300-2) 
[…] whatever has been accustomed to be born will be born by the 
same terms, and will be and grow and stand strong in strength, as 
much as is granted to each by the pacts of Nature. 
 
Lucretius explains, via the ‘natural laws are boundaries restricting things’ strand of the 
BOUNDARIES thread (expressed especially here by foedera and condicio, which usually depicts a 
socially or legally binding ‘agreement’),439 that the possibilities of motion govern the 
possibilities of birth. The restrictions on birth also apply to the sum of matter, which remains 
constant because ‘nothing increases and nothing dies from it’ (neque adaugescit quicquam 
neque deperit inde – 296). There is nowhere into which matter could flee (effugere – 305) 
from the sum,440 or from where the power ‘to change the nature of things and turn their 
motions’ (307) could originate. Since atoms are limited in variety and power (as explored in 
Part 2 Section D), only new forces from outside the universe could alter their motion: the 
limitless universe disproves this. Motion causes birth, which in turn must also be unchanging, 
and eternally restricted by the same laws. 
 
Birth and (lack of) boundaries 
In addition to boundaries restricting birth, in an opposite but complementary proof, the 
limitless universe enables birth to occur. This is because (as Part 2 Section D considered) the 
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 e.g. a truce (as in Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.73, Att. 11.12.3; Sal. Iug. 112.1; Livy 42.62.3) or a marriage or 
marriage contract (apparently in Enn. scen. 373 War.; also in Plaut. Trin. 159; Cic. Amic. 34). 
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 Recalling the spear cast at the boundary of the universe in 1.983. See pp.120-1 for discussion. 
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limitless universe contains limitless matter and void. If either were limited, things would not 
be born (1.1014-20).441 Lucretius expresses this emphatically: 
 
nam dispulsa suo de coetu materiai 
copia ferretur magnum per inane soluta, 
sive adeo potius numquam concreta creasset 
ullam rem, quoniam cogi disiecta nequisset.  1020 
       (1.1017-20) 
For the abundance of mother-substance, driven out from its own 
union, would be untied and carried across the great void, or for that 
matter could rather never have grown together and given birth to 
anything, since it could not be forced together, having been thrown 
apart. 
 
If matter were finite in an infinite universe, it could not perform the appropriate ‘sexual’ 
unions (coetu; cf. coetus experiundo, ‘by trying out unions’ – 1025; conciliata, ‘married’ – 
1043)442 for birth to occur. Lucretius then (1021-51) describes perpetual atomic motion and 
union, exemplified by the perpetual flow of rivers, the generative cycle of living things, and 
the movement of the stars. These rely on an abundance of materies supplied ‘from the 
infinite’ (ex infinito – 1036), since all things are diminished when new bodies cease to be 
supplied (1038-41). Furthermore, bodies often fail to cohere when they collide (1042-8), and 
so ‘there is a need for an infinite strength of mother-substance from all directions’ (infinita 
opus est vis undique materiai – 1051). A careful balance of boundaries governs Lucretius’ 
birth-death cycle, since matter, void and the universe must be unlimited to facilitate birth and 
growth, which are themselves restricted by several boundaries. 
 While matter and the universe are unlimited, atomic variety is restricted. These two 
theories combine to prove that our world is not unique in the universe (2.1048-88), and that 
Nature creates worlds without divine assistance (2.1090-1104). Lucretius restates, with 
striking pleonasm, that the universe is infinite: 
 
principio nobis in cunctas undique partis 
et latere ex utroque supra subterque per omne 
nulla est finis; […]     1050 
       (2.1048-50) 
Firstly, for us everywhere and in all directions, on both sides, above and 
below through the universe, there is no limit; […] 
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 Assuming that the lacuna between 1013 and 1014 (printed by all recent editors) refers to the 
impossibility of finite void. An approximation of this argument, supplied by Diels, is supported by 
Bailey (1947) ad loc. and printed by Smith (1992). 
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 See n.202. 
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He then emphasises that this totality consists of ‘unlimited space everywhere’ (undique […] 
spatium […] infinitum – 1053) ‘and seeds of innumerable number’ (seminaque innumero 
numero – 1054). Together these assertions deny that our world was ‘born’ (creatum – 1056) 
alone, because seeds, being infinite, must have combined elsewhere to make other worlds 
(1058-66). Logic informed by the knowledge of boundaries can deduce the birth of other 
worlds, unprovable by observation alone. 
 This deduction is strengthened by an analogy that there is nothing in the universe 
that is ‘born unique and grows unique and alone’ (unica […] gignatur et unica solaque crescat 
– 1078) in its kind (genere – 1080). The language brings to mind animals, and a comparison 
with animals follows: just as no animal is alone in its kind (1081-3), the same must be true of 
the world, the sun and the moon, which 
 
non esse unica, sed numero magis innumerali, 
quandoquidem vitae depactus terminus alte 
tam manet haec, et tam nativo corpore constant, 
quam genus omne quod hic generatimst rebus abundans 
       (2.1086-9) 
[…] are not unique, but rather are innumerable in number, seeing that 
an equally deeply-established boundary post of life awaits these 
things, and they consist of a body that was just as much born as every 
kind of thing here which abounds in individuals of the same kind. 
 
The infinite universe must contain innumerable worlds, and these, like animate beings, have a 
limited lifespan and an inborn (i.e. established at birth) body – both intrinsic entailments of 
birth. Furthermore, the established boundaries governing matter and quid possit oriri, quid 
nequeat dictate that these worlds must be like ours, containing the same life-forms (1076), 
since ‘the same power’ (1072) and ‘such abundance of seeds’ (seminibus […] tanta […] copia – 
1070) cause them to be born. The passage recalls 2.532-40, which uses the abundance of 
each kind of animal to prove the unlimited number of each kind of atom (532-40). The reader, 
recalling this passage, will more readily comprehend that there are innumerable worlds, 
limited in variety. Thus Lucretius universalises the concept of ‘limitless abundance, limited 
variety’, from the atomic to the most macroscopic level. 
 In Book 6, similar specific cases of abundance are explained by the same arguments. 
Great clouds form from an abundance of bodies combining in the air. Because these are of 
‘innumerable number’ (innumerabilem […] numerum – 485) and they come ‘in all directions’ 
(undique – 492) from the ‘unlimited’ (infinitam – 486) universe, a great mass of cloud can 
form suddenly (489-91). Rain ‘grows together’ (concrescat – 495) in these clouds, formed 
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from semina aquai / multa (497-8; semina aquarum / multa – 507-8) rising into the air. 
Therefore, clouds and rain can be understood ‘to grow’ (crescere – 499) as one – just as 
moisture ‘grows’ (crescit – 501) with our bodies. The lack of boundaries restricting bodies and 
the universe enables this creation. Volcanic eruptions are explained as being caused by a 
great gathering of seeds (655-72), supported by an analogy from human experience, of 
burning pain and disease (655-61), which occurs when multarum semina rerum (662) 
combine to create ‘a strength of immeasurable disease’ (vis immensi […] morbi – 664). In the 
same way (sic – 665), seeds supplied ‘from the infinite’ (ex infinito – 666) cause earthquakes, 
whirlwinds and volcanic eruptions. Lucretius maps our understanding of human disease onto 
these devastating natural occurrences, and by association onto the everyday occurrences of 
rain and cloud formation. All are caused by the chance union of atoms, enabled by the infinite 
sum of matter and the boundless universe, and are therefore equally inevitable and not to be 
feared.443  
 
‘Death is the departure from boundaries’ 
We have seen that Lucretius considers a given thing’s potential lifespan as a set boundary 
that cannot be transgressed by life. Crossing the boundary constitutes death. This concept is 
introduced among proofs discrediting Heraclitus’ theory that fire is the sole primary element. 
Heraclitus’ denial of void prevents fire from becoming more or less rarefied to make different 
substances (1.655-64). Therefore, for fire to create different things, it must ‘be extinguished 
and change its body’ (stingui mutareque corpus – 666). At the ‘death’ of fire, things would be 
reborn from nothing (e nilo fient quaecumque creantur – 669) – an impossibility dismissed in 
the first arguments – and change would lead to the same impossibility:  
 
nam quodcumque suis mutatum finibus exit,  670 
continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante. 
       (1.670-71) 
For whatever is changed and leaves its boundaries, at once this is the 
death of that which was before. 
 
In Epicurean physics, one thing changing into another involves its first-bodies changing 
position.444 For example, forest fires are caused when seeds of fire present in wood flow 
together – 1.897-914. Physically, change involves the boundaries formed by a thing’s first-
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 The Epilogue considers the threads as consolatory devices. 
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 Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 54; see Bailey (1947) ad 670-1 for a brief summary of the theory and its 
relevance. 
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bodies being broken and transposed – representing death and rebirth.445 If fire is the first 
element, but it dies and is reborn to create new things, what does it die into? If it dies into 
nothing, then rebirth must occur from nothing (but this is impossible). This recalls the first 
arguments, both in content and birth terminology, and also in the repetition of e nilo (669) 
and ad nilum (673) from the first two principles (1.150 and 1.216 respectively). Again 
Lucretius has employed his threads to tie two arguments together, as he accounts for the 
conjecture that, instead of indestructible first-bodies existing, things might change into 
others.  
 The important theory that change constitutes death and rebirth is repeated verbatim 
three further times in the epic. The first of these (1.792-3) is in a similar context, dismissing 
the Empedoclean theory of four elements. Part of this theory argues that the four elements 
change into one another (1.782-802) – an impossibility, because rebirth requires ‘something 
unchangeable’ (immutabile […] quiddam – 790) to remain, so things do not return ad nilum 
(791). The second occurrence of the law (repeating 1.789-93 in 2.750-54) is in the rather 
different context of proving that atoms are colourless. Because we see that colours change, 
and atoms themselves cannot change (or ‘die’), atoms themselves must be colourless. The 
third (3.519-20) occurs within an argument that, because medicine can change the soul, the 
soul must be mortal.446 The BOUNDARIES thread extends across three important proofs: that 
the primary elements must be unchangeable; that colour must be caused by changed atomic 
arrangement, not by atoms changing colour; and that the soul must be divisible into first-
bodies. The conceptual boundary limiting a thing’s lifespan also denotes the point whose 
transgression entails death.447  
 
LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING 
Part 1 highlighted that the first mention of death in the DRN (in 1.57) is expressed by a 
weaving metaphor, in which the spent force of Natura ‘unties’ (resolvat) things into their 
primordia. This is picked up in the first arguments of Book 2, in which Lucretius promises ‘I 
shall disentangle by which motion the generative bodies of mother-substance give birth to 
various things and untie them again once born’ (quo motu genitalia materiai / corpora res 
varias gignant genitasque resolvant […] expediam – 62-6). The link is made especially by the 
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repetition of resolvo, but also by expedio,448 which recalls the weaving metaphor of dispono, 
dissero and pando applied to Lucretius’ methodology in 1.52-5. In both instances, the 
‘unweaving’ of a thing into its constituent primordia represents its death – and no death term 
is required in either passage. This mirrors the employment of the weaving metaphor 
elsewhere in the epic, where it frequently stands alone to represent death. These prominent 
passages alert the reader to this usage. 
Another prominent passage in which unweaving represents death is the second of 
Lucretius’ first principles: that nothing dies to nothing. This is evident in the expression of the 
principle itself: ‘Nature unties each thing into its own bodies again and does not destroy 
things to nothing’ (quidque in sua corpore rursum / dissoluat Natura neque ad nilum 
interemat res – 215-6): for Lucretius, death does not entail destruction to nothing, but 
untying into constituent parts. The image is then expanded: 
 
nam si quid mortale e cunctis partibus esset,  
ex oculis res quaeque repente erepta periret; 
nulla vi foret usus enim quae partibus eius 
discidium parere et nexus exsolvere posset.  220 
       (1.217-220) 
For if something were mortal in all its parts, each thing would perish 
and be snatched from our sight in an instant; for there would be no 
need of force, which could bring about the tearing up of its parts and 
untie its bonds. 
 
Instead, the ‘death’ (exitium – 224) of something only occurs by an appropriate blow (ictu – 
222) or when something ‘penetrates through its void spaces and unties it’ (penetret per 
inania dissoluatque – 223). Thus, Lucretius defines ‘death’ specifically as the ‘untying’ of 
something into its constituent parts, and so these parts cannot be mortal. 
 The implications of this theory are then expanded, as Lucretius argues that the same 
force would ‘destroy’ (conficeret – 239) all things, unless they consisted of tighter or looser 
‘bonds’ (nexus – 240). Without eternal constituent bodies forming the ‘fabric’ (contextum – 
243) of things, which only a special force could ‘untie’ (dissolvere – 243), a touch would be 
sufficient to cause ‘death’ (leti – 241) for all things. Thus, for all things, ‘unweaving’ into 
constituent bodies represents their ‘death’, and vice versa. Lucretius supports this further 
with a definition of atoms later in Book 1: ‘the first-threads of things must be of immortal 
body, into which each thing might be untied at the last moment’ (esse inmortali primordia 
corpore debent, / dissolui quo quaeque supremo tempore possint – 545-6). While things are 
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untied and die, the first-threads remain intact and eternal – otherwise ‘reweaving’ or ‘birth’ 
would be impossible. By the correspondence between the WEAVING thread and the death 
strand of the LIFE-CYCLE thread in these prominent arguments, Lucretius urges the reader to 
consider death as a process of unweaving, and unweaving as constituting death, throughout 
the epic. This will be particularly important in Book 3, in relation to the soul’s mortality. 
 
LIFE-CYCLE and LIQUIDS 
The depiction of things being born from primordia and untied into them again at death 
epitomises Lucretius’ birth-death cycle, as discussed in Part 1. Alongside this intertwining of 
the LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING threads, a third thread is central in depicting this key doctrine: 
LIQUIDS. This is first evident in an image (1.250-64), brilliantly analysed by West,449 depicting 
the cycle of life initiated by rains from Pater Aether.450 ‘The rains die’ (pereunt imbres – 250) 
when Father Ether has hurled them into Mother Earth’s lap, and in turn plants ‘grow and are 
made pregnant with produce’ (crescunt […] fetuque gravantur – 253) – a vivid image mapping 
animal insemination (violent, as West observes), conception and pregnancy onto plants. In 
turn the human race ‘is nourished’ (254) and animals are too, and so ‘we see flourishing cities 
blossoming with children and everywhere leaf-bearing woods sing with new-born birds’ 
(laetas urbes pueris florere videmus frondiferasque novis avibus canere undique silvas 255-
6).451 At first glance the passage is simply a vivid depiction of birth, with an expected 
causative chain of water causing plants to grow, which feed animals and enable them to 
procreate. However the striking florere, which maps plant ‘birth’ onto humans, not only 
compares children growing in a city to flowers growing on a plant, but also associates water 
more closely with human growth.452 This concept persists in the remainder of the image, in 
which female livestock lie on the grass while their offspring play. Lucretius depicts the 
animals lactating (candens lacteus umor / uberibus manat distentis – 258-9) and the effect 
feeding has on their young, who gambol about as though drunk, ‘struck to their young hearts 
with neat milk’ (lacte mero mentes perculsa novellas – 261).453 Again Lucretius suggests, as 
West observes, that the same water from Pater Aether feeds young animals as milk.454 In this 
passage, Lucretius suggests, by using the water cycle as pictorial evidence for the 
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transmission of matter from one thing to another, that liquids provide an appropriate model 
for portraying the cycle of life.  
 This is summarised in the conclusion to this exemplum, which resumes the death 
image from 250: 
 
haud igitur penitus pereunt quaecumque videntur, 
quando alid ex alio reficit Natura, nec ullam 
rem gigni patitur nisi morte adiuta aliena. 
       (1.262-4) 
Therefore anything that seems to does not completely die, since 
Nature restores one thing from another, nor does she allow anything to 
be born unless benefitted by another’s death. 
 
Lucretius has shown that, while birth and death alternate, matter itself perpetuates like 
water in the water cycle.455 Although the liquids imagery of the previous lines has dried up 
here, the keen reader, with flowing liquids in mind (and with pereunt recalling pereunt 
imbres in 250), would envisage the material reality behind the birth-death cycle in these 
terms. Again Lucretius introduces a theory expressed by a clearly defined metaphor (here the 
‘flow’ of matter within the birth-death cycle) in a prominent and richly poetic passage in 
order to encourage the reader to envisage the theory in these terms throughout the epic. 
It is not, of course, a Lucretian innovation to portray a creative cycle in liquid terms. 
The image stems from his philosophical predecessors, and a solid theory of the processes 
causing flux and change is a fundamental cornerstone of any, in particular Presocratic, ancient 
philosophy. The theory is associated in particular with Heraclitus, especially in the phrase 
πάντα ῥεῖ, attributed to him (perhaps in paraphrase) by Plato (Cra. 402a),456 and of particular 
interest is his analogy (Arius Didymus ap. Eusebium P.E. xv.20 = fr.214 KRS) between the ever-
changing constancy of matter and the river that is the same but constantly flowing with 
different water. In this image, the river consists of fixed points from which matter has 
departed and into which matter is yet to arrive. When mapped onto matter in general, these 
points represent intersections between creation and destruction. As a whole, however, the 
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river remains the same, just as the universe remains constant in its flux. Other predecessors 
of Lucretius, meanwhile, employ flowing liquids metaphors to describe the coming together 
of matter – half of the cycle of creation and destruction. For example, συρρέω, ‘flow 
together’, is applied by Diog. Laert. 9.31 (= KRS 563) to Leucippus’ theory of the formation of 
worlds, and ῥέω, ‘flow’, is used metaphorically to describe death in Pl. Phd. 87D (εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι 
τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο).457 The flowing water in these explanations is mirrored by Lucretius’ 
LIQUIDS thread, and so Lucretius’ metaphor ‘the cycle of creation and destruction is the ebbing 
and flowing of matter’, marking a convergence between the LIFE-CYCLE and LIQUIDS threads, is 
firmly rooted in the philosophical tradition. 
 Therefore, Lucretius, in the introduction to his theory of atomic movement as a cause 
of creation (2.62-79), states how ‘we perceive everything flowing, as it were, through 
prolonged time’ (quasi longinquo fluere omnia cernimus aevo – 69). Lucretius extends the 
image, arguing that the movement of bodies ‘forces these things to grow old, and those to 
flourish (florescere) in turn’ (74). The keen reader would recall the striking image of florere in 
the similar context of 1.250-64, and map the liquids correspondence in that passage onto this 
introduction. As there, the flow of atoms is potentially a life-giving or destructive force, 
depending on the direction of the flow.  
 This concept is expanded towards the end of Book 2 in a passage explaining that the 
world was born from a congregation of bodies, which will depart again when it dies (1105-
43). The LIQUIDS thread enters in an analogy with living things, which grow to full maturity and 
subsequently decline by the same process of added and subtracted bodies. The liquids 
metaphor first depicts the point of decline in living things, which occurs when less is given 
into the veins than ‘flows out and departs’ (fluit atque recedit – 1119). This is contrasted with 
nourishment – the absorption of food into the veins (1122-7) – thus depicting a stream of 
bodies, either combining to nourish things or flowing out to leave them empty and dying. 
Lucretius concludes that we must be sure that ‘many bodies flow out and depart from things’ 
(fluere atque recedere corpora rebus / multa – 1128-9), and as a result ‘age breaks strength 
and adult vigour, and melts into an inferior state’ (vires et robor adultum / frangit et in 
partem peiorem liquitur aetas – 1131-2). This striking metaphor (perhaps rooted in the Greek 
τήκω, used of the body wasting away in e.g. Pl. Resp. 609C) appropriately continues the 
liquids metaphor established in the preceding lines to describe a steady flow of bodies 
pouring from things, causing their decline and, ultimately, death. 
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 The next lines expand the analogy with food dispersed in the veins, to explain why 
decline follows when growth ceases. The larger or broader something is, Lucretius states, 
once bodies stop being added to cause growth, ‘the more bodies it sprinkles and sends out 
from itself’ (plura modo dispargit et ab se corpora mittit – 1135).458 Simultaneously the veins 
absorb food less easily ‘and it is insufficient to replace in the same quantity the vast flood [of 
bodies] it floods out’ (nec satis est, proquam largos exaestuat aestus – 1137).459 Owing to 
this negative balance, ‘therefore they rightly die, when they have been made loose-knit by 
flowing away’ (iure igitur pereunt, cum rarefacta fluendo / sunt – 1139-40).460 Thus the 
progression from nourishment and growth to death is described as an increasing and 
decreasing ‘flow’ of bodies, depicted especially through the image of veins carrying food. The 
striking etymological figure exaestuat aestus suggests waves cast out until none remain (the 
ex- prefix signifying exhaustion),461 at which point death occurs. Even the niceties of detail fit 
our comprehension of liquids, since water evaporates more swiftly from a broader pan, just 
as broader and larger things emit bodies more swiftly. Thus the LIQUIDS and LIFE-CYCLE threads 
intertwine in a complex web to depict birth, growth and death, with each employed both 
metaphorically (the flowing of bodies, the ‘melting’ of age) and literally (veins flowing, and 
the birth, growth and death of living things), and in turn mapped metaphorically onto the 
world.462 
 The intake of food is addressed directly in 4.858-76, in relation to hunger, which is 
caused by a continuous outward ‘flow’ (fluere – 860) of bodies – exemplified by liquids 
excreted by sweating (863) and panting (864). The body again ‘grows loose-knit’ (rarescit – 
865; cf. 2.1139 above)463 owing to this departure of moisture, which causes pain (866), and so 
food is sought to fill the gaps, and drink to satisfy ‘whatever parts beg for fluid’ (870-1). In 
these parts are bodies of heat that ‘bestow fire (incendia) on our stomach’ (872), which the 
fluid ‘extinguishes like a fire’ (restinguit ut ignem – 873).464 Thus the heat of thirst is ‘washed 
away’ (abluitur – 876) and hunger ‘is filled up’ (expletur – 876).465 Having read this passage, 
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the keen reader might map this example back onto 2.1105-43, to expand the liquids 
metaphor there and reinforce the ‘ebb and flow’ of matter in the world. 
 When Lucretius returns to the world’s mortality in 5.235-415 he again employs the 
LIQUIDS thread to depict its growth and decline. First Lucretius depicts the earth diminishing as 
dust is exhaled into the air (251-4), and as it is washed away by water and rivers (255-6), and 
increasing as things return to the earth (257-60). Lucretius’ conclusion terra […] libatur et 
aucta recrescit (260) hints at liquid flux, since libo commonly means ‘to pour a libation’.466 The 
Earth, previously described as Mater Terra (2.598-9, 998), now receives things at death – 
emphatically confirming her as the ‘grave of things’ (rerum commune sepulcrum – 259), an 
idea previously hinted at in 2.999-1001.467 Lucretius then considers water, in a proof more 
abundant in visual imagery, terms relating to liquids and flow, and several emphatic rhetorical 
techniques: an asyndetic triplet (mare flumina fontes – 261); pleonasm (umore novo […] 
abundare et latices manare perennis – 261-2); and synonyms depicting copiousness 
(abundare – 261; abundet – 265; magnus decursus aquarum – 263), pouring (besides abundo 
and mano, we find percolo and remano – 269; and fluo – 271) and water (umor – 261, 265, 
270; mare, flumen and fons – 261; latex – 262; aqua – 263, 264; aequor – 266; amnis – 270; 
and liquidus and unda – 272). Through the appropriate paradigm of the LIQUIDS thread, this 
passage embodies in the reader’s mind the crucial doctrine of ebbing and flowing matter as 
the basis of creation and destruction in the world.  
 In typically Lucretian style, the thread spills into the next proof, which depicts the 
growth and decline of air, and becomes metaphorical. The ‘great sea of air’ (aeris […] 
magnum […] mare – 276) is increased because it receives ‘whatever flows from things’ 
(quodcumque fluit de rebus – 275); but contrarily it must also ‘give birth again’ (recreet – 277) 
to the same things by an outward flow of bodies (fluentis – 277), or else all, ‘having been 
untied’ (resoluta – 278), would now be air. Air is constantly born (gigni – 279) from things and 
constantly returning (reccidere – 280) to them again, and ‘remains in constant flow’ (adsidue 
[…] fluere […] constat – 280). In 261-72 Lucretius depicted the cycle of water from the sea to 
the river source and back again. Here, in a clear comparison, bodies return to and flow from 
the ‘sea’ of air. Thus the process of growth and decline is universalised via the LIQUIDS thread, 
and, as with the wind/river analogy in 1.271-97, the liquids image makes the invisible air 
visible. This thread is intertwined with the LIFE-CYCLE (recreet, gigni) and WEAVING (resoluta) 
threads to depict a threefold process, of birth via the conflux of bodies, and death via the 
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unweaving and subsequent flowing away of those bodies. The three threads are introduced in 
turn in 5.247-280: LIFE-CYCLE (perire – 249; gigni – 250; alit auget – 257; aucta recrescit – 260), 
then LIQUIDS (first by dispergunt in 254, before the section on the water cycle) and WEAVING 
(278). The conceptual threads guide the reader through the proofs in turn and intricately 
interweave to universalise key doctrines. The passage emerges as a prime example of the 
threads’ centrality to Lucretius’ argumentation. 
 
LIFE-CYCLE and PLEASURE 
Part 1 and Part 2 Section E introduced three aspects of the PLEASURE thread in Lucretius, 
namely leading, persuasion and blows. In particular Venus and voluptas in the Book 1 
prologue were interpreted as instigators of creation through these three aspects, which, as 
we have seen, Lucretius often employs in sexual or creative contexts. This reading is 
enhanced by several further passages, where the LIFE-CYCLE and PLEASURE threads intertwine 
as part of Lucretius’ theory of creation. The first of these occurs in Lucretius’ second principal 
argument, that nothing dies to nothing. He denies that time past could have totally 
destroyed all materies (225-38), because if this were the case 
 
unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitae 
redducit Venus, aut redductum daedala tellus 
unde alit atque auget generatim pabula praebens? 
       (1.227-9) 
[…] from where does Venus lead back a kind of animal into the light of 
life according to kind, or, having been led back, from where does the 
skilful earth nourish them and make them grow, providing food, 
according to kind? 
 
Lucretius describes Venus’ role in leading animals to sexual union and subsequent birth, and 
the perpetuating of their genus. The polyptoton redducit […] redductum pointedly recalls the 
animals led to procreate by Venus in 1.15-20.  
 This conceptual framework later supports a dismissal of the conjecture that the gods 
change the seasons and produce things including crops (2.167-83). Instead, ‘divine pleasure 
the leader of life leads’ (deducit dux vitae dia voluptas – 172)468 men in the direction of 
pleasure (suadit adire – 2.171), and ‘charms them to propagate the next generations by the 
act of Venus’ (res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent – 173). Here voluptas assumes 
Venus’ role of leading and her divinity (dia) – re-emphasising the relationship between Venus 
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and voluptas established in the prologue. There, as considered in Part 1, Venus and voluptas 
represent desire and expected pleasure, and also resultant pleasure. Here the roles of Venus 
and voluptas are transposed, as voluptas brings ‘Venus’ (in the form of sexual intercourse), 
rather than vice versa. Again this passage depicts the important theory of pleasure instigating 
creation by persuasion and leading. 
 This process occurs not just with animate beings. Among the first arguments (1.174-
83), Lucretius states that ‘we see the rose, corn and grapevines poured forth by persuading 
spring, heat and autumn’ (vere rosam, frumenta calore, / vites autumno fundi suadente 
videmus – 174-5).469 The verb suadeo, also seen in 2.171, recalls the Venus prologue, mapping 
the persuasion from that context onto plants. This image occurs later in an example within 
the exploration of the development of farming (5.1361-78), whereby wild fruits were tamed 
‘by tender care and persuasive tilling’ (indulgendo blandeque colendo – 1369). Lucretius 
again recalls the prologue, in which Venus strikes blandus amor into animals’ hearts, causing 
them to procreate, and thus reiterates that persuasion – and by association, pleasure – 
instigates creation.  
 A further role of pleasure in creation is sexual intercourse, by which conception and 
subsequent creation occur. This is expressed by the verb concipio, which was introduced in 
the opening address to Venus: ‘since by you every kind of living thing is conceived’ (per te 
quoniam genus omne animantum / concipitur – 1.4-5). The term is literal here, and also in 
Book 4, where it describes wives conceiving (4.1266, 1269),470 but is elsewhere applied 
metaphorically to things in general. In 1.551-55, Lucretius states that each thing is 
‘conceived’ (conceptum – 555) from unbreakable materies – the atomic term enhancing the 
metaphor of procreation. Later, in 2.544-6, Lucretius asserts that without unlimited materies 
no individual thing (unica res – 542) ‘could be conceived and brought to birth, nor could it be 
born, nor, what is more, grow and be nourished’ (progigni possit concepta, creari / non 
poterit neque, quod superest, procrescere alique – 545-6) – embodying a full scheme of 
atomic creation from conception to birth and growth. The intended metaphor of concipio is 
emphasised in 5.539-49, which argue that the parts of the world cohere in a joint nature 
because the Earth was ‘conceived from the birth of the world’ (concepta ab origine mundi – 
548) together with air, just as we are one with our limbs (549). In mapping mortal nature and 
growth onto the Earth, sexual conception is also applied to the Earth. Conception from atoms 
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dictates that when things grow their nature remains fixed. Thus, the threads of PLEASURE 
(depicting both the impulse for sexual union, and the act itself), LIFE-CYCLE and BOUNDARIES 
intertwine to create a scheme of consistent development from pre-creation to death, for 
both animate and inanimate things.  
 
Pleasure in atomic creation 
Building upon the established role of pleasure in instigating the conception and creation of all 
things, animate and inanimate – the former by sexual union, the latter by the union of atoms 
– the role of pleasure in atomic creation can now be considered in more detail. The careful 
reading advanced in Part 2 Section A of the passage on sex in Book 4, in which successful 
conception relies upon appropriately ordered combinations of compatible semina (which 
simultaneously represent sexual seed and the atoms from which it is formed), revealed that 
atomic combination can be understood in sexual terms.471 Similarly, as considered in Part 1 
and Part 2 Section E, pleasure can be instilled in things by blows, encouraging them to 
perform certain actions including joining together in (sexual) union. Since blows are one of 
the principal aspects of atomic creation (1.633; 2.726; 5.438), again atomic union might be 
understood in sexual terms. Further aspects of Lucretius’ theory of atomic combination can 
be read in this way, with unexpected results.  
In the passage on sex at the end of Book 4, alongside the LIFE-CYCLE thread (which, 
through the term semina in particular, explains the reasons behind successful conception, 
inherited characteristics and a child’s gender) the PLEASURE thread unsurprisingly also occurs. 
Its role in conception is hinted at first in 4.1218-26, in which Lucretius explains that Venus 
‘leads forth’ (producit – 1223; recalling her ‘leading’ role from the prologue) characteristics 
from the bodies hidden in the parents’ seed. In other words, sexual intercourse facilitates the 
combination of seed from which characteristics arise and are passed on. Venus, as in the 
prologue, is not creation itself, but the enabler of creation.  
 The reading of other passages can be enhanced in this way. In 4.1233-77 Lucretius 
offers various reasons for failed conception, including how the thickness of the man’s semen 
affects its ability to mix with the woman’s (1242-7), and, related to this, how compatibility 
between male and female seed is essential for successful conception (explaining why 
apparently barren women or infertile men successfully conceive with a new partner). 
Lucretius’ summary is clear: 
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usque adeo magni refert, ut semina possint 
seminibus commisceri genitaliter apta, 
crassaque conveniant liquidis et liquida crassis. 
       (4.1257-9) 
It matters so much that the seeds can mix in generative manner with 
seeds to which they are suited, and that the thick comes together with 
the thin, and the thin with the thick. 
 
The phrase magni refert is picked up later in a passage outlining why certain sexual positions 
aid conception: ‘it is also of great importance in which ways charming pleasure itself is 
carried out’ (et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda voluptas, / id quoque permagni refert – 
1263-4). Specifically, ‘supple movements’ (molles […] motus – 1268)472 are detrimental to 
conception, because they divert the seed from the appropriate place (1273). These 
movements are employed by prostitutes: 
 
idque sua causa consuerunt scorta moveri, 
ne complerentur crebro gravidaque iacerent,  1275 
et simul ipsa viris Venus ut concinnior esset; 
coniugibus quod nil nostris opus esse videtur. 
       (4.1274-7) 
And prostitutes are accustomed to move thus for their own ends, lest 
they be impregnated473 frequently and lie pregnant, and so that at the 
same time the pleasure might be more pleasing for their men; 
something which is seen to be of no use to our wives. 
 
Lucretius explicitly states that movements aimed at bringing pleasure directly prevent 
successful conception. Again, pleasure is a means by which sexual intercourse occurs, and 
thus enables conception and birth,474 but does not cause birth directly. 
 The reading of an analogy between sexual and atomic semina, which, as previously 
argued, is implicit throughout this part of Book 4, has specific implications for understanding 
atomic combination. The reader is directed towards this comparison by the repetition of 
magni refert, which has occurred three times previously to emphasise the importance of 
atomic position and movement in creation and causing variety in things (1.817-9, 908-10; 
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2.894-6).475 Therefore, just as here the configuration of sexual semina enables successful 
cohesion (suggested by the aptus in 1258, used elsewhere in a weaving sense of atomic 
bonding), and appropriate movements are required to help seed combine, so ordo, positura 
and motus are crucial to atomic cohesion. In contrast, while expected pleasure persuades to 
sexual intercourse, successful conception is not dependent on the resultant pleasure itself. 
Therefore, by extending this analogy we might infer that pleasure plays a similar role in 
atomic creation: it initiates atomic union, but does not itself ensure successful union, which 
depends upon the appropriate movements, positions, shapes, etc. of atoms. 
A further correspondence between sexual and atomic union supports this tentative 
conclusion. Section E of Part 2 showed that, for Lucretius, blows cause animate things to seek 
pleasure in the direction of the blow, and therefore initiate desire for the pleasure of sexual 
union – a sequence evident in the Book 1 prologue, where Venus causes animals to procreate 
by striking them to the heart. The act of attaining this pleasure involves a ‘blow’ in the form of 
ejaculation (expressed by ictus in 4.1245, 1273). Blows are associated with sexual intercourse 
elsewhere in Latin, with Juvenal 6.126 employing ictus to denote a sexual thrust.476 Therefore 
a sequence emerges, whereby a blow causes desire for pleasure, and in turn the blow that 
might initiate successful conception. 
 The terms plaga and ictus in Lucretius depict bodily blows as a cause for many things, 
including perception477 and dissolution.478 They are also frequently applied to lightning 
(fulminis ictus), often drawing attention to results brought by the blow: creating heat;479 and 
causing dissolution (ictus – 6.240). Among the most common results of blows, however, are 
motion480 and creation caused by motion481 – and so blows (plagae) are included in the 
repeated asyndetic list of atomic variables dictating creation and variety in things (1.633; 
2.726; 5.438). From these correspondences a sequence emerges, in which blows cause 
motion, which in turn leads to creative motion and creation itself. Frequently this chain of 
                                                          
475
 The phrase also occurs in in 4.984-6 (expressing how a person’s hobbies and interests enter their 
dreams) and 5.545 (expressing the relationship between parts of the world).  
476
 See Adams (1982) 145-9 for these correspondences. He also suggests that tundo, ‘strike’, might 
have been used of sexual acts (based partially on pertundo in Catull. 32.11, describing the penis 
striking a hole through clothes). Perhaps tunditur ictu (4.1284) – denoting light ‘blows’ causing a man 
to love a woman – hints at a sexual blow. This reading is tentative, however, since the female is 
supplying the blow. 
477
 plaga: 2.810; 4.263, 703; and ictus: 2.808; 4.746. 
478
 plaga: 1.528, 583; 2.715, 1111, 1140, 1143; 3.810 (=5.357), 817 (= 5.363); and ictus: 1.222, 528, 
1055; 2.448, 952; 3.807, 813; 4.934; 5.352, 358. 
479
 plaga: 5.1095, 6.309; and ictus: 5.607; 6.311, 313, 316. 
480
 plaga: 4.188; 6.336, 339, 347, 1003, 1020; and ictus: 2.85, 99, 136, 272; 3.429; 6.294. 
481
 plaga: 1.1025, 1042, 1050; 2.141, 285; 5.188, 423; and ictus: 2.241. 
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blows applies specifically to atoms, for example to depict the creation of the world (1.1021-
51) and to deduce the existence of the atomic swerve (2.216-93). 
 Returning to the Book 1 prologue, it is Venus, representation of voluptas, who deals 
out blows instigating movement. By introducing blows in this context, Lucretius alerts his 
reader to consider them in the context of pleasure elsewhere in the DRN. In Book 4 blows 
cause desire, which leads to sexual pleasure and conception. Therefore, extending atomic 
correspondences there, we might imagine blows having a similar effect on atoms: causing a 
metaphorical ‘desire’ resulting in atomic ‘conception’ (i.e. union). Atomic ‘blows’ have 
previously been read not in a sexual sense, but as part of Lucretius’ military metaphor, 
describing the ‘warfare’ of hectic atomic collisions.482 Certainly this metaphor is persistent in 
the DRN; however, it does not especially enhance the reader’s understanding of how atomic 
collisions occur, and why a collision might result in combination and resultant growth.483 For 
this purpose, Lucretius supplies various metaphors from his WEAVING, LIFE-CYCLE and PLEASURE 
threads. In this context, the PLEASURE thread sits well alongside the military metaphor, since it 
was an ancient literary commonplace to express love and sexual intercourse in these terms, 
referring to the blows, wounds and battles of love,484 as Lucretius does in the closing section 
of Book 4.485 Alongside the military metaphor, a sexual metaphor can be defined, expressing 
desire and resulting conception in atomic blows.  
 
The swerve 
This surprising reading requires extensive defence, which can be sought in Lucretius’ 
portrayal of the swerve. This is perhaps the most hotly debated and variously interpreted of 
all Epicurean theories, principally because its longest treatment, in Lucretius 2.216-93, is 
complex, at times frustratingly compact, and apparently unclearly explained. The theory has 
                                                          
482
 See Murley (1947) 343-4; Gale (1994) 117-8, and (2000) 232-69. 
483
 The metaphor may have a more general purpose, for example in 2.323-32, in which, as De Lacy 
(1964) argues, comprehending atomic collisions by viewing military action from afar is an appropriate 
metaphor for scientific observation.  
484
 In fact in Latin, as in English, there is a common gestalt metaphor ‘love is war’ (see Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980) 49), consisting of multiple corresponding parts. Some of the parts occur in a sexual context in 
Latin, as listed by Adams (1982) 145-9 (striking), 152 (wounding), 157-9 (wrestling and fighting; killing 
and dying). Kenney (1970) 380-4 argues that in Book 4 Lucretius satirises the Greek epigrammatic 
commonplace of wounds of love. 
485
 The arrows of desire or Venus (1052-4; 1278); words cast like arrows, causing jealousy (1137-38); 
wounds (1048-57; 1070); blows (1050; 1070; 1245; 1285). See West (1969) 94-5, who reads an 
extensive military simile in 4.1045-60. Brown (1987) 64 argues that such correspondences recall the 
imagery of erotic poets, which is ‘stripped by Lucretius of its normal decorative function and pressed 
into the service of his relentlessly physical analysis.’ 
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implications for our understanding of the Epicurean position on atomic combination486 and 
free will,487 and so its correct interpretation seems crucial.488 Yet it is frequently 
acknowledged that a consensus is far from being reached,489 or argued that the theory itself is 
flawed and resists comprehensive understanding.490 Solving these issues will be impossible 
here, and it will be unnecessary to reject existing interpretations of the swerve, as seems de 
rigueur.491 Instead, interpretations will be formed by reading the swerve in light of Lucretius’ 
methodology of universalisation by means of conceptual threads and analogy. Tracking the 
PLEASURE thread will support and expand Bollack’s radical interpretation that Lucretius 
expresses his understanding of the force behind the swerve with a metaphor of ‘le Plaisir’.492 
If correct, this most likely represents a departure from, or at the very least an unexpected 
presentation of, Epicurus’ theory. 
 Specifically, tracking the PLEASURE thread might provide an alternative interpretation 
of the connection between the swerve and free will. Lucretius describes the actions of both 
atomic swerves and our movements by free will in similar terms, perhaps considering them to 
be caused by comparable processes. This radical reading emerges from a comparison 
between the portrayal of the swerve in 2.216-50 and 284-93, and free will in 2.251-83. This 
connection is most clearly evident at the start of the latter passage, in which Lucretius 
supplies a modus tollens deduction: without the swerve, free will would not exist; free will 
does exist, so the swerve must too. Lucretius describes our ability to break free from fate by 
our will: 
 
libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat, 
unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas, 
per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas, 
declinamus item motus nec tempore certo 
nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens?  260 
                                                          
486
 Perhaps intended to improve on Democritus here, in the light of Aristotle’s criticism of his theory. 
See Furley (1967); Sedley (1983) 11; O’Keefe (1996). 
487
 Perhaps partially a response to (Peripatetic, Stoic or Democritean) determinism, for which see 
Furley (1967) and Sedley (1983), who argues the swerve is only a small part of this response. 
488
 For the opposing view, see Annas (1992) 188. 
489
 O’Keefe (2009) 143: ‘The texts on this topic are suggestive and philosophically rich enough to fuel a  
huge range of views, but sketchy and obscure enough that no consensus has emerged’.  
490
 Long (1984) 61 states ‘Obscurities persist, and we cannot rule them out in order to make the theory 
more palatable or convincing.’ Sharples (1996) 65, following Furley (1967), concedes there are 
‘admitted oddities’ in Lucretius’ exposition. Annas (1992) is particularly dismissive of the theory’s 
success. 
491
 Esp. Annas (1992) ch. 6 and 8; Purinton (1999) 275-94. 
492
 Bollack (1976). 
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       (2.256-60)493 
[…] from where exists this free will in living things across the lands, 
from where, I say, is this will torn from the fates, through which we 
proceed to wherever pleasure leads us, and again we deviate in 
movement not at a fixed time, nor in a fixed region of space, but where 
the mind itself carries us? 
 
Here the jingle of voluntas (will) and voluptas (pleasure) at the end of consecutive lines 
closely connects them by (probably faux) etymological figure.494 Specifically, pleasure leads us 
in a particular direction, but our movement only takes place through will. Strikingly, the 
atomic swerve of 2.216-54 is mapped onto our movements, as both are described in the 
same terms: our will allows us to deviate (declinamus, cf. declinare in 2.221, 250, 253 and 
inclinare in 243),495 takes place at unfixed times and in unfixed places (nec tempore certo / nec 
regione loci certa – 259-60, cf. incerto tempore ferme / incertisque locis – 2.218-9), and breaks 
restrictions of fate (fatis avolsa – 257, cf. fati foedera rumpat – 2.254).  
 From these linguistic resonances one might infer a causal chain of swerving atoms 
bringing successive swerves, culminating in the ‘swerve’ of motion by free will. This 
interpretation has damaging implications, however, since our movements cannot occur by 
free will, if this itself is caused by the random swerving of soul atoms. In turn, Lucretius’ 
ethical theory would be compromised, since the chance swerving of atoms, rather than ratio, 
would inform decisions, and his power over his reader’s conversion to Epicurean philosophy 
would be limited.496 Therefore, if the atomic swerve and free will are somehow linked, the 
relationship must not be causative, so that our will has power over decision-making. 
 These linguistic resonances may be intended to draw a comparison between the 
processes underlying the swerve and movement by will.497 This fits within Lucretius’ 
methodological approach of universalisation by comparing apparently different processes via 
shared terminology. The technique is effective enough to link depictions of processes 
separated by many lines (or even books); here the correspondence is maintained over merely 
fifty lines. Assuming Lucretius is employing the same universalising approach here, the 
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 The manuscripts have voluptas at the end of 257, and voluntas at the end of 258. Fowler (2002) 
324-6 argues convincingly for their transposition. 
494
 Maltby (1991) lists no popular etymologies connecting the words, and Lucretius was probably 
unaware of the etymological link between them through volo. However, as previously noted, it is 
typically Lucretian to connect words by aural similarity alone (see n.77 in general; p.34 – ordo-ordior; 
p.71 – primordia-exordia and primordia-ordo). 
495
 As Fowler (2002) ad loc. notes, declino is used ‘properly of men […] and often of decisions’. 
Perhaps, therefore, its application to atoms in 2.221 and 250 surreptitiously introduces the analogy 
between atoms and humans drawn later – a typically Lucretian technique. 
496
 Long (1984) 61; Sharples (1996) 65; O’Keefe (2009) 148-9.  
497
 See Bollack (1976) 182-3: ‘la structure causale est la même dans les atomes et dans le cœur.’ 
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comparable processes behind the atomic swerve and movements by will must be ascertained. 
As seen in other instances of universalisation, the process is not explicitly stated here, but 
must be inferred. Lucretius does not depict a force behind the swerve, but does for 
movements by will: the initial cause is voluptas, which leads us to move by our voluntas. 
Perhaps, therefore, voluptas plays a role in the atomic swerve. 
 At face value this reading seems to imply that atoms are affected by feelings, in this 
case pleasure, and therefore to contradict the very essence of Epicurean atomic theory. 
However, perhaps the comparison is less specifically defined, between the process of human 
will, which is guided at unfixed times and in unfixed places by voluptas, and the process of 
the swerve, by which atoms are guided at unfixed times and in unfixed places by an 
unspecified remote force. Lucretius’ proof, in addition to providing evidence for the swerve 
by the existence of free will, may also suggest the processes causing them are similar.  
 This suggestion can be supported by the next passages, which depict two different 
types of movement: the horse bursting at will from the racing gate (2.263-71); and the forced 
movement of a person when struck from without (2.272-83). Our will, Lucretius argues 
(2.257-62), initiates movement in the limbs, by which we progress in whatever direction 
voluptas leads us. A more detailed example (with the connection made by etiam – 263) of a 
horse bursting from the racing gate expands upon this chain: led by (expected) pleasure (of 
running, or of being unconfined), the horse wants to run, but, even once the gate has 
opened, it cannot move until the mind has transmitted its will to the limbs.498 In contrast, 
Lucretius provides an example where an external blow forces us to move. In this case we 
move instantly, because the will does not initiate movement. However, crucially, we can 
soon regain our desired position, once the will has ‘reined in’ (refrenavit – 276, cf. refrenatur 
- 283)499 the substance of our body.500 The same process that causes the horse to run enables 
us to regain our position501 – therefore, a similar delay occurs between being pushed and 
regaining our desired position.  
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 Annas (1993) 69 notes that Epicureans considered certain animals to be responsible agents, and 
therefore able to reason. 
499
 With refreno Lucretius pointedly refers back to the preceding exemplum of the horse, perhaps with 
an intended contrast. There, Lucretius described what happens when the will has (as it were) ‘free 
rein’ to act; in the human example the will ‘reins in’ movement after force. The reader might return, 
via refreno, to the horse example and consider the process involved when a rider reins in his horse 
against its will. By this connection the two examples can be seen together to explain that both internal 
will and external force can ‘rein in’ movement. Thus refreno is pointedly used here, rather than, pace 
Smith (1992) ad loc., simply being suggested to Lucretius by the preceding racing context.  
500
 As in the horse example, we infer that the counteracting movement is delayed until the mind’s 
‘reigning in’ communication reaches the limbs. 
501
 Long (1984) 59. 
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 Returning to the linguistic comparison between our movement by will and the 
atomic swerve in 2.251-62, an extended analogy can be read in the subsequent exempla. The 
horse’s movement is analogous with the atomic swerve,502 and being forced to move against 
our will is analogous to atomic movement by collisions with other atoms. In the latter 
example, voluntas helps us regain our position (which, comparable to being pushed, will 
bring pleasure)503 whereas an atom, lacking voluntas, will revert to downward movement by 
its own weight, or perhaps by a swerve.504 In the former example, voluntas causes the horse 
to move in the direction in which voluptas leads it, whereas the atom, lacking voluntas, 
moves in the direction in which some unexpressed force leads it. 
 That Lucretius’ two examples are indeed intended as analogies for atomic movement 
is underlined by what follows: 
 
quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest, 
esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam  285 
motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas, 
de nilo quoniam fieri nil posse videmus. 
       (2.284-7) 
For which reason it is necessary to confess that the same is also in the 
seeds, that there is another cause of motions besides blows and 
weights, from which this power is born in us, since we see that nothing 
can come to be from nothing. 
 
The comparison here is between different causes of motion, which exist both for atoms and 
for us.505 First, an external force of blows causes us to move against our will, and atoms to 
deviate from their downward path; second, the intrinsic quality of ‘weights’ (i.e. different 
weights of different bodies), keeps the horse in its gate, us on the ground and atoms falling 
vertically through the void. These two causes alone cannot fully explain atomic combination 
or animate things moving at will, as discussed (2.225-45; 2.251-60). Therefore, a third cause is 
required, namely an external and remote force, embodied in animate things by voluptas, and 
in atoms by the unexpressed cause of the swerve. Our movement towards voluptas may be 
considered as a kind of swerve, but with the intervening factor of voluntas, by which we 
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 As Purinton (1999) 272 argues, on the grounds that ‘everything that exists at the macroscopic level 
must be caused […] by something at the atomic level’. 
503
 Bollack (1976) 188 points out the importance of resisting opposing force, in order to seek pleasure, 
or the absence of pain. 
504
 All things tend downwards unless propelled by a force, and they tend downwards again once the 
force wears off (2.184-215). 
505
 Purinton (1999) 263-4, 268. 
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decide whether we should enact this swerve.506 This voluntas may follow a rational decision, 
or an instinct, informed by experience, of whether something will be pleasurable or painful.507 
The atoms, lacking voluntas, simply move in the direction of the unexpressed force that 
causes the swerve.508 
 If the processes behind free movement and the swerve are comparable, this has 
consequences for the interpretation of Lucretius’ premise that free will would not exist 
without the swerve. This premise does not imply that the swerve causes free will – indeed 
this would remove human agency from free will – but rather that the swerve is a necessary 
condition for free will to exist.509 This swerve, we must infer, occurs in the soul (or specifically 
the intellect – ut videas initum motus a corde creari – 269),510 and then transfers movement 
to the limbs, causing us to move.511 However, by our voluntas we can control whether or not 
this transferral occurs.512 In other words, movement at will is possible because our soul atoms 
are able to swerve – but our voluntas decides whether the swerve is exploited (although the 
process behind this decision is unclear).513 This allows both for the swerve to be random and 
for human agency through free will to exist. However, it does not allow the swerve to be 
occasional,514 since acts of free will would then be infrequent. Frequent swerves, however, 
would allow our voluntas to initiate desired movement at the desired time.515 With this 
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 Kleve (1980) 29 suggests voluntas puts ‘the soul and body in such a state that they only react to 
some of the swerves.’ 
507
 arbitrium (281) may represent both of these mental processes, which initiate a return to a desired 
position, by depicting an instinct instigated partially by our will being compromised, and partially by 
our experience that being forced to move is rarely beneficial. It cannot mean ‘judgement’ here, and 
still less ‘moral choice’, which Fowler (2002) ad loc. indicates is a common sense of the word. 
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 Purinton (1999) 264, 267. 
509
 See Purinton (1999) 266-7; Fowler (2002) 332; and O’Keefe (2005) 29, who argues we should 
similarly not ‘conclude that Epicureans think that motion is caused or constituted by the void, since 
the existence of void is a necessary condition for the existence of motion’. In contrast Annas (1992) 
184 argues that ‘Lucretius’ passage suggests that swerves are responsible for free actions rather 
directly.’  
510
 The two form a conjoined entity for Lucretius, who scarcely maintains a distinction between them; 
see n.230. 
511
 The soul itself, being fine, is especially susceptible to the swerve. It is unnecessary to infer, with 
Annas (1992) 187, that swerves only affect the soul, or, with Sharples (1996) 66, to locate the swerve 
specifically in the nameless fourth part of the soul. 
512
 See Kleve (1980) 29 (supported by Saunders (1984) 38): ‘the swerves represent forces that can be 
utilized’ – i.e. by the soul or voluntas. Purinton (1999) argues, in contrast, that swerves cause volition 
‘from the bottom up’.  
513
 This supports the Epicurean belief that only reason enables the correct choice between beneficial 
and damaging desires. Furthermore, moving is later (4.881-91) described in similar terms: images of 
movement strike the mind, and our mind causes us to enact them – but only when an act of will 
decides to (inde voluntas fit; neque enim facere incipit ullam / rem quisquam, quam mens providit quid 
velit ante – 4.883-4); see Fowler (2002) 415-9. 
514
 As argued by Furley (1967). 
515
 Argued by Long (1984) 60 and, somewhat exasperatedly, Annas (1992) 186-7: ‘The only way that 
the theory has a hope of working is on the assumption that swerves are extremely frequent, so as to 
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reading, the two supporting exempla would be more than simple analogies, but rather 
‘internalised analogies’ – a favourite Lucretian technique whereby a microscopic process is 
exemplified by a macroscopic process, which is itself caused by the microscopic process in 
question. Prominent examples of this technique include the movement of dust motes (2.112-
24) and the moving-yet-stationary flock of sheep and army of men (2.308-32), which 
pictorialise atomic motion, while being internally driven by atomic motion.516 The latter 
‘internalised’ analogy follows shortly after the swerve passages, perhaps highlighting a 
connection in their shared methodology. 
 Returning to the force behind the swerve, this is difficult to define, since neither 
Lucretius nor other Epicurean sources provide an explicit explanation. However, some clues, 
expressed as facets of the PLEASURE thread, can be found in the DRN. An important image in 
this section is of voluptas leading us in a given direction (quo ducit quemque voluptas – 
258)517 – part of the PLEASURE thread, in which voluptas and Venus are described as leaders.518 
Therefore, returning to the Venus prologue, in which this image is particularly prominent, 
might prove fruitful.519 There, as discussed, Venus, metonymy for voluptas, exhibits the 
powers of leading (inciting animate and inanimate things to certain actions), ‘steering’ birth 
(or, metonymically, Natura), and persuading. These powers are carried out by two essential 
forces: a tangible force, described as ‘striking’, and a remote force, which persuades and 
leads. Importantly, Natura, whom Venus steers, creates things from atoms (1.55-7).520 We 
might analogously infer that the creative deeds of Natura are also instigated by a tangible 
‘striking’ force, and a remote ‘leading’ or ‘persuading’ force. This interpretation holds in the 
depiction of atomic union in Book 2, where atoms move and combine by being struck (atomic 
collisions) and by being led (the atomic swerve) – just as the human (pushed by an external 
force) and the horse (led by pleasure) do in the accompanying analogies. The actions of 
Venus, therefore, might be analogous for both types of atomic movement, and voluptas, 
which Part 1 suggested is synecdoche for Venus in the prologue (representing only her 
                                                                                                                                                                       
produce a standard physical condition.’ Fowler (2002) 417-9 stresses that swerves in the mind are 
more frequent than acts of voluntas, and furthermore the swerve usually causes predictable actions, 
and only occasionally deviations (= free will). 
516
 Further examples include 2.700-17, 826-33, 834-41; 3.136-60, 548-57. 
517
 Bollack (1976) 176-78 keeps the manuscript reading of voluptas in 257 and voluntas in 258, but 
(after Bailey (1947) ad loc. and Furley (1967) 174) libera voluntas is a more likely expression. 
Furthermore, voluptas frequently occurs as a leader in the DRN. 
518
 Bollack (1976) 164 notes dux vitae dia voluptas (2.172) as an example of voluptas the instigator of 
movement. 
519
 Bollack (1976) 176. 
520
 Brown (1987) 93 considers Venus in 1.20 as ‘metonymy for the sexual instinct’. Considering Venus’ 
role as steersman of birth (Natura) of all things, this would support a sexual reading of atomic 
combination. 
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powers of causing pleasure and sexual attraction by leading and persuading), might represent 
only the attractive ‘leading’ force behind the swerve.521 This reading would surely represent a 
departure from the standard Epicurean theory of the swerve – but this is not necessarily 
detrimental to Lucretius. Indeed it outlines a further connection between the movements of 
atoms and animate things, and suggests that the Venus prologue may be read as a complex 
analogy for atomic creation. 
 This analogical reading is complex. However, if Lucretius considered the force behind 
the swerve as a kind of attraction comparable to voluptas, he would be well advised to 
suppress an explicit link.522 Therefore, perhaps Lucretius’ presentation is intentionally 
obscure, in both its choice of words (such as the deliberately vague ferme and paulum, 
qualifying the restrictions on the swerve in 2.218-9) and its connection to the Venus prologue 
through the PLEASURE thread. Instead of making a direct comparison between the swerve and 
leading by voluptas, Lucretius partially compares the two, and relies on the reader’s 
knowledge of the PLEASURE thread to complete the comparison. The mental process employed 
here, labelled ‘conceptual blending’ in cognitive theory, is an everyday function of the brain, 
which enables comparisons to be made between conflicting or incompatible concepts and 
scenarios, by partial mapping of each scenario onto an intermediary scenario, known as a 
‘blend’, which can in turn be mapped onto the two scenarios to enhance their meaning.523 In 
Lucretius’ theory of the swerve, the PLEASURE thread is the blend, merging aspects of atomic 
movement and animal movement with the role of voluptas in attraction, in turn enabling an 
indirect comparison between the swerve and movement by pleasure, where a direct 
comparison would be problematic. Whether or not Lucretius succeeds is debatable, and the 
interpretation advanced here may reveal inadequacies as much as coherence and scientific 
sense in his theory. Furthermore, Lucretius’ brief exposition of this idiosyncratic Epicurean 
theory does not lend itself to easy, cohesive understanding.524 Nevertheless, Lucretius guides 
the reader to this interpretation via the strands of the PLEASURE thread prominent in the 
Venus prologue. 
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 Bollack (1976) 181 argues on the contrary that an internally formed force causes the horse (and 
analogously atoms) to move.  
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 Compare, for example, the teleological issues created by Charles Darwin’s metaphor of ‘natural 
selection’, which erroneously implies an active process of choosing evolutionary paths; Young (1985). 
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 For conceptual blending, see especially Fauconnier & Turner (2003). Notably, not all aspects of each 
scenario must be mapped onto the blend, nor must the blend only consist of aspects mapped from the 
scenarios. This is the case in Lucretius’ presentation of the swerve. 
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 This is a frequent concession in arguments on the swerve, see Sharples (1996) 66: ‘There does, 
however, seem to be a relation here between different types of explanation that has not been fully 
worked out.’ Annas (1992) is especially critical of the theory, arguing (p.188) not just that the theory 
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Returning at last to the earlier consideration of atomic union in sexual terms, the following 
reading develops: the attractive force behind the swerve instigates atomic collisions, but 
these will not result in successful conception and birth unless certain restrictions of positura, 
conexus and motus are fulfilled; and similarly voluptas instigates sexual union, but successful 
conception depends upon the relative ‘consistencies’ of male and female semina – ultimately 
dictated by the positura and conexus of their constituent bodies – and appropriate sexual 
motus. In Book 4, therefore, the PLEASURE thread is employed in a literal context to expand 
upon its previous metaphorical application to atoms, and to reemphasise that all processes 
are dictated by atoms and their interactions.525 This inverts Lucretius’ usual methodology of 
establishing a clear metaphor in an atomic context, before applying it literally and 
metaphorically to other concepts. Here, the sexual metaphor is latent in the atomic context, 
but clarified by the literal exempla in Book 4. 
 
A scheme of creation 
The investigation of the arguments formed when the LIFE-CYCLE thread intertwines with the 
BOUNDARIES, WEAVING, LIQUIDS and PLEASURE threads has outlined a complex scheme of creation. 
Forces of attraction and collision (part of the PLEASURE thread by association with Venus and 
voluptas) initiate possible atomic combination. Whether or not atoms combine depends on 
appropriate motions and physical compatibility, in terms of shape and position, to enable 
interweaving in bonds. Successful combination is successful conception, which brings about 
birth, or the creation of complex composite bodies. The addition of more atoms, or ‘seeds’, 
brings growth, and growth is maintained as long as more seeds are added than ‘flow away’, 
having been ‘untied’. When more bodies depart than are gained, decline occurs, eventually 
culminating in death as the bodies are all untied from their bonds. The LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES 
threads run throughout this scheme. The overall chain of atomic combination, birth, growth 
and death is conceived as a ‘flow’, with atoms causing growth by flowing together, before 
things reach a limit of growth, when they decline and die as their atoms flow away. At death, 
the atoms untie and flow away, marking a convergence of the LIFE-CYCLE, WEAVING and LIQUIDS 
threads. Finally, every aspect of the chain is governed by boundaries, dictating quid possit 
oriri, quid nequeat and the finita potestas restricting all things. Boundaries govern what sort 
of atoms exist, which atoms can combine to make things, when they can combine and for 
how long, and how far atoms can swerve to initiate creation; a lack of boundaries enables the 
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combination of matter in the universe – both of which are infinite; and each entity exists 
within boundaries, the transgression of which marks the point of death. Throughout this 
complex network of correspondences, Lucretius applies the threads metaphorically (often to 
atoms or atomic processes), and literally (often in analogies, or to reinforce the choice of 
metaphor) to universalise his materialist philosophical theory.   
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Section B 
 
Essential Processes 
 
This Section will introduce certain intrinsic processes depicted consistently by two or more 
intertwined conceptual threads. These processes, being rooted in multiple laws or simple 
processes, display aspects of the threads considered already. They also form the basis of 
several of Lucretius’ principal doctrines, and therefore they will return frequently in the 
remainder of this Part. 
 
BOUNDARIES and LIQUIDS: the container metaphor 
In Part 2 Section D, the BOUNDARIES thread was seen in 1.503-39, which explains that body is 
bounded off from void, and so can hold void within it, in which other bodies can be 
situated.526 This allows one bodily substance to hold or ‘be filled’ by another. In fact this 
passage can be enhanced by established facets of the LIQUIDS thread. As discussed, within this 
thread is the metaphor ‘movement is pouring through the void’, which depicts the speed and 
efficiency of ‘filling’ space. Mapping this metaphor and its parts onto the bodily container 
image creates a composite metaphor depicting how one thing can ‘fill’ another by ‘pouring’ 
through its internal void space. Therefore, body can act as the ‘container’ of body. The liquids 
metaphor implicit in the ‘container’ image of 1.503-39 is enhanced by the preceding passage 
(492-6, recapped in 534-5), which describes how substances, some liquid and some not (such 
as fire and cold), can pass through the void in others by pouring.527 The reading of this 
compound metaphor strengthens and extends Garani’s ‘filling or emptying the atomic 
container’ metaphor,528 revealing the ‘liquid’ process that enables the container to be filled.  
 This essential concept of body filling body combines with the theory that all body 
tends downwards (addressed in full in 2.184-215) in a supplementary image supporting 
Lucretius’ portrayal of the infinite universe (1.951-1113): 
 
praeterea spatium summai totius omne 
undique si inclusum certis consisteret oris  985 
finitumque foret, iam copia materiai 
undique ponderibus solidis confluxet ad imum, 
nec res ulla geri sub caeli tegmine posset, 
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 See pp.115-16. 
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 See pp.97-8 for an analysis of this passage. 
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 Garani (2007) 187-195. 
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nec foret omnino caelum neque lumina solis, 
quippe ubi materies omnis cumulata iaceret  990 
ex infinito iam tempore subsidendo. 
       (1.984-91) 
Besides, if all the space of the whole sum existed closed in from all 
sides by fixed boundaries, and if there were a limit, by now the 
abundance of mother-substance would have flowed together from all 
sides to the bottom by its solid weights, and nothing under the roof of 
the sky could be done, nor could the sky exist at all, nor the light of the 
sun, when clearly all mother-substance would lie accumulated by 
sinking throughout already infinite time. 
 
The image extends established notions of the birth of things from materies. We are aware 
that birth requires an unbounded universe, and atoms able to ‘flow’ together through the 
void. For example, as discussed (in Section A of this Part), things are born seasonally when 
seeds ‘flow together’ (1.177; 5.661) at specific times. However, here all atoms (not just those 
able to combine) have flowed together into a confused mass. The natural atomic qualities of 
downward movement and pouring through the void combine to prove that the universe 
must be unbounded, so that matter does not congregate from the bottom up like a liquid 
filling a container. Lucretius has carefully intertwined the LIFE-CYCLE, LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES 
threads in three stages to construct this important proof. This ability of body to fill void space 
in body forms the basis for several other theories, including the nature of body and soul, the 
processes of ‘squeezing’ (ἔκθλιψις) and magnetism, and the ethical theory of pleasure – to 
be considered later in this Part. 
 
WEAVING and LIQUIDS: ease of motion 
A further application of the LIQUIDS thread, as discussed in Part 2 Section C, depicts how 
certain things, in particular atoms, the soul and light, ‘pour’ at speed through the void. 
Nothing moves as quickly as atoms, as Lucretius proves in 2.142-64, by intertwining the 
WEAVING thread with this part of the LIQUIDS thread. Although sunlight moves apparently 
instantaneously, atoms move more quickly through the void, because they move singularly 
(singillatim – 153; cf. singula – 2.396, 397) and unimpeded, whereas sunlight meets opposing 
air atoms, and ‘beats its way through, as it were, airy waves’ (aerias quasi dum diverberat 
undas – 152),529 and its atoms ‘move intertwined and massed together in a ball’ (complexa 
                                                          
529
 West’s (1969, p.92) interpretation of diverberat as symbolising strenuous swimming strokes is 
particularly attractive. 
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meant inter se conque globata – 154),530 impeding their movement further. Sunlight’s speed 
of pouring is reduced by the intertwined configurations of its constituent atoms. 
 From this we can infer that anything that moves more slowly than sunlight must 
consist of atoms intertwined more thoroughly in a mass. This is expressed in 2.381-97, which 
explains how certain substances pass through the void openings in others. These openings 
become progressively larger in each example. First, lightning ‘flows’ (fluat – 383) with more 
penetration than ‘terrestrial fire’ because it ‘consists of finer texture and smaller shapes’ 
(subtilem magis e parvis constare figuris – 385).531 Next, while light passes through horn, rain 
‘is spewed back’ (respuitur – 389), because light consists of ‘smaller bodies’ (minora / corpora 
– 389-90) than water. In each case, the size of atomic congregations, not of individual atoms, 
is the focus, since we know from 142-64 that even sunlight consists of atoms intertwined into 
larger groups, and subtilis (385) suggests several threads woven finely together.  
 Lucretius then turns to visible openings, in a comparison between wine and oil being 
strained through a sieve (2.391-7). Wine passes through ‘as quickly as you like’ (quamvis 
subito - 390), while ‘slow olive oil lingers’ (tardum cunctatur olivum – 2.392).532 This is 
because the oil consists of either ‘larger elements’ (maioribus elementis – 392): 
 
aut magis hamatis inter se perque plicatis, 
atque ideo fit uti non tam diducta repente  395 
inter se possint primordia singula quaeque 
singula per cuiusque foramina permanare. 
       (2.394-7) 
[…] or ones more hooked and thoroughly entwined among themselves, 
and for that reason it happens that all the single first-threads could not 
be drawn apart so swiftly among themselves and ooze through each 
one’s single holes. 
 
As with the preceding examples, elementa must refer to atomic congregations, rather than 
single atoms. These congregations are themselves entangled (plicatis)533 in a jumbled mass, 
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 conglobo is not specifically a weaving term, but supports the weaving image here; see n.279 on 
conglomero. 
531
 For the weaving term subtilis, see n.276. 
532
 The contrast is embodied by a deft transition from a dactyl symbolising the speedy wine to 
spondees symbolising the slow oil: pērflŭĕr(e), āt cōntrā tārdūm (392), an effect echoed by the 
spondaic fifth foot (pērmānārĕ) in 397. 
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 Lucretius commonly applies three connected verbs to create an image of things either entangled – 
in the case of perplico (2.394 – oil atoms; 4.828 – limbs; 6.1087 – magnet and iron), and implico 
(4.1149 – a man and the knots of Venus; 6.1232 – a man and plague) – or being untied – as with 
explico (2.882 – fire ‘unravelled’ from wood). Cf. OLD, plico, 2, ‘to twine, coil’ (Verg. Aen. 5.279, of 
snakes, with nodus); explico 1 (Cic. De or. 1.161, with vestis); implico 1, 2, 4 and 5 (of hair (Verg. Aen. 
4.148, Ov. Fast. 5.220); of a spider’s web (Plin. HN. 11.81)). Compare also plecto and its derivatives, 
see n.271. 
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owing to their essentially thread-like nature and external hooks.534 Within these 
congregations of elementa, the first-threads cannot be ‘drawn apart’ (diducta – suggesting 
the untying of knots)535 and ooze through the sieve’s holes quickly and singularly.536  
 This passage expands upon the comparison between the movement of sunlight and 
single atoms in 2.142-64. Both the oil and sunlight are slow (tardius – 156; tardum – 392), and 
their bodies cannot move singularly (singillatim – 153; singula – 396, 397) because they are 
intertwined (complexa – 154; cf. perque plicatis – 394)537. Two striking instances of tmesis 
strengthen the connection between the passages (conque globata – 154; perque plicatis – 
394). The keen reader, or re-reader, will recognise the extensive correspondence between 
the constituent structures and movements of these substances. Their structures cannot be 
equally intertwined, but both are more intertwined than those of the substances they are 
compared with. By this comparison, Lucretius extends his argument a fortiori further: 
sunlight, although exceedingly swift, must, on account of its intertwined bodies, ‘flow’ more 
slowly than single atoms, to a similar degree as oil, on account of its intertwined bodies, flows 
more slowly than wine. How quickly a substance moves is directly related to how intertwined 
its constituent structure is: the more intertwined, the larger the elementa and the slower 
their ‘flow’. This important theory, expressed by the intertwined LIQUIDS and WEAVING threads, 
will return later in this Part, in relation to sensation, the soul, and various phenomena 
including lightning and magnetism. 
 
Interactions between substances 
Part 2 Section C considered Lucretius’ portrayal of substances flowing across wide void space, 
and through the void in things. This marks a convergence between the LIQUIDS and WEAVING 
threads. All things are rarus (‘loose-knit’) to an extent (1.347; 6.936), but the ease of liquid 
movement within them depends both on how interwoven the ‘flowing’ substance is (as with 
                                                          
534
 One thinks anachronistically of Velcro here. 
535
 As in Ov. Met. 2.560: nodosque manu diducit (‘untied the knots by hand’). Note also the sense 
‘cause to come apart’, used of wool in Col. Rust. 7.4.5, and of clouds ‘teased out’ like wool by the wind 
in Lucr. 6.215 (see pp.90-2 for ‘woven’ clouds in Lucretius). The verb appropriately depicts the 
separating of threads in atomic compounds. 
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 Reading elementa as a synonym for primordia would create the impossibility of visible atoms 
sticking in the holes of the sieve – suggesting a mistake on Lucretius’ part, as argued by Giussani (1923) 
ad loc. (‘epperò credo che Lucrezio qui non avrebbe inteso che il suo testo epicureo parlava non 
d’atomi, ma di molecule’) and Bailey (1947) 866 (Lucretius ‘probably misunderstood – not for the only 
time – his Epicurean authority’), which Smith (1992) ad loc. seeks to excuse. Reading elementa as 
‘groups of atoms’ (as opposed to Giussani’s and Smith’s anachronistic ‘molecules’) absolves Lucretius, 
and enables the reappraisal of other passages, such as 1.827-9, which contrasts the potential variety 
caused by rearranged elementa and primordia. 
537
 perplico and complector are etymologically related; see n.271. 
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the olive oil example), and on the woven texture of the containing item or substance. How 
easily the atomic congregations of the ‘flowing’ substance fit through the pores within its 
container’s woven texture dictates the speed of its transit. Thus, as seen just above, loose-
knit lightning ‘flows’ easily through the exceedingly loose-knit air, but heat and cold, 
although loose-knit, only ‘ooze’ through metal (permanat – 1.494), and water, a more tight-
knit substance, only ‘oozes’ through rock (permanat – 1.384). These interrelationships are 
central to Lucretius’ theories of how substances interact, especially in explaining the nature 
of the human body, sensation, and various apparently mysterious phenomena, considered 
later in this Part. 
 By this composite metaphor, substances ‘flow’ through the void space in others with 
varying degrees of ease. A complementary metaphor depicts the ‘woven’ container 
substance contracting to ‘squeeze out’ the substance within. This process explains a broad 
range of processes in the DRN, expressed principally by the verb premo and its derivative 
exprimo. This process is labelled ἔκθλιψις in Greek, a term used by Epicurus (Ep. Pyth. 109), 
and attributed to Empedocles (Aët. 2.13.2 = Dox. Gr. 341 = DK 31A53), Anaximenes (Aët. 
3.4.1 = DK 13A17) and Democritus (Simpl. in Cael. 712.27 = KRS 575). Lucretius appropriates 
the theory and applies it within the framework of his LIQUIDS, WEAVING and BOUNDARIES threads 
to explain crucial creative processes and certain potentially mysterious meteorological and 
terrestrial phenomena. 
 Garani examines Lucretius’ appropriation of the theory of ἔκθλιψις, and reads in its 
presentation a ‘squeezing out the sponge’ metaphor, which she classifies among four 
principal metaphors in Lucretius.538 The reading is informed by an analogy in Lucretius’ 
explanation of taste:  
 
principio sucum sentimus in ore, cibum cum 
mandendo exprimimus, ceu plenam spongiam aquai 
siquis forte manu premere ac siccare coëpit. 
inde quod exprimimus per caulas omne palati  620 
diditur et rarae per flexa foramina linguae. 
       (4.617-21) 
Firstly we sense flavour in our mouth when we squeeze out food by 
chewing, just as if by chance someone begins by hand to press a 
sponge full of water and to dry it out. Then what we squeeze out is all 
given through the openings in the palate and through the winding 
pores of the loose-knit tongue. 
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From this analogy, Garani states that ‘Lucretius suggests that a body that can be squeezed 
must have a spongy texture’,539 and argues that Lucretius’ reader, when confronted with 
other instances of ‘squeezing’ (via the terms premo and exprimo) in the DRN, should ‘bring to 
mind all the parameters involved in [this] archetypal model’.540 This is a legitimate process of 
inductive reasoning in Lucretius’ methodology of metaphor and argumentation – aided by the 
established framework of the LIQUIDS thread. 
 However, it is not necessarily the case that everything capable of being squeezed 
must specifically be spongy – and one might protest that 4.617-21 is a relatively obscure 
archetype, being brief and related to a specific, minor doctrine of Lucretius’ philosophy.541 
Additionally, the specific example of a sponge only occurs here in the DRN. Instead, an 
alternative image can be read, supported by Lucretius’ WEAVING thread. In this passage, 
Lucretius contrasts two types of movement by one substance through another: of flavour 
being squeezed out of food, and entering through the (relaxed) pores of the tongue. The 
latter process relies on the tongue’s loosely-woven texture, denoted by rarus – a central term 
of the WEAVING thread542 – the former on the food’s ability to be squeezed (presumably on 
account of its rarus texture). With this reading the sponge, as a structure containing void 
space, is conceptually analogous with any woven substance,543 and Lucretius’ theory of 
ἔκθλιψις marks a further intersection between his LIQUIDS and WEAVING threads. 
 Several instances of premo and exprimo in the DRN support a ‘squeezing out the 
cloth’ metaphor. As Section F of this Part will consider, this supports the explanation of 
several meteorological and terrestrial phenomena, the reading of which is informed by an 
explanation (5.416-508) of how the first stages of the Earth’s formation occurred. The bodies 
of matter arranged themselves in order, starting with those forming the Earth: 
 
quippe etenim primum terrai corpora quaeque, 
propterea quod erant gravia et perplexa, coibant 450 
in medio atque imas capiebant omnia sedes; 
quae quanto magis inter se perplexa coibant, 
tam magis expressere ea quae mare sidera solem 
lunamque efficerent et magni moenia mundi; 
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 Garani (2007) 212.  
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 Garani (2007) 213. 
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 We might compare the ‘movement is pouring through a void’ metaphor, which is introduced in a 
sustained fashion by analogies of water permeating caves and living bodies, and fish moving through 
water (see pp.95-7). 
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 See n.275. Garani’s (2007, p.212) translation of rarus as ‘spongy’, although supporting her 
metaphor, implies that fluid can be similarly squeezed out of the tongue. 
543
 Elsewhere, roots are similarly used as an image conceptually reminiscent of threads in relation to 
the soul (3.325) and the world (5.554) – for which see Sections D and E of this Part. 
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       (5.449-54) 
Besides, clearly first of all every body of earth, because they were 
heavy and entangled, united in the middle and all seized the lowest 
resting places; however much more they united, entangled among 
themselves, so much more they squeezed out those bodies which 
would make up the sea, stars, sun and moon, and the walls of the great 
world; […] 
 
The weaving term perplexa, not especially redolent of a sponge, is strikingly repeated in the 
same place in 450 and 452, supporting an image of first-threads of earth squeezing out those 
of other substances.544 The more intertwined the congregations of earth become, the more 
other substances are squeezed out – like a wet cloth being wrung out.545 Garani suggests, 
perhaps rightly, that this image has unintentional ‘teleological implications’, which are made 
particularly problematic by a perceived connection with the sponge being wrung out 
specifically by hand in 4.617-21.546 If the image of a cloth is intended in our passage, this 
connection is less clear, as is the accompanying suggestion of a purposeful action behind the 
process.   
 
Light and ‘filling the container’ 
Lucretius’ portrayal of light as a fast-flowing liquid, capable of filling void space swiftly and 
totally, has been considered in Part 2 Section C. Further aspects are brought out by 
correspondences between the LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES threads. The ability of darkness to 
‘pour’ like light, and similarly fill a container (complesse cavernas – 4.171), explains why we 
can see things in the light when we are in the dark, but not vice versa. In the first instance, 
darkness enters the eyes first (338-9), followed by the light, and, once this ‘has filled’ 
(replevit – 4.344) the eyes, the images of things in the light are seen. In the second instance, 
light possesses the eyes first, before darkness ‘fills the pores’ (foramina complet – 4.350) so 
images of things in the dark cannot be seen. Light and darkness move so swiftly that they 
reach and fill our eyes before the images of objects situated in them arrive. 
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 Compare 5.483-8, which describes the sea as a ‘salt sweat squeezed out of the [Earth’s] body’ 
(expressus salsus de corpore sudor – 487) – an image Arist. Mete. 357a25-8 (= DK 31A6) attributes this 
description of the sea to Empedocles. Aristotle criticises the metaphor as only satisfactory to poetry. 
Lucretius describes sweat similarly as ‘pressed out from the depths’ (ex alto pressa) of the body in 
4.862. 
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 The image persists to depict these bodies ‘flowing away’ to create ether with its ‘liquid bodies’ 
(corporibus liquidis – 499), ‘most liquid’ (liquidissimus – 500) in nature, which ‘flows above’ (influit – 
501) the air, but does not mix its ‘liquid body’ (liquidum corpus – 502) with it. Ether is then said to 
‘flow’ (fluere – 506) like the Pontus, ‘which flows with fixed current’ (certo quod fluit aestu - 507). 
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176 
 
 The threads intertwine later (5.592-603) in an analogy for why such a small sun 
(roughly the same size as it appears to the eye – 5.564-75) can emit so much light 
 
quod maria ac terras omnis caelumque rigando 
compleat et calido perfundat cuncta vapore.  595 
nam licet hinc mundi patefactum totius unum  597 
largifluum fontem scatere atque erumpere lumen, 
ex omni mundo quia sic elementa vaporis 
undique conveniunt et sic coniectus eorum  600 
confluit, ex uno capite hic ut profluat ardor. 
nonne vides etiam quam late parvus aquai 
prata riget fons interdum campisque redundet? 
       (5.594-603) 
[…] which fills the seas and all lands and the sky by irrigating, and 
drenches all with warmth and heat. For it may be that from here one 
free-flowing fountain, opened on the whole world, gushes forth and 
light bursts out, because in this way particles of heat from the whole 
world come together from all directions and their gathering flows 
together in such a way that heat pours forth from here from one 
source. Besides, do you not see how widely a small fountain of water 
irrigates the meadows and sometimes overflows in the fields? 
 
The explanation is striking, because the sun is described as a fountain purely metaphorically 
before the analogy is explicitly drawn in 602-3.547 This passage is among the richest 
metaphorically in the DRN,548 and its effectiveness depends on the established strand of the 
LIQUIDS thread applied to light. The passage expands the description of the sun as a ‘fountain 
of light’ (5.281-3), discussed in Part 2 Section C, to depict the source from which the fountain 
emanates.549 Specifically, the reader, based on their understanding of Lucretius’ ‘filling the 
container’ metaphor, is invited to envisage light as stored in a tank, perpetually replenished 
from all around. The sun acts like a valve, which we infer opens only at fixed times, when 
sufficient ‘liquid’ light has ‘flown together’ (an image later expressed by confluere in 5.661, 
668 and 702 to explain the regularity of dawn) and filled the ‘tank’, and so bursts through the 
‘valve’ and gushes out. This reading relies on a tight network of established correspondences, 
expressed as a ‘container metaphor’, between the LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES threads. 
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 West (1969) 91 sees a negative effect on the analogy: ‘in characteristic Lucretian style, the first 
argument is expressed in metaphorical terms which anticipate and perhaps even weaken the analogy 
that follows’. Rather than the analogy being weakened, I argue the metaphor is strengthened by this 
technique. The sun is not like a fountain but is actually a fountain, pouring light onto the world below. 
548
 Pope (1949) 74-5 uses the passage to disprove that confluo is a dead metaphor when applied 
elsewhere to the confluence of matter. West (1969) 90-1 considers the imagery of this passage, 
additionally suggesting that vapor here means ‘steam, exhalation, as well as heat’. 
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 See p.103. 
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Section C 
 
Sensation 
 
Lucretius’ application of the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads to depict sensory effluences is built 
upon the explanation, considered in the previous Section, that the free ‘flow’ of a substance 
is dictated by how intertwined its structure is. Part 2 introduced the ‘fine texture’ of these 
effluences and their ‘perpetual flow’ from things, and together these weaving and liquids 
metaphors, as in the depiction of light, explain their speed of movement.  
 The importance of these metaphors to Lucretius’ theory of sensation is evident in the 
famous awning analogy in which they are introduced. We see many things casting films from 
their outer surface, and: 
 
et volgo faciunt id lutea russaque vela   75 
et ferrugina, cum magnis intenta theatris 
per malos volgata trabesque trementia flutant; 
namque ibi concessum caveai subter et omnem 
scaenai speciem patrum matrumque decorem 
inficiunt coguntque suo fluitare colore.  80 
et quanto circum mage sunt inclusa theatri 
moenia, tam magis haec intus perfusa lepore 
omnia conrident correpta luce diei. 
ergo lintea de summo cum corpore fucum 
mittunt, effigias quoque debent mittere tenvis  85 
res quaeque, ex summo quoniam iaculantur utraque. 
sunt igitur iam formarum vestigia certa 
quae volgo volitant subtili praedita filo, 
nec singillatim possunt secreta videri. 
       (4.75-89) 
Yellow, red and purple awnings also do this habitually when, stretched 
out in great theatres across posts and beams, they flow, fluttering in 
the public view; for then they dye the audience in the cavern below, 
and all the appearance of the stage, and the finery of the senators and 
matrons, and force them to flow in their colour. And the more the 
walls of the theatre are enclosed around, the more everything, flooded 
with beauty, laughs in the captured daylight. Therefore since awnings 
send out dye from their outermost body, all things must also send out 
fine semblances, since each casts out from the edge. There are, 
therefore, now fixed traces of shapes endowed with fine-textured 
thread, which flit about habitually and cannot be seen singularly and 
separated. 
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The image is rich, depicting vibrant colours (lutea russaque vela / et ferrugina – 75-6; inficiunt 
coguntque suo fluitare colore – 80; the splendour of the crowd – 79),550 cast from the 
awnings and reflecting off the crowds below. While the preceding analogy, explored in Part 2 
Section B, depicts ‘woven’ outer layers cast off by animals,551 here woven linen awnings 
provide a more appropriate analogy to support the accompanying weaving metaphor.552 
These awnings were dyed, and probably as natural fibres pre-weaving, so multi-coloured 
woven patterns could be created – in which case, just as every thread of the awning carries 
dye, so even the finest film, formed from the awning’s ‘first-threads’ cast from the outermost 
edge, is imbued with it. With this reading, fucus (84) might depict ‘dyed films’ as an example 
of the effigiae tenuis cast from all things. The weaving meaning of tenuis and subtili praedita 
filo553 ties the effigiae more closely to the awnings and their cast-off fucus. The sustained 
weaving metaphor across these concluding lines clarifies Lucretius’ logic, which would 
otherwise jump from dye to ‘images’ without explanation.  
 The weaving metaphor in this passage is supported by extensive liquids imagery, 
which West skilfully analyses.554 In particular, Lucretius states that the colours cast onto the 
auditorium ‘flow’ (fluitare – 80) just as the awnings themselves ‘flow’ (flutant – 77) in the 
wind. By using two near identical verbs (fluto being a contracted form of fluito),555 Lucretius 
emphasises that the movements of the awnings and the colours in the auditorium are 
similar, and therefore that the former causes the latter.556 The films of colour therefore are 
understood to move like a liquid, and the auditorium is ‘flooded’ in their beauty.557 Deeper 
metaphorical correspondences pertaining to liquids, beyond West’s interpretation, can be 
discerned. In describing colour cast from an awning and dyeing the audience below, Lucretius 
supplies a specific subsidiary image, of liquid sunlight – an established image in the DRN – 
‘pouring through’ the awning like water and washing out the dye (but scarcely dulling the 
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 Reading patrum matrumque decorem with West (1969) 38-41, who argues that the senators’ white 
togas and the matrons’ colourful clothing ‘would provide the most striking colour effects under the 
coloured awnings’, supporting his assertion with well-chosen extratextual comparisons (Verg. Aen. 
5.340-1; Ov. Ars am. 1.93-99). 
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cloth’s colour). This is appropriate to Lucretius’ theory of effluences, which, when cast from a 
given thing, do not seem to diminish it. Thus by the example of dye Lucretius introduces his 
LIQUIDS thread in relation to sensation. Similar liquid qualities are possessed by Lucretius’ 
sensory effluences, which will later be seen to flow with the swift motion of liquids. 
 In this complex image, the WEAVING thread persists from the preceding animal 
exempla and is joined by the LIQUIDS thread to introduce the effluences. The passage is a 
startlingly rich web of complementary and contrasting metaphors, but Lucretius, by 
employing sustained images and multiple terms from each metaphor, helps his reader to 
unpick them. By introducing the primary conceptual threads of his theory of sensation in this 
prominent context, Lucretius urges his reader to understand effluences as ‘woven forms 
flowing from things’ throughout the book. 
 The WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads combine in the passages preceding and following the 
animal skin and awning analogies. In contrast to the animal skins, which are ‘more 
interwoven and crowded together’ (contexta magis condensaque – 57), diffuse substances 
like smoke or heat are ‘poured out loosened’ (diffusa solute – 55)558 when emitted from 
things – a crucial image in Lucretius’ theory of dissolution. The threads return after the 
awning image to bookend the analogies, describing the same diffuse substances, which ‘flow 
away, poured out from things’ (diffusae e rebus abundant – 91) because ‘they are torn up in 
the course of their twisting journey’ (scinduntur per iter flexum – 93)559 out of things. 
Contrarily, a ‘skin’ of colour, tenuis (95) though it is, has nothing in the way ‘to tear it up’ 
(discerpere – 96),560 because it is emitted from the very surface. The finely-woven texture of 
effluences enables them to ‘flow’ quickly, but also makes them fragile. 
 These aspects are repeatedly emphasised in Lucretius’ theory of vision. In 4.176-238 
Lucretius considers the speed of vision films, introducing the topic as ‘what movability has 
been bestowed upon them in swimming through the air’ (quae mobilitas ollis tranantibus 
auras / reddita sit – 177-8). He then asserts that light things made from minutis / corporibus 
(183-4) are swift, including sunlight, which is driven on by a constant chain of light following 
light. We have previously seen that sunlight consists of small ‘interwoven’ atomic 
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 Later Lucretius compares the formation of composite images in the air with the formation of 
clouds. When clouds disperse, they melt (liquentia – 4.141), and so images are pictured in the same 
way, with their dispersal causing them to pour away. 
559
 For the weaving sense of scindo and its cognates, see n.270. 
560
 This term is applied to wool in 2.829 (its first occurrence in the DRN); E-M, s. v. discerpo: ‘dans la 
langue de tissage, <<détirer, démêler brin à brin (la laine, le lin)>>’. The verb can depict anything being 
pulled apart piece-by-piece, but is appropriately applied to the ‘woven’ effluences here. See also 
p.190-1 on Cic. Tusc. 1.71, in which discerpo is applied to the soul. 
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congregations, and ‘flows’ quickly through the air. The keen reader might apply these 
qualities analogously to vision films.  
The conclusion of this comparison confirms the connection, asserting that films move 
swiftly by a similar chain of impulses, and: 
 
deinde quod usque adeo textura praedita rara 
mittuntur, facile ut quasvis penetrare queant res 
et quasi permanare per aeris intervallum. 
       (4.196-8) 
[…] next because they are emitted endowed with such a loose-knit 
texture, so they can easily penetrate any manner of things, and as it 
were ooze through the intervals between the air. 
 
Like sunlight, the films pass through the air like a liquid, because they are only slightly 
impeded by air atoms (cf. 2.142-64 of sunlight), and, being ‘loose-knit’, they can also 
penetrate ‘any manner of things’ (as sunlight passes through horn – 2.388). Were the films 
more tightly woven, they would be impeded or broken up by substances and not seep 
through. The verb permanare recalls the olive oil’s slow progress through a sieve in 2.397, but 
here suggests that the films, owing to their loose-knit nature, can contract and squeeze 
between the bodies in air and things. Although penetrare does not in itself suggest liquid 
movement, there is surely an intended comparison between quasvis penetrare queant res 
and permanare per aeris intervallum. In this description aeris intervallum cannot refer to the 
gap between the source of the film and the film’s destination, but to the void gaps between 
air atoms,561 as it does in reference to sunlight in 4.187.562 Vision films penetrate things and 
move through the air in the same way – by passing through the void space between bodies. 
We should therefore perhaps envisage both processes as a kind of ‘liquid’ flow, although only 
one is explicitly portrayed in this way. 
Vision films do not only move swiftly but are also formed swiftly (4.143-75). In this 
explanation the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads are again prominent, as Lucretius states that 
something always ‘streams away’ (abundat – 145) from the surface of things, and this is 
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 intervallum is often accompanied by the genitive of things separated (OLD, intervallum 2; Vitr. 
8.1.7; Livy 8.8.9; Sen. Ben. 4.19.2) – atoms in our case. It also occurs with the genitive to denote spaces 
in time between events (OLD, intervallum 3), e.g. intervallo temporis (Cic. Part. or. 59), and St. 
Jerome’s portrayal of Lucretius composing per intervalla insaniae, ‘through intervals between insanity’ 
not ‘of insanity’.  
562
 Depicting the intervals within the air through which sunlight passes (simultaneously suggesting 
resistance caused by intervening air atoms – cf. 2.152, in which sunlight ‘beats through airy waves’). 
Leonard & Smith (1942) ad 4.198 note the difficulty of aeris intervallum in 198, stating it is ‘less 
specific’; however they consider it impossible to apply the meaning from 4.187 here. 
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proved by mirrors, from which images ‘stream back’ (redundent – 154). Indeed, mirrors 
reflect instantly when placed in front of something, 
 
perpetuo fluere ut noscas e corpore summo 
texturas rerum tenuis tenuisque figuras. 
       (4.157-8) 
[…] so that you may recognise that fine textures and fine shapes of 
things continuously flow from the outermost body. 
 
The metaphor of ‘pouring’ explains both the films’ speed and their continuous emission – a 
correspondence which, as seen in Part 2 Section C,563 is then applied to sunlight (161-7). 
These lines are also the most emphatic statement of the films’ woven nature, and the keen 
reader will recall that their finely-woven texture contributes to their speed.  
 The woven and liquid nature of these films explains why they are sometimes 
distorted or destroyed when they interact with things. In the same passage, their finely-
woven texture makes vision films fragile: one ‘is torn up’ (scinditur – 149) when it interacts 
with stone and timber; whereas a mirror allows them neither to pass through nor ‘to be torn 
up’ (scindi – 153) – the polyptoton emphasising the weaving metaphor. Lucretius recalls the 
example of stone and timber to explain why voices can leave a closed room but image films 
cannot – the latter being ‘utterly torn up’ (perscinduntur – 601) as they try to leave. However, 
even effluences of sound cannot always pass through walls undamaged. A voice, on its way 
through ‘the closed-off parts of a house’ (clausa domorum – 612), i.e. those separated by 
more than one wall,564 ‘is blunted and penetrates the ear having been poured together’ 
(obtunditur atque auris confusa penetrat – 613), compressing the voice into mere sound 
(614). The liquids metaphor in confusa is activated by the already established liquid ‘flow’ 
attributed to sensory effluences. 
 Voices are similarly affected when travelling over distance (557-62), because 
intervening air causes the words ‘to be poured together’ (confundi – 558) and ‘disordered’ 
(conturbari – 559), and as a result the utterance arrives ‘poured together’ (confusa – 562).565 
An additional weaving image is supplied, stating that the utterance is ‘entangled too’ (inque 
pedita – 562), depicting the jumbling of its constituent threads, which we assume its loose-
knit nature makes easier. A smell is affected even more, being ‘gradually drawn out’ 
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 See p.105. 
564
 It seems clausa marks an intended distinction from single walls, which allow voices to pass through. 
565
 Contrast the moon, which cannot be much larger than it appears, since over a great distance things 
become ‘poured together’ (confusa – 5.580) and lose shape before they lose size.  
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(paulatim distractus – 693) in the air, like threads being pulled from a cloth.566 This occurs 
because the smell is emitted from the depths of a thing (694-7), which was earlier shown to 
cause effluences to be torn up. Sounds ultimately break up without being heard if the 
distance traversed is too great, and so when a voice ‘divides itself’ in the air (566) some parts 
‘die in vain, poured out through the air’ (perit frustra diffusa per auras – 569)567 before they 
reach a listening ear – just as spilt water swiftly disperses on contact with a surface. Again a 
combination of the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads explains the dispersal of effluences from 
things. 
 Lucretius’ description of effluences ‘pouring’ from things creates a possible issue in 
relation to his theory of flux, which, as Section A of this Part discussed, is also expressed in 
liquid terms. Lucretius has argued for a constant flow of image films from things, but visual 
evidence proves that things are not diminished. The reader, from their knowledge of the 
LIQUIDS thread, should expect this constant flow to cause death. To avoid this impossibility, 
Lucretius, following Epicurus (Ep. Hdt. 47), stresses the fineness of these images – at greatest 
length, we assume, in the passage missing after 4.126, but elsewhere by the weaving 
metaphor of the adjective tenuis, which depicts the fine textura of the films. This allows a 
constant stream of films with no visible diminution of the source object. Thus the WEAVING 
thread addresses a contradiction created by the LIQUIDS thread. 
 Throughout Book 4 Lucretius pointedly expands the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads from 
his introductory analogies (4.54-89) to depict the fragility and ‘pourability’ respectively of 
sensory effluences. This ‘pourability’ increases when the effluences are more loosely 
interwoven, and even more so when they are fully untied – recalling the portrayals of the 
speed of sunlight and olive oil in Book 2. Lucretius again highlights the shared processes 
underlying all movement, by the technique of universalisation, which is enhanced by the 
conceptual threads. The metaphor of things being ‘untied and poured out’ recalls the 
destructive element of Lucretius’ theory of flux, and is a central image in Lucretius’ theory of 
the soul.  
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 For the weaving sense of distraho, cf. 2.827, 231 (of a thread – see pp.70-1) and 5.1421 (of 
clothing). It is also applied to hair (the same shape as thread) in Apul. Met. 8.8. Lucretius applies the 
term metaphorically to the soul, as Section D of this Part will discuss. 
567
 As in the theory of flux, discussed in Section B of this Part, effluences die when ‘poured out’. 
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Section D 
 
The Body and the Soul 
 
Part 2 addressed various elements of Lucretius’ portrayal of the nature of the soul and its 
relationship with the body. The LIFE-CYCLE thread depicts the soul as born and therefore 
mortal; the WEAVING thread explains the interwoven compound nature of body and soul; and 
the LIQUIDS thread depicts the soul’s mobility, attributed to its small round seeds, like those of 
a liquid. This Section will outline how these threads combine to explain further aspects of the 
soul and the body, and what happens to each at death. Further applications of each of these 
threads will be introduced, in addition to facets of the BOUNDARIES thread, revealing the utility 
of metaphor in theories of the soul,568 and showing that Lucretius’ threads create a 
comprehensive scheme for this important element of his scientific and moral philosophy.  
 
The nature of body and soul   
Section B of this Part explored the ‘container’ metaphor, formed from the intertwined 
BOUNDARIES and LIQUIDS threads, by which a body can contain void in which other body can sit 
or move. The relationship between body and soul is expressed in these terms in the DRN, and 
indeed the metaphor ‘the body is the container of the soul’ is established in ancient 
philosophy. However, while in Plato and the Stoics the body is a temporary container for the 
immortal soul,569 for Lucretius, although the body contains the soul,570 the two die together. 
In order to accommodate this theory he introduces aspects of his WEAVING thread alongside 
his own container metaphor.  
 Taking the container metaphor first, Lucretius argues that, just like other things with 
fixed abodes (3.549-50, 784-7), the soul’s ‘fixed power’ (certa […] / vis – 3.746-7) is located in 
a ‘fixed’ (certus) place within the body (3.98,571 548-9, 617-8, 794-5), established at birth 
(3.618-9). The body is described as the soul’s ‘covering’ (tegmen – 3.577, 604) and ‘vessel’ 
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 See Pender (2000) 30-6. 
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 In the Phaedo, Plato refers to the soul being ‘set free’ (the verb ἀπαλάσσω, and the noun 
ἀπαλλαγή – 64C, 66D, etc.) and ‘separated’ (the adverb χωρίς and the noun χωρισμὸς – 66E, 67D) 
from the body at death, as something released from confines; see Pender (2000) 165-70, 176-81. Cf. 
Cic. Tusc. 1.52: nam corpus quidem quasi vas est aut aliquod animi receptaculum.  
570
 Görler (1997) 207 argues that Lucretius’ ‘body-vessel-analogy’ is not metaphorical, but rather 
depicts the body as a literal vessel. However, this simplifies Lucretius’ application of this term, and 
denies the conceptual depth of metaphor enabled by depicting the body as the soul’s vessel. For 
Lucretius the vessel serves as a gestalt image consisting of multiple metaphorical correspondences. 
571
 With the missing line after 3.97 suggested by Bailey (1947) ad loc.: at quidam contra haec falsa 
ratione putarunt (combining and amending Diels’ and Marullus’ suggestions). 
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(vas – 3.440, 555, 793) – i.e. its container. The reader, applying their knowledge of Lucretius’ 
container metaphor, can envisage our bodies as containing void, in which the soul moves like 
a liquid. Indeed this is the case, and the soul moves the body in turn from within (3.231-57). 
The body is ‘a limit of [the soul’s] movement’ (finis / motibus – 3.256-7), allowing us to hold 
onto life (3.257) by preventing the soul’s movements from passing out of the body.572 The 
container metaphor is necessary to explain how the soul moves within the confines of the 
body.  
 However, as Part 2 Section B discussed, the body and soul’s relationship is more 
complex than simply ‘container and contents’. Rather, the two are interwoven from first birth 
like a cloth woven from two types of thread.573 This weaving metaphor is crucial for depicting 
the combined entity of body and soul, and their shared mortality – something the container 
metaphor cannot express. Lucretius explicitly states the differing applications of these 
metaphors in a depiction of the fixed place of mens and animus in the body (3.548-57). He 
asserts that, just as body parts decay (literally ‘melt’, liquuntur – 553)574 when cut off, the soul 
cannot exist having left the body: 
 
 […] illius quasi quod vas esse videtur,  555 
sive aliud quid vis potius coniunctius ei 
fingere, quandoquidem conexu corpus adhaeret. 
       (3.555-7) 
[…] because it is seen to be, as it were, [the soul’s] vessel, or something 
else you might want to think up that is more closely connected, since in 
fact the body clings to it by interweaving. 
 
Again the body is described as the soul’s container. However, Lucretius corrects himself, 
confessing that this analogy is inapt, since it fails to express the interwoven nature of body 
and soul.575 Bailey, Kenney and M. F. Smith note the confession,576 but do not explain the 
motivation behind providing an inaccurate analogy. It is typically Lucretian to encourage the 
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 See Segal (1990) 96. This is an instance of the ‘death is the transgression of boundaries’ metaphor.  
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 See pp.79-80. 
574
 This is the first attested usage of liquor in the sense of bodily decay (TLL, s. v. liquor, 1b). The sense 
stems from ῥεω, as applied to the body in Plat. Phd. 87D: εἰ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο […]. Perhaps 
Lucretius is suggesting that substance flows from the part removed because the bodily container has 
been breached. 
575
 Expressed by conexus, a term firmly situated (alongside its cognates nexus, necto, conecto and 
adnecto) in Lucretius’ WEAVING thread – see n.254. 
576
 Bailey (1947); Kenney (1971); Smith (1992) (all ad loc.). Bailey’s analysis is particularly pertinent: 
‘[Lucr.’s metaphor] is insufficient because, though the vas contains the liquid, it has no atomic 
connexion with it […]. The animus and anima […] have a far closer connexion with the body, since they 
are woven into it by an atomic nexus.’. Bailey’s use of Lucretius’ weaving metaphor is striking, but alas 
not expanded further. 
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reader to find their own explanatory examples, as in 1.400-9, where they should sniff out 
further proofs like hounds tracking prey. Here he tests his reader’s understanding of the 
conceptual thread of WEAVING by urging them to make their own analogy within its framework 
– thus consolidating their knowledge of the body and soul as a thoroughly interwoven joint 
entity. 
 Lucretius’ alternative to the Stoic conception of the body as container for the soul is 
expressed by two contrasting but complementary metaphors: the container representing the 
soul’s fixed place in the body; the woven nexus representing their intrinsic connection. The 
WEAVING thread clearly marks Lucretius’ divergence from the Stoic theory by depicting the 
shared mortality of body and soul. This image occurs in a description of a faint, in which 
onlookers fear the worst and hope the sufferer ‘regains the bond of life’ (vitae reprehendere 
vinclum – 599). The image of bonds is used by Plato (Phd. 73b3-4) to depict the soul’s 
confinement in the body.577 For Lucretius, the bond also represents the interconnection of 
body and soul, the untying of which constitutes death for both (‘a slightly more serious cause 
could untie (dissolvere) [body and soul]’ – 602).  
 This is expressed more fully after the image of the vas, in a proof stating that body 
and soul only exist in union (558-79). Lucretius resumes his analogy with body parts to argue 
that the eye cannot see when ‘torn from its roots’ (avolsus radicibus – 3.563). The threadlike 
roots in this image conceptually support the weaving metaphor applied to body and soul,578 
hinting additionally that neither would survive being torn apart. However, in the subsequent 
lines this weaving metaphor is suppressed, with the soul described as ‘mixed throughout the 
veins and flesh, throughout the nerves and bones’ (per venas et viscera mixtim / per nervos 
atque ossa – 3.566) – a relationship elsewhere expressed in weaving terms, in almost 
verbatim phrases (with nexam – 3.217; with conexa est – 3.691). Instead, the mind and soul 
are described, via the BOUNDARIES thread, as ‘held in’ (tenentur – 567) and ‘enclosed’ (conclusa 
– 569) by the body, enabling them to transmit motions to it. When mind and soul depart at 
death these motions cease, ‘because, by the same reasoning, they are not held in’ (propterea 
quia non simili ratione tenentur – 572). The focus, currently on the soul’s proper place in the 
body and its initiation of movement within it – appropriately depicted by the BOUNDARIES 
thread – shifts in the conclusion: 
 
corpus enim atque animans erit aer, si cohibere 
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 See Pender (2000) 166. 
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 Cf. 2.100-4, in which iron and stone are indupedita suis perplexis ipsa figuris (102) and consist of 
validas […] radices (103). 
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sese anima atque in eos poterit concludere motus 
quos ante in nervis et in ipso corpore agebat.  575 
quare etiam atque etiam, resoluto corporis omni 
tegmine et eiectis extra vitalibus auris, 
dissolui sensus animi fateare necessest 
atque animam, quoniam coniunctast causa duobus. 
       (3.573-9) 
For air will be body and living, if soul could hold itself together and 
enclose the motion, which it made before in the sinews and the body 
itself. Therefore again and again, when the covering of the whole body 
has been untied and the vital breath is cast outside, you must confess 
that the sensation of the soul is untied, and the soul too, owing to the 
conjoined nature of the two. 
 
Lucretius maps the container metaphor onto the air, to create a reductio ad absurdum in 
which the air assumes both the body’s role of container and its other qualities – enabling the 
soul to carry out its usual motions. The WEAVING thread expresses Lucretius’ dismissal, stating 
that the untying of the bodily ‘covering’ causes the soul to untie too, since the two are 
conjoined. The boundaries aspect of the container metaphor could not express this important 
argument alone, and so the WEAVING and BOUNDARIES threads combine to strengthen the 
argument. 
 Finally, complementing this correspondence, Lucretius uses the LIQUIDS thread to 
depict an additional aspect of the body and soul. Since the two form an interwoven mass, this 
must be porous, owing to the void space between the interwoven first-threads. Therefore, 
the body allows things to ooze within it, including pain (3.249-55), which can, although not 
easily, penetrate and ‘ooze through’ (permanare - 252) to the body’s depths – and by 
reaching this far threaten life itself. A similar effect is caused by wine (3.476-86), which is 
distinguished from other food and drink by its ability to penetrate and confound the whole 
body. Alongside well-known effects such as sluggish limbs (478-9), a slurring tongue (479), 
and involuntary noises and coughs (480), Lucretius states that ‘the mind is wet, the eyes 
swim’ (madet mens, / nant oculi – 479-80). We are to assume that the wine has penetrated 
this far through the pores in the body.579 Like all composite things our bodies consist of 
interwoven first-threads with void in between, through which other substances can 
permeate.  
 
The soul’s mobility 
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 The Athenian plague had similar effects (6.1145-62): fervor was ‘poured out under’ (suffusa – 1146) 
the eyes; the throat ‘was sweating’ (sudabant - 1147), the tongue ‘oozing’ (manabat – 1149), with 
blood; the disease ‘had filled’ (complerat – 1151) the head and ‘flooded’ (confluxerat – 1152) the 
mind. 
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Not only can things pour through the totality of body and soul, but, as considered in Part 2 
Section C, the soul’s swift movement in the body is described as ‘pouring’, which it does 
more easily than water owing to its smaller and rounder constituent bodies. In turn its easy 
movement effortlessly causes the body to move. In Section B of this Part, a thing’s loose-knit 
structure was seen to contribute to its ease of motion. In Book 3 the soul is depicted in both 
ways, creating a possible contradiction: its swift movement is attributed both to its 
‘exceedingly fine’ (persubtilem – 179) – i.e. ‘loose-knit’580 – nature, and to its ‘exceedingly 
round and exceedingly minute seeds’ (rutundis / perquam seminibus […] perquamque minutis 
– 186-7), the same shape as those in liquids and similarly mobile things like smoke, clouds 
and flames (levibus atque rutundis – 2.451, 258). One might reasonably object to the soul 
consisting of round bodies in a ‘loosely-woven’ configuration. However, the liquids metaphor 
of the former and the weaving metaphor of the latter denote different aspects of the soul: 
the former its speed, and its ability to fill the body and ‘pour’ to cause movement; the latter 
its speed, lightness and fragility. Each metaphor, as with Lucretius’ atomic birth and weaving 
terminology, emphasises certain qualities of the soul that the other suppresses and vice 
versa; and although the two should perhaps not be taken together, the soul’s complex nature 
cannot be explained without both of them. These images are often applied individually in 
separate proofs, but here they are sufficiently close together to cause a potential 
contradiction. 
 
Unweaving body and soul 
Part 2 Section B showed that Lucretius considers body and soul as closely interwoven from 
first birth, and, briefly, that the two die together. The latter is expressed most frequently 
throughout Book 3 via the intertwining of the WEAVING thread with the death strand of the 
LIFE-CYCLE thread. As considered in Section A of this Part, anything woven can be unwoven, 
which is synonymous with dying in the DRN. Therefore the woven body and soul are mortal 
both as a compound and individually. This was seen briefly in the analysis in Part 2 of 3.688-
97, where Lucretius states the body and soul are ‘so interwoven’ (tam contextae – 695) that 
they cannot ‘untie themselves safely from all the flesh, bones and joints’ (exsolvere sese / 
omnibus e nervis atque ossibus articulisque – 696-7).581 In fact this recalls 1.809-16, which 
argues that we require food and water to supply new atoms, or life ‘would be untied from 
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 In the same passage, honey is said to cohere in a jumbled mass (haeret enim inter se magis omnis 
materiai – 193), because it consists of ‘bodies not so fine and round’ (corporibus neque tam subtilibus 
atque rutundis – 195) – but rather, we infer, tightly-woven and jagged. 
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 See p.79. 
188 
 
our flesh and bones’ (e nervis atque ossibus exsoluatur – 811), and 2.944-62, in an argument 
explaining how a blow brings death:  
  
dissoluuntur enim positurae principiorum 
et penitus motus vitales inpediuntur, 
donec materies, omnis concussa per artus, 
vitalis animae nodos a corpore solvit   950 
dispersamque foras per caulas eiecit omnis. 
nam quid praeterea facere ictum posse reamur 
oblatum, nisi discutere ac dissolvere quaeque? 
       (2.947-53) 
For the arrangements of first-things are untied and the vital motions 
are deeply entangled, until the mother-substance, shaken up 
throughout all the limbs, unties the vital knots of the soul from the 
body, and, scattered outside, casts it out through the pores. For what 
else do we reckon the inflicted blow could do, except to shatter and 
untie everything? 
 
The blow unties the body’s atoms from their woven pattern, binds up (i.e. ‘restricts’) the vital 
motions, and unties the soul from the body. The ‘vital knots’ conjoining soul and body 
maintain life, and their untying constitutes death. This passage previews the soul’s dissolution 
before its full introduction in Book 3. 
 The concept of the soul being untied from the body is in fact employed by Plato, 
expressed by the term λύσις and the image of the soul ‘being freed from the body as from 
bonds’ (ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) (both Phd. 67D).582 Plato’s metaphor 
depicts the soul as anchored to the marrow by bonds, which can be untied (Tim. 73d5-7), 
allowing the soul to depart the body fully intact (Tim. 81d4-e1).583 For Lucretius, however, 
untying is a universal process affecting all things down to the atomic level, and so both body 
and soul are untied at death. The importance of the WEAVING thread for Lucretius’ depiction of 
the soul is proved by the introduction to Book 4, which lists the principal content of Book 3 
as: the nature of the soul; the bodies that make it strong (26-7); ‘and in what way, drawn 
apart, it returns into its first threads’ (quove modo distracta rediret in ordia prima – 28).584 
 In Book 3 the metaphor occurs first in the opening arguments for the united nature of 
body and soul (3.323-416). First a container metaphor describes the soul as ‘held’ (tenetur – 
323), and therefore protected, by the body. Then Lucretius supplies a horticultural metaphor, 
that body and soul ‘cling among themselves by roots’ (inter se radicibus haerent – 325), and 
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 For Epicurus’ varied responses to the theory of the soul in the Phaedo, see Warren (2006). For 
Plato’s image of bonds, see p.185. 
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 Pender (2000) 167-70.  
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 For the weaving sense of distraho, see n.566. 
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cannot ‘be torn apart without destruction’ (sine pernicie divelli – 326).585 Conceptually this 
metaphor, as in 3.563 in reference to the eye, recalls Lucretius’ weaving metaphor, implying 
tearing apart of (first-)threads. Lucretius then gives an analogy with frankincense, from which 
one cannot ‘tear away’ (evellere – 327, continuing the metaphor with etymological figure) its 
scent ‘without its nature also dying’ (quin intereat natura quoque eius – 328). This mortality 
applies analogously to body and soul, and Lucretius expresses this correspondence explicitly 
with a weaving metaphor:  
 
sic animi atque animae naturam corpore toto 
extrahere haud facile est, quin omnia dissoluantur: 330 
inplexis ita principiis ab origine prima 
inter se fiunt consorti praedita vita; 
       (3.329-332) 
[…] thus it is not easy to drag the nature of mind and soul away from 
the whole body without everything being untied: with first things 
interwoven in this way from first birth they exist among themselves 
endowed with shared life; […] 
 
So established is the synonymous nature of death and untying in the DRN that a death term is 
unnecessary here. Furthermore, by mapping the preceding image of roots onto this 
deduction, the reader can picture the body disintegrating like the earth when a plant is 
uprooted.586 The triplet divelli-evellere-extrahere represents thread-like shapes being drawn 
from a larger network.587 Parallel to this image, the soul is understood to be as intertwined 
with, and as intrinsic a part of, the body as odour is to frankincense; and, just as ‘tearing’ 
odour from frankincense (i.e. by burning) destroys the whole, so drawing the threads of soul 
from the body unties both entities on account of their closely interwoven nature.588 The soul 
dissipates just like the odour of burning frankincense, albeit quicker – as is appropriate for the 
soul’s exceedingly fine nature. Similarly, later in Book 3 the soul is said to disperse more 
quickly than smoke (435-9), and in Book 4 the ‘untying’ and dissipation of smoke and smell 
                                                          
585
 Cf. e.g. Cato Agr. 161-2: asparagum vellito ab radice. 
586
 A metaphor noted by Leonard & Smith (1942) ad 3.310, 325 and 327. 
587
 See n.287 on vello and its derivatives. extraho sometimes depicts the pulling out of thread-like 
things (Plaut. Rud. 984, with rete; Cic. Tusc. 4.57, with radices), but more importantly recalls distraho, 
whose weaving meaning in an atomic context was proved in the analysis of 2.826-33 (pp.70-1). 
Compare also diduco (see n.535), employed in 3.287 to argue for the unity of the four parts of the 
soul: ‘having been drawn out, they would destroy and untie sensation’ (interemant sensum 
diductaque solvant (3.287). We might also add deduco to this group of verbs depicting the loosening 
of the soul’s threads, for which see n.591. 
588
 I argue that Lucretius has purposely chosen evellere to describe the burning of frankincense in 
order to bring out this ‘tearing’ correspondence, rather than the more neutral seiungi seque gregari 
used of other inseparable ‘properties’ (coniuncta) similar to odour in 1.451-4.  
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are considered (e.g. 55-6, 90-4), retrospectively strengthening Lucretius’ argument for the 
soul’s mortality. 
 The WEAVING thread persists in the subsequent lines, in which Lucretius contrasts the 
soul departing the body with water losing heat, by which water is not ‘torn apart’ (convellitur 
– 340, responding to divelli and evellere in the preceding example).589 The body, however, 
cannot survive ‘the soul’s tearing apart’ (animai / discidium – 341-2) as it departs. Rather 
both ‘totally die, having been torn up, and utterly decay’ (penitus pereunt convulsi conque 
putrescunt – 343) because they are conjoined at first birth, ‘so tearing apart cannot occur 
without destruction and harm’ (discidium ut nequeat fieri sine peste maloque – 347). There 
may be a subsidiary weaving metaphor in the image of contagia (‘contacts’ – 345) formed 
between body and soul in the womb, since these are described as reposta (‘laid out’ – 346), 
which recalls the weaving sense seen in its cognate terms dispono and dispositura elsewhere 
in the DRN (and prominently in 1.52),590 of warp threads laid out before weaving. The 
interweaving (or, even without a weaving metaphor, ‘conjoining’) of body and soul at this 
early developmental stage would presage the image in 3.370-95 of body and soul interwoven 
from birth like a single cloth, the untying of which causes the death of the whole. 
 This correspondence, emphasising Lucretius’ opposition to the Platonic and Stoic 
portrayal of the soul, is extensive in Book 3. In 3.526-46, Lucretius considers a gradually dying 
man, who feels his sensation fail in certain areas first because his soul ‘is torn’ (scinditur – 
531)591 – thus proving it ‘must have a mortal nature’ (natura […] mortalis habendast – 531-
2).592 Again, in 3.679-98 body and soul are described as ‘so interwoven’ (tam contextae – 
695; cf. adnecti – 688, conexa – 691) that souls cannot enter from without (688-97, answering 
Pl. Phd. 81e2, where souls wander until ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα), and cannot ‘untie themselves’ 
(exsolvere sese – 696, answering Phd. 67D, discussed above) from the body and leave intact. 
An echo of Lucretius in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations supports the conclusion that Lucretius’ 
stance contrasts with the Platonic and Stoic view.593 In DRN 3.634-41, Lucretius states that, 
                                                          
589
 Because, as Smith (1992) ad 3.340 observes, ‘heat is an accident, not a property, of water’. 
590
 See discussion pp.34-5, 72. 
591
 For the weaving sense of scindo, see n.270. Here it is juxtaposed with two further weaving terms: 
the spirit does not ‘draw together’ (conducere – 534, i.e. its threads) into one place, and ‘draw away’ 
sensation from parts of the body (deducere – 535, i.e. by ‘drawing away its first-threads’). For 
deducere in the sense ‘drawing out, spinning out the thread’ (OLD, deduco 4) cf. Catull. 64.312-3 (with 
fila); Tib. 1.3 (with stamina); and Ov. Met. 4.36, Am. 1.14.7, Her. 9.7 (all with filum); and E-M, s. v. dux, 
who translate deduco as ‘tirer de haut en bas (les fils)’. 
592
 See also 3.640-1 (at quod scinditur et partis discedit in ullas, / scilicet aeternam sibi naturam abnuit 
esse – with scinditur echoing discissa in 639). 
593
 It is generally agreed that the magister character ‘M’ in Tusculan Disputations represents Cicero, 
although the extent to which his views are represented is unclear: Douglas (1985) 16; Gildenhard 
(2007) 25-6; Altman (2009). Cicero’s own philosophy is difficult to pigeon-hole, since, as Powell (1995) 
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when the body is severed, the soul ‘having been split […] and torn apart together with the 
body […] is scattered’ (dispertita […] et discissa simul cum corpore dissicietur – 638-9).594 Tusc. 
1.71 opposes this view, echoing its linguistic presentation: the soul ‘can neither be divided 
nor torn apart nor drawn apart’ (nec dividi nec discerpi nec distrahi potest), ‘because perishing 
is like the separation and severance and divorcing of the parts’ (est enim interitus quasi 
discessus et secretio ac diremptus […] partarum). These passages, like DRN 3.634-41, contain 
triplets terms with a -dis prefix, each denoting kinds of separation. Furthermore, Cicero’s 
choice of vocabulary, in particular discerpi, distrahi and interitus, is strongly reminiscent of 
Lucretius, and he corrects Lucretius’ unweaving metaphor by denying the soul can be ‘torn 
apart’ or ‘drawn apart’. A direct contrast arises between Lucretius’ and Cicero’s (Stoic or 
Platonic) position, emphasised by their opposing applications of the unweaving metaphor. 
 In 607-14 Lucretius recalls the gradually dying man of 526-46, to deny that the soul 
departs intact through the throat, since the man feels his soul fail in a particular region first. 
An extraordinary image is supplied, arguing that if the soul left intact, ‘it would not complain 
of being untied, but rather of going outside and abandoning its clothing, like a snake’ (non […] 
dissolvi conquereretur, sed magis ire foras vestemque relinquere, ut anguis – 613-4).595 
Lucretius does not complete the argument, because this image is a sufficiently absurd 
proposal.596 The reader can ascertain multiple correspondences in the analogy by applying 
reasoning based on their knowledge of Lucretius’ application of the WEAVING and LIFE-CYCLE 
threads to the body and soul: while the snake’s ‘clothing’ remains intact, the body is untied; 
while the snake remains alive, the soul does not. This is because an individual is not 
interwoven with their clothing from first conception, unlike the body and soul, which are 
untied together at death. 
 Lucretius summarises these correspondences in one of his last proofs of the soul’s 
mortality: 
 
quare, corpus ubi interiit, periisse necessest 
                                                                                                                                                                       
3 argues, he often examines philosophical theories admirably even-handedly. However, he clearly 
wished to emulate Plato in De Republica and De Legibus – and his interest in Platonic philosophy is 
revealed in his writings on the soul, e.g. in Somnium Scipionis (ibid, p.6, with bibliography in n.14). For 
Cicero’s philosophical variety, see also Douglas (1985) 9-12. 
594
 Contrary to Smith’s (1992) translation (‘sundered apart and cleft apart and cut apart’) the verbs 
denote three different processes: division, tearing and dispersal, united, as Smith notes (ad loc.), by 
their shared dis- prefix. 
595
 The image of ‘going outside’ recalls Plato’s ἀποδημία (Ap. 41a5; Phd. 61e2, 67c1), but denies its 
additional sense of ‘finding a new home’, for which see Pender (2000) 152. 
596
 For the snake leaving its ‘clothing’ behind, cf. 4.60-1, in which vestis is a visual exemplum for the 
films emitted from things. 
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confiteare animam distractam in corpore toto. 
       (3.798-9) 
Therefore, when the body dies you must confess the soul, drawn out 
throughout the body, perishes. 
 
The juxtaposition interiit, periisse emphasises the shared mortality of body and soul – a 
collocation translation cannot capture. Neither body nor soul can survive the ‘unweaving’ of 
their shared ‘cloth’, because unweaving and death are synonymous.   
 The association between unweaving and death is exploited in several analogical 
arguments supporting the proofs of the soul’s mortality. Specifically these are formed by 
arguments a fortiori, that if the soul is injured by diseases or shock, it must be destroyed at 
death. These arguments are expressed principally by the WEAVING thread, which describes the 
soul being ‘untied’ (470) by disease. In the specific example of an epileptic fit (3.487-509), the 
symptoms of shaking and foaming at the mouth occur because the soul is ‘drawn apart 
throughout the limbs’ (distracta per artus – 492) by the disease. The term distracta is 
repeated again in 501 and in the conclusion (507), which argues a fortiori that since the spirit 
can be drawn apart in the body it could not survive in the air after death. The image is of the 
(threads of) soul being separated, suggesting its fragility. Building upon this image, Lucretius 
states that a large shock to the body can seem to make the spirit try ‘to depart and be untied 
from the whole body’ (ire […] ac toto solui de corpore – 594). A faint follows, causing 
onlookers to hope that the victim can ‘grasp the last bond of life’ (extremum […] vitae 
reprehendere vinclum – 599). A faint unties the soul to the last bond (or, more likely, few 
bonds), thus closely approaching the full untying of death. Indeed, Lucretius concludes that 
mind and soul are so shaken ‘that a slightly graver cause could untie them’ (ut gravior paulo 
possit dissolvere causa – 602). The soul’s susceptibility to partial unweaving by diseases, 
shocks and fainting proves it is fully unwoven at death.  
 Sleep is portrayed in a similar way in 4.907-61. Recalling Lucretius’ explanation of 
epileptic fits, the soul in sleep is ‘drawn out’ (distracta – 916, 946; distractior (‘more drawn 
out’ following a large meal) – 961) throughout the limbs. Contrary to the epileptic fit, in sleep 
the limbs ‘are untied’ (dissoluuntur – 919; resolvunt – 953; cf. solvit – 6.796; solvunt – 
6.798)597 and the body ‘becomes loose-knit’ (rarescit – 865) and limp.598 Despite this untying 
                                                          
597
 Contrary to these metaphors of ‘untying’, Lucretius creates possible confusion by describing 
children as ‘fastened down by sleep’ (somno devincti – 1027) in his description of dreams (4.962-
1036). Although the limbs of the body are ‘untied’, the body as a whole is held largely still during 
sleep, and it is presumably this to which Lucretius refers here. 
598
 A similar description is given by Cicero in de Divinatione (44B.C.): si […] animus […] somno relaxatus 
solute moveatur ac libere (2.100); cf. also Ov. Met. 11.238. 
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the body does not die, because part of the soul withdraws and congregates in the body,599 
and part is cast into the air (917). This explains why the lack of sensation in sleep is similar to 
that in death. We must infer, since Lucretius does not state this explicitly, that the departed 
threads of the soul must remain entangled with those still in the body, or death would occur. 
A subsidiary liquids metaphor supports this intended distinction. Sleep ‘floods’ (inriget – 
4.908) the body and ‘pours out’ (profudit – 4.757; cf. effusum 3.113) the limbs, so they ‘flow’ 
(fluunt – 4.919) – i.e. become slack.600 The soul, however, must remain intact or the body 
would be ‘flooded’ (perfusum – 4.924).601 The processes of flooding and the untying of the 
soul that cause sleep also, when they occur to a greater extent, cause death. Thus the 
WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads emphasise the soul’s mortality and the fragility of life 
 
Unweaving, breaching boundaries and pouring 
The application of the WEAVING thread mapped out in this Section is the principal explanation 
for the mortality of body and soul. This image is enhanced by other concepts also established 
earlier in this Section, namely: the body is the container of the soul; they form a porous 
totality; and substances can pour through this totality. In this way, the BOUNDARIES, LIQUIDS 
and WEAVING threads interweave in a complex web to prove that the soul is born and dies 
with the body. The importance of the threads in this theory is made clear when they appear 
together in the first of Lucretius’ 30 proofs for the soul’s mortality (425-44). Lucretius 
reiterates the soul’s speed in liquid and weaving terms: it consists of smaller bodies than 
liquidus umor aquai (427) and is moved by ‘a fine cause’ (tenui causa – 429), such as images 
of smoke or mist (430-3), than which, we infer, it is much finer. Lucretius then offers an 
analogy: 
 
nunc igitur quoniam quassatis undique vasis 
diffluere umorem et laticem discedere cernis,  435 
et nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras, 
crede animam quoque diffundi multoque perire 
ocius et citius dissolvi in corpora prima, 
cum semel ex hominis membris ablata recessit. 
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 This distinguishes sleep from death, since a man’s slow death (3.526-47) is caused by the soul’s 
gradual ‘tearing apart’ (scinditur – 531) and dispersal (dispargitur – 539), and not because the spirit 
‘draws itself’ (conducere – 534; deducere – 535) into one place. For the weaving sense of deduco, 
which is also carried by conduco here, see n.591. 
600
 The image is recalled in Book 4, where, under the effects of desire during sexual intercourse, the 
limbs are said to ‘melt’ (liquescunt – 4.1114), suggesting a similar effect on the mind and lack of 
control over the body as occurs during sleep. 
601
 The same image occurs in a transferred sense in 6.794, where, the smell of castor oil causes a 
menstruating woman to drop her needlework, which ‘flows down’ (effluit – 795) from her hands. 
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       (3.434-9) 
Now, therefore, since you perceive water flowing away and liquid 
departing when vessels are shaken about, and since clouds and smoke 
depart into the air, believe that the spirit is also poured out and dies 
much faster and is untied much more quickly into its first bodies, when 
it has once been carried away and has receded from the limbs of men. 
 
The image of a vessel of water is mapped onto the body and soul, and the latter is in turn 
compared to cloud and smoke (the tenuis causae of 429). Lucretius argues a fortiori that, 
because the soul moves more quickly than water, it must pour out more quickly when it 
leaves its ‘vessel’; and since it is finer-knit than smoke, it must be ‘unwoven’ more quickly.602 
In fact the soul unties almost instantaneously,603 whereas smoke merely ‘departs’, suggesting 
it is not untied as instantaneously. Smoke is later described as being ‘poured out loosened’ 
(diffusa solute – 4.55),604 just as the soul is here. Again, pouring and unweaving constitute 
death. 
 The images of containers, liquids and unweaving persist in the conclusion: 
 
quippe etenim corpus, quod vas quasi constitit eius, 440 
cum cohibere nequit conquassatum ex aliqua re 
ac rarefactum detracto sanguine venis, 
aere qui credas posse hanc cohiberier ullo, 
corpore qui nostro rarus magis incohibescit? 
       (3.440-4) 
Why clearly, since the body, which exists as it were as its vessel, 
cannot, when shaken violently by some other cause and made loose-
knit by blood drawn from the veins, contain it [i.e. the soul], how could 
you believe it could be contained by any air, which is a container more 
loose-knit than our body? 
 
An additional deduction a fortiori is couched within the one outlined above. The con- prefix of 
conquassatum suggests more violent shaking than quassatis in 434: if water spills when its 
vas is shaken a little, the soul (being lighter and swifter) must depart much more quickly 
when its vas is shaken violently. In addition, whereas we do not assume that the body from 
which smoke departs is loose-knit, the soul easily departs the body, which has become ‘loose-
knit’ by ‘drawn-out’ blood (detracto suggests pulling out thread). Lucretius then offers a 
further deduction a fortiori, that, since the ‘loose-knit’ body cannot contain the soul, the air, 
being ‘more loose-knit’, certainly cannot. Containers must be tight-knit to hold substances, 
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 A comparison reiterated in 3.455-6: ergo dissolui quoque convenit omnem animai / naturam, ceu 
fumus, in altas aeris auras. 
603
 The soul’s unsurpassed speed is also emphasised by the pleonasm ocius et citius. 
604
 See p.85. 
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which otherwise pour out through the void spaces between threads, and are untied. The 
pourable soul cannot be confined by a body made loose-knit at death, and so it disperses 
untied into the surrounding air.605 
 Such is the combined nature of body and soul that the bodily container also unties 
and becomes liquid when the soul pours out at death.606 This is summarised emphatically in 
an argument that the body cannot survive ‘tearing apart’ (discidium – 581) from the spirit 
without ‘melting away in foul odour’ (in taetro tabescat odore – 581).607 There can be little 
other reason, he says, why the body would decay when the soul ‘has oozed out, poured out 
like smoke’ (emanarit uti fumus diffusa - 583), than the body’s structure being compromised 
‘by the oozing soul’ (manante anima – 586). We can conclude that the soul’s woven texture 
was ‘drawn out’ (distractam – 590; cf. 3.798-9, discussed above) before it ‘swam out’ (enaret 
– 591) into the air. In this combined image, we envisage the soul as pouring out gradually at 
death, with some soul threads remaining partially entangled with the body. These are 
thoroughly ‘drawn out’, but only fully untied when the entire soul has poured into the air. 
Together these two proofs emphasise why (as established in 550-7) Lucretius considers the 
‘container and contents’ metaphor insufficient for his depiction of the body and soul. The 
soul is again seen to pour from its bodily container when the latter becomes ‘loose-knit’; 
however, since body and soul exist closely intertwined, the body is torn when the soul’s 
threads are ‘drawn out’ at death. 
 The metaphors of pouring, unweaving and container/contents combine differently to 
argue that the soul’s mortality is proved by its ability to be healed by medicine: 
 
addere enim partis aut ordine traiecere aequumst 
aut aliquid prorsum de summa detrahere hilum, 
commutare animum quicumque adoritur et infit 515 
aut aliam quamvis naturam flectere quaerit. 
at neque transferri sibi partis nec tribui vult 
inmortale quod est quicquam neque defluere hilum; 
nam quodcumque suis mutatum finibus exit, 
continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante.  520 
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 Cf. 3.1033: Xerxes ‘poured (fudit) his soul from his dying body’. 
606
 Suggested by the sensory organs ‘melting’ when cut off in 3.553.  
607
 The word tabesco can refer either to mental or physical decay or, more figuratively, to melting 
(OLD, tabesco 1, 3 and 2 respectively). The conceptual link between decay and melting in this term was 
already established in Latin (And. trag. 17 War.; Plaut. Stich. 684) and felt by Cicero (Nat. D. 2.26). 
Lucretius also captured the correspondence in liquor (see n.574). The first attested use of the noun 
tabes to denote the liquid resulting from melting (OLD, tabes 3b) is DRN 1.806 (cf. also Livy 21.36.6; 
Luc. 10.225). The subsequent lines strengthen the liquids sense of tabesco here, showing the 
dissolution of body and soul to be a shared process. This reading is supported by linquuntur tabe in 
553, which equates rotting with liquefaction. 
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       (3.513-20) 
For it is reasonable that anyone who attempts and begins to change 
the mind, or seeks to contort whatever other nature, should add parts 
or transmute their order, or to draw out some little bit. But that which 
is immortal wants its parts to be neither transferred nor to be 
bestowed, nor a single bit to flow away; for whatever is changed and 
leaves its boundaries, at once this is the death of what was before. 
 
The unweaving metaphor depicts the soul’s ‘woven array’ of atoms being altered and also 
drawn out, which is then associated with pouring by the echo of detrahere hilum in defluere 
hilum. The ‘departure from boundaries’ metaphor implicit in the concept of change is 
explicitly stated in the closing lines, where defluere extracts an additional sense from 
mutatum finibus exit – of a river altering its boundary by changing course.608 Here, Lucretius’ 
metaphorical paradigms of death (pouring, unweaving, departing boundaries), as outlined in 
Section A of this Part, emphatically combine to show that the soul undergoes the same 
destructive processes as all composite bodies.  
 In 3.698-712 Lucretius answers a hypothesis, which works within his descriptions of 
the body as porous (or ‘loose-knit’) and the soul as ‘pourable’, that the soul can enter609 and 
‘ooze through’ (permanare – 699) the body at birth. If this happened, 
 
tanto quique magis cum corpore fusa peribit;  700 
quod permanat enim dissolvitur, interit ergo. 
       (3.700-1) 
[…] so much more it will die, poured out with the body; because that 
which oozes is untied, dies therefore. 
 
Lucretius relates the conceptual metaphor of a liquid spreading out to a cloth being 
unravelled, and both, when mapped onto the soul, constitute death. The destruction entailed 
in permano is emphasised later in the argument when it is replaced by partio (‘to divide’) as 
Lucretius argues that the soul in our bodies would differ from the one that entered, which 
‘died at that time, having been divided through our limbs’ (tunc periit partita per artus – 
710). In an accompanying analogy, the same is true of food, which ‘dies away’ (disperit – 704) 
when it is distributed throughout the body. Similarly souls, if they could enter intact, ‘in 
oozing are untied’ (in manando dissoluuntur – 706). Lucretius does not restate that they die, 
since disperit suggests this in the analogy, and the supplied metaphors of oozing and 
unweaving are synonymous with death. The argument is supported further by the assertion 
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 Several rivers were the fines of territories in the ancient world (Cic. Phil. 6.5 – the Rubicon; Curt. 
7.7.2 – the Tanais).  
609
 A theory advanced in Plato’s Phaedo, e.g. 77b, 81d-e. 
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that food ‘makes another nature out of itself’ (704) when absorbed by the body – an 
argument recalling the metaphor ‘death is the departure from boundaries’.  
 This link is drawn further in 3.754-9, where Lucretius restates that immortal souls do 
not enter bodies at birth. He suggests there is intrinsic false reasoning in arguing 
 
inmortalem animam mutato corpore flecti;  755 
quod mutatur enim dissolvitur, interit ergo. 
       (3.755-6) 
[…] an immortal soul is contorted by a change of body; because that 
which is changed is untied, dies therefore. 
 
Mortality and change are incompatible, because, as discussed in Section A of this Part, change 
constitutes a departure from boundaries, and therefore death. 756 is repeated from 701 
above, but with permanat replaced by mutatur, confirming that oozing and departing 
boundaries are synonymous with each other, and with unweaving and death. Furthermore, 
Lucretius continues, change constitutes altered woven array (ordine migrant – 757),  
 
quare dissolui quoque debent posse per artus, 
denique ut intereant una cum corpore cunctae. 
       (3.758-9) 
[…] for which reason they must also be able to be untied through the 
limbs, so they finally perish as a whole together with the body. 
 
The only way change can occur is by unweaving and re-weaving at an atomic level, just as 
one can alter a cloth only by unravelling it and starting the weaving process afresh. Positing a 
changeable soul intrinsically implies its mortality, which is expressed via metaphors of oozing, 
unweaving and transgressing boundaries. 
 
Summary 
The LIQUIDS, WEAVING and BOUNDARIES threads intertwine in a carefully balanced relationship in 
Lucretius’ portrayal of the body and soul. The body is a container for the soul, which is 
envisaged as a liquid; the liquid soul pours through the body, which is porous or ‘loose-knit’; 
and the soul and body are a thoroughly interwoven, porous totality. At death, the untying of 
the soul unties the body, and vice versa; the liquid soul pours from the body, which also 
melts, and both are fully untied; and the soul in departing transgresses the boundary of its 
bodily container. In fact, this transgression is of both a conceptual and physical boundary, as 
expressed in 3.592-606, where Lucretius argues that because the soul is shaken by a faint 
even when it ‘moves within the boundaries of life’ (finis […] vitae vertitur intra – 592), it 
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could scarcely survive at death ‘with its covering removed’ (tegmine dempto – 3.604). The 
soul, in transgressing its bodily container, transgresses the conceptual finis vitae restricting its 
lifespan. The same reading might be applied to 3.548-57, where Lucretius states the soul 
‘remains fastened in a fixed place’ (loco […] / fixa manet certo – 3.548-9) in the body, and, 
like our other organs, cannot survive if removed (3.549-57, 563-5). Here fixa, from figo, ‘to 
fix’ or ‘to drive in’, recalls the vitae depactus terminus alte (2.1087) or alte terminus haerens 
allotted to each thing, marking a boundary whose transgression again represents that thing’s 
death. The human body itself, being a physical boundary to be transgressed, represents the 
boundary of life. The transgression of one entails the transgression of the other, and the 
finality of our death is therefore utterly inevitable.610 
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 See Segal (1990) 94-114. 
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Section E 
 
The World, the Body and the Soul 
 
A persistent image in the DRN maps human physical characteristics onto the world, by which 
the world can be seen as makranthropos (a ‘large-scale human’), a term applied by Schrijvers 
and subsequently Garani.611 The comparison is especially strong in relation to the Earth’s 
maternal qualities.612 Lucretius establishes in the first two books that the Earth, as Mater 
Terra, currently bears plants and nurtures animate beings (1.250-64; 2.594-8, 604-5, 991-8), 
and bears worms (2.871-2, 898-901, 928-9; cf. also 3.719-36; 5.797-8), and indeed once bore 
all animals too (2.1151-2). The comparison is outlined in depth in Book 5 – most vividly in 
depicting animals being born from the Earth (5.795-836), a portrayal Garani labels ‘turning 
the Earth into a woman’.613 Alongside this, the conceptual threads draw a further important 
correspondence between the mortality of the Earth and of man, creating a strong connection 
between Books 3 and 5 and reinforcing the reader’s belief in the universal cycle of birth and 
death.  
 Section A of this Part considered an analogy, expressed by the LIQUIDS thread, 
between the ebb and flow of matter from things and the need for animate beings to 
replenish food in their veins (2.1122-43). This sits within a wider analogy, expressed 
principally by the LIFE-CYCLE thread, of the world’s growth and decline with that of the human 
body. The preceding lines (2.1105-21) explain that many bodies have been added to the 
world from without since its birth, but this increase only happens until ‘no more is now given 
into the veins of life (vitalis venis) than what flows away and passes out’ (1117-8) – signifying 
the end of growth. The phrase unexpectedly introduces the human analogy in the next lines, 
that whatever is seen to grow, ‘climbing the steps of adult life’ (gradus aetatis scandere 
adultae – 1123), is receiving more bodies than it gives out (1122-4). The reader’s focus is 
drawn towards humans, and the analogy is strengthened in the subsequent lines by West’s 
‘transfusion of terms’:614 the analogy flits between human images (in venas cibus – 1125, 
                                                          
611
 Schrijvers (1977) 95-101; Garani (2007) 71-81. Garani, drawing resonances with Empedocles, 
considers how Lucretius negotiates the Platonic and Stoic connotations of a human-like world. On the 
metaphor, see also Schiesaro (1990) 74-83. 
612
 Perhaps enhanced by the jingle of mater and terra in e.g. 2.993, 998; 5.795-6, 821-2; Friedländer 
(1941) 20. 
613
 Garani (2007) 81-93. 
614
 West (1969) 43-8; see n.6 of this thesis. Editors, perturbed by the human terms applied to the Earth 
in this passage, have attempted to rearrange the line order of the manuscripts. Considered especially 
suspicious are 2.1146-9, which (as Smith (1992) ad loc. summarises) Leonard & Smith (1942) and 
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1136; vescitur aetas – 1127; robor adultum – 1131; grandi cibus aevo […] defit – 1141), and 
the description of generic ‘things’ (1128, 1133). At sic igitur (1144) the focus surreptitiously 
shifts solely to the world’s intake of atoms, with cibus and venae becoming entirely 
metaphorical (omnia debet enim cibus integrare novando / et fulcire cibus, cibus omnia 
sustentare – 1146-7; quoniam nec venae perpetiuntur – 1148).615 This analogy is prominently 
located to introduce human mortality directly before Book 3. If the reader accepts the world 
is mortal, they might more readily believe the soul is too.  
 
The Earth as mother 
The conclusion extends the analogy further: 
 
iamque adeo fracta est aetas, effetaque tellus  1150 
vix animalia parva creat, quae cuncta creavit 
saecla deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu. 
       (2.1150-2) 
Indeed now its lifespan is broken, and the Earth, worn out from birth, 
scarcely bears small animals, she who gave birth to all generations and 
brought huge bodies of beasts to birth. 
 
Lucretius suggests that the Earth, which previously gave birth to all animate beings, is 
currently going through a ‘menopause’. The contrast between its past and present states is 
expressed by the antithesis parva creat, quae cuncta creavit, signalling alongside fracta est 
aetas its decline and impending mortality. 
 A full account of how the Earth gave birth to ‘all things’ is given in 5.795-836. 
Lucretius reasserts that the Earth deserves her maternal designation (merito maternum 
nomen adepta – 795 = 2.998), because everything is born (cuncta creata – 796; cf. cuncta 
creavit – 2.1151) from her. Even today worms are ‘grown together’ (concreta – 798) in the 
Earth, so it is easy to believe bigger creatures sprang forth (coorta – 799) when the Earth was 
new. How these creatures were born is explained with a startling image: 
 
tum tibi terra dedit primum mortalia saecla;  805 
multus enim calor atque umor superabat in arvis. 
hoc ubi quaeque loci regio opportuna dabatur, 
crescebant uteri terram radicibus apti; 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Büchner (1936) place after 1138 to continue the example of food in the veins. Bailey (1947) ad 2.1122-
49 argues the lines ‘read strangely in reference to the world and would more naturally refer to the 
living body’. West’s theory obviates the need for transpositions.  
615
 Garani (2007) 72-3 captures the human resonances in her translation of this passage, but overlooks 
the intricacy and fluidity of Lucretius’ argument. 
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quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerat aetas 
infantum, fugiens umorem aurasque petessens, 810 
convertebat ibi Natura foramina terrae   
et sucum venis cogebat fundere apertis 
consimilem lactis, sicut nunc femina quaeque, 
cum peperit, dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis 
impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti.  815 
       (5.805-15) 
You see, the Earth first gave forth mortal generations at that time; for 
much heat and moisture were ruling in the fields. Because of this, 
wherever a favourable region of space was supplied, wombs would 
grow, tied to the Earth by roots; when the age of infants, when the 
time was ripe, opened these up, fleeing the moisture and seeking the 
air, Nature would develop openings of the Earth there, and force it to 
pour sap, similar to milk, from open veins – just as now a woman, 
when she has given birth, is filled with sweet milk, because all that 
drive of nourishment is directed into the breasts. 
 
Lucretius maps the characteristics of a human mater onto Mater Terra. The biological detail is 
precise, including the anatomical term uteri,616 the warm and damp environment required for 
pregnancy,617 an appropriate gestation period (tempore maturo), the change of environment 
from moisture to air at birth, and the sap similar to milk.618 In the context umor in arvis might 
be a sexual metaphor, following common Roman sexual metaphors relating the female 
genitals to fields.619  
 The explicitly-drawn analogy with a pregnant woman is aided by an intermediary 
plants metaphor. Garani considers this in depth,620 and it suffices to summarise her 
arguments briefly here. The full personification, rather than a simple partial analogy, 
legitimises the theory that the Earth had wombs.621 The concurrent plant imagery, mapped 
onto the ‘Earth as mother’ analogy, vividly answers the hypothetical question, ‘how would 
one depict the Earth as a pregnant woman?’. Thus, the connections between the wombs and 
the Earth (representing the internal connection attaching the womb in the female body) are 
                                                          
616
 Garani (2007) 90 questions the plural, contending that only a ‘monstrous’ mother could have 
multiple wombs. However, it would be improbable for the Earth to give birth to all animals from a 
single womb. Lucretius depicts the Earth as being larger, having more ‘limbs’ and producing more 
offspring than a woman, and so it appropriately has more wombs.  
617
 As Garani (2007) 85-6 notes, the spontaneous creation of worms in 5.797-800 is also facilitated by 
the warm, moist Earth. Conception requires both warmth and moisture, to facilitate sexual intercourse 
and for producing seed, according to Aristotle ([Pr.] 4.5-6). Similarly, for successful gestation, the 
womb must be warm (Arist. Gen. an.  1.12, 719a31) and various fluids must be supplied (Gen. an. 2). 
618
 For pregnancy, and specifically embryological, cosmological analogies in the Presocratics, see Baldry 
(1932); Wilford (1968).  
619
 For the sexual metaphors of ‘ploughing’ and ‘sowing’, see Adams (1982) 154-5, which quotes 
Lucretius 4.1107: atque in eost Venus ut muliebria conserat arva. 
620
 Garani (2007) 89-92. 
621
 Perhaps advanced first by Epicurus, although this is disputed; see discussion in Gale (2009) ad 808. 
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described as radices,622 and the sucus supplied by the Earth for her offspring simultaneously 
suggests sap and the milk supplied by lactating women. This additional imagery is employed 
(successfully or not) to make the concept of the Earth as a mother giving birth to animals 
seem more likely. 
In 821-36 Lucretius abandons the plant imagery and resumes the simple analogy 
between Mater terra and mater humana. He reasserts that the Earth’s maternal designation 
is apt (maternum nomen adepta / terra tenet merito 821-2; cf. 795-6), since she gave birth 
(creavit – 822) to all living things.623 He then explains her present greatly reduced fertility624 
with an analogy with a menopausal woman (thus confirming the intended analogy in 2.1150-
2): sed quia finem aliquam pariendi debet habere, destitit, ut mulier spatio defessa vetusto – 
826-7).625 The Earth ages and is therefore mortal (as expressed in 2.1105-43), and subject to 
the universal birth-death cycle – as expressed by the antithesis of namque aliud putrescit et 
aevo debile languet, / porro aliud concrescit et e contemptibus exit (832-3).626 
 Notably, in this description the Earth’s ‘menopause’ is expressed as a boundary – ‘a 
limit of bearing’ (826). Similar boundaries are expressed in 2.1105-43, in which the point of 
decline of things, including the world, is described as extremum crescendi […] finem (‘the 
extreme limit of growing’ – 1116) and alescendi summum […] cacumen (‘the highest peak of 
growing’ – 1130). By this boundary Nature ‘reins in’ (refrenat – 1121) infinite growth. These 
limits of size recall the impossible giant men of the first arguments (1.199-207) – a further 
connection between the world and humans. Both are ultimately restricted by the limits of 
size and variety governing atoms (seen in Part 2 Section D), which dictate what size things can 
grow to. Again, the BOUNDARIES thread is shown to embody the universal laws governing all 
things in Lucretius’ science. Coupled with the extensive applications of the LIFE-CYCLE thread, 
the Earth is shown to be subject to the same laws as all composite things. This should 
strengthen the reader’s acceptance of the world’s mortality. 
 
The mortality of the world, the body and the soul 
                                                          
622
 Garani (2007) 90 denies these represent umbilical cords. However, they are compared to roots (as 
vehicles for nourishment) by Aristotle, Gen. an. 2.4, 740a24-740b13. See also Campbell (2003) ad loc. 
623
 Garani (2007) 81-2 argues convincingly that this constitutes a firm denial of the Earth’s divinity. 
624
 As mentioned above, Lucretius believed the generation of worms from the soil still occurred in his 
time. 
625
 Garani (2007) 92-3 provides an enlightening analysis of this passage. 
626
 The antithesis is emphasised by the lines’ identical metrical form, the elision of a conjunction and 
aliud at the start of each line, the shared position of metrically identical -sco verbs, and the third 
person singular verbs in the final feet. 
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The world’s place within the universal birth-death cycle is emphasised in particular by the 
description of the world and its parts as mortalis (‘mortal’) and nativus (‘born’). These terms, 
belonging to the LIFE-CYCLE thread, occur frequently in the DRN but often in certain specific 
applications. The adjective mortalis and its antonym immortalis occur 89 times in the DRN, of 
which 11 describe the world or its parts either directly or by analogy,627 but by far their most 
common application is to humans, totalling 69 instances (including 19 denoting the soul628 
and three the body in Book 3;629 and 5.348 pointedly referring to the body in contrast with 
the Earth). nativus, meanwhile, occurs 12 times, of which eight depict the world or its parts 
either directly or by analogy,630 and two of the remaining four refer to the soul.631 
Interestingly, the terms occur together nine times, embodying the birth-death cycle, of which 
seven refer to the world or its constituent parts either directly or by analogy,632 and another 
refers to the soul – prominently in the first line of the first argument for the soul’s mortality 
(3.417).633 The intended comparison between the world and the body and soul drawn by 
these terms is made clear in the Book 5 prologue, which recaps the principal topic of Book 3 
– that the soul ‘was born and consists of body that had birth’ (nativo […] consistere corpore 
creata – 60) and has a finite lifespan (59-61) – before introducing the focus of Book 5 – that 
‘the world consists of mortal body and had birth’ (mortali consistere corpore mundum / 
nativomque – 65-6).634 This correspondence, expressed by the LIFE-CYCLE thread, draws 
attention to the general comparison between the world and the human body, addressed at 
length in the book.  
 The comparison is resumed emphatically in the first argument that the world is 
mortal (5.235-46). Lucretius argues, pars pro toto, that because the world’s constituent parts 
(Earth, water, wind and heat – 235-6)635 ‘consist of a body born and mortal’ (nativo ac 
mortali corpore constant – 238), the whole must be mortal too.636 A broad comparison is 
                                                          
627
 mortalis: 5.65, 248, 238, 248, 321, 377; 6.43 (of the world); 5.241, 243 (animal analogies with the 
world) and 5.348 (human analogy with the world); immortalis (in denial): 5.159 (of the world). 
628
 mortalis: 3.417, 423, 512, 521, 532, 543, 668, 767, 831; immortalis (in denials): 3.612, 624, 670, 
715, 748, 755, 775, 778, 804, 819. 
629
 mortalis: 3.778, 799, 804. 
630
 2.1088; 5.66, 238, 321, 376; 6.44 (of world); 5.241, 243 (analogy with world). 
631
 3.417; 5.60. 
632
 5.65-6, 238, 241, 242-3, 321, 376-7; 6.43-4 (this instance in a recap of Book 5). 
633
 The only other occurrence relates to Empedocles’ four elements (1.755), to mark a contrast with 
the immortale corpus of Lucretius’ atoms (cf. also mortalis used of Anaxagoras’ homoeomeria – 1.855). 
634
 Bailey (1947), Costa (1984) and Gale (2009), all ad loc. 
635
 A surreptitious link with the soul (anima) may be intended in the pleonastic aurarum […] animae 
(‘breezes of wind – 236).  
636
 Further terminology of the LIFE-CYCLE thread supports this: the air receives particles and ‘gives birth 
to them again’ (recreet – 277) – allowing them to form new things; the sky never stops ‘being born’ 
from things and returning into them again (haud igitur cessat gigni de rebus et in res / reccidere – 279-
204 
 
then drawn with ‘things’ in general, which, because their ‘parts and limbs’ (partis et membra 
– 240) consist of ‘born body and mortal shapes’ (corpore nativo ac mortalibus […] figuris – 
241), must themselves be ‘mortal and born as well’ (mortalia […] nativa simul – 242-3).637 
This implicitly recalls the arguments in Book 3 that the soul, if mortal in parts, must be mortal 
as a whole (see Section D of this Part). The connection is supported by membra in 240,638 
drawing a subtle personification supported by mortalia and nativa. In 5.318-23 Lucretius 
states that the sky consists of nativo ac mortali […] corpore (321) and, like the Earth, gives 
birth to things (procreat – 319), makes them grow and nourishes them (auget alitque – 322), 
and even receives things when they are destroyed – recalling the image of the Earth as 
commune sepulcrum in 5.258-60. These similarities, supported by nativus and mortalis, guide 
the reader to recall the Earth and, by analogy, the body and soul. 
 The reader should keep this analogy in mind, since it soon returns in an argument 
(5.338-50) that if previous disasters have struck the world, it must be mortal.639 This is 
because a greater disaster than (possible) previous floods or fires would be sufficient to 
destroy the world entirely. Lucretius concludes: 
 
nec ratione alia mortales esse videmur, 
inter nos nisi quod morbis aegrescimus isdem 
atque illi quos a vita Natura removit.   350 
       (5.348-50) 
Nor by any other reasoning are we seen to be mortal, when in turn we 
grow ill from the same diseases by which Nature has removed others 
from life.640 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
80); and the light of the sun is renewed in constant supply, so there never seems to be a break and the 
‘death’ (exitium – 301) – i.e. departure – of one light beam ‘is hidden by the swift birth’ (celeri celatur 
origine – 301) of another. In the latter example, the perpetual cycle of creation and destruction is 
emphasised by the tmesis nec loca lux inter quasi rupta relinquit (299) and radios inter quasi rumpere 
lucis (287). For this technique in Lucretius, see Hinds (1987) 450-3. 
637
 Cf. 5.318-23, in which the sky is said to consist of nativo ac mortali […] corpore (321) because, like 
the Earth in 5.258-60, it gives birth to things (procreat – 319) and receives them again when they are 
destroyed (perempta – 320), and must be diminished (diminui – 323) and reborn (recreari – 323) in the 
cycle of growth, nourishment (auget alitque – 322) and death of things. 
638
 See Garani (2007) 75-81 on Lucretius’ use of membra in relation to the world. 
639
 The use of the term exitium (344) to describe the world’s inevitable ‘death’ has mortal 
connotations, supported by the preceding lines that offer proofs that the world had a ‘birthday’ 
(genitalis origo – 324), and that this was recent (habet novitatem summa recensque / naturast mundi 
– 330-1) – proved by the lack of poems sung about civilizations before Thebes and Troy. This latter 
assertion seems to contradict Lucretius’ account of the world’s creation and his history of man, who 
evolved over time (5.925-1457). Perhaps Troy and Thebes were the first civilisations of man with 
deeds worthy of poetic tales. 
640
 Segal (1990) 57 suggests the root ‘birth’ sense of Natura is activated by juxtaposition with a vita 
here, together embodying the birth-death cycle. 
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The reader is by now attuned to analogies between the Earth and the human body. However, 
this one is loosely made. Lucretius’ argument that a single world suffers afflictions of differing 
gravity is supported by an analogy involving multiple human individuals suffering the same 
diseases. The reader must perhaps supply additional information to the human example – 
namely that although we suffer light illnesses and survive, we know stronger illnesses are 
fatal, and therefore we are mortal. This argument occurred in 3.592-606, that since we know 
shocks affect the soul, a greater shock would be fatal. The connection seems difficult for the 
reader to follow. However, in the argument directly following ours – that eternity is a quality 
only possessed by atoms, void and the sum of things – 5.351-63 repeat 3.806-18 almost 
verbatim, following which Lucretius argues (3.819-29) that the soul cannot be immune to 
destruction like atoms, void and the universe, because it is susceptible to disease.641 The keen 
reader (and re-reader), guided by the LIFE-CYCLE thread and its application to the Earth and the 
human body, might recall the correspondences with the soul in Book 3 and map them onto 
the analogy of 5.348-50. In turn, the conclusion (364-79) that the world is mortal, and 
therefore its parts must be nativa (376) and consist of mortali corpore (377), by analogy 
strengthens the reader’s belief in the soul’s mortality. 
 The other principal way in which the world and the body are compared is in their 
internal structure. This is hinted at by the LIFE-CYCLE thread in an image considered in Part 2: 
the Earth and the sky live as a composite just as they did when they were first conceived 
(prima concepta ab origine – 5.548; ex ineunte aevo – 5.555). This recalls the nature of body 
and soul, which live ‘with first-bodies interwoven from first birth’ (inplexis […] principiis ab 
origine prima – 3.331). Here the WEAVING thread depicts the body and soul’s combined 
nature, and this is echoed by Lucretius’ description of the parts of the world. 
 In 5.534-64 Lucretius explains that the earth rests in the middle of the world because 
it is ‘conjoined and bound as one’ (coniuncta atque uniter apta – 537; repeated in 555 and 
558)642 with the air. The weaving meaning of apta is strengthened by a neighbouring 
metaphor, that the earth and sky ‘cling together among themselves by shared roots’ 
(communibus inter se radicibus haerent – 554). This image, conceptually reminiscent of 
entangled threads, is applied (as we saw in Section D of this Part) in 3.325 to the relationship 
between the body and the soul (with the implicit weaving image supported by divelli, evellere, 
                                                          
641
 The soul’s susceptibility to disease as a proof for its mortality is common in Book 3 (459-78, 487-
509, 510-25). 
642
 The elisions emphasises the conjoined nature, as with anima atque animus (and its variations) 
discussed in n.230. 
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extrahere, dissoluantur and inplexis nearby).643 The keen reader would notice this resonance 
and map the interwoven nature of body and soul onto the Earth and the air. Lucretius 
confirms the intended analogy: 
 
nonne vides etiam quam magno pondere nobis 
sustineat corpus tenuissima vis animai 
propterea quia tam coniuncta atque uniter apta est? 
       (5.556-8) 
Do you not see also how the finest strength of soul holds up our body 
with its great weight, for the reason that it is so conjoined and bound 
to it as one? 
 
The analogy is strengthened by the weaving metaphor of the repeated phrase coniuncta 
atque uniter apta, and tenuissima, an adjective frequently applied by Lucretius to the soul. 
The connection is in fact drawn in the bridging section (5.91-109) between the Book 5 
prologue and first arguments, in relation to the seas, Earth and sky: ‘one day will hand over 
these three such woven textures to death’ (tria talia texta, / una dies dabit exitio – 94-5). The 
reader well-versed in the LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING threads will know that a substance’s woven 
nature betrays its mortality. More specifically, however, after the recap of Book 3 in the 
prologue to Book 5, the reader will recall the body and soul. The proofs of the world’s birth 
and inevitable death are similar to, and as conclusive as, those applied to the soul in Book 3. 
Each depiction of the world’s mortality recalls the soul, reinforcing the reader’s belief in the 
soul’s mortality. The processes of birth and death, depicted by the LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING 
threads, are relentless and universal. 
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 See pp.188-9. 
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Section F 
 
The Phenomena of Book 6 
 
Part 2 considered applications of individual threads for the purpose of explaining mysterious 
phenomena in Book 6. The WEAVING thread is particularly prominent, attributing 
meteorological phenomena to the texture of clouds, which are compared to clothes in 6.471 
(vestes) and wool in 6.504 (vellera lanae), embodying, as Garani notes, their absorbent 
qualities.644 This woven texture is susceptible to being torn, causing lightning, rain and 
whirlwinds. The LIQUIDS thread also occurs, portraying the swift ‘flow’ of lightning (recalling 
the ‘fountain of the sun’ image of 5.592-603) and the way in which fire seeds ‘gush forth’ 
from the spring of Dodona and ignite tow held at a distance. This Section will address how 
the threads combine in explaining such phenomena, and the mystery of the magnet. 
 
Squeezing and loosening 
As well as clouds being ‘torn’, several of Lucretius’ suggestions explaining the emission of 
lightning and rain rely on a squeezing image. Lightning is forcefully squeezed out by wind 
(expressa – 6.181, 212; expressit – 6.275) or its own force (exprimitur – 6.328), rain less 
forcefully (minus the ex- prefix) by cloud and wind (premit – 6.512; premuntur – 6.518, 
734).645 This process fits conceptually within the ‘squeezing out the cloth’ metaphor outlined 
in Section B of this Part – in particular because the clouds’ ‘woven’ nature has been 
established. Among Lucretius’ alternative explanations of lightning an opposite but 
complementary process is evident. Lucretius suggests (6.214-8) that lightning falls from 
clouds when ‘they grow loose-knit’ (rarescunt – 214): 
 
nam cum ventus eas leviter diducit euntis  215 
dissoluitque, cadant ingratis illa necessest 
semina quae faciunt fulgorem; […] 
       (6.215-7) 
[…] for when the wind gently draws them out and unties them as they 
go past, those seeds that cause lightning must fall against their will; […] 
                                                          
644
 Garani (2007) 213 gives these examples to support a preceding assertion that ‘clouds are thought 
of as possessing a spongy texture’ in Lucretius, recalling Theophr. Metars. 2.13-17; 4.4-7 Daiber (1992), 
which compares clouds to both wool and sponges. This reading is problematic in the images of vestes 
and vellera lanae, however, since both refer explicitly to textiles and their associated absorbent 
qualities. 
645
 Cf. Aët. 3.3.2, which attributes to Anaximenes the theory that ‘rain is squeezed out’ (ἐκθλίβεσθαι 
τοὺς ὄμβρους) when clouds are compressed. 
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The wind loosens the woven texture of clouds in two ways: drawing apart and untying the 
constituent threads. Subsequently, the structure becomes sufficiently loose-knit for fire seeds 
to fall through – or, by mapping the established image of liquid lightning onto this proof, to 
‘pour’ through. Therefore, in addition to ‘wringing out’, clouds can cause a lightning strike 
when its threads are loosened – an image applied to flavour entering the tongue in 4.621 (see 
pp.173-4). 
 Lucretius uses these opposite processes to explain why certain springs are cold 
during hot periods and hot during cold periods (6.840-79). In hot weather the earth ‘grows 
loose-knit’ (rarescit – 841) and ‘sends out’ (dimittit – 842) bodies of heat into the air, thus 
cooling the spring; in cold weather the earth ‘is pressed’ (premitur – 845) so that ‘it squeezes 
out’ (exprimat - 847) heat into the well. The former process suggests the Earth’s constituent 
interweavings being loosened, the latter its woven texture being compressed and the water 
within being wrung out. 
 The same processes offer possible explanations for why the spring near the shrine of 
Ammon is hot at night and cold during the day (6.848-78). Lucretius explains that the earth 
nearby is ‘more loose-knit’ (magis […] rara – 861-2) than elsewhere and contains seeds of 
fire. The spring is heated when the earth, ‘as though compressed by a hand, squeezes out 
whatever seeds of fire it contains into the spring’ (tamquam compressa manu sit, / exprimat 
in fontem quae semina cumque habet ignis – 866-7). In the morning the sun ‘makes the earth 
loose-knit’ (terram […] rarefecit – 869-70), enabling it to receive the heat again.646 Once more 
the opposite processes are envisaged as a cloth being wrung out647 and its threads being 
loosened – supported by the weaving terms rarus and rarefacio. Lucretius’ final proof 
enhances this reading: 
 
praeterea solis radiis iactatur aquai 
umor et in lucem tremulo rarescit ab aestu;  875 
propterea fit uti quae semina cumque habet ignis 
dimittat, quasi saepe gelum, quod continet in se, 
mittit et exsolvit glaciem nodosque relaxat. 
       (6.874-8) 
Besides, the liquid of water is thrown about by the sun’s rays and 
grows loose-knit in the light by its shaking heat; for this reason it 
happens that it sends out whatever seeds of fire it holds, just as it often 
                                                          
646
 A similar process occurs in 6.631-8, in which saltwater is filtered through the earth (percolatur and 
remanat – 635; confluit – 637). 
647
 Despite compressa manu recalling manu premere in the sponge analogy; see pp.173-4. 
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sends out the cold which it holds in itself, and unweaves the ice and 
loosens its knots. 
 
Here exsolvit […] nodosque relaxat bridges the proofs as a synonym for rarescit, and 
emphasises the weaving metaphor in Lucretius’ explanations648 – supported by radii, which 
can also mean ‘shuttles’.649 Interestingly, whereas wringing out always involves one 
substance departing another, ‘loosening’ enables bodies to both enter and depart the 
containing substance. This mirrors Lucretius’ established explanations (expressed by the 
LIQUIDS and WEAVING threads) for how one substance pours through something loose-knit, an 
explanation seen in relation to the human body in Section D of this Part.650 In addition, the 
reader should also recall Lucretius’ ‘emptying and filling the container’ metaphor. The 
reader’s receptiveness to Lucretius’ explanations here will perhaps be correlative to their 
understanding of the conceptual threads and their application in depicting the interactions 
between substances. 
 
Magnets 
The explanation of the magnet (6.906-1089) also relies strongly on the extensive web of 
correspondences between threads in the preceding five books. Book 6 as a whole, and the 
magnet passage in particular, encompasses Lucretius’ methodology of encouraging the 
reader to combine established theories (and the metaphors that explain them) to explain new 
and complex scientific problems for themselves.651 The magnet was a common puzzle to be 
solved in ancient philosophy, previously addressed by Thales (Diog. Laert. 1.24 = KRS 90),652 
Empedocles (Alex. Quaest. 2.23 = DK 31A89)653 and Diogenes of Apollonia (Alex. Quaest. 2.23 
= DK 64A33), and its mysterious nature is acknowledged by Lucretius – men ‘wonder’ at it 
(mirantur – 910). His explanation is supported by applications of the WEAVING and LIQUIDS 
threads echoing those already established in the DRN. 
 The threads combine in the introduction to the theory as Lucretius depicts a magnet 
holding a chain of iron rings: its ‘strength and bonds’ (vim vinclaque – 915) are obvious, ‘to 
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 For the unweaving (i.e. melting) of ice, see p.90. 
649
 Cf. 5.266-7, 388-9, discussed pp.87-8; and also n.179. 
650
 We might also compare how heat makes the skin contract or ‘draw together’ (trahit et conducit – 
6.967) – a process the keen reader might imagine as ‘squeezing out’ sweat. 
651
 Applying the method of ‘one proof kindling light for other proofs’, outlined in 1.1114-7; see Clay 
(1998) 141. 
652
 This reports that Aristotle and Hippias attribute the theory of magnets containing soul to Thales. 
For discussion, see KRS, pp.95-7. 
653
 Based on a theory of effluences, apparently taken up in Diogenes’ account. Garani (2007) 165-70 
compares Lucretius’ treatment with Empedocles’, focusing specifically on metaphors of binding and 
fitting together, rather than of pouring (which is mentioned only in passing). 
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such an extent does its strength prevail by oozing (lit. ‘oozingly’)’ (usque adeo permananter 
vis pervalet eius – 916). It is not yet stated explicitly which processes these metaphors 
denote. Lucretius reveals this throughout his explanations, returning to several of his 
established theories and metaphors. This methodology is hinted at as Lucretius asserts that 
‘many things must be confirmed’ (917) before an explanation can be deduced, and solicits the 
reader’s attention for this task (quo magis attentas auris animumque reposco – 920). He then 
compares in turn: the discharge of particles from things (921-35); the porosity of all things 
(936-58); the different effects one thing has on several different things (959-78); and the 
varying shapes of bodies and ‘openings’ (foramina) accounting for different interactions 
between things (979-97). Finally, when summarising his various explanations for magnetism, 
Lucretius considers other things with special affinities (6.1065-94). Throughout these 
confirmations Lucretius resumes previous arguments and applications of the LIQUIDS and 
WEAVING threads – embodying the method of universalisation by applying shared explanations 
to many disparate things. The LIQUIDS thread, being more prominent, will be considered first, 
however it will become apparent that its effectiveness at explaining magnetism relies both 
explicitly and implicitly on the WEAVING thread. 
 The first confirmation in this section establishes the importance of the LIQUIDS thread 
to Lucretius’ theory.654 He argues (6.921-35) that there is a perpetual discharge from all 
things, since vision-provoking bodies ‘must perpetually flow and be sent out and sprinkled’ 
(perpetuo fluere ac mitti spargique necessest – 6.922) from everything.  The subsequent lines 
(923-35) repeat 4.217-29 almost verbatim, and 921-2 may supply part of the lacuna before 
4.217.655 Lucretius extends the liquids examples and vocabulary used in 4.217-29 (supporting 
the theory of sensory effluences flowing perpetually from things)656 by replacing volitare 
(4.221) with manare (6.927) to depict the movement of sound. By repeating these lines 
Lucretius universalises the (liquid) processes behind magnetic and sensory effluences, while 
being careful to distinguish between their physical natures by not applying the same term to 
the two kinds of effluences. This contrasts Empedocles’ use of the liquid term ἀπορροή, 
which applies to both sensory and magnetic effluences (Plat. Meno, 76C-D, and Alex. Aphrod. 
Quest. 2.23 = DK 31A89).657 
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 See Serres (2000), 95-6. 
655
 Cf. also fluere et mitti volgo spargique putandumst in relation to smell (4.676), discussed on pp.107-
8. 
656
 See pp.106-8. 
657
 For ἀπορροή in theories of sensation, see pp.104-5 and note there. For Empedocles’ effluences, see 
Garani (2007) 157-60. 
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 Lucretius’ terms for magnetic effluences, unlike those that cause sensation, carry 
liquids connotations – in particular aestus. Although this can mean ‘heat’,658 the intended 
sense of ‘wave’ or ‘current’ is clear when Lucretius first addresses magnetism directly 
(6.1002-21), stating that attraction occurs when seeds ‘flow’ (fluere – 1002) from the stone, 
or a ‘wave’ (aestum – 1002)659 beats away the intervening air, allowing the primordia of iron 
to fill the space created. The image of a wave prepares the reader in advance for Lucretius’ 
explanation (1022-41) of the iron’s movement towards the magnet, when air penetrating the 
iron’s foramina propels it forward, like wind propelling a ship by its sails (1031-3). The keen 
reader will remember the aestus and perhaps envisage the iron ‘ship’ being carried on a ‘tide’ 
of air, suggesting a joint impulse of air within the iron and without. 
 The liquids sense of aestus is clear in the next passage (6.1042-55), where Lucretius 
explains how a magnet repels iron filings in a bronze bowl.660 The bronze, like the magnet, 
emits an aestus (1049), which fills the iron’s pores before the magnetic aestus (1051) can 
enter. As a result, the magnetic aestus cannot ‘swim through’ (tranet – 1052) as normal. 
Lucretius concludes: 
 
cogitur offensare igitur pulsareque fluctu 
ferrea texta suo; quo pacto respuit ab se 
atque per aes agitat sine eo quod saepe resorbet. 1055 
       (6.1053-55) 
Therefore it is forced to collide and to beat the woven texture of iron 
with its flood; by which means it spews back from itself and stirs up 
through the bronze that which without the bronze it often swallows. 
 
Being unable to fill the iron, the magnetic wave buffets it with its fluctus – here a synonym for 
aestus. The reader might recall the ship analogy here.661 The image of the iron being ‘spewed 
back’ by the aestus, rather than being ‘swallowed’ as normal, might direct the keen reader 
towards 2.196-200 in which a wooden beam is ‘spewed out’ (respuat umor aquae – 2.197; 
also revomit – 199) when pushed into water.  
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 OLD, s. v. aestus, 1-4. 
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 The term suggests a continuous flow of invisible particles, a concept shared with Lucretius’ 
explanation of the spread of disease (mortifer aestus – 6.1138; cf. aestu, of the plague – 6.1262-3). The 
liquids reading there is supported by confluxit (6.1260), of disease ‘flowing together’. Perhaps, 
however, aestus may appropriately carry a sense of ‘heat’ here, as a common cause and symptom of 
illness (passim in [Arist.] Pr.). 
660
 See Wallace (1996) on this proof. 
661
 In a further correspondence, pulsare recalls both discutit in 1003, and also diverberat in 2.152 
(aerias quasi dum diverberat undas – for West’s ‘swimming’ image here, see n.529). Water is able both 
to beat and be beaten through. 
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 It is evident that the reader should envisage magnetic force as a ‘liquid’ wave. This is 
strengthened further in the subsequent consideration (6.1056-64) of other items unaffected 
by the magnet’s aestus (1056), owing either to weight, as in the case of gold, or, like wood, a 
rarus texture, through which the aestus (1059) passes intact. Lucretius then emphatically 
completes his argument, stating that the iron’s weight and texture together allow it to be 
filled with corpuscula of bronze and propelled by the magnet’s ‘river’ (flumine – 1064). The 
occurrence of flumen at the very end of Lucretius’ explanation strikingly confirms the liquid 
process behind magnetism. The metaphor, a vivid embodiment of a liquid flow from magnet 
to iron, is undermined when translated as ‘flow’ (Rouse, Melville, Stallings) or ‘current’ 
(Latham, Godwin). Lucretius wishes his reader to consider magnetic force not simply as 
possessing liquid qualities, but as an actual liquid. His closing remarks (6.1065-89), listing 
other things with singularly close affinity, consist entirely of liquid examples: glue and wood; 
grape juice and spring water; purple dye and wool; and solders between metals. A contrasting 
example is of pitch and olive oil, which will not mix owing to their different viscosities.662 By 
the end of the long explanation of the magnet, the reader, tracking the LIQUIDS thread, is 
certain that magnets attract or repel iron not by magic or because magnets contain soul, but 
by a wave of bodies. 
 In the passages just analysed, the WEAVING thread is also evident. Section B of this 
Part outlined Lucretius’ theory that woven structures enable ‘liquid’ movement through 
them. This is utilised here to explain how attraction is possible and the way in which the iron 
and magnet cohere. In 6.1053-5, Lucretius states that the magnetic ‘flood’ beats into the 
iron’s texta because the iron’s pores have been filled with the aestus of the intervening 
bronze dish. Normally the iron’s texta would allow free passage to the magnetic aestus. 
Lucretius draws attention to the opposite effect here. 
 Indeed, the expected metaphors depict normal magnetic attraction. The second 
proof confirmed before the magnet is addressed is ‘of how loose-knit a body things consist’ 
(quam raro corpore sint res – 936) – on which several later arguments in the theory rely (with 
rarus occurring a further four times – 958, 1024, 1035, 1059). Lucretius directs his reader back 
to Book 1 (quod in primo quoque carmine claret – 937), and in particular they should recall 
1.346-57, with which our passage shares several examples: caves dripping with moisture 
(1.348-9; 6.942-3); food dispersed throughout living things (1.350-3 (including trees); 6.946-
7); sounds passing through walls (1.354-5; 6.951-2 (mentioning smells also)); and the 
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 Garani (2007) 167 notes the similarity here with Empedocles: ‘water combines rather with wine, 
but does not want to with oil’ (Alex. Quaest. 2.23 = DK 31B91). 
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penetrating power of cold (1.355; 6.948-50, 952-3 (mentioning heat also)).663 The Book 6 
passage offers more examples than the corresponding passage in Book 1, including sweat 
(944), the growth of body hair (945), disease (955), and storms penetrating the sky (956-7, 
and the possible missing line before 955)664 – and the content of the latter two situates the 
passage firmly in its Book 6 context. The metaphor of ‘pouring through the void’ is brought 
out by liquids terms, both metaphorical and literal, as with the rocks that ‘sweat with 
moisture’ (sudent umore – 943), and the ‘sweat’ that ‘oozes from our whole body’ (manat 
item nobis e toto corpore sudor – 944). Not all the examples given are of liquids, but those 
that are not should be considered in liquids terms. Hence, Lucretius describes smell and heat 
as oozing (permanat – 952) through walls. The same word can be applied to the example of 
cold and heat passing through metal cups (947-50), particularly since in the same example in 
1.494-6 the process is described in this way (permanat – 494).665 The liquid flows in these 
examples are enabled specifically by the container substance’s rarus texture, as in the Book 1 
passage (1.347). The passage’s conclusion emphasises this further: ‘there is nothing that is 
not woven with loose-knit body’ (nil est nisi raro corpore nexum – 958). 
 This process, marking an intersection between the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads, is 
emphasised further in 6.979-97, where Lucretius considers how the different pores in 
different things (multa foramina […] variis […] reddita rebus – 981) cause different effects 
when substances interact. Thus, one thing is seen ‘to ooze’ (manare – 990) through stone, 
another through wood; and different things pass through metals and glass – warmth through 
the former, flowing images (fluere – 993) through the latter (990-4).666 These examples again 
recall the water oozing through rocks in 1.348 and 6.943, and hot and cold oozing through 
silver in 1.494-501. They also echo the explanation in 4.143-67 of how vision films, moving 
with a constant flow (abundat – 145; perpetuo fluere – 157), are broken up by stone or wood, 
but pass through glass and flow back (redundent – 154) from mirrors. The examples of stone 
and wood might also recall 4.595-602, in which sounds ‘swim through’ (tranant – 601) walls 
and are heard from a closed-off room. The passages are linked by the LIQUIDS thread, again 
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 The passages are very similar but with minor differences. For example, the moist caves are 
described with several shared words (in saxis ac speluncis (1.348), in speluncis saxa superna (6.942); 
umor (1.349), umore (6.943); guttis (1.349; 6.943)); but in Book 1 the rocks ‘cry’ (flent – 1.349), while 
in Book 6 they ‘sweat’ (sudent – 943). This emphasises Lucretius’ method of universalisation by clear 
signposts, and his urge for varietas of metaphor. 
664
 For thoughts on the content of this line, if only one is missing, see Smith (1992) ad loc., with refs. 
there to Bailey’s and Smith’s suggested interpolations. Godwin (1991) ad loc. supports Bailey’s. 
665
 See p.97 for an examination of this passage. 
666
 Other verbs of motion are used here too – transire (991), meare (992), transmittere (994) – 
however, the shared process of pouring is emphasised by the repetition of aliud four times in 990-2, 
joining these verbs to manare in 990. 
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universalising by shared metaphor the process of movement through the void. However, the 
Book 6 passage explicitly explains that these flowing movements differ because of ‘the 
dissimilar nature and woven textures of things’ (dissimilem naturam textaque rerum – 997). 
 This WEAVING thread not only explains how certain substances can flow through 
others, but also how one combines with another. From experience, weaving occurs when 
threads coincide with gaps between other threads – a process that metaphorically explains 
atomic cohesion. It also explains how iron and the magnet cohere. Garani distinguishes 
between a construction metaphor depicting this coherence, and a weaving metaphor 
specifically depicting the iron’s constituent texture.667 The iron is described vividly – nothing 
clings together ‘more intertwined among its own elements, woven together more tightly’ 
(magis primoribus ex elementis / indupedita suis arte conexa – 1009-10) – while the 
construction metaphor is evident in a collocation of terms (iungitur – 1069, 1074; iungatur – 
1079; compages – 1071, cf. also 1016). However, Garani’s clear distinction in usage cannot 
always be drawn. In the analogies with pairs of things that cohere closely, Lucretius describes 
them as apta (‘bound together’ – 1067), and employs the verb copulo (‘join together’ – 
1078),668 to assert that ‘in this way the textures of these things have fallen mutually against 
each other’ (quorum ita texturae ceciderunt mutua contra – 6.1084) so their cava and plena 
(empty and full spaces) align (6.1085-6).669 Also, in 1031-6 Lucretius describes the air being 
‘insinuated finely’ (subtiliter insinuatus – 1032) in the iron, which is of raro […] corpore (1035) 
– again suggesting threads interacting. Finally, the examples of various individual substances 
affecting different things in different ways in 959-78 frequently involve weaving processes. 
Although the reader may elsewhere envisage the iron and magnet as conjoined like wooden 
joints (as in Garani’s interpretation), in these proofs a complementary weaving metaphor 
guides the reader to envisage the iron and magnet becoming interwoven. As a result, the 
process of magnetism involves a flow of bodies from magnet to iron, which become 
insinuated in and interwoven with the iron’s woven texture, which is itself sufficiently tightly 
woven to drag the whole mass of iron towards the magnet (1012-6). 
 
In sum, the reading of the presentation of the phenomena outlined here shows the LIQUIDS 
and WEAVING threads intertwining to create new and universalised explanations for complex 
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 Garani (2007) 165-70 (esp. 169-70). 
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 Garani (2007) 167 also takes inter se singlariter apta (1067) and copulat (1078) as construction 
metaphors. However, aptus is situated in Lucretius’ WEAVING thread, and copulo, whose cognate copula 
means ‘a bond, leash, ligament, tie’ (OLD, copula 1, 2), comfortably joins it. These terms are 
sufficiently ambiguous to undermine Garani’s specific metaphor reading. 
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 Similarly, Empedocles (Alex. Quaest. 2.23 = DK 31A89) asserts that effluences from the iron must be 
symmetrical with the pores of the magnet; see Garani (2007) 158-60. 
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processes. For the ‘wringing out the cloth’ metaphor, Lucretius has appropriated ἔκθλιψις 
from the Greek tradition and expanded and adapted it with his own persistent metaphors to 
explain an important facet of his atomic theory. In his explanation of magnetism, meanwhile, 
Lucretius does not fully express the process as outlined in this Section, but relies on the 
reader’s understanding of established aspects of the WEAVING and LIQUIDS threads, as well as 
the complementary ‘container’ metaphor, expressed by the intertwined BOUNDARIES and 
LIQUIDS threads. To enhance the reader’s understanding, Lucretius directs them with the help 
of the threads towards specific previous proofs, but they are also to search out proofs 
elsewhere, like the proverbial hound tracking its prey. The closing proofs of the DRN, before 
the plague scene, are partly designed to train the reader in the process of comparing proofs 
by means of universalisation and analogy, supported by the conceptual threads. They are 
then prepared to explain by the same method any other phenomena they might encounter, 
at which point they will be truly well-versed in Epicurean science.  
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Section G 
 
Moral Philosophy 
 
Lucretius’ explanation of his moral philosophy, like his physical science, is shaped by his 
conceptual threads. Unsurprisingly, the PLEASURE thread is central in explaining pleasure, and 
it is joined by the BOUNDARIES, LIQUIDS and WEAVING threads to explain several of its aspects. In 
theory Lucretius’ reader will become able to employ their knowledge of the threads to 
manage their own emotions, or at the very least understand the processes underlying them 
more clearly. This is especially the case in relation to established applications of the threads 
in Lucretius’ materialist worldview. This Section will explore how the same processes – 
expressed by the threads – that govern atoms and their interactions, and the effects these 
have on a macroscopic scale, also dictate how we experience pleasure. This will have 
consequences for the consolatory aspects of the DRN.  
 
Pleasure, limits and containers 
The aspect of Epicurean pleasure upon which Lucretius places greatest focus is the limits of 
pleasure,670 addressed especially in the Book 2 prologue. Here Lucretius emphasises the 
importance of taking pleasure from personal safety and freedom from pain (1-19), and not 
desiring extravagant things ahead of more natural things (20-61).671 In this exposition, 
Lucretius, following Epicurus (Ep. Men. 127-32), states that things that are necessary for the 
body are limited to those that bring pleasure by subtracting pain (20-3), such as relaxing by a 
stream in nice weather, rather than luxuries such as precious metals and partying (23-33). 
Similarly, expensive linen cannot dispel the pain of illness any more effectively than a 
plebeian’s cloak (34-6). Luxuries are also unable to dispel fear, since this can only be achieved 
by Naturae species ratioque (53-61).672 Elsewhere in the DRN these doctrines are expressed 
principally by the intertwined PLEASURE and BOUNDARIES threads. This is the case when the 
vanity of luxury is considered again towards the end of Book 5, when Lucretius argues that 
throughout the history of man possessions, however luxurious, have only been objects of 
desire until something new exceeds them. This occurs because man ‘does not know what the 
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 See Epicurus, Ep. Men. 127-35 and RS 3, 18-21; De Lacy (1969) 109; Gosling & Taylor (1982) 352, 
355-8; Long (1986) 306-7 Bailey (1947) 61-3, 767-7. 
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 Woolf (2009) argues that Epicurus believed that the desperate pursuit of luxury, rather than luxury 
in itself, was to be avoided. 
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 Epicurus, Ep. Men. 131 outlines the importance of reasoning in deciding which pleasures to choose; 
see Woolf (2009), 165. 
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limit of possession is, and to what point true pleasure can ever grow’ (non cognovit quae sit 
habendi / finis et omnino quoad crescat vera voluptas – 1432-3) – since pleasure is the 
satisfaction of a need, and unnecessary desires cannot be satisfied.  
 The limits of pleasure are of great importance to two further fundamental theories of 
Lucretian moral philosophy – that death should not be feared, and that love is harmful and 
should be avoided. In the closing passages of Book 3, Lucretius depicts the complaints of 
men, that their life, and therefore pleasure, is limited. Lucretius in response argues that 
although pleasure is limited by death, so too is the craving for it. Therefore, mourners should 
qualify their lamentations with a consolation that ‘no more does any craving for these things 
sit upon you’ (nec tibi earum / iam desiderium rerum super insidet una – 900-1). Later, 
Lucretius argues by analogy that just as we feel no care in sleep (919-20), so in the 
‘everlasting sleep’ (aeternum […] soporem – 921) of death, no ‘craving’ (desiderium – 922) 
affects us. Death constitutes a limit both to pleasure and to harmful longing for pleasure. 
Lucretius emphasises the dangers of craving in the closing passage of the book. He asks why 
there is ‘such evil, extensive desire for life’ (mala […] vitai tanta cupido – 1077), despite the 
finis vitae (1078) established for all mortals. He then criticises the desire to live longer in 
order to encounter ‘new pleasure’ (nova […] voluptas – 1081), since, because pleasure is 
limited, there would be no new pleasure awaiting us anyway. Instead, we crave (avemus – 
1082) what is absent, and upon finding it we crave (avemus – 1083) something else, so ‘the 
same thirst for life’ (sitis aequa […] vitai – 1084) always remains. 
 To strengthen this argument, Lucretius asserts that at death pain, like pleasure and 
craving (which, we infer, brings pain), is limited.673 This is expressed in particular in the 
conclusion of the explanation that the storied punishments of the afterlife do not await us 
after death, but occur in life (3.978-1023). A man who evades punishment for evil deeds in 
life fears recriminations after death, unaware that there is a ‘boundary of misfortunes’ 
(terminus […] malorum– 1020) and ‘limit of punishments’ (poenarum […] finis – 1021), which 
cannot worsen after death (1022). Lucretius again portrays death as an all-encompassing 
limit, and reiterates the importance of understanding boundaries as a means of dispelling 
fear. 
 The limits of pleasure and pain outlined here are also expressed in a more complex 
image from Lucretius’ ‘container’ metaphor (formed from the LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES 
threads), which first occurs when Nature upbraids the dying man for his lamentations (3.931-
63). The man’s ability to hold onto pleasure is depicted metaphorically as filling a vas (936): if 
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 As pain is limited, so should grief be. Konstan (2013) argues that Lucretius’ principal criticism of 
mourners is not that they are grieving, but that their grief might be without limit. 
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the vessel is without holes, it holds pleasure, and the man is content (935-9) – he should then 
willingly die ‘like a banqueter full of life’ (ut plenus vitae conviva – 938);674 but if it has holes, 
pleasure will have ‘poured out’ (profusa – 940) – he should, however, not seek to add more 
(941), but draw ‘a limit on life’ (vitae finem – 943), and accompanying pleasure and pain. Thus 
pleasures are envisaged as liquids filling the container of the mind and soul.675 The very 
concept of a container entails a limit of filling, and therefore a limit of pleasure, which is 
reduced further (causing increased craving) if the container has holes. It is not explained how 
one could plug these holes, although an answer may be inferred that is similar to Plato’s 
portrayal of the same allegory in the Gorgias (493b-c). There leaky souls are possessed by 
people prone to both seeking pleasure and to unintelligence. Increased intelligence (vera 
ratio in Lucretius) would be able to plug such holes. 
 Lucretius resumes this application of the container metaphor in 4.1084-120, which 
warns that desire for love cannot be satisfied. Lucretius contrasts this with the natural and 
necessary pleasure of food and drink: 
 
quae quoniam certas possunt obsidere partis, 
hoc facile expletur laticum frugumque cupido. 
       (4.1092-3) 
Since these [sc. food and drink] can occupy fixed parts, this desire for 
liquid and grain is easily filled up.  
 
The satisfaction of desire is depicted in terms of filling up, which nourishment does literally. In 
contrast, desire for love, consisting only of ‘thin images’ (simulacra […] tenvia – 1095-6), 
cannot fill us up. Within the framework of the ‘filling the container’ metaphor, the reader can 
envisage these images as an insubstantial liquid, dissipating or evaporating without being able 
to increase the sum in the vessel of the soul – a reading aided by the subsequent comparison 
(1097-1100) with a man who cannot quench his thirst simply by dreaming of drink. In liquid 
terms, love is as insubstantial as dreamt-up water, which consists only of mental image films. 
Furthermore, because the pleasure of love is an insubstantial liquid, the more we experience 
it, ‘the more the heart burns with dire desire’ (tam magis ardescit dira cuppedine pectus – 
1090), since it cannot quench the flame.676 Lucretius exploits the stock metaphor ‘love and 
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 Nussbaum (1989) 314 points out that the notion of a banquet also incorporates the concept of an 
‘appropriate termination’ (i.e. boundary) once the meal has finished. 
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 Cf. 6.17-23, in which the vas of the mind contaminates its contents; see Garani (2007) 194-5. 
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 Brown (1987) 75 suggests Lucretius is referring specifically to repeated intercourse with the same 
partner. He also (p.84) notes that sexual thirst is solved by emitting, not taking in, liquid. 
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desire are burning flames’677 for his explanatory purpose, and enhances it with his container 
metaphor to show that the pleasure of love should be avoided.  
 
Binding love 
This doctrine is supported further by the WEAVING thread. Following several examples of 
love’s side-effect in 4.1073-140, Lucretius urges (4.1141-54) the importance of avoiding its 
beginnings, to protect against future pain: 
 
nam vitare, plagas in amoris ne laciamur, 
non ita difficile est quam captum retibus ipsis 
exire et validos Veneris perrumpere nodos. 
et tamen implicitus quoque possis inque peditus 
effugere infestum, nisi tute tibi obvius obstes  1150 
       (4.1146-1150) 
For to avoid being lured into the nets of love is not so difficult as it is to 
get out, having been captured in the nets themselves, and to break 
through the strong knots of Venus. And nevertheless you can also, 
having become entwined and entangled, escape from danger, unless 
you stand in your own way […] 
 
The image of net hunting is common in an erotic context in ancient literature,678 and 
Lucretius exploits it as part of his WEAVING thread. Love is portrayed as a bodily substance 
consisting of ‘strong knots’, which entangle a love-struck man. However, it is, ‘unless you 
stand in your own way’ (4.1150), possible to escape – perhaps by untying love’s knots and 
bonds, and freeing the mind. If this fails, men in love, ‘blind with desire’ (cupidine caeca – 
1153) start to overlook obvious faults in the object of their desire (1153-4) – impinging on 
their ability to make reasoned, logical decisions.679 Erotic desire is a restricting force, binding 
the mind, and preventing the application of necessary reason to the emotions. Elsewhere, as 
the Epilogue to this thesis will consider, religio and general fear also bind the minds of men. 
These are especially harmful, and by association so is amatory desire. Also, because religio 
and fear can be overcome by ratio, this type of desire can too. By spotting this association 
between fear and amatory or sexual pleasure, the keen reader might be dissuaded more 
strongly from such pleasures. 
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 Cf. e.g. Sappho 31 (imitated by Catull. 51 and Hor. Carm. 1.13); Hor. Carm. 1.19; Verg., Aen. 4.2; and 
the extended fire metaphor in Lucretius’ vignette on the Trojan war, which began with ‘fire enflamed 
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 In particular in epigram; Kenney (1970); Brown (1987) 134-5 (on this passage). 
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are depicted in terms of clear vision and light); Anderson (1960) 3-4; Lehoux (2013) 139-46. 
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 Men are also susceptible to purposeful ensnarement by their lovers. Following the 
famous passage cataloguing various false qualities ascribed by men to their lovers (4.1155-
70), Lucretius states (4.1171-91) that all women have faults, and men should realise they 
have put them on pedestals. This is difficult, however, since women purposely mask their 
faults ‘from those who they want to hold down and be bound up in love’ (quos retinere volunt 
adstrictosque esse in amore – 1187). These lovers are pointedly called Veneres (1185), 
suggesting they can bind men as Venus does, with the same results. Until now, love’s effect 
on men alone has been discussed, but women are also susceptible to being bound, in cases 
when they feel genuine pleasure during sexual intercourse:  
 
nonne vides etiam quos mutua saepe voluptas 
vinxit, ut in vinclis communibus excrucientur? 
       (4.1201-2) 
Do you not also see that often those who mutual pleasure has bound 
are tortured in shared bonds?  
 
The weaving metaphor is extended from hunting to torture as Lucretius argues that pleasure 
in sexual desire restricts and causes pain for both men and women.680 Interestingly, this is 
supported by an example of dogs unable to part at the crossroads because ‘they cling in the 
strong joinings of Venus’ (validis Veneris compagibus haerent – 1205). This would not happen 
‘if they could not experience the mutual joys which could entice them into a trap and hold 
them in bonds’ (nisi mutua gaudia nossent / quae lacere in fraudem possent vinctosque 
tenere – 1206-7). This image, recalling the hunting image of 1146-50, reiterates and 
universalises the power of Venus, showing her to govern both humans and animals, as in the 
Book 1 prologue. The keen reader can resist her power if, guided by the WEAVING thread, they 
recall the importance of avoiding such bonds and subsequent pain, and employ their ratio to 
avoid the beginnings of love.  
 The description of love in terms of ‘binding’ and ‘tying’ was commonplace in Latin,681 
embodying the immobility of those who are stricken or the nefarious work of those seducing 
                                                          
680
 See Brown (1987) ad 1202, who notes the metaphor and its application in relation to love in 
comedy and Catullus. 
681
 The image is popular in the Elegists, e.g. Tibullus (me retinent vinctum formosae vincla puellae – 
1.55) and Propertius, whose description of his relationship with Cynthia as servitio (1.4.4, 1.12.18) 
recalls Lucretius’ vincla. Horace exploits the commonplace in the gentle mocking of a love-struck youth 
in Odes 1.27.23-4 (vix inligatum te triformi / Pegasus expediet Chimaera – where expediet denotes the 
opposite process to inpeditus in DRN 4.1149), and the positive experience of being bound by Myrtale’s 
‘pleasing fetters’ (grata compede) in Odes 1.33.14. Cf. vincio with Venus in Plaut. Trin. 658, and amor 
in Stat. Theb. 2.366, Silv. 3.3.109; and Cic. Cael. 44-5, which argues against lovers holding Caelius 
‘entangled’ (impeditum). 
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others. The connotations of the WEAVING thread in Lucretius’ materialist philosophy give his 
use of the image special relevance. By describing one experiencing love as being ‘bound’ or 
‘tied up’, Lucretius invites his reader to consider love in bodily terms. This is supported by the 
specific terminology used. Love is described as consisting of nodi and vincla, and the man as 
inpeditus in its bonds – terms elsewhere used to describe tight atomic cohesion (nodi and 
vincla together describe the solid structure of metals in 6.356).682 From these 
correspondences, the reader might recall that the more intertwined two substances are (like, 
for example, the body and soul), the more difficult it is to extricate them. Thus love, as 
depicted in 4.1146-50, restricts man tightly. The reader is also aware, however, that all 
woven substances are essentially fragile and prone to being untied – suggesting that it is 
possible to extricate oneself from love, as Lucretius advises in 4.1149-50. Presumably the 
vera ratio of Epicureanism makes this possible. Lucretius, by directing the reader to view the 
commonplace of binding love through the prism of his atomic weaving metaphor, might help 
them overcome their desires.  
 
  
                                                          
682
 Compare also the vitalis nodi conjoining body and soul in 2.950; the nodi of ice in 6.87; anima and 
animus described as ‘bound’ (vincti – 3.415); the vinclum of life (3.599); the Earth ‘bound’ (revincta) to 
the atmosphere (5.553); the vincla of magnetic attraction (6.915) and, analogously, glue (6.1071). 
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Epilogue 
 
The Broader Application of Lucretius’ Threads 
 
This thesis has proved the conceptual threads’ breadth and importance in explaining the key 
theories of Lucretius’ science. The threads are applied first to fundamental processes, in 
particular at an atomic level, before being expanded to explain complex concepts on a 
macroscopic level, where they activate the reader’s knowledge of the underlying 
fundamental processes. These processes are thus shown to be universal. The threads also 
contribute to the process of forming scientific theories, especially in Book 6. Here Lucretius 
shows his reader how to apply their knowledge of the threads to understand apparently 
miraculous or inexplicable phenomena, without reverting to religio. By this approach, a 
reliable proof based on known facts and established principles can be created. The reader, 
having been shown this methodology, can form their own proofs of any further difficult to 
explain events or phenomena not covered in the DRN. Therefore, the epic can be seen as a 
training manual for how to understand the world in Epicurean terms, and the threads play a 
crucial role here. The conclusion of this thesis, rather than simply summarising the 
arguments of Parts 1 to 3, will consider further aspects of how the threads support Lucretius’ 
methodological approach – in terms of composition, his ethical theory and the consolation of 
the DRN.  
 
The threads and composition 
Lucretius’ threads express two main aspects of composition: the persuasive power of poetry 
(expressed by the PLEASURE thread),683 and the method of forming arguments (expressed by 
the WEAVING thread). These will be considered in turn here. The importance of persuasion in 
the DRN is expressed in the methodological digression of 1.921-50. The ‘sweet love of the 
Muses’ (suavem […] amorem / Musarum – 1.924-5) drives Lucretius to portray his philosophy 
in ‘sweet-speaking song’ (suaviloquenti / carmine – 1.945-6)684 – a phrase suggesting the 
pleasurable and persuasive aspects of his poetry.685 The sweetness of Lucretius’ exposition is 
embodied by the honey placed round the cup of medicine in the accompanying analogy 
(1.936-42): the pleasing taste of honey (= poetry) persuades children (= Lucretius’ reader) to 
                                                          
683
 See Volk (2002) 96-9. 
684
 We also recall Lucretius’ wish that Venus persuade Mars: suavis ex ore loquellas / funde (39-40). 
685
 For the linguistic resonance between suavis and suadeo, see n.77. 
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drink medicine (= Lucretius’ philosophy) by masking its bitterness686. Lucretius echoes this 
methodological approach later by promising that his ‘sweet tongue’ (lingua […] suavis – 
1.413) will pour forth ‘copious draughts from great springs’ (1.412), and later by asserting 
that the speed of vision films will be described ‘with sweet-speaking verses’ (suavidicis […] 
versibus – 4.180).687 Pleasing poetry supports Lucretius’ philosophical exposition.  
 It also provides the kind of pleasure valued by Epicureans, an example of which is 
given in Book 2: instead of wealth and luxury,688 sufficient, natural pleasure can be gained by 
lying in a meadow by a stream ‘especially when the weather laughs’ (praesertim cum 
tempestas adridet – 32). Early man found pleasure in this before they were corrupted by envy 
and greed (5.1392-6, which repeat 2.29-33 almost verbatim). As the act itself provides 
pleasure for man, so the image provides pleasure for Lucretius’ reader, as do several similar 
images in the DRN. Among these are the depiction of Venus’ arrival in the Book 1 prologue 
(tibi rident aequora ponti / placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum – 1.8-9), designed to 
entice the reader to learn (or perhaps ‘swallow’) Epicureanism. The pleasant weather in the 
gods’ abode is portrayed similarly in the Book 3 prologue (large diffuso lumine ridet – 22).689 
The PLEASURE thread exhibits Lucretius’ poetry as a source of pleasure, both in itself and in the 
pleasure that can be gained from accepting Epicurean philosophy.690 The pleasure Lucretius 
gains from poetic composition (iuvat integros accedere fontis / atque haurire, iuvatque novos 
decerpere flores – 927-8) is passed onto the reader. 
 Poetry can of course persuade of falsehoods, and so Lucretius stresses throughout 
the DRN the truth of his philosophy.691 Without ratio, which is required to facilitate correct 
persuasion, poetry can be misguided, even harmful. Lucretius’ reader must not be duped like 
Heraclitus’ followers (1.635-44), who are similarly attracted to pleasing poetic style.692 
                                                          
686
 Epicureans believed that philosophy should have medicinal qualities, as Nussbaum (1986) observes. 
687
 Shortly after occurs a delightful depiction of stars reflected in the sea: extemplo caelo stellante 
serena / sidera respondent in aqua radiantia mundi (4.212-3). 
688
 Epicureans connected the pursuit of wealth with the (harmful) fear of death, and believed that both 
should be avoided equally strenuously, as Konstan (2008) 27-77 observes.  
689
 Implying that the man relaxing by the stream is enjoying pleasure worthy of the gods (cf. 3.322). 
690
 Similar pleasing images include the theatre awning (esp. omnia conrident correpta luce diei – 4.83) 
and the peacock’s beauty (aurea pavonum ridenti imbuta lepore – 2.502). Of course, not all Lucretian 
imagery is pleasant. As West (1969) 37 points out, Lucretius provides unpalatable examples with equal 
enthusiasm, such as 4.679-80: mellis apes quamvis longe ducuntur odore, / volturiique cadaveribus. In 
such cases some ‘honey’ of pleasing imagery is often provided as an accompaniment (literally in the 
case of 4.679). 
691
 E.g. 4.907-15 (of which 909-11 repeat 4.180-2, including suavidicis versibus, verbatim), which ask 
the reader to pay attention to and accept Lucretius’ vera […] dicta (914); and 5.108 which urges, ‘let 
reason rather than the fact itself persuade’ (ratio potius quam res persuadeat ipsa). 
692
 West (1969) 26 notes the malice in this description, but not the similarity to Lucretius’ own poetic 
style. The difference is that Heraclitus’ philosophy is ‘dyed with charming sound’ (1.641), whereas 
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Heraclitus’ poetry masks untrue philosophy, and so his unintelligent followers (stolidi – 641) 
are not only tricked (like the children in Lucretius’ analogy) but gravely so. They err by seeking 
pleasing-sounding words instead of the truth (640);693 Lucretius offers his reader both vera 
ratio and pleasing imagery.  
 Lucretius’ methods of deduction and exposition, essential to his persuasive strategy, 
are portrayed by the WEAVING thread. This is appropriate, since several weaving terms are 
applied to reasoning and argumentation in both Greek and Latin.694 In addition, it is well 
established that ancient authors, particularly Homer and the Greek lyric poets, associate 
poetry (or song) with weaving.695 This connection is enabled by multiple etymological and 
semantic links between weaving and singing,696 which may reflect the physical similarities 
between the lyre and the loom,697 or more likely the singing that accompanies weaving in 
several cultures.698 Lucretius aptly exploits these metaphors to depict his methodology, 
composition and presentation of arguments.699 
 Part 1 outlined that Lucretius describes his approach in the Book 1 prologue in terms 
of ‘disentangling’ and ‘separating out’ the facts of things (expressed by dispono, dissero and 
pando).700 Directly after the prologue Lucretius marks the start of his ‘warp of discourse’ 
(exordia – 1.149)701. Together the terms introduced here describe Lucretius’ methodology of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Lucretius’ is like honey on the rim of a cup of medicine, affecting the content only at the point of 
tasting. 
693
 The principal thrust of Lucretius’ attack, as Marković (2009) 102 argues. Mitsis (1993) 111-15 notes 
that Lucretius’ reader in 1.931-50 is less a consenting adult actively pursuing a cure, and more a 
passive (indeed child-like) patient receiving necessary treatment. 
694
 Snyder (1981) 193-4 considers weaving terms applied to intellectual processes in Homer. In Latin cf. 
e.g. implico in Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.97, and contexo in Cic. Fin. 5.83 (denoting logical connection). For 
weaving terminology in verbal composition, cf. e.g. Cic. Orat. 140 (necto of joining words together) and 
195 (vinctus and dissolutus of rhythmic ordering), De Or. 3.176; Ov. Pont. 4.2.30 (necto of combining 
words and numbers); Quint. Inst. 9.4.13, (textus of the ‘fabric’ made by conjoining words); and 
especially Sen. Ep. 45.5 (nectimus nodos et ambiguam significationem verbis inligamus ac deinde 
dissolvimus). Norman (2006) considers weaving as a means of communication in itself. 
695
 Snyder (1981) 195-6 notes Kalypso and Circe singing while weaving (Hom. Od. 5.59-62; 10.220-23, 
226-28, 254-5); Sappho’s use of κρέκειν (often ‘to pass the shuttle through the loom’) to describe the 
‘striking’ of lyre strings (fr.99 Lobel & Page (1955)); the ‘woven word’ in Callimachus (Aetia 26.5 Try.); 
and the ‘woven’ songs in Pind. Nem. 4.44-6 and Bacchyl. 5 and 19. See further Tuck (2006) 539-40, 
546; Nagy (1996b) 61-78 and (2002) 70-98.  
696
 Snyder (1981) 193-6; Scheid & Svenbro (1996) 112; Tuck (2006) 546. 
697
 Yates (1875); Snyder (1981) 194-5. Tuck (2006) 546 dismisses this interpretation, since attestations 
of the ‘weaving song’ metaphor in Indo-European languages predate the invention of the loom. 
698
 As metrical mnemonics to recall complex patterns; Tuck (2006).  
699
 Snyder (1983) provides a useful introduction. 
700
 pp.34-5. 
701
 OLD, exordium 1. West (1969) 80-2 notes the metaphor; as does Snyder (1983) 39, who asserts that 
it embodies ‘the prominence of weaving as a source for imagery in Lucretius (she does, however 
overlook the important correspondences in 1.50-61). The term also frequently denotes an 
introductory passage of a speech or book (OLD, exordium 4); cf. Cic. Inv. 1.20. For weaving and 
beginnings, cf. Nagy (1996b) 62-3 and (2002) 79. 
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untying the facts of things and reweaving them for explanatory purposes. The prominence of 
these metaphors invites the reader to consider Lucretius’ composition in this way throughout 
the epic, and they are reminded when dispono occurs in the same sense in 3.420 and 5.529, 
and when pertexo is used of ‘weaving discourse’ in 1.418 and 6.42. In addition to tying 
together arguments, Lucretius also refers to ‘untying the reasons for things’, expressed by 
various derivations of solvo,702 and by expedio,703 which means ‘to explain’, but also, 
appropriate to the weaving metaphor depicting explanation, ‘to untie’.704 Often the terms 
appear alongside ratio,705 creating a complex metaphor, ‘to untie by reasoning’.  
 Most interestingly, as we have seen, Lucretius also applies the majority of these 
terms (or their cognates) in an atomic context. In particular the persistent sense of dissolvo, 
exsolvo and resolvo – ‘to untie into atomic first-threads’ – would suggest to the reader in this 
context ‘untying visual evidence into its facts or proofs’. The same is true of dispono, which 
denotes first-threads ‘set out’ in their appropriate ordo (1.1027; 5.192, 445), as arguments 
should be, and pertexo, which, although only used by Lucretius of ‘weaving discourse’, recalls 
the large group of derivatives of texo applied to atomic compound structure.706 The weaving 
connotations of expedio are supported by its antoynym impedio, used to denote 
entanglement of first-threads.  
 Such findings support the theory that Lucretius’ composition mirrors his science.707 
Things and the reasons for them can be untied respectively into constituent atoms and 
constituent proofs. Lucretius, by untying things into their shared atoms and processes, 
connects (or ‘ties together’) varied and disparate things with shared reasoning. This is 
appropriate, because atoms create new things when rewoven together, just as new 
arguments are created by reweaving existing evidence and knowledge. This embodies the 
role of the rhapsoidos, ‘the re-sewer of the song’, who ‘sews together’ existing music to 
create new works708 – as Lucretius re-sews the obscura reperta (1.136) of the Greeks into 
Latin. Lucretius achieves this in particular by his conceptual threads. These threads represent 
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 Four in all: exsolvo – 2.381; resolvo – 5.773; dissolvo – 4.500; 6.46. 
703
 13 in all: 1.499; 2.66, 183; 4.634, 931; 5.77, 113; 6.245, 497, 641, 682, 739, 1093.  
704
 OLD, expedio 4, ‘to give an account of, explain, expound’. See n.256 on its weaving sense and its 
antonym impedio. 
705
 2.381, 4.500 and 5.773 with derivations of solvo; 1.499, 5.113, 6.641 and 6.1093 with expedio. 
706
 See n.255. Garani (2007) 182 remarks, ‘[…] everything, even the poem itself, is seen as a small piece 
of the cosmic fabric (e.g. pertexere dictis / “weaving the web of discourse,” 1.418)’. 
707
 For this view, see Thury (1987); Schiesaro (1994); Volk (2002) 100-5. See Snyder (1983); Gale (2004) 
58; and Garani (2007) 182 on the weaving metaphor in this context. Hendren (2012) even suggests (at 
times tenuously) that Lucretius’ alliteration is analogous with atomic interweaving. 
708
 Nagy (1996a) 85-6. 
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composite theories – the atoms of his argument – which are shared by several wider 
concepts. Lucretius’ materialist philosophy is even evident in his exposition itself. 
 The ordering of Lucretius’ threads is crucial to his argument – in particular with 
respect to their metaphorical and literal applications. This was considered especially in the 
analysis of the LIFE-CYCLE thread in Part 2 Section A. Occasionally both applications occur in 
one passage, for example 1.159-73, where the fixed birth of living things from fixed mothers 
and the fixed ‘birth’ of all things from fixed ‘mother-substance’ are juxtaposed. Our 
knowledge of the realities of birth supports the existence of fixed first-bodies, which in turn 
explains why birth as we know it is fixed. More often only a metaphorical or a literal 
application occurs, but in such cases whichever is used recalls the other. Therefore, when 
atoms are said metaphorically to ‘give birth’ to things, the reader recalls restrictions of real-
life birth. Similarly, when heredity and successful conception are discussed in terms of seeds 
and their ratios (4.1209-62), the reader recalls the established metaphor of fixed things being 
‘born’ from varying ratios of atomic ‘seed’ (in both cases semina is used, strengthening the 
intended connection). It is unnecessary for Lucretius to mention atoms or their processes in 
the latter passage. Instead he relies on the reader’s understanding of the LIFE-CYCLE thread to 
activate the metaphor from its atomic context. The complex interplay between the literal 
and the metaphorical in Lucretius’ scientific explanations has implications for the 
interpretation of his ethical philosophy, which will be addressed shortly. For now, further 
instances will be considered of the threads’ role in depicting one aspect of Lucretius’ ethics: 
his theory of emotions. 
 
Emotion, religio and ratio 
We have already seen that Lucretius’ threads express aspects of his ethics. He places great 
importance on the clear understanding of his BOUNDARIES thread, which can help to dispel 
fear (see pp.111-2). A complex intertwining of the BOUNDARIES, PLEASURE and LIQUIDS threads, 
expressing the limit to which pleasure can ‘fill us up’, helps to prevent the pursuit of 
unnecessary pleasure (see pp.216-9). In a convergence of the PLEASURE and WEAVING threads, 
an understanding of the physical process of ‘binding’ by love can help us avoid its harmful 
consequences (see pp.219-21). Such aspects of ethics are based on, or are used to support, 
fundamental theories depicted by the threads.  
 The third of these fits within an important metaphor of Lucretius’ ethical theory, 
which depicts other emotions, via the WEAVING thread, in terms of restriction by binding. In 
the Book 2 prologue, Lucretius argues that only ratio can dispel men’s fear, denying that the 
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sight of warfare might make fear flee ‘and the terrors of death leave the breast empty and 
untied from care’ (mortisque timores / tum vacuum pectus linquunt curaque solutum – 45-
6).709 Rather, only vera ratio can have this effect, as expressed in the discourse against the 
fear of death (3.830-1094). Lucretius expresses regret that mourners, lamenting the 
deceased being robbed of life’s rewards, neglect to say he will have no craving for such things 
(894-901). If they understood this, Lucretius says, ‘they would untie themselves from great 
anguish and fear of mind’ (dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque – 903). In both cases 
the emotions are cripplingly binding, and only the vera ratio of Epicureanism can untie the 
bonds.710 
 Something else that binds the mind is religio. In the methodological explanation of 
1.921-50 (repeated almost verbatim at 4.1-25), among the rationale for choosing poetry to 
present scientific discourse, Lucretius explains that he deserves to be crowned by the Muses 
not only for his poetry (933-4), but also ‘because I teach great subjects and proceed to untie 
the mind from the tight knots of superstition’ (quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis / 
religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo – 931-2). The philanthropic cause of freeing man 
from care, although perhaps an unusual criterion for being crowned by the Muses, is central 
to Lucretius’ poetic purpose. The image of untying suggests Lucretius saw an etymological 
link between religio and religo, ‘to bind’711 – perhaps amending a more positive construal of 
religio as a ‘bond of piety’ (suggested by votis nectere vota, ‘to weave vows with vows’ – 
albeit denoting an impious religious ceremony – in 5.1202).712 While Lucretius’ ratio unties 
the reasons for things, in contrast religio binds our minds, restricting our ratio.713 
Furthermore, since the WEAVING thread depicts the emotions and religio in the same way 
(they restrict the mind, but can be ‘untied’ by ratio), religio appears akin to an emotion and, 
depending on the degree to which one considers the emotions to be incompatible with 
reasoning,714 an obstacle to vera ratio. This constitutes a fervent dismissal of the logical 
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 Sleep can have the same effect. It ‘unties cares from the breast’ (curas e pectore solvat – 4.908), 
although this, unlike ratio, provides only temporary relief. 
710
 For Plato (Phd. 83a1-5), philosophy can untie the soul from its bonds with the body; for Lucretius, 
philosophy frees the mind from the bonds of fear or emotion. See Pender (2000) 179-80. 
711
 A theory advocated particularly by Springer (1977) 57 including n.12, which lists Roman authors 
who drew this etymological link.  
712
 See also Lactantius, who rejects Cicero’s view that religio was linked to relego (4.28.3, 4.28.12). 
Instead, diximus nomen religionis a vincula pietatis esse deductum, quod hominem sibi deus 
religaverit. He paraphrases Lucretius 1.932 in support: qui ait religionum se nodos solvere; Maltby 
(1991) s. v. religio. 
713
 Lucretius dismisses all religio as harmful, while Epicurus allowed for participation in cult and 
sacrifice, as long as an Epicurean detachment was maintained; see Summers (1995).  
714
 Aristotle, for example, states that emotional arguments (pathos) – one of three principal forms of 
persuasion (Rh. 1.2, 1356a1-4, 1356a14-15) – cause changes of opinion by affecting judgement (Rh. 
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credentials of religio reminiscent to the modern reader of Richard Dawkins’ forthright belief 
that religion and reasoning are mutually exclusive.715 
 Interestingly, the WEAVING thread’s most consistent application in the DRN – to atomic 
bonding and dissolution – supports this aspect of Lucretius’ ethical theory. Since ‘woven’ 
atomic bonding forms the fabric of the universe, it must also form the make-up of the mind 
and its emotions and fears. The WEAVING thread, by drawing a correspondence between 
emotions and atomic interaction, roots the emotions in the physical rather than the 
metaphysical. The reader who tracks the thread here might comprehend more clearly the 
physical processes underlying the emotions and religio. By this understanding, this ratio, the 
reader might be able to untie the bonds restricting the mind, and approach a life free from 
care and worthy of the gods. 
 
The threads and consolation 
We have seen that specific applications of the conceptual threads express aspects of 
Lucretius’ ethical doctrine (limited pleasure, the untying of emotions, etc.). In addition, 
Lucretius’ method of setting out and developing the threads supports his quest to rid man of 
fear. This is unsurprising, since the threads are essential to Lucretius’ explanatory approach, 
and dispelling fear is the principal moral aim of the epic.716 Furthermore, the threads help the 
reader to memorise doctrines,717 and thus to understand the shared processes underlying 
things. Understanding the physical realities of the world is, for Lucretius, consolatory in itself. 
He argues in the Book 1 prologue that fear can be dispelled only through Naturae species 
ratioque (148) – the appearance and reasoning of Nature, but also our reasoning in 
interpreting it, to understand quid possit oriri, / quid nequeat (75-6) and quae sit natura 
animai (112). Our very understanding of Nature, presented by the threads, will rid us of our 
                                                                                                                                                                       
2.1, 1378a19-20, 24-27). Konstan (2006) argues convincingly that the ancient Greeks believed emotion 
to inform and be informed by judgement. 
715
 Dawkins’ frequent vehement expression of his opinions strongly recalls Lucretius. This is 
encapsulated by the ‘mission statement’ (as of 15
th
 October 2013) of the Richard Dawkins Foundation 
for Reason and Science (founded by Dawkins, 2006): ‘Our mission is to support scientific education, 
critical thinking and evidence-based understanding of the natural world in the quest to overcome 
religious fundamentalism, superstition, intolerance and human suffering’. The foundation’s title and 
its mission express in plain words the dichotomy, as they see it, between ratio (‘Reason’) and religio 
(‘religious […] superstition’), and imply a belief in Naturae species ratioque (= ‘critical thinking and 
evidence-based understanding of the natural world’) and its power to overcome religio. Thus Lucretian 
Epicureanism lives on in the twenty-first century. 
716
 Proved by its prominence in the prologues (1.62-135; 2.37-61; 3.31-93; 4.6-7 (repeated from 1.931-
2); 5.55-90; 6.43-79) – see Cox (1971) – and his ‘mission statement’ (1.931-2). Nussbaum (1994) 13 
notes that Epicurus (Porph. ad Marc. 31 = Usener (1887) fr.221) saw the therapy of the soul as the sine 
qua non of philosophy. 
717
 Clay (1983) 176-86 notes the importance of this to Epicurean exposition.  
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cares. Furthermore it is the inevitability in particular of the universal atomic processes of 
Nature and their outcomes that helps to banish fear.718 The threads, not just in their content, 
but also in their order of exposition, including their alternation between literal and 
metaphorical applications, are central to this ethical purpose. 
 Examples can be recalled from earlier in the thesis. A straightforward one is how the 
BOUNDARIES thread introduces in Book 2 the concept of limited atomic variety (333-729), in 
which Lucretius denies that the best and worst things can be surpassed (500-21). Having 
understood this doctrine, the reader will more readily accept in Book 3 that there are no new 
pleasures awaiting man (1080-6) – because such things are limited by the limits of atomic 
variety. Another example involves the WEAVING thread, which depicts the complex 
intertwining of body and soul in Book 3, and the same physical relationship between the 
Earth and air in Book 5 (534-63). In both cases, the interwoven compound is understood to 
be mortal as a whole. The reader understands the latter, explained in only 30 lines, more 
clearly by recalling the more extensively outlined image of the body and soul in Book 3. 
Together the proofs emphasise the inevitable death awaiting all things – one of the principal 
consolatory aspects of the DRN.  
 This understanding relies in turn upon a more complex and firmly established series 
of proofs expressed by the LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING threads in the first two books. The central 
theory of Epicurean philosophy that death is nothing to us, and therefore should not be 
feared, is difficult for the Epicurean novice to swallow. To overcome fear of death, the reader 
must thoroughly understand the proofs for the soul’s mortality, which in turn depend on the 
established atomic processes governing all things, depicted by the threads. Tracking the LIFE-
CYCLE thread to the end of Book 2, a complex pattern emerges. Lucretius takes literal aspects 
of birth and death from human experience – some of which are depicted in the Venus 
prologue and first arguments – and uses them to create a complex, coherent metaphor of 
birth and death, introduced in 1.50-61 and extended throughout the first two books, in 
relation to atomic union, the creation and destruction of composite bodies, and other related 
processes. The metaphor is so persistently and consistently applied that any small 
congregation of birth or death terms applied to atomic compounds or composite bodies 
recalls the LIFE-CYCLE thread and all it entails. Also, separate macroscopic processes are linked 
together by the thread, universalising Lucretius’ birth-death cycle.  
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 At the start of Book 3 the reader is fully conversant with the concept that all 
composite bodies are ‘born’ from, and ‘die’ into, constituent atoms.719 The description of the 
soul as a composite body in 3.161-257 activates the reader’s knowledge of the LIFE-CYCLE 
thread, from which they can infer that the soul undergoes the same processes of birth and 
death as all composite things. When Lucretius describes the soul as nativus and mortalis 
(3.417) and (through words such as mors, pereo, interemo etc.) as dying with the body, the 
reader should recall how things are born from and die into atoms, and so reduce the 
terrifying concept of human mortality to the simple joining and separating of atoms. 
Lucretius, having carefully established an extensive metaphor on a foundation of literal, real-
life concepts, now reverses the relationship: the literal death of the human body is 
comprehended in terms of metaphorical death at an atomic level. Thus we are shown to be 
simply a part of the inexorable cycle of birth and death. As Lucretius says, ‘mother-substance 
is required so the next generations can grow’ (3.967): we should accept death when it is our 
time, to allow rebirth.720 With the help of the LIFE-CYCLE thread, Lucretian atomism is the 
primary form of consolation in Book 3.721  
 The WEAVING thread also plays an important role here. The death of things is defined 
in the Book 1 prologue and first arguments as ‘untying’ into constituent atomic ‘first-threads’ 
– a metaphor supported by the consistent depiction of the ‘woven texture’ of things, in 
which the woven connections are the very points at which death occurs. Thus a mention of 
death should activate the metaphor of unweaving in the reader’s mind, while unweaving or 
even a reference to ‘woven texture’ should suggest mortality. In Book 3 Lucretius presents a 
carefully-drawn image of the woven soul, and its woven relationship with the body. These 
images (in fact introduced in 1.696-7, 811; and 2.947-53) activate the reader’s knowledge of 
the WEAVING thread, and its interaction with the death strand of the LIFE-CYCLE thread to 
portray mortality. When the soul’s departure and dissolution at death is explained in terms 
of unweaving later in Book 3, the theory is strengthened by the foundation already provided 
by the intertwined LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING threads. The fundamental atomic processes these 
threads depict desensitise the reader to death, and this is supported by the application of the 
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‘unweaving’ metaphor to bodily shocks, diseases and even sleep (see pp.192-3), which hints 
at the precariousness of human existence. The reader is invited to view death as an 
inevitable part of life, which is itself as fragile as a cloth is prone to unravelling. The reader 
who has understood the intertwined LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING threads will more readily accept 
the soul’s mortality. Here the metaphorical (unweaving) and the literal (human mortality) 
intertwine to enhance the consolatory aspects of Book 3.  
 The fragility of life is supported further by the intertwined LIQUIDS and BOUNDARIES 
threads in the ‘bodily container’ metaphor. In the first two books Lucretius outlines the key 
theories of free movement through the void, which is portrayed in terms of pouring liquids, 
and of bodily containers, by which one substance can contain void in which another 
substance can move and be situated. The introduction of the soul as situated in the body 
(3.117-29), and moving swiftly and freely like water (3.177-207), activates these earlier 
images. This sets up the explanation that the soul, upon departing the bodily container at 
death, disperses more swiftly than liquid from a shaken vessel (3.425-44). This image is 
supported further by the ‘unweaving’ metaphor, which also denotes separation on 
departure. Again, the atomic processes expressed by the threads in Books 1 and 2 prepare 
the reader in advance to accept the mortality of the soul more readily. 
 The consolatory aspects outlined here persist as the epic progresses. In Book 4, 
understanding the atomic reality behind infertility or failure to conceive prevents the 
common (but futile) recourse to religio for a solution (nequiquam divom numen sortisque 
fatigant – 1239). In Book 5 the depiction of the world’s mortality is supported by 
comparisons with the human body, expressed especially by the LIFE-CYCLE and WEAVING 
threads – again underlining the inevitability of death. In Book 6 Lucretius employs the 
threads to explain certain apparently miraculous meteorological and terrestrial phenomena – 
with the specific aim of denying divine provenance and avoiding recourse to religious 
superstition (and accompanying fear) (43-91, 379-422).722 Lucretius reduces these 
phenomena to the atomic realities underlying them, again activating the reader’s knowledge 
of the threads, in order to dispel fear.723 An interesting example of this explanatory method 
occurs within the exploration of earthquakes (535-607). Men, Lucretius says, ‘are terrified 
that the nature of the earth might untie the caverns below’ (metuunt inferne cavernas / 
terrai ne dissoluat natura repente – 597-8), or that the earth might be ‘drawn apart’ 
(distracta – 599) and seek to consume itself. They are correct that this might happen, since, 
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as the reader is aware from Book 5, the world, as a ‘woven’ composite body, is prone to 
being untied at some point in the future. However, men should not be afraid, because 
unweaving is an inevitable atomic process. Understanding this aspect of Epicurean physics 
should help the reader to consider, and even experience, earthquakes with a calm mind. 
 A connection is also drawn between natural phenomena and the more pressing fear 
of disease. Part 2 Section A considered how Lucretius explains volcanic eruptions as a conflux 
of fire seeds, just as rain occurs when seeds of water congregate in the clouds, and disease 
arises from a congregation of certain disease-bringing seeds.724 The strength of this analogy is 
supported by the extensive comparisons between the world and the human body in Book 5, 
and further by the reader’s understanding of atomic boundaries – i.e. that each variety of 
seed is unlimited in number. Volcanic eruptions and outbreaks of disease are no more 
remarkable, or terrifying, than rain. Lucretius reassures the reader: such things are liable to 
happen to anyone (siquis – 655), by chance at any time (ubi forte – 672), so fear is pointless. 
The consolation for disease provided here is founded upon the preceding explanations for 
other phenomena in Book 6, each of which reemphasises the eternal, inevitable atomic 
processes governing all things. 
 
The plague 
Lucretius extends his explanation of disease further in 6.1090-137. He reiterates that disease 
arises when seeds capable of bringing illness and death congregate. These seeds make the air 
diseased, and this spreads to man either directly or via water and food. This description 
serves as the last reminder of underlying atomic processes before the finale of the plague of 
Athens (1138-286). Here applications of the threads to explain scientific processes are 
strikingly sparse. Instead we encounter a relentless stream of symptoms, vividly and 
disturbingly described, and the fear-ridden desperation of the infected and uninfected alike. 
Lucretius describes in particular fire as a symptom (1145-6, 1163-77), but it is left to the 
reader to infer that this is formed from a congregation of fire seeds. When a term from a 
thread does appear, for example to describe retching, which causes cramps and ‘unties’ 
(dissoluebat – 1162) the limbs, it occurs alone. Nevertheless this should be sufficient for the 
reader to recall the thread and its applications – here the WEAVING thread and atomic 
dissolution. 
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 Unsurprisingly, given the subject matter, the death strand of the LIFE-CYCLE thread is 
predominant in this passage in its literal sense. This is illustrated by the frequency of mors 
and pereo,725 which occur 11 times in the 149 lines of the plague scene (out of 20 instances in 
total in Book 6) at a frequency found nowhere outside Book 3.726 This ties the end of Book 6 
more tightly to Book 3, and its arguments for the soul’s mortality and against the fear of 
death. More specifically, just as the reader is supposed to recall atomic applications of the 
threads in the plague symptoms described by Lucretius, instances of death terminology in 
this passage should again recall that the death of body and soul entails a simple untying into 
constituent first-threads (in accordance with the universal atomic processes outlined in 
Books 1 and 2). Again, as in Book 3, in the depiction of the plague Lucretius reverses the 
correspondence between the literal and the metaphorical, intending his reader to 
understand death from the plague in terms of atomic dissolution. This is not made explicit. 
Instead Lucretius requires his reader to seek out proofs like keen hounds (1.400-17), based 
on their knowledge and understanding of the threads.  
 Our reading supports the common interpretation of the plague passage as a test of 
what the reader has learnt727 – providing a worst-case scenario to which they should apply 
their knowledge of atomic processes and their resistance to fear of death.728 This is 
contrasted with the irrational actions of the Athenians – for example falling into depression 
when struck with the plague (1230-4), and fighting over the pyres (1281-6) – which represent 
the wrong reaction to the situation.729 Those who have overlooked or denied this 
interpretation have assumed that the passage either reveals Lucretius’ doubts and/or 
melancholia,730 or is one of the unfinished parts of the epic.731 However, with this reading the 
passage – assuming the reader does view the plague with a calm mind – succeeds as a 
consolation, and is an appropriate conclusion to the epic. It is not futile for the reader who 
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fails to respond calmly: they can return to the beginning and take consolation from the Venus 
prologue,732 or apply themselves more carefully to understanding Lucretius’ scientific 
explanations and noticing the importance of the threads to his exposition.  
  It may be objected that the reader is not explicitly told to treat the plague as a test. 
However, although Lucretius leaves this unsaid here, it is explicitly outlined in the preceding 
exploration of the magnet (see pp.209-14). Here Lucretius emphasises the importance of 
establishing principles and analogies before understanding difficult concepts (6.917-20). The 
lengthy investigation into magnetism puts this to the test, and is therefore an important 
reminder of Lucretius’ approach of using analogies and the threads to highlight the shared 
universal processes underlying things, and his encouragement of the reader to combine 
established theories to seek their own proofs.733 It is the methodological approach of this 
section, rather than the content per se, that is of greatest importance. The magnet serves as 
the last test-case example before the reader is left to comprehend the plague alone.734 
 
The power of the conceptual threads 
Lucretius’ conceptual threads run throughout the DRN, depicting the fundamental laws and 
processes governing everything from the atomic to the universal level. The threads enable 
Lucretius to link processes together without resorting to overly frequent recapitulations of 
key theories – and the reader should be guided by them to make connections between 
disparate processes. The network the threads form is comprehensive, and within it the 
lifespans of all things, including man and the heavenly bodies, are shown to be insignificant in 
the great, eternal process of atomic movement, combination and dissolution. Together the 
threads lay bare the inner workings of all things – Naturae species ratioque – to show that 
the soul is mortal, and untie the micro- and macroscopic processes that terrify and confuse 
man. This expository method should reassure the reader that their place in this eternal cycle 
is insignificant, and so their fear should be banished for good. This will be possible, if they 
have only understood and swallowed Lucretius’ science and philosophy. The threads unfold 
the reality of nature before the reader, enabling them to see deep into things hidden, and to 
overcome their fears. In this way the conceptual threads, and in particular their metaphorical 
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applications and the images they create, are the honey that makes the reader more inclined 
to swallow Lucretius’ unpalatable philosophy.  
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